

THE IDEA OF PROGRESS IN PHILO JUDAEUS

By
JESSE SCOTT BOUGHTON

*Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy, in the Faculty of Philosophy,
Columbia University.*

New York
1932

Copyright 1932
JESSE SCOTT BOUGHTON

TO
ERNEST FINDLAY SCOTT

CONTENTS

PART I

MATERIALS, METHODS AND MOTIVES OF PHILO AS A THINKER

	Page
Chapter I. Introduction	12
Introduction—12-19 Motives—19-31 Intellectual Background—31-34	
Chapter II. Philo's Allegorism	35
The Alexandrian Setting—35-39 Ecstatic Experiences—39-46 Institutional Background, The Synagogue—46-49 Competition with Gentile Cults and Schools—49-54	
Chapter III. Allegory and the Law	55
The Problem of Exposition—55-58 The Law not a Symbolic Poem—58-67 Lawgiving and Prophecy—67-73 The Divisions of the Torah—73-75 The Law as History, Midrash versus Poetry—75-82 History and Moral Insight—82-86 The Law as Liturgy—87-91 The Law, a Promise—92-95	
Chapter IV. Allegory a Sacrament	96
The Re-living of Revelation—96-98 The Enlightenment Experience—98-102 Summary 102-104	

PART II

THEOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

Chapter V. The Egocentric Predicament	107
Theology not an Academic Study—107 Mind and The Self—107-111 Retrospection versus Introspection—111-113 Ethical Manhood—113-115 Fundamental Dispositions—115-116 Faith—116-118 Grace—119-123 Summary 123-124	
Chapter VI. Ontology	125
God the Object of All Reference—125-126 <i>Onsia</i> —126-128 <i>Onsia</i> and <i>Soma</i> —128-129 First Principles—129-131 General and Particular Ideas—131-132 Atomism 132-134 The Whole-part Relation—134-137 Summary 137-138	
Chapter VII. The Idea of Purity, Harmony	139
The Problem—139-141 Order, Harmony and Quality—141-142 The Theme of Witnessing—142-145 The Disjunctive Relation—145-148 The Hypothetical Relation—148-154 Repentance—154-156 The Relation Involved in Dedication—157-159 The Mercy of God—159-161 The Cosmological Interpretation of God's Oath—162-164 The Spheres—164-167	
Chapter VIII. ΑΠΟΙΟΣ as Betterness	168
God is Better than any Particular Excellence—168 Self Qualification—169-170 Concreteness—170-171 Unity by Free Choice—171-174 Dynamic versus Formal Unity—174-175	

CONTENTS (Concluded)

Chapter IX. Quality an Individual Experience	176
Clarity and Truth—176-177 The Subjective Condition—177-178 Self-Mastery—178 Communication, a Witnessing—179-181 <i>Eulogos</i> —181-182 Reason Like an Oath—182 Self-Testimony and Witnessing—183-184	
Chapter X. Quality and the Vitalistic Good	185
Life is Perfect—185-186 Goodness and Beauty—186 Display versus Care—186-188 The One and The Many—188 Beauty—189-192 Holiness—192-194 Summary—194-195	
Chapter XI. Moral Purity	196
Coordinate and Alternate Opposites—196 The Moral Faculty—196-197 Original Ignorance—197-198	

PART III

TELEOLOGY

Chapter XII. Greek and Hebrew Eudaemonism	201
The Platonic Source—201-202 Immanent Purpose—202-203 Peace—203-205	
Chapter XIII. Traditional and Rational Teleology	206
The two Types of Teleology—206-208 Time and Its Analogues—209-210	
Chapter XIV. Creative Goodness	211
Knowledge of the Good versus Faith in Providence—211-214 The Continuity of Ends—214-216 The Educative Good—216-218 Creation Implies the New—218-219	
Chapter XV. Teleology, Its Sanctioning Insight	220
The Two Modes of One Cause—220 The Intuition of Cause—220-223 The Guiding Presence—223 The Theological Interpretation of the Intuition of Cause—223-224 The Inadequacy of Pantheism—224-225 The Inadequacy of Logic—225-226 The Finality of the Intuition of Cause—226-229	
Chapter XVI. The Status of Reason	230
The Argument from Design—230-231 The Figure of the House—231-233 The Figure of the Oath—233-234 The Wager of Faith—234-236	
Chapter XVII. The Divine Names, <i>Theos</i> and <i>Kurios</i>	237
Yahweh and Elohim—237-239 The Mystery of the Names—239 The Divine Attributes—239-242 The Rise of Reason—242-243 Courage—243-244 Knowing by Training—244-246 Knowing by Revelation—246-248	
Chapter XVIII. The Nous Speculation	249
Creation <i>Ex Nihilo</i> —249 Mind and Measurement—249-251 The Three Images—251-253 The Pythagorean Harmony—254-256 Division—256-258 Logos Tomeus—258-261 Summary—261-262	
Chapter XIX. Conclusion, Conscience	263
Sacred Reason—263-264 Stoic Reason—264-266 Theocracy—266-269 Conscience—269-272 Philonic <i>Zakuth</i> and the Pauline <i>Kurios</i> —272-274 <i>Eulogos</i> —274-275	

PREFACE

~~This~~ This appraisal of the harmony of the religious and philosophical ideas of Philo Judaeus, Brehier has posed the rhetorical question, where can one find elsewhere a philosophy peculiarly appropriate to Judaism? For here a harmony appears to establish itself on the basis of Philosophy, a Philosophy that rests upon certain religious concepts. In the following pages there is proposed an interpretation of the personal faith of the ancient Jewish scholar. The scope of our enterprise is therefore narrower than an exposition of Philonic thought and its historic setting. The attempt to reconcile apparent contradictions that lie on the surface of Philo's rambling exegetical discussions is but a secondary consideration. The center of interest lies in Philo's use of the learning of his day to justify an outlook on life that the Hebrew savant can recommend as reasonable to philosopher, saint and religious devotee.

It is the view of the writer that Philo's extravagant use of the allegorical method of exposition and thought is more than an accident of training and intellectual environment. It lies in the personal character of his message, in that curious mixture of critical candour and buoyant faith, that allegory should be the appropriate medium of his instruction. In Philo the disinterestedness of dialectic has not yet given way to the dogmatism of catechetical instruction. Allegory flourishes as a method of religious education. It performs the functions of an institution of worship, an instructor of conduct and a ritual of initiation. It is therefore inescapably personal whether in its institutional, its dramatic or its intellectual aspects. The hope of eliminating the personal equation from the literary remains of such an enterprise is vain.

It has seemed advisable therefore, to exploit the peculiar opportunities which such a use of allegory offers for glimpses into personal faith even when this must be done at the risk of a prejudiced interpretation. For the purposes of research it seems safer to overestimate the mind of Philo than arbitrarily to subject his offerings to the limitations of an incredulous critic. It is possible in some degree to reconstruct the conditions under which allegor-

ical approximations of new ideas arose by assuming the pupil-teacher relation by which alone Philo hoped that "mysteries" might be understood. The allegories are admittedly, "happy conjectures" but there is a deeply spiritual mind to become acquainted with behind those conjectures.

The central focus of our interpretation of Philo's faith ~~lies~~ in the figure of Israel's pilgrimage from Egypt to the Promised Land. That this tradition even more than the similar tradition of Ulysses and the Odyssey, should come to represent for the Western Mind the idea of progress is perhaps due more to the discipline of Judaism than to the visions of Christianity. Perhaps the contribution of the Hebrew sense for history to a philosophy of progress may become more explicit by indicating the service of Philo in transmitting this contribution.

The text of Cohn and Wendland has been used for the treatises extant in the Greek. Citation is made by the section numbers of that edition of Philo's works. For the treatises not extant in the Greek the Fragments of Philo collected by J. R. Harris and the English translation of C. D. Yonge in the Bohn Library have been used. In addition to these recourse has been had to German translations by Cohn and the English translation by Colson and Whitaker now appearing in the Loeb Classical Library. The use of doubtful treatises has been avoided. A list of abbreviations appears on page 276.

Grateful acknowledgment is made to Dr. Ralph Marcus of Columbia University and The Jewish Institute of Religion for corrections in my manuscript. But far greater than this is the debt I owe to his kindness in making available to me his intimate knowledge of Philo and the whole tradition from which Philonic thought takes its rise. He has been my most valuable critic and guide. To Professor James Everett Frame of Union Theological Seminary, I owe many suggestions arising from his incisive questions. Dr. Raymond T. Stamm of Gettysburg Theological Seminary and Professor H. W. Schneider of Columbia University have offered valuable suggestions, some of which I have adopted. Although not a specialist in the field of New Testament research, Professor Eugene William Lyman of Union Theological Seminary has contributed to this work through his companionable guidance of my study in the field of the Philosophy of Religion.

I am unable adequately to acknowledge my gratitude to Pro-

fessor Ernest Findlay Scott of Union Theological Seminary. He not only introduced me to the work of Philo and guided and encouraged my study but he also introduced me to the meaning and satisfaction of research. Companionship with his rich and penetrating mind has been for me the rarest privilege and the most illuminating experience of what a teacher can mean to a pupil.

To these and others not mentioned by name but who have assisted in my work I acknowledge my debt for what is sound in my interpretation of Philo. Where that interpretation appears unduly speculative the responsibility is mine alone. It should be added that my manuscript in its final form contains some revisions that not all of my first readers have had an opportunity to examine.

Gettysburg,
March 9, 1932.

J. S. BOUGHTON.

PART I

MATERIALS, METHODS AND MOTIVES OF PHILO
AS A THINKER

INTRODUCTION

It was during the same generation in which the Hebrew people produced the founder of Christianity that they also produced their one noteworthy ancient philosopher. Philo of Alexandria was a contemporary of Jesus of Nazareth. His dates lie between the second decade before and the fifth or sixth decades after the opening of the Christian era.

The one public event in his life that is well attested is the embassy that he led on behalf of the Jews of Alexandria when they made appeal to the Roman Emperor Caligula because of the persecutions they were suffering in their home city Alexandria. This was about A. D. 40 and Philo speaks of himself as an old man in his account of that mission. According to Josephus it would appear that Philo was a brother of Alexander, the Alabarch of Alexandria, although Ewald and Zeller think he was an uncle.¹ Jerome's intimation that Philo was of priestly rank is not supported by earlier authorities.

Our Jewish philosopher is sufficiently well placed when we say that he was a member of the most aristocratic and influential family among the Jews of the Dispersion, that he was a citizen of the city which was at once the chief home of his scattered people and the world center of learning, that he was trained in both Greek and Jewish learning and that he was recognized for his profound erudition.

As the most illustrious member of that group of Hellenistic Jews who prepared the way for the Christian catechetical school at Alexandria, Philo contributed much to a heritage of Judeo-Hellenic culture so valuable to the intellectual interests of the early Church. Indeed the relation between Philo and his group and Clement and Origen and their group is perhaps a much closer one than is commonly supposed. Siegfried² has shown how great a debt both Clement and Origen owed to Philo. That Philo may not be separated from the whole movement of religious and phil-

1 Schürer, *Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi*, 3d A. Vol. III, p. 490.

2 Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger des Alten Testaments, 1875, p. 343 sq.

osophic thought that gave to Alexandria so important a place among the early churches in matters of doctrine and of intellectual authority, was recognized at a very early date. The legend of his meeting with St. Peter at Rome during the reign of Claudius, though probably without foundation in fact, serves to echo a frame of mind that testifies both to his prestige and to the mediating position he had earned among Gentiles, Jews and Christians.

Of the consideration enjoyed by Philo in antiquity, Eusebius³ and Josephus⁴ bear witness. No other Jew of those early centuries has been discovered to have so thoroughly mastered the learning of his day. The religious appeal of the profuse writings of this erudite scholar recommended them to the Fathers and the theologians. His works must have provided a veritable mine of materials for the biblical commentator. For the preservation of the bulk of his works however we are probably indebted to their value for devotional reading.

These writings continue to be important to scholars today because they provide access to a point where two great streams of thought come into confluence. In Philo's day and in Philo as a representative of that day, Jewish and Greek thought mingle in preparation for that synthesis later to be known as Christian Theology. Philo's attempt to bring the Jew over to an appreciation of Gentile thought and the Gentile over to the religious faith and reverence of Hebrew tradition provides to us a perspective from both sides.

Schürer is impressed by the evidence of Philo's influence upon succeeding generations. He mentions as drawing upon Philo, directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, such widely separated minds as pagan Neo-Platonists, New Testament writers, the Greek Fathers, Apologists as well as Alexandrians, the Gnostics as well as their adversaries and finally the Rabbis. The least that can be said is that Philo stands close to the rise of a many-sided movement of thought produced by the fusion of several Mediterranean cultures in Alexandria during the early days when Philo labored there.

The degree to which Philo gives direction to this movement rather than passively reflecting its early characteristics should be

3 H. E., II, 4. 3.

4 Ant., XVIII, 8.1.

determined by an analysis of his thought. But unfortunately, analyses of that thought have not met with that degree of success which could suggest a personality behind the writings which is convincingly congruous with Philo's ancient prestige. Too much of the impatience of investigators with his intricate allegorical and exegetical methods comes to attach itself to an evaluation of the mind behind the confusing literary remains. As just as this impatience may be, it operates to obscure the cogency of thought once important enough to have been borrowed. The circumstances of literary difficulty have too largely hidden the religious simplicity of the man. In the interest of some particular interpretation of his words it has become necessary for the investigator to impute motives and to ascribe purposes often contradictory to the warm fervor of faith which breathes through all the work of the Jewish scholar. We shall mention a few representative evaluations of Philo as a thinker.⁵

Dähne treats him with contempt charging that he robs the human race of its God. Caird⁶ values him chiefly as representative of a point from which the bifurcation of ideas may be observed to diverge. He holds that Philo had no conception of an historical process of evolution and objects that his world is regarded as related to God but not God to the world. Vacherot emphasizes the inconsistency of borrowing now from Plato and now from the Stoics, the result being an incoherent syncretism dragged into the service of Judaism.

Siegfried is impressed by his complete abandonment of the old Jewish religion which nevertheless he affects to defend in words.

"No Jewish writer ever contributed so much to the dissolution of Judaism. The history of his people becomes in his hands mainly a didactic poem, by which he inculcates the doctrine that man attains to the vision of God by mortifying the flesh. The God of Philo was an imaginary Being, who in order to gain power over the world, had need of a Logos, to whom the palladium of Israel, the unity of God was sacrificed."⁷

5 A review of changing estimates of Philo's thought including medieval criticism is made by Billings in *The Platonism of Philo Judaeus*, ch. I. See also W. R. Inge's articles on Alexandrian Theology, *Hastings Enc. of Rel. and Ethics*.

6 *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, 1904.

7 Siegfried, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

Drummond⁸ is perhaps inclined to analyze out of Philo his own peculiar stamp upon ideas by tracing them through Philo to remote sources. Zeller,⁹ who in the opinion of Schürer, has given us the best exposition of Philo's doctrine, thinks his whole system vitiated by a fundamental contradiction. This is the attempt to achieve union with a Being whose very notion makes such a union impossible. Such a scheme could be the creation only of a consciousness at discord with itself and the world.

W. R. Inge with a deeper sympathy for the Jewish philosopher says,

"No sane critic could place Philo in the same rank with a great original thinker like Plotinus but the unfavorable estimates of him have proceeded mostly from critics who extend their condemnations to the school of Plato generally, in the interest of some rival system.

"The 'inconsistencies' which have been freely attributed to Philo are mainly the difficulties which all who believe in a God at once transcendent and immanent, must be prepared to face, though some of them are mere misunderstandings due to an unsympathetic and sometimes superficial study of his writings. His belief in the possibility of immediate communion with 'The First God' in visions is a result of personal experience. He describes, modestly and clearly 'what has happened to himself a thousand times'. In the face of this passage it is difficult to maintain that in Philo, 'God is not related to the world' or with Dähne, that he 'robs the human race of their God'."

While these various estimates of Philo's thought make it appear that there is no closely knit system of doctrine in Philo, there have been attempts to identify him with one or another of the schools. Thus Zeller and Heinze stress his leanings toward Stoicism while Stein and Billings emphasize his Platonism. Says Schürer, "His system may on the whole be entitled an eclectic one, Platonic, Stoic and Neo-Pythagorean doctrines being the most prominent".

In the proverb "either Plato Philonises or Philo Platonises" the ancient classification of Philo is evident. But Clement of Alexandria calls him a Pythagorean and that in the two passages in which he characterizes Philo's philosophic tendency.¹⁰ Sozomenus

8 Philo Judaeus, 2 vols., 1888.

9 Die Philosophie der Griechen, III, 2 pp., 338-418, 1881.

10 Strom., I, 15, 72.

also calls him a Pythagorean.¹¹ Eusebius indicates both his Platonism and his Pythagoreanism.¹²

Siegfried and Billings among others have called attention to literary parallels that indicate Philo's direct knowledge of the works of Plato. Parallels with other writers are also evident. But it is not necessary to suppose that Philo's wide and varied learning is gained by direct access to the works of each philosopher. It is more probable that contemporary compendiums of the teachings of the various schools formed the bulk of the materials of Philo's study.

As one such compendium of Greek philosophy, the writings of the eclectic Posidonius may be mentioned. A group of German scholars have tended to regard Philo's writings as a reproduction of the doctrines of this Platonizing Stoic who taught at Rhodes. Mathilda Apelt¹³ traces to Posidonius the doctrines of Philo that can be grouped under the name of mysticism. We should distinguish however, the "rhetorical syncretism" which Strabo condemns in Posidonius from the homiletic and Haggadic method of Philo. In the Hellenistic tradition this distinction goes back to the difference between Zeno and Antisthenes, the *diatribe* and the *chreia*. It is clear in the constructive Plato when he satirizes pedantic allegorists. It marks a difference between the critical Panaetius and the imaginative Posidonius.

Stoic proof by citation must not be confused with Jewish exegesis by inference from precedent. Philo himself makes the distinction in a treatise that abounds in Posidonian parallels.¹⁴ The figure of testimony in a court is significant. He disparages proof by mere weight of citation in favor of the skillful arrangement of testimony about a given case.

Apelt's collection of parallels with Posidonius suggests a source of materials which Philo uses for the phrasing and illustrating of his meaning. But the essential Judaism of Philo is not therefore to be discounted anymore than the Christian thesis in Clement and Origen is to be subordinated to their Jewish and Greek vocabulary of ideas.

11 H. E., I, 12.

12 H. E., II, 4.3.

13 De Rationibus Quibusdam quae Philoni Alexandrino cum Posidonio Intercedunt.

14 Plant. 173. ἐντέχνους ἀποδείξουσιν versus ἀτέχνους λεγομένοις. cf. Aristotle, Rhet. I, 2, 2:15, 1.

It is even a bit aside from the point to observe with Billings that

"it is not sufficient proof of the Posidonian origin of a special doctrine to show parallels between, for example, Seneca and Philo and declare that both draw from Posidonius." (Billings, *The Platonism of Philo Judaeus*, p. 9).

The interest of a reader should be directed to the use which Philo makes of borrowed materials. Apelt (p. 101) has observed that Philo in employing incompatible phrasings for a doctrine must be aiming at some central significance. Posidonian mysticism can scarcely be set up as a clear enough unit of doctrine by which Philo's allegories may become intelligently readable.

There is no reason to believe that the orthodoxy of Philo was suspect in the eyes of his Jewish contemporaries. Nor was he a sufficiently unusual phenomenon within Judaism to arouse significant comment among Rabbis of succeeding generations. It is to the Christians that his importance has appeared and because of this he has been appraised by aliens until a very recent date. And such appraisal has often assumed the validity of an account of Jewish theology derived from non-Jewish critics from the ancient Gregory of Nyssa¹⁵ to the modern Weber.¹⁶

The intellectual frustration of Philo's Gentile contemporaries took no significant hold upon the Rabbis. Says Schechter (*Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, p. 24).

" . . . to the Rabbis and their followers the revelation at Sinai and all that it implies was to them not a mere reminiscence or tradition, but that which through their intense faith they re-witnessed in their own soul, so that it became to them a personal experience. Indeed, it is this witnessing or rather re-witnessing, to revelation by which God is God; without it He could not be God".

Says Brett,

"In spite of the lofty aspirations of Plato and the equally lofty

15 *Contra Eunomium*, IX, 1. Philo is identified with "the new Judaism" and a heretical doctrine of the Godhead is scored as the "reasoning of the Jews".

16 *System der Altsynagogalen Palästinenischen Theologie*, Leipzig, 1880. See Schechter in comment upon a misleading emphasis on legalism in Weber's criticism of Jewish thought, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, p. 23.

resignation of the Stoic, the literature of the West lacked something; no Greek could have named the deficiency of the *Phaedo* or put his finger on the weak spot in the armour of Chrysippus; it required a temper of different make; it required a people whose God was jealous and whose faith was a flaming fire; in a word the Greek thought about himself until he was indifferent to all things and desperately skeptical; the Hebrew had still the fire of passion and the impetuosity of faith; with these he made life interesting and fused into one molten mass the attractive elements of every known doctrine. The result was pre-eminently unintelligible, but it was inspired."¹⁷

Says Tarn,

"Whether a Jew adopted or rejected Greek forms he remained a Jew, a man whose ideals were not those of the Greek, even if expressed in the same words".¹⁸

Says Brett again,

"The words of Philo are lighted throughout by the strong reflection of personal aims and feelings. His peculiar method of exposition would be irritating beyond endurance if the reader were not continually sustained by a sense of the passionate earnestness which lies behind it and the ceaseless striving after an expression of deep feeling which pervades every page. This temper might be called spiritual fervor; but the term is inadequate, for religion and philosophy were combined in Philo and each limits the other".

Motives

It would seem gratuitous to look beyond Judaism for the central core of faith which informs the diverse expressions of Philo's thought. It must be understood that God-consciousness may express itself in other forms than spectacular and credulous mysticism and that one of these forms is the very axis of the practical attitude of the Jew. The simplest name for this axis is faith. But this name may cover a range of meanings including spiritual vitality, definite tradition, accepted creed, ideal objective, practical activity and ethical quality. Quoting again from Schechter (op. cit. p. 12),

¹⁷ History of Psychology, pp. 239-240.

¹⁸ Hellenistic Civilization, p. 180, 1927.

"The old Rabbis seem to have thought that the true health of a religion is to have a theology without being aware of it; and thus they hardly ever made—nor could they make—any attempts toward working their theology into a formal system, or giving to us a full exposition of it. With God as a reality, Revelation as a fact, the Torah as a rule of life, and the hope of Redemption as a most vivid expectation, they felt no need for formulating their dogmas into a creed, which as was once remarked by a great theologian, is repeated not because we believe, but that we may believe".

It is a matter of the first importance to observe the distinction which is made in Judaism between motives and rewards.¹⁹ This distinction follows from the thoroughgoing and practical application of the idea of a revealed religion. Gratitude to God for the revelation is to be expressed by labor in the study and practice of His revealed Will. The promised blessings come normally after such labor but they come only because of the ever benevolent activity of God who chose to make the revelation to this particular people. Such blessings are practical, ethical, intellectual and devotional.

All motivation should be unselfishly religious. From a love of God, His Name should be "hallowed". His name may become "hallowed" by man in the giving of substance to the revealed Will. This may be a learning of the Will, or a practice of it, or the development of an ethical character like unto God's as reflected in his Will or again by furthering the purpose for Israel in the world, namely to embody God's Kingship in a commonwealth of devout people.

The subject matter of ethical, intellectual and devotional practice was derived from the inherited traditions of Israel through which as a whole the Will of God had been revealed. There were no final objects separately appropriate to each of these disciplines. Each finds its reward in the same divine Will whether in a blessing upon conduct as success and ethical satisfaction or upon learning as a better understanding of that Will or upon worship as a religious satisfaction of reverent fellowship with that Will.

Now the Rabbis understood human nature and for them religious motivation was not theory but a practical affair. They were fully aware of the pedagogical principle of learning by doing.

¹⁹ For details see G. F. Moore, *Judaism*, vol. II, pp. 3-16; 79-112; 201-234.

The Will of God must be done. It should be done from a pure love of God. But let it be done whatever the motive and in the very doing the proper motive may finally be learned and made real in practice.

Thus they maintained the value of the study and practice of the Torah even from selfish motives in order that such a study might come to be pursued in unselfish devotion. The same pedagogical principle was applied in scholarship, in ethics and in worship. The end of each was to be the "Love of God". A merely formal scholarship is to end in unselfish scholarly devotion. A merely ceremonial righteousness is to end in a purity of ethical motive. A merely ritualistic worship is to end in a consecrated spiritual devotion.

Thus the practical effect of Judaism is to develop the religious motive as an end in itself and to account for all rewards as gratuities of this motivation. No discipline practical or intellectual is formally associated with its own appropriate perfection as an object or ideal. Such perfection always comes as a blessing of God and as a byproduct of the religious motive. Purposes and rewards do not correlate. Only one purpose is sanctioned and all rewards flow from that purpose.

As one reflects upon this conservatively maintained attitude abundantly and dramatically set forth in the history and writings of Judaism one may see that its philosophic expression coincides with the general perspective of all of Philo's writings.

If the four dogmas mentioned by Schechter with the manner in which they were held, be the marks of the Jewish economy of thought, it is at once obvious from a reading of the works of Philo that for all his erudition he does not depart from the point of view of Judaism. It is as an informed mind expressing its faith in the language of the schools that Philo differs from his less widely learned co-religionists.

There is need to emphasize the fact that the school and the enterprise of study were regarded as fundamental by Judaism. To the exploitation of the enlarged area of learning made available by contact with Hellenism, the Jew brought a well formed tradition of study and engrained habits of mental discipline. There was no great danger to the scholarly Jew of that intoxication with new knowledge which stimulates the imagination to run off into a vague mysticism. A neglect of Philo's training as a Jew will

allow undue stress upon his Hellenism and ascribe to his logical inconsistencies a stop-gap explanation labelled mysticism of one sort or other.

"Jewish Scholars knew that understanding is an intellectual function which is not promoted but perturbed by the intrusion of any mystical or emotional element. They prayed for intelligence, and to be kept from error, but they looked for the answer in the working of their own minds, and did not expect supernatural illumination". (G. F. Moore—*Judaism*, Vol. II, p. 243).

Philo in the field of philosophy works in the spirit and method of Judaism. Instead of a logically consistent theology, reminiscence and description of Israel's past set forth testimony to an enduring fact which not only accounts for the history of the Jew but also justifies the practice of traditions derived from that history. This is not a blind reverence for the past but evidence of a habit of proof by precedent and inference in contrast to a rational analysis. The enduring fact may be named God or the Law or Revelation or the Kingdom. It is known by no logical device but it is dramatized in the ceremonial practice of tradition and re-visioned in the study of the history from which the tradition derives.

Israel like the wise man described by Philo advances with his eyes upon a mirror within which the reflected events of the past make possible the laying of a straight course and within which the light of the future inspires by illuminating those events.²⁰ This "seeing" and "self-taught" Israel celebrated by Philo, is a mind with a peculiarly keen faculty for abstracting from a host of examples one universal meaning. He is not indifferent to logic. He is indifferent to the merely aesthetic appeal of concrete form. He is abstract. For him form merely illustrates and logic applies attributes to a fact already vividly known.

The enduring relation of a vivid consciousness to a universal meaning may be conveniently designated passion, in its dramatic aspect. It is not uncommon to refer to the passion of the Jew for God, for righteousness or for Torah. On its subjective side such passion is oriented toward an imageless informal cynosure, repeatedly and variously described but never defined. In its intel-

20 Mig. 219-222; cf. Qu. in Gen. II, 72 ed. Aucher. Cf. Plato, Rep. 514 D.

lectual access it is a supreme abstraction. Between these two, subjective intensity and objective reference there intervenes no formally coherent meditation. There intervenes a rich and changing descriptive byproduct.

It is therefore easy to misread the eclecticism of Philo. For conceptual coherence is commonly confused with logical consistency. And extremely abstract thought is often dismissed by the ascription of "mysticism" in the sense of paradoxical vagueness or mystification. This is like quarreling with the metaphors of Jewish poetry because no picture is painted by the incompatible symbols used. Says Billings of Philo (op. cit. p. 11),

"Looking at Greek philosophy as he did from a standpoint which he regarded as superior he seemed to see that the differences of the schools were in many cases a mere matter of terminology. By varying the expression of his ideas he emphasizes similarities and established parallels strongly and closely. No doubt this variation of terminology and phrasing was in part adopted for an apologetic purpose. The leaders of the Dispersion were under the constant necessity of counteracting the attraction of Gentile speculation in order to retain their own people. By this eclecticism in philosophic vocabulary Philo exhibits Judaism as the transcendent philosophy, which gives a place to all that is true in all schools of Greek speculation."

Where Siegfried sees "the palladium of Israel the unity of God" sacrificed to the mediation of the Logos, and Zeller sees "a consciousness at discord with itself and the world" a more sympathetic understanding of what constituted the so-called "mysticism" of the Jew may see all forms of expression including the philosophic doctrines of the Greeks, subordinated to that passion for direction which is grounded in the individual revelation of the presence of God within the conscience of man and is a criterion of truth capable of logical explication only by the most abstract terms.

These two features must ever be kept in mind in a reading of Philo. The first is the attempt to keep a convincing gnosis of deity from picturesque theosophical nonsense. And the second is the acceptance of a most exacting task of abstract thought by which stubborn tools of conception may be made to serve the expression of a single meaning. Philo, like the writer of *The Song of Songs*, is not concerned with touching off a portrait of the beloved object. He works like the poet by reiterating a passion in

formally disconnected suggestions of its meaning rather than of its details.

We cannot escape the evidence in Philo's work for that simple naive consciousness of God so characteristic of the faith of the Rabbis. They placed it at the foundation of religious institutions. Philo indicates it as a source for all philosophic labor. As the Torah was the Will of God to be dramatized in the practical life of man so philosophy is a hymn of praise to honor the creations of that Will.

The Alexandrian scholar finds the materials for such a hymn both rich and varied. The learning of many peoples particularly the brilliant Greeks lay before him in the university city of the world. The body of such learning had come to constitute an account of the world of man and of nature accepted by Philo in common with his informed contemporaries as a dependable natural science. All that was required was to arrange this mass of learning about a central theme.

We wish to indicate the consequences of such an attempt by an erudite Jew without reading in obviously inferable motives. The Torah is allegorized in such a manner that the following results to some degree follow. A sacred document is vindicated. Conservative Jews are authoritatively introduced to Gentile science. Critical Gentiles²¹ are informed that Jewish wisdom as a mother culture includes such science. Racial heroes are glorified. A pre-eminent "wiseman", Moses, is popularized. Atheism, philosophic, political, and social is refuted. A reliable, practical and universal moral code is promoted. Piety is rationalized. A "mystery" is schematized. An ineffable saving God is indicated.

It is necessary however to distinguish between the possible services which Philo rendered to his contemporaries by his writ-

21 For the charges against the Jews that an apologist would need to meet see Schürer, *op. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 412-420. These charges include, (1) Jews of recent origin, (2) leprous Egyptians, (3) had contributed nothing to general culture, (4) atheistic in excluding pagan worship, (5) treasonable in refusing emperor worship, (6) antisocial in their segregation, (7) superstitious in their peculiar customs. The first two of these charges indicate a fear of the prestige of Hebrew tradition and the racial solidarity of the Jews as a threat to a disorganized paganism. In Alexandria this fear led to the most vicious attack upon what was apparently recognized as the strength of Judaism. From the answer of Josephus it would seem that Alexandrian religionists pretended to trace the origin of the Jews to a colony of lepers in Egypt and to claim that they therefore had no national history nor distinctive racial antecedents. Josephus, *Contra Apion*, I, 24-35; II, 1-3.

ings whether directly or indirectly, and his motives in penning his treatises. The degree of success with which the things mentioned above may have been accomplished should account for his ancient prestige. But to account for the character of the authorship of these treatises it is necessary to discount a propaganda interest behind any of the particular services rendered. A propaganda interest in all probability would have produced a more unified and more neatly articulated apology. Such an interest could scarcely have passed unnoticed. It would have deprived Philo of that mediating position accorded to him by Jew, Gentile and Christian. We must either discount the propaganda interest or suppose Philo to have been far more clever and far less sincere than is indicated by his writings.

We will come closest to the motive of Philo by viewing his efforts as a form of worship offered to a Supreme Imageless Deity after the manner of the Rabbinical ideal of scholarship.

"Say not, I will study the Torah with the purpose of being called Sage or Rabbi, or to acquire fortune, or to be rewarded for it in the world to come; but do it for the sake of thy love to God, though the glory will come in the end". (*Sifre*, 73 a—Schechter op. cit. p. 68).

"Shammai said, 'make thy study a regular thing; say (or promise) little and do much; and meet every man with a friendly mien.'" (Moore—op. cit. vol. II, p. 243).

Motive and reward must be distinguished. The motive orients all effort toward a love of God. Deity is the objective reference. The reward and accompanying stimulus is, however, a gratuity of unexpected fruition of knowledge and expertness in the acquisition of intellectual power, critical insight and ethical improvement.

"Whosoever labours in the Torah for its own sake, merits many things. . . . he is called friend, beloved, a lover of God, a lover of mankind; it clothes him in meekness and fear (of God), and fits him to become righteous, pious and upright; it keeps him far from sin, brings him toward the side of virtue, and gives him a sovereignty and dominion and discerning judgment. To him the secrets of the Torah are revealed; he becomes a never-failing fountain, he grows modest and long-suffering, forgiving insults, and is exalted above all things." (Schechter, p. 136, and Moore, op. cit. p. 244; *Kinyan Torah*, Friedman, p. 15 sq.).

Let us indicate how Philo in consonance with such a tradition of study testifies to its various features in his more personal passages and his recommendations for the study of philosophy. In the first place Philo finds the Rabbinical counsel to the student to be in agreement with the spirit of the Pythagorean hymn which assigns to man the place of an appreciative audience of the works of God. Philosophy is a hymn of praise to the Creator as an epic of His great deeds.²² Such eulogy is not a mere virtuosity of intellect and art nor a mystical vision as in a Posidonius or a mystery cult it might become. There must be an inner coherence in the panegyric. No mere blandishment of God, no naive enthusiasm for Nature and Wisdom is true praise. Appreciation must proceed from a virility of understanding. Without this there results merely a superficial eclectic potpourri that tickles the fancy. This not only fails of true praise but is the very stultification of reason.²³ To guard against an absorption in a polytheistic or pantheistic worship let a student dwell upon the insignificance and worthlessness of the materials with which the Creator works. Thus may he come to wonder at the skill of the Creator to glorify all He touches.²⁴

The first care of a correct understanding therefore is a critical candour by which the folly²⁵ both of created things and their human appraiser may be detected and discounted.²⁶ The Socratic notion of self-criticism in philosophy and the Jewish idea of self-examination in worship unite in Philo's conception of philosophy as a suitable praise. Before the acceptable philosophic panegyric may be formed, the student must examine himself.²⁷

This examination is an investigation of the microcosmic "man" of human nature and his capacities and also of the macrocosmic "man" of physical nature and the harmony of its constitution. Microcosm and macrocosm reflect each other so that the one is

22 Plant. 131; Opif. 4-6; cf. Plato. Timaeus 29 A.

23 Plant. 158-9; Sp. L. I, 209-11; V. M. III, 212-16.

24 Ebriet. 104 sq.; Som. I, 201-212.

25 φρονεῖν ὀρθῶς versus ἀφροσύνην. Cf. Plato's use of φρόνησις, Rep. IV, 441 C; 443 B; Laws I, 631 C; 632 E; XII 436 C; X 906 B. For Plato *temperance* is a principle of harmony which involves contact with the divine. For Philo *temperance* must first distinguish the Creator from the creature. It is a principle of self-criticism which discounts spurious enthusiasms.

26 Mig. 134-138.

27 Det. 17-21; Decal. 59-81; Som. I. 211-212.

studied for and by the image of the other.²⁸ To know one's self is to behold one's projected ideas in the macrocosm and to learn one's capacities and duties as a cosmopolite or microcosm. It is to see the truth as in a mirror.²⁹ This self-examination will cure the student of worshipping himself in some mystical nonsense of emotionalizing his own projected cosmology into a deity. And it will teach him to subordinate interested feelings and sensations to a true rational praise of the creative skill of God.

God who has assigned man to be a judge of His works is best praised therefore as that judge delves critically before expressing his praise.³⁰ The self-examination of man is an arduous task requiring a stern discipline of the understanding. Its fruit is two-fold. There is produced by the work of man's intellect a clear conception *φαντασία*, a "mind child". This is to be offered as the suitable sacrifice of praise to God.³¹ There is also provided by God a creative power transforming the workman into a "self-taught race". A sacrifice has been accepted and a blessing conferred, namely, a mental power which not being enamoured of its own success strives for a mastery in order to contribute in humility to a greater end.³²

In describing his own study in such picturesque terms Philo suggests that he had entered into a contract with Philosophy.³³ The Muses each in turn had fructified his labor to inspire a mastery in each art studied. But he had dedicated his work to their mistress Philosophy, the Love of Wisdom, and maintained a continuous progress. He had not been in search of particular knowledge as such. By dedicating and transcending each achievement he had experienced the joy of fresh intuitions like a craftsman feeling the thrill of developing skills. He advanced along the "royal road" of learning and wisdom.³⁴

The divine stimulus symbolized by the Graces, the Muses, the Logoi or the revealing Word is not to be hypostatized into an object of knowledge. Such figures are but the graceful fancy of acknowledged gratitude for the encouragement which seems to come

28 V. M. III, 134-145; Qu. in Gen. I, 56 ed. Aucher.

29 Mig. 183-191.

30 Mig. 219-222.

31 Mig. 139-140.

32 Det. 27-31.

33 Cong. 74-78.

34 Post. 101-102.

from above as tasks near completion. The reward of the art of knowing is the improvement of that art itself. A groping reason becomes a power of intellectual vision.³⁵ Wisdom becomes self-conscious, critical, and appreciative of itself because of the stimulating attestation of its service. Knowledge is not so much an object as an appraising art and a justification for a life of reason.³⁶

Philo's discussions would seem to bring together revelation as a glorious privilege and revelation as normal to intellectual labor. As the Rabbis prayed for guidance in their study but looked for the answer through their own labor so Philo regards mental industry as a prerequisite for intuition but offers thanks to God that his labor should be thus rewarded by the divine touch. He prefers a virile faith to an easy mysticism. He has had the experience of revelation "ten thousand times" but does not exploit it as some dark mystery by which to advance a claim of special access to God or special holiness as the vehicle of some revolutionary message. He has examined himself, as he advises, to find that his own reason is sufficiently wonderful to admonish humility in its critical use.

Indeed, in citing his own experience with revelation,³⁷ Philo implies that the revelation to Abraham was perhaps nothing essentially different from that which comes to the industrious student in moments of discovery. Spectacular mysticism is to be discounted in favor of a quickened reason which through discipline deserves God's enlightening touch. Faith is to be applied in a practical way to the life of study.

Even the revelation of the Law to Moses is not to be superstitiously regarded. Moses is not to be deprived of the credit of nurturing in his own life the virtue expressed by him in the Law. Without such nurture the prompting of God would not have come. The marvel of revelation strips neither Moses nor God of their respective parts in the miracle of the giving of the Law. Two miracles explain each other, an astounding human achievement is correlated with an unprecedented divine revelation, man and God cooperate, the greater is man's achievement the greater is God's revelation.³⁸

Philo therefore denounces the obscurantism of the mystery

35 Mig. 39-40.

36 Mig. 47.

37 Mig. 34-45.

38 V. M. II, 10-11.

cults. The study of God and nature, human and physical, is to be a democratic enterprise carried into the market place where all may partake of its benefits. Esoteric secrets are but individual achievements of faith and the common property of such students as have the will and reverence to seek them out. Further than this they must square with the character and repute of a student or be denounced as subversive to truth.³⁹ A disciplined art of knowing by subordinating the particular objects of its past success is ever ready for fresh instruction under the divine master. It moves to new things by observing that eternal truths may be continuously rephrased to recur with fresh vitality in a creative study under an ever youthful God.⁴⁰

This brings us back to the function of man as the appreciative critic of the works or rather of the continued deeds of God. Like the harmonious macrocosm he studies, man becomes a harmony of the faculties of his knowing. He becomes a similar musical instrument in which sense and reason and judgment symphonize.⁴¹ That "purified mind" which was the very condition of raising suitable eulogies to God, becomes through disciplined preparation a trained intelligence and a sustaining joy.

From such a statement of purpose and reward in the pursuit of philosophy we are moved to claim for Philo the motive and the critical candour of the philosopher *par excellence*. He exhibits as does the Jewish philosopher Spinoza that double view of the infinite, the object of a quest and the "intellectual joy" of its eternal pursuit. This "joy" takes no narrow pride in discovery nor moves in aggressive exploitation of opinion. It is a naive delight in the privilege of having faculties developed by a divine colleague after unstinted labor. It is a sense of wonder before the ever changing aspects of truth reached in the quest of wisdom.⁴²

For such motivation it is not possible to separate scientific, ethical and practical goals and to regard them as ends. They each appear under the one aspect of truth which intermittently illuminates the character of the Creator. Thus motive and reward are never the same. The motive referred to the infinite is a "Love of God" and it is rewarded by the unexpected recurrence of "joy".

39 Sp. L. I, 319-323.

40 Sac. 76; Post. 151-152.

41 Mig. 104.

42 Sp. L. I, 345.

The ideal is a function, an affective complement incarnate as knowledge in the life of the student, a life that knows no limitations. The quest itself is an eternally present reward.⁴³

In the preface to the third book on the *Special Laws*, Philo describes the joy which he had experienced as a student and the regret with which he views the decline of his powers under the stress of political duties. This personal statement should be sufficient to afford the clue to an understanding of the passion of his life. An insatiable thirst for learning and a keen satisfaction in intellectual vistas, these are the very substance of the symbols of his imaginative literary expression. There is no distraught straining for God. God is a fact taken into account in the practical normal Jewish manner, the beginning and end of all things.

Philo was no solitary,⁴⁴ no mere contemplative,⁴⁵ no ascetic.⁴⁶ He was critical without being sceptical as Plato was. He recognizes but one aristocracy, the aristocracy of noble living.⁴⁷ He places upon such nobility the responsibility for the saviourhood of less fortunate fellows. The wiseman is to sweeten and enlighten the life of his people. Siegfried, Zeller and others have entirely misconstrued Philo's religious simplicity as a moral fanaticism in the interest of their interpretations of his doctrine. The austerity of his moral counsel, must be viewed against the moral chaos of his day. But he condemns asceticism as a superstition and an hypocrisy. His position is a modification of the Greek "all things in moderation" to an "all things in grateful dedication to God".

On the other hand Philo is a scholar with all the exclusive rigours that true scholarship demands. As such he values the fellowship of all great minds and earnest students whether known through literature or as aspiring comrades who may become his audience, "initiates" in the art of reverent philosophizing. Such a fellowship is of necessity restricted to a small circle by conditions of devotion and talent. To these Philo speaks in particular and often technical terms of address. He is not therefore to be re-

43 Cong. 121-163; Mut. 37-38, 220 sq.

44 Prob. 83; Decal. 106-120.

45 V. M. III, 211-212. Philo's account of his embassy to Caligula indicates his importance in the public life of his people.

46 For antiasceticism see Plant. 165-172; Det. 17-21; Praem. 118-126; Opif. 77-78. For asceticism as superstition and hypocrisy see Deus. 94-103; Fuga. 33-38.

47 Virt. 187-227.

garded as a prophet of a divergent sect. His plea is to broaden the ranks of Israel chosen because of their "self-taught" virility of mind, so that there may be included all sane and hard thinking men of courage and faith who seek true wisdom in an allround disciplined service of mind and heart and hand, dedicated to a common benevolent God.⁴⁸ Thus Philo accepts the claims of a "love of God, a love of virtue and a love of man". He finds his own peculiar joy in meeting these claims as a scholar. And he invites to the joys he has himself known as a philosopher with a faith.

But Philo is not a direct student of the "nature" which he eulogizes. He is a student of books and of the thought of men rather than a natural scientist. As such he seeks to coordinate his findings. He is rarely concerned with direct refutation. His endeavor is to harmonize. It is typical of Philo that his condemnation of a doctrine is to regard it as an unsuitable offering to God. This means not that it is untrue but that it is out of its place in the harmony of God's truth.

Arrangement then is a chief concern of study. The fruitful arrangement is to so relate all ideas to the experience of the seeker for truth that the result will be a mind which complements "nature". This is a "way of wisdom". It is a psychology and a cosmology. But above all it is an allegory of the history of man in his search for God. It offers counsel for the individual career and suggests the trend of a racial mind in consonance with the universalism and individualism of Philo's age.

Intellectual Background

Psychological and gnostic interest in philosophy colored the general intellectual outlook of Philo's day. The mystery cults were exploiting poetry, religious need and philosophic questioning. Here a well planned ritual, pageantry and thought formula was designed to lead the spirit of man to release, adventure or research as individual need might determine. The continuity of mood, emotion, aesthetic insights and ecstatic delight monopolized more attention than the political or practical matters which formerly bulked so large in converse with the deity at the local shrine. The

48 V. M. III, 211-212.

gods no longer spoke through favorite oracles on matters of state but became guides to a realm of romantic felicity.

As philosophy itself came to center about an idealized form of the "wiseman" rather than a cosmology, a metaphysic or a utopia, the emphasis upon knowledge, thought and reason spun itself out into a fine, undifferentiated technique of the knowing experience which sought reports of the highest truth concerning ethics, deity, science and life as a single illumination of the intellect, a "*gnosis*". Such a "*gnosis*" was of personal significance rather than a tool for constructive work. It led a man to happiness rather than providing him with the tools of research. In the Hermetica for example, the seer is bidden to rise and tell all men of his vision not as an item to be added to a general store of knowledge but as a glad gospel of hope and faith and joy, a suggestion that they too might come into a similar experience. The seer as an example of felicity was more important than the truth he proclaimed.

Even the scientists at Alexandria drew within toward theory, speculation and mathematics rather than moving boldly in experimentation to a degree worthy of their great example Aristotle. Libraries, laboratories, botanical gardens and multiform labors of scientists followed in a formal manner the lead of an earlier Greek naturalism but the spirit of this research lacked virility and objectivity and tended to lose itself in speculation. The astronomy of Ptolemy is typical of the greatness and the weakness of the day. It was characteristically limited in its foundation by the power of the mind to erect an hypothesis neither verifiable nor vulnerable within the area of the data selected. A subjective satisfaction rather than objective test held the power to meet the obligations of thought even for the mind of the avowed scientist.

As this subjective satisfaction became ever more difficult to maintain in the face of philosophic skeptics, coherence among intellectual workmen became ever more rare and the hope of a higher degree of certainty more cherished. The other worldliness of subsequent generations germinated as men sought for something beyond the rationalism which had carried them thus far. They came to demand a mystical illumination by which to make respectable the long prized achievements of the Greek masters. Plato must be supported by tracing his truth to the priests of ancient Egypt. Stoics must republish a more ambitious defense of natural

reason by allegorizing Homer in greater inclusiveness. Ancient documents must be re-examined or rediscovered or fabricated.

But even as rationalism became discredited by skeptics and exhausted thinkers so it became reinstated as a secondary discipline by those few who pressed through to a "gnosis" or to a less spectacular serenity of faith. Plutarch assigns it a place as a necessary secular discipline. The Neo-Pythagoreans make it a skeleton for number speculations. The Gnostics need reason to frame successions of worlds and planes of felicitous adventure. The mysteries levy upon reason as a discipline by which to insure correct psychological sequences and life processes so that ancient myths and religious rituals may be improved in their effectiveness to induce that ecstatic experience toward which all effort was directed. In short reason became mediatory rather than final as with earlier thinkers.

We have then as a background for the thought of Philo Judaeus, a secularized world, an exploded rationalism, an absorption in poetry, a recourse to religion per se, an active psychological experimentation and an individualism that was finding so many avenues closed that the energy denied to the practical affairs of this world sought comfort in an elusive other world.

Our Jewish Philosopher brings to such an age a message of faith and courage and practical works. Without denying that this world is a pageant, relatively unreal and temporary, he nevertheless seeks to justify it as a school for virtue. In order to read this message we must first become acquainted with his method of exposition, allegorical commentary.

It is well to remember that allegory in Philo's day involved much more than literary exegesis. To confine the significance of Philo's allegorism to the defense and exploitation of a sacred book is to over-simplify the motives, methods and problems of Philo's age. Allegorism in the first century describes a temper of mind which finds expression in a number of different ways. Allegory might be used to regain a mythopoetic world view or to reduce that view to a natural science. It might be used to gather fragments of history about a genealogical narrative, to reduce a social chaos to a ritualistic morality, or to revitalize outworn political forms by a public life of pageant and festival. It might be used to organize private associations, religious, social, professional and racial by reinterpreting established forms of order. It was not only an

educational technique both expository and dramatic but it also provided a ready means of imparting an appearance of order to the diverse elements of Mediterranean life. Thus social practices, political forms, religious institutions, literary heritages, philosophic ideas and spiritual aspirations contributed by many peoples to a common life found their preliminary reconciliation in allegory. It is in view of this synthesizing agency of allegory that we must examine Philo's use of it as a craft.

CHAPTER II

PHILO'S ALLEGORISM

The Alexandrian Setting

In the works of Philo, Hellenistic Judaism presents its claims with such assurance and in such mature form that one must suppose that Jewish scholarship had for some time been preparing the way for Philo to make his ambitious attempt to accommodate the learning of the day to the faith of Israel. The evidence of this preparation is meager. However the Jews in defending themselves and their religion had produced a literature which while hardly approaching the nature of philosophy nevertheless introduced the thought forms of Gentile culture into the vocabulary of Judaism. A literature of wisdom, apology, propaganda and symbolic history had arisen to glorify Judaism, by enriching proverbial wisdom with philosophic ideas, by claiming the Greek philosophers and poets for the Mosaic tradition or by presenting the religion of Israel as an instrument of revelation through which a world plan is unfolded by Israel's God.

Within this literature may be included, *The Sibyllines*, *Aristeas*, *Artapanus*, *Eupolemus*, *Jason of Cyrene*, *Third Maccabees*, *Hecateas*, *Pseudo-Phocylides* and others. In *The Wisdom of Solomon* may be seen the influence of Greek philosophy upon a conception of wisdom that suggests germinal thought of the sort elaborated in the Logos doctrine of Philo.

Perhaps Aristobulus stands nearest to Philo in presenting the claims of Judaism through philosophy by the accepted exegetical method. Brehier⁴⁹ places him after Philo but Schürer some two centuries previous. From the few fragments of his work that remain it would appear that he attempted to allegorize the Mosaic law from the point of view of a Peripatetic. He claimed that Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato and even Hesiod and Homer borrowed from Moses.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Les Idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie, p. 47 sq.

⁵⁰ Clement, Strom. V 14.97; I 22.150; I 15.72; VI 3.32. Euseb. Praep. Evang. VII 14; VIII 10; XIII 12; H. E. VII 32, 16-19.

In Philo we meet with similar claims.⁵¹ And like Aristobulus he received the label of a school. But in Philo the extravagant claims of the apologist and the accommodation to some particular philosophic school have begun to give way to a catechetical enterprise which suggests that the Synagogue as Philo knew it in Alexandria was achieving a standing as a school in its own right without losing its usefulness as a popular institution. It is this note of success, this attempt to bring information of hitherto unsuspected things to the lukewarm Jew no less than to the friendly Gentile that marks the work of Philo.

If we grant that Jewish scholarship in Philo's milieu had achieved a syncretism of contemporary thought which could command the respect of Gentiles as well as liberal Jews, it remains to describe the conditions which give rise to such a product of scholarship.

In the first place it is evident from Philo's own words that a militant movement for the promotion of the Mosaic Law had arisen in Alexandria in response to the growing disposition of all sorts of people to accept it.⁵² Its reinterpretation into Gentile terms had become much more than an occasional effort of a scholar to prepare for some noble patron a manual written with special reference to a favorite philosophy.⁵³ The people at large have become interested in such numbers that Hellenistic Judaism seems to be rivaling the numerous religious and philosophical sects that flourished in Alexandria.⁵⁴ This movement is sufficiently new and virile for Philo to think of it as the emergence of Israel and the Law from the obscurity of a pilgrimage to the promised land of universal acclaim.⁵⁵ It was characteristic of Philo's age that a public demand should invite the Jews to make a special effort to fit their Law to Gentile needs. With the cosmopolitanism of the day there had descended upon men a moral chaos and a sense of religious need that was driving individuals in loneliness to seek comfort and enlightenment from the most varied sources.⁵⁶

51 E. g. L. A., I 108.

52 V. M. II 41-44; cf. Det. 10-12.

53 The work of Aristobulus was addressed to King Ptolemy Philometer; Clement, Strom. I 22; Euseb. Praep. Evang. IX 6, 6; VIII 9; VII 13.

54 See Bousset, *Jüdische-Christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom*, pp. 1-154.

55 V. M. II 25-44.

56 For a brief characterization of the "failure of nerve" see Murray, *Five Stages of Greek Religion*, ch. IV.

The Jews of Alexandria were peculiarly well situated to assume a leadership among their brethren of the Diaspora in responding to this Gentile need. A long and privileged residence in that city had brought them closer to Gentile life and thought than could have been possible for less securely established Jewish colonials elsewhere or for colonies so predominantly Jewish that there had been no need to conform to an alien culture and therefore but scant translation of Jewish habits of thought and conduct into terms that Gentiles could appreciate. But more than this, the Jews of Alexandria, the university city of the world, enjoyed a unique opportunity of becoming familiar with the most diverse currents of Gentile thought and learning.

In view of the prosperity of the Jews in Alexandria and the testimony of Philo that the Law is gaining Gentile converts in encouraging numbers, the reason for his subordination of Messianism⁵⁷ becomes clear. There was no occasion for that deferred hope which burdened the Palestinian Jew. The Law in militancy before the eyes of an Alexandrian Jew could suggest that the Messianic Mission might lie in the capacity of that Law to appeal to all men. The agent of God in making that Law universal need not be some special personage to come. For the allegorical method of interpretation was proving a competent way to such success. Here would be a stimulus for Philo to exploit the allegorical method in lieu of waiting for a Messianic personage or event.

The growing demand of Gentile candidates for instruction could not fail to arouse the Alexandrian Synagogue to the sense of a new mission. Such a mission would not be strange to the normal habit of the Jews to proselytize. But for Hellenistic Judaism this mission would be defined in terms that must place upon Jewish teachers a new responsibility with respect to Gentile thought. It would produce a new attitude toward Gentile learning, just such an attitude that is found in Philo. For here the concern for ex-

57 In *De Praem.* Philo treats Messianism. He here touches upon, (1) the significance of messianic judgment, (2) the gathering of the dispersed, (3) the re-establishment of the theocracy, (4) the renovation of the world by a catastrophic event, (5) the victory over hostile powers. But Philo allegorizes these things. He has abandoned Jewish nationalism and makes the features of Messianism signify personal events in the lives of individual men. He holds, (1) man is by nature a "gentle and sociable creature", (2) God leads men by enlightening individuals, (3) the perfection of this world will come about by the multiplication of wisemen through the study and practice of the Law.

pository and catechetical instruction subordinates defensive criticism. But to account for Philo's individual use of such a flexible instrument as allegory we must search still farther.

Willoughby⁵⁸ has suggested that Philo as a liberal Jew of the Diaspora was probably influenced by the Graeco-Oriental cults in Alexandria to achieve for himself a vision of God by intellectualizing the cult practices which he as a Jew could not perform. The regeneration ritual of the Isis cult in particular would appear to be so treated. The Hermetic tractates offer a parallel to such intellectualization and they exhibit interesting affinities with Philo.

Now if this account means that Philo had compensated for a sense of being deprived of access to God it should be shown that he had become disillusioned of his own Jewish way of communion and departs from the normal Jewish habit of seeking some new *torah* or "sign".⁵⁹ To this habit he testifies when he says, "I myself was initiated under Moses the God-beloved into his greater mysteries, yet when I saw the prophet Jeremiah and knew him to be not only himself enlightened, but a worthy minister of the holy secrets, I was not slow to become his disciple" (*Cherub.* 49). And again when Philo admonishes that Jews should show respect for all forms of worship without themselves making any "image" of the Name of God,⁶⁰ he testifies to the religious attitude that can see in all divine service something that commands respect without compromise to one's personal faith.

This attitude is sufficient to account for Philo's intellectualizations without reading into them some thwarted desire that is unusual to the normal Jewish habit of seeking fresh insights into religious truth. And without the thwarted desire the psychological conditions would hardly be ripe for the supposed vision. It must be remembered that Philo intellectualizes the Messianic Hope⁶¹ no less significantly than cultic myth. But if we must have

58 Pagan Regeneration, ch. IX.

59 Is it not this habit that St. Paul refers to in I Cor. 1-22 when he says that the Jews seek a sign? For the Greeks who seek wisdom the crucifixion is "foolishness". But for the Jews it is a "stumbling block", a scandal. For it suggests the preposterous idea of a "weakness" in God. The Jews can find no spiritual meaning in such a strange idea. They therefore reject the crucifixion as a sign or portent for its religious significance cannot be reconciled with their idea of the omnipotence of God. For the characteristic habit of seeking some new *torah* or teaching or spiritual message in the Scripture or the Law see Schechter, op. cit., p. 126.

60 V. M. II 205-208.

61 In De Praem. 158 Philo refers to a Messianic prophecy (probably

a cultic myth for Philo to intellectualize then the myth of Mnemosyne is far more significant as an influence upon his thought than the Isis-Osiris myth.

After all the cultic myths were so similar in pattern by Philo's time and so adapted to enlightenment experiences that they could hardly fail to symbolize that experience for any man who had enjoyed significant religious insights from other sources. If this were not so we today could hardly appreciate their religious value for their times.

Ecstatic Experience

Since we are seeking for personal motives in Philo's use of allegory it is well that we outline his position in the matter of ecstatic experiences. It is obvious that his descriptions of the experience is personal testimony to a familiarity with it. It is equally obvious that he does not present the experience as evidence of the sort of transformation,⁶² the thought of which was so comforting to many Gentiles. When he speaks of the experience as coming upon him "ten thousand times"⁶³ he assumes the authority of an expert in religious psychology who knows these things intimately and can therefore give them their proper evaluation. He distinguishes four types of *ἔκστασις* (*Heres.* 249-275 sq.). We shall list them under the names he uses though these names are not strictly used as class titles.

(1) *παράνοια*, an alienation of the mind,⁶⁴ includes such states as insanity, melancholy, senility, lust or chronic unreason for whatever cause. The lunatic, the sensualist and the irrational or "drunken" fanatic are all victims of what we would call a fixation. They are impervious to the appeal of the mind. This condition constitutes the first type of *ἔκστασις*.

(2) *κατάπληξις*, consternation and amazement, describes the reaction to an impressive spectacle or idea. The word is used by Philo to indicate such things as the domination of man over animals,⁶⁵ the grandeur of nature,⁶⁶ the arresting example of virtue,⁶⁷

Isaiah 54, 1) as allegory.

62 Gig. 19-31, 47, 53; Som. II 232 sq.

63 Mig. 34.

64 Cf. Ebriet. 15; Plant. 147-148; Sp. L. III 99; Cherub. 69, 116.

65 Opif. 83-85.

66 Opif. 78; Sp. L. I 95.

67 Praem. 164; Sp. L. I 321.

the imperious voice of conscience,⁶⁸ the sense of sin and remorse,⁶⁹ the madness of Caligula.⁷⁰ There are two sides to its religious meaning.

(a) There is a spurious *κατάπληξις* which is a voluntary or self-induced condition.⁷¹ This is the *ἐκθουσιασμός* of mania or *panic* and is to be associated with mob hysteria and with the frenzy and sensuality of orgiastic rites. It is inhuman and irrational and describes the inspiration of false prophets whose unethical mania may be symbolized by "homicide".⁷² It stands in dark contrast to the enlightening good will, *εὐνοία*, that unites all men of whatever race or creed in the exalted service of The Benevolent God.⁷³ It includes the "mysteries" of paganism and divinations that are to be contrasted with true prophetic insight. It produces obscurant secrets and fictitious forecasts that differ from the genuine revelation which the wiseman neither invents nor hides from public view.⁷⁴ In short the voluntary or self-induced *ἐκθουσιασμός* is inhuman, orgiastic, unethical and obscurant charlatanism.

(b) The authentic *κατάπληξις* is an "involuntary" rather than a self-induced condition. It is the more awesome for that reason. But it is like a "right reason"⁷⁵ rather than an abject superstition. It is the "sober enthusiasm"⁷⁶ so celebrated by Philo. It is a flaming faith that not only leads the good and reasonable man but like a passion for righteousness it frequently bursts forth into a hatred of evil.⁷⁷ Its keynote is the "fear of God" that ranges from remorse for sin to prophetic leadership. Philo associates this "fear" with the terrible spectacle of the wrath of God when He destroys the pursuing Egyptian hosts (evil), at the Red Sea and

68 Decal. 46; Deus. 138.

69 Flac. 169.

70 Gaius. 98, 226.

71 Ebriet 119 sq.; Plant. 139 sq. Philo contrasts and adapts Stoic diatribes on "drunken-ness" to a Scriptural authority for the joyous and inspiring observance of the Law. He rejects both the cold rationalism of Stoic morality and the irresponsible enthusiasms of ecstatic religion. *εὐπάθεια* and *εὐμενέστερον* are contrasted with *ἐκουσία φρενοβλάβεια*. Plant. 171; Ebriet. 123-127; 151-153; see also Mut. 166; Som. I 68-71; Fuga. 28-32.

72 Sp. L. III 91; Conf. 159.

73 Sp. L. I 315 sq.

74 See Balaam's curse turned to blessing, V. M. I 289; Jos. 8; Som. II 1; Mig. 84; Sp. L. I 59-65; IV 48.

75 Mig. 59 sq.

76 Opif. 71; Sobriet. 27; Mig. 190; 68 sq.; Ebriet. 140-150.

77 Fuga. 90; Cong. 113.

by that same act opens up a way of daring faith for Israel to tread.⁷⁸ By this same "fear" Moses is transported into a state of ἐνθουσιασμός as he turns from the terrifying spectacle of God's righteous indignation and exhorts Israel to advance in faith under the protecting care of the awesome Deity.

The "fear of God" describes that paradoxical formidableness of the good man by which he strikes terror into the heart of the evil doer and yet offers strong and kindly championship over the righteous.⁷⁹ Not only is there a jealous God in Philo's theology but there is also a man of terrible "meekness" in his ethics. The type of this militant righteousness is Phineas,⁸⁰ a name made to signify both righteous wrath and "peace". It is the figure of the Hebrew prophet that is exemplified in the authentic κατάπληξις. The good man is a scourge of God no less than a man of humility and "right reason". To turn from that "right reason" toward the enthusiasms of unethical ecstasy is an apostasy⁸¹ that is immediately visited with a "destruction" from "earth" and "heaven" the symbols for sensuality and opinion. The significance of this suicidal "destruction" will appear in the discussion of Philo's general theory of ἔκστασις below.

(3) The third type of ἔκστασις is called ἡρεμία διανοίας, tranquil understanding, a state of docility and teachableness that marks the mood of responsive appreciation and readiness for new instruction. This is not necessarily a contemplative pause. For it may not be dissociated from Philo's use of the Hebrew conception of "rest" and "peace", a freedom from trouble and from enemies but never from labor.⁸² The ideas involved concern the "appeasing" of the "wrath" of God by sacrifice. Philo raises these primitive ideas to a conception of self-dedication. Militant righteousness rests upon a docility and a readiness to receive new commissions from God.⁸³ It is to be noted that when Philo appears to use

78 V. M. I 175-177; II 246, 258.

79 Sac. 121 sq.; Virt. 164-174; Gig. 45-52.

80 V. M. I 304; Post. 182; L. A. III 242; Conf. 57; Mut. 108-109.

81 V. M. II 275-287. The worship of the golden calf is the type of all apostasies. Philo makes idolatry and materialism mean self indulgence both in a religious and a moral sense and in a philosophic sense it means empty opinion or empiricism.

82 For further discussion on this point see below p. 203.

83 Mut. 186-270.

cultic symbols he frequently offers for contrast the Hebrew conception of "peace". Thus in *Som.* II, 245 sq., Jerusalem, the city of God and "peace" are associated with the idea of voluntary effort derived from God. If Philo is here commenting upon the Isis cult as other symbols in the context suggest he is not borrowing but condemning. The "River of Egypt" is used to signify evil.⁸⁴

(4) *ἐνθεος* is ethical godlikeness. It is in one place contrasted with *εὐσεβεία* as a *mania* set over against humane wisdom.⁸⁵ But it is usually associated with the Law and indicates the ethical inspiration which comes through practice and contemplation of the Law.⁸⁶ It describes that state of mind in which the good and reasonable man ascribes to God the higher motives and moral promptings within, while he ascribes to selfishness the lower motives. It eagerly welcomes the higher motives as the stirring of God's spirit within the soul. Man becomes a disinterested critic of himself. He commits that "homicide"⁸⁷ which is not the idolatrous sort but the iconoclastic sort. He smashes the "idols" and "slays" the devotees within his own soul. He not only "forsakes father and mother" as in the New Testament parable. He "slays" his kindred or humbles himself before God by repudiating all his own excuses and consecrating all his own powers that God may "dwell" within him. For the spirit cannot enter while the "man" fills the house. *ἐνθεος* signifies the condition by which a good man transcends his lower self and feels the spirit of God stirring within to give sanction to his ethical insights.⁸⁸ It is the voice of conscience blessing man.

With the exception of the first type of *ἐκστασις* this classification

84 Cf. *Fuga.* 170-182. Philo here regards the Nile myth as the precise opposite of the truth. For it makes the spiritual proceed from the material whereas the material should be regarded as but an instrument of the spiritual. This is in line with all of Philo's symbolism of "Egypt", the materialistic, totemistic, polytheistic and sensualistic, the ancient enemy of Israel the spiritual pilgrim. The contrast in this passage lies in the *ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀνῴθην ὁ δὲ κάτωθεν ἄνω* (180). The idea of peace and the idea of voluntary endeavor also appear. Here the voluntary significance is "nature". It may be understood in the light of Philo's ascription of a good "natural" disposition to Isaac the "self-taught". Cf. *Abr.* 52 sq.

85 *Mut.* 39 sq.

86 *Decal.* 35, 176; *Conf.* 59; *Mig.* 35, 84; *Prob.* 80; *Heres.* 250, 264; *Sp. L.* IV 48; *Fuga.* 168; *Som.* I 36.

87 *Sp. L.* III, 124-127; *Sac.* 118-139.

88 *L. A.* III, 177-181; *Cherub.* 40-51.

indicates authentic moods of the good man. They are obviously taken by Philo from such typical Jewish experiences as the zeal for the Law and the Joy⁸⁹ of the Law. Beside this classification Philo offers a theory of *ἑκστασις* as a mode of moral choice.⁹⁰

ἑκστασις marks a point of change from which regeneration or degeneration sets in. All creatures must suffer change. They cannot choose not to be changed. That change may be likened to a lustration.⁹¹ The things of sense and the things of mind flood in upon the soul to cleanse or to defile it. Sensations and opinions crowd upon man. He can neither exclude this flux nor can he escape the effect it has upon him to change him even against his will.

In this situation man is forced to make one of three choices. He may surrender himself to sensation and let reason go. He then becomes changed into the nature of an earthly beast. He may surrender himself to the charm of opinion, the mere "words" of the human mind. He then becomes changed into a Sophist,⁹² enamoured of ideas without substance. Both these choices mark the setting in of a degeneration, a movement toward "destruction". He exemplifies the first type of *ἑκστασις* either because he undergoes a fixation in sensuous things or because as a mere theorist his mind is "alienated" from practical life. Man becomes either a beast or a visionary⁹³ if he chooses sense or mind as his own.

The choice that makes for regeneration is made when a man surrenders himself neither to sense nor mind but refers both of these to a moral object that transcends them. Passion then becomes a love of God and reason a service of God. Man escapes a fixation in what he might take to be his own "possessions" and exemplifies the third type of *ἑκστασις*. He is changed only to become ever more ready for fresh instruction.⁹⁴ This regenerative change is a continuing and transforming progress for the better. *ἑκστασις* has become an epistemological term the criterion for which is a moral object. Perception arises. Moral insight, faith

89 Cf. Praem. 161; Sac. 53-71; Mig. 152-157; Mut. 134-170.

90 L. A. II, 31 sq.

91 L. A. II 32 may be compared with Plato's Phaedrus 243 D. But observe in 52 of L. A. II the idea of the scape goat as a symbol for a "passion that averts evil". It is not a Platonic love that Philo is thinking of but a moral passion that replaces a love of "pleasure".

92 Det. 72-74.

93 Cherub. 57-64; Mig. 70-85; Som. I 72-119.

94 Heres. 51-67; Gig. 47-50; Mig. 101-105.

in God the Saviour and a grasp of the meaning of experience are brought together in this theory of *ἐκστασις*. The theory provides a formula that Philo applies to a wide variety of problems.

It is altogether misleading to speak of Philo's "mystical yearnings" as though a serious doubt of his own Judaism had driven him to take a vicarious comfort in the cultic mysteries. His faith is a glad confidence,⁹⁵ his message a rational hope.⁹⁶ The privilege of "seeing God" is enjoyed periodically.⁹⁷ To be sure Philo lays great stress upon the limitations of human reason.⁹⁸ But this is religious humility, a thing that lies at the poles from skepticism. The search for truth is its own reward and happiness in that search awaits no long deferred success. Willoughby has correctly indicated an element of quietism in Philo but to say that "Philonean regeneration was largely self-induced and was normally experienced in solitude" (op. cit., 259), is to miss the whole point of Philo's laborious distinction between the self-induced "drunkenness" of ecstatic religion and the unexpected "joy" of voluntary good works.⁹⁹

Two elements are blended in Philo's mysticism. He indicates them repeatedly as the "fear" and the "love" of God.¹⁰⁰ The one echoes the austerity of the Hebrew prophet and the sense for the "wrath" of God in moral indignation. The other rests upon the Love of God in appreciation of the appeal of righteousness. Like a double thread of meaning these two elements run throughout all of Philo's thought. They are united at one extreme in a God who exercises benevolent care both to regulate by discipline and to bless by love, the creatures He has made. At the opposite extreme these two elements unite in a human experience that Philo vividly describes as Joy "smiling amid her tears".¹⁰¹

This line from Homer and several lines from the Psalms are used by Philo to describe an overwhelming sense of gratitude by

95 Plant. 85-89; Abr. 200-207.

96 Deus. 48-50; Prob. 68-71.

97 Gig. 47-52; Deus. 152-163.

98 Conf. 122-133; Ebriet, 166; Von Arnim has remarked upon Philo's use of the skeptical tropes to clear the ground for a doctrine of faith.

99 This is the theme of the four connected treatises, Agri., Plant., Ebriet. and Sobriet.

100 Mig. 152-157; Cong. 1 sq. Mut. 134-170; Deus. 69 sq. Cong. 158-167; L. A. III 214-219. The divine names *Kurios* and *Theos* as fundamental to this theme are treated below, p. 237 sq.

101 Som. I 160-188; II 172-180.

which God humbles and delights the soul. After expectant labor and when at the point of giving way in despair the soul suddenly finds the fruits of faith and toil showered upon it. The suddenness and magnificence of the gift make expectations pale into insignificance. Like "bread steeped in tears" the gift comes both to rebuke the little faith that once despaired and to humble man with an excess of love by granting favors too great to be claimed as his due.

As in the case of other typical experiences Philo symbolizes this Joy by the names of Biblical characters. Sarah, "my principdom" gives birth to Isaac "the birth of laughter", the "self-taught wisdom", the man of insight and happiness in whom sincerity, learning and practice have come to be one. We shall endeavor to indicate the congruity of this enlightenment experience with the experiences of the Rabbis as they, like Philo, "rewitness" in their own souls the Oath of God on behalf of Israel. Philo's allegorical method is designed to make available to Gentiles the illuminating experience that is bound up with the devotional study and practice of the Torah.

To lead up to the nature of the ecstatic privilege as Philo views it by a hasty interpretation of his doctrine as a radical dualism of evil "flesh" and good "spirit", is to trifle with Philo as a philosopher.¹⁰² A monistic theme lies at the center of all of Philo's thought however unsuccessful critics have been in the attempt to disentangle that theme from his ethical counsel. It cannot too often be emphasized that Philo allegorizes almost every theme he touches. The very profusion of terms borrowed from the vocabulary of ecstatic experience should be a warning to the careful reader against taking them too literally. His vocabulary of ecstasy like his vocabulary of natural science and ethical counsel has been turned by the inveterate habit of allegory into the technical terms of a philosopher. His cosmology, his psychology and his ethics are forced into the same verbal vehicles. Thus the terms appro-

102 The contrast that Philo makes is between an instrumental good and a justifying motive. In Deus. 140-144, Philo distinguishes a *way of the flesh* from a *way of wisdom*. When selfishness, the symbol for which is *flesh* and *ignorance* is made a finality, the way of *Him* not *it* (αὐτοῦ not αὐτῆς) is corrupted. And this is the *way of wisdom* that leads to God when unselfishly trod. For further reference to the "body" as an instrumental good see Opif. 77-78; Sp. L. I 207-211; L. A. III 73, 138-178; Opif. 170-172; Mig. 101-105.

priate to mystical experience often become tame technical coins in an epistemology, or coloring matter for ethical counsel and abstract metaphysics. They are not reserved for the description of one state of privileged communion with the divine. And furthermore Philo does not describe one such experience of his own as a turning point for his thought. The significance of this must appear as we proceed.

Institutional Background, the Synagogue

There is more in Willoughby's suggestion of the Gentile influence upon Philo to indicate institutional backgrounds for his personal use of the allegorical method than there is to indicate that Philo had compromised his avowed loyalty to Judaism by yearning for his individual salvation. In the fashion set for him by the Haggadic sermon in the synagogue, he turns his borrowings into homiletic instruments by which to promise richer things in the law. Judaism had long maintained the paradox of an individual holiness before a God who mediated his Will through national institutions. However individualistic the sanctions of a Jew might become, Judaism could include him so long as he practiced the law. Those individual sanctions became merely the private rewards of his practice. Individuality never became individualism.

While the Jewish dogmas of righteousness and the promise of the life to come through the law, remain unshaken by the influence of the cults upon Philo, his appreciation of the doctrine of regeneration apparently reacts upon his view of the Synagogue and the Law. His own enlightening experiences apparently suggest a more inspirational function for the Synagogue and a regenerative element in the Law. The stress that he lays upon the Synagogue and his use of the term συναγωγός¹⁰³ makes it necessary

103 This term for "a bringing together" is used but five times but each time in a context that suggests an almost technical meaning. It is used (1) when discussing a gregarious reason by which the dispositions of men become harmonized, Decal. 132, (2) when discussing a principle by which "mind" and "sense" become reconciled, L. A. II 71, (3) when discussing the "reason" in which the Goodness and the Authority of God unite, Cherub. 27, (4) when discussing the "great vow" of personal surrender to God, Sp. L. I, 248, (5) when indicating that laws of God hold the universe in harmony by a sort of persuasion. Plant. 10.

Philo takes over the term ἐκκλησία from LXX to designate the ideal community of Israel. L. A. III 81. It would seem, therefore, that the term resembling the name of the empirical institution refers to a procedure associated with that institution and is viewed in the light of a universal principle.

to place that institution in the background of his thought much as the πόλις must be placed behind the thought of Plato. His freedom as a Jewish scholar to read into the Law through the Synagogue service whatever inspirational message he might have, gave him the opportunity to claim for the Synagogue a capacity to serve individuals who were seeking a regenerative experience through the cults.

Right here may be seen the practical invitation to Philo's personal use of allegory. He is provided with an institution which affords him an opportunity for the homiletic presentation of his rich insights both into religious experience and into the mission of the sacerdotal community represented by the Synagogue and the Law. An appreciation of what the cults could offer to the individual suggests a larger service for the Synagogue and the Law. The Synagogue with the study of the law as a ritual and the practice of the law as credentials of membership¹⁰⁴ might become a center for a ceremonialism in which the moral interest would be colored by a regenerative element not present in the older Phariseism.¹⁰⁵ The Synagogue could begin to meet a need that was later to be satisfied by the Christian church.

The character of Philo's allegorical method would seem to require an institutional background providing for the enlightenment of individuals by a common ceremonial practice which includes an element of credal subscription in lieu of the racial credentials that were becoming increasingly theoretical among the Jews. Brehier¹⁰⁶ has called attention to the germinal idea of heresy that is present in Philo's religious and ethical polemic against a materialistic view of the universe.¹⁰⁷ By intellectualizing a regeneration ritual and by emphasizing the universally ethical character of the Law, Philo would tend to substitute for the national bond which united the

104 Cf. Schürer op. cit., 2d ed., II 2, p. 323, in comment upon Arrian, *Dissertat. Epicteti* II, 9. The Jews offer a stock example of the necessity of conforming practice to principle. Without the practice a convert is not entitled to be called a Jew even though received into religious fellowship.

105 *Praem.* 162-184. The human mind is a counterpart of the divine Word. Hence returning to the sacred laws and exhibiting a sincerity of conscience are but one act of attaining "unexpected liberty". Cf. *Decal.* 132-134; *Det.* 18-21, 58-61.

106 Op. cit., p. 297 sq.

107 L. A. III 13; *Conf.* 144; *Det.* 1-14.

members of the Synagogue,¹⁰⁸ an enlightening acceptance of the Judeo-Hellenic way of wisdom. The institution would still presuppose a religious community but that community would begin to be viewed as a group of like minded initiates.¹⁰⁹

It is possible that some such sect as the Essenes or the problematical Therapeutae, represented for Philo the special emphasis upon individual sanctification that he would include as a feature of Synagogue membership. His high regard for the Essenes¹¹⁰ and indeed for the Pythagoreans¹¹¹, probably indicates a direction of transition which he covets for the more popular Synagogue of normative Judaism. The evidence of his own adherence to the more orthodox body of Hellenistic Jews is sufficient to render it highly improbable that he was himself identified with any divergent sect. It is more probable that he reflects a transformation that is modifying the Alexandrian Synagogue as the influx of Gentile converts and the effectiveness of the allegorical presentation of religious and philosophical doctrine, stirs Hellenistic Judaism to an unusual militancy.

The success of such a movement will explain the bitter opposition of the Gentile religionists in Alexandria who gather under the leadership of Apion and turn to their own ends the weakness of Flaccus the governor and the insane desire of the Roman Emperor Caligula, for divine honors.¹¹² Political and racial jealousies would contribute their share to inflaming the Alexandrian rabble to a cruel persecution of the Jews. But it is significant that a general destruction of the Synagogues in Alexandria preceded the pogrom, according to Philo's account.¹¹³ And it is doubtful that the embassy which Apion headed could have had a

108 It is evident that local peculiarities of language and nationality had led to the establishment of separate Synagogues bearing the title of a home city, even when reestablished in other places. Schürer inclines to the view that the Synagogues of the Libertines, (Roman), Cyrenians, Cilicians, Asiatics and Alexandrians in Jerusalem represented different communities though the reference to them in Acts VI 9, is otherwise interpreted by some critics. That such communities should come to represent varying shades of doctrine seems inevitable.

109 Cf. *Virt.* 35.

110 *Prob.* 75-91.

111 *Prob.* 2-4.

112 Gaius. 120-121; Josephus *Ant.* XVIII 7.2 fin., 8.1; XIX 1.1; Dio Cassius LIX 26, 28; Suetonius, Caligula, 22.

113 *Flac.* 53-54.

political status.¹¹⁴ For the native Egyptians whom Apion apparently represented, according to Josephus,¹¹⁵ did not enjoy a citizenship that was recognized by Rome as was the isopolity of the Jews whom Philo represented as head of the Jewish embassy. It would seem therefore that a smouldering religious feud breaks forth into persecution as religious sects turn from the interminable quarrels, for which Alexandria was notorious,¹¹⁶ and make common cause against the growing popularity of a modified Judaism when the opportunity is presented by the insane desire of Caligula to be worshipped as a God and by the difficult situation in which Flaccus found himself because of his personal insecurity with Caligula. By demanding divine honors Caligula had given the religious feudists of Alexandria an issue by which they could label Judaism,¹¹⁷ discourage converts and wreak their vengeance upon successful rivals. In a city where Jews were so thoroughly at home as they were in Alexandria such a campaign against them must be ascribed to their competitors for religious aggrandizement.

Competition with Gentile Cults and Schools

If we may ascribe to the influence of the cults a tendency of the Alexandrian Synagogue to individualize its appeal there remains to be considered the effect of this influence upon Philo's attitude to the ceremonial law. If as Willoughby suggests, Philo had in-

114 For a discussion of isopolity see Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilization*, pp. 175-177.

115 *Contra Apion*, II 61-78.

116 *Juv. Sat.* XV 33 sq.

117 *Gaius*. 184-206. Cf. *Som.* II 123 sq. It would seem that as Alexandrians the Jewish embassy to Caligula was in a favorable position. But the grounds of the mission on behalf of the Synagogues are cut from beneath the Jewish case by the news that the issue of image worship had been raised in Jamnia and was being pushed to the test by inciting Caligula to profane the temple at Jerusalem by erecting his statue there. Thus the Synagogue issue which appears to have been the chief concern of Philo's embassy becomes a racial issue which subordinates the Alexandrian feud. Philo is embarrassed because he has to fight such renegade Jews or former proselytes as Helicon, now a privileged slave of Caligula. By their intimate knowledge of Jewish customs these court politicians know just how to handle Caligula in order to curry favor with the Alexandrian enemies of the Synagogue. They dare not come out into open hostility to the Jews as Capito is doing in Judea because the Alexandrian Jews and their sympathizers are not as impotent nor as readily identified as are the Jews in Judea. Court intrigue for power in Alexandria thus plays into the hands of the religious rivals of Philo as control is sought over both the Jews and their opponents in Alexandria.

tellectualized a regeneration ritual which he as a good Jew could not perform with the realism that constituted its appeal for Gentiles, he must have violated the Jewish conception of the efficacy of ceremony.¹¹⁸ Such a violation might be expected to react upon his attitude to his own ceremonial law.

It is evident however that Philo discountenanced the tendency of allegorists to neglect the actual practice of the ceremonial law.¹¹⁹ But he distinguishes the things in the Torah that are properly speaking laws and things that are not thus binding although they are "laws" in a broader sense.¹²⁰ The things that are binding are epitomized in the Decalogue. And the Decalogue alone has the unequivocal authority of God.¹²¹ The understanding of the Decalogue will teach an individual the "manner in which the great ceremonies are to be performed".¹²² And this manner is associated by Philo with the Stoic doctrine of the equality of all men as sons of one mother, Nature. The Decalogue is also associated with the Decade which the Stoics by borrowing the Pythagorean use of the myth of the graces led by Hermes, had allegorized into a naturalistic "harmony", a Logos of the world order.¹²³

The Stoicism which Philo would meet directly in Alexandria was that of religionists like Chaeremon and Apion who had turned their doctrine back into Egyptian religious theory by way of an

118 Philo retains (1) the practical obligation of the ceremonial law, (2) the efficacy of ceremony to atone for unintentional sin, (3) the necessity of true repentance accompanying sacrifices for intentional sin, (4) the inadequacy of sacrifice to replace deeds of charity and justice, (5) the general position that God alone forgives and has revealed the law for the practical conditions of such forgiveness as well as assurance of grace.

But Philo has made of the ceremonial law, (1) a "lesser mystery", (2) a civil order, (3) a naturalistic world order, (4) an educational discipline. This results from an attempt to universalize the Jewish community in terms of the cults which are, (1) naturalistic, (2) ritualistic, (3) mystical.

In contrast to the ceremonial law, the written law becomes both a philosophy and a "secret" because it requires individual training to prepare each man to see its universality. Philo therefore places the ceremonial law first as a practical and naturalistic discipline and the written law first as an intellectualization of this discipline. He repudiates the formalism of the Pharisees by insisting that only by intellectualizing ceremonial practice according to a complete philosophy can man attain the proper attitude by which the law may be both practiced and understood. This is to introduce a creed into the ceremonial law. This whole attempt of Philo is seen in Sp. L. I 167-345. Cf. Det. 18-21; Ebriet. 130, 139.

119 Mig. 89-94.

120 Deus. 53 and elsewhere.

121 Decal. 175; Sp. L. IV 132-135.

122 Decal. 36-43.

123 Plant. 127-131; Decal. 26-31; Cong. 88-120.

allegorization of cultic myth. Willoughby cites Apion's application of allegory to the Egyptian God Thoth, "Lord of Divine Words". It would probably be this sort of Stoicism that would suggest to Philo the naturalistic grounding for the Decalogue both as an acted "reason" with regenerative significance and the "voice" of God within the rational or pneumatic soul of each man. It is evident that Philo gives to the Decalogue a creative significance both as an original act of God by which the world came to exist and as an enlightening act of God in the soul of the individual man by which Creation is first viewed in its proper perspective.¹²⁴

This enhancement of the place of the Decalogue brings a theory of the "nature" of man and the world into line with the ceremonial law as conduct of individuals who are "citizens of the world". The Decalogue then becomes a spiritual principle which signifies both the immanence of God in rational man and nature, and the transcendence of God as a Creative lawgiver. This requires a modification of the Rabbinical view of the delivery of the law and the elaboration of the ceremonial law. For it pushes an essential element in the Torah back before Moses to the "birthday of the world".¹²⁵ It makes of Moses the hierophant of a "mystery" established as the Creation which he "interprets". The practice of the ceremonial law is to be retained not so much as testimony to the faithfulness of the nation to God's covenant but as testimony to the harmony of a man's thought and practice with the natural world which God continues to hold in a state of fresh creation. The World and the Law are identical as a way of thinking prescribed by the Decalogue and a way of acting prescribed by the ceremonial law. The naturalism of the Stoics has been turned by way of a pagan ceremonialism into a universal sanction for the Jewish law.

This tendency of Philo to both individualize and universalize the law in terms of "nature"¹²⁶ rather than in terms of the national tradition of Israel must lead him to a different view of The Scrip-

124 Decal. 32-35.

125 V. M. II 209-210.

126 Brehier, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13, notes the parallel between Cicero and Philo in proclaiming a universal law grounded in "nature". Both Roman and Jew have as object lessons a successful legal constitution in an age when most institutions were in flux. From such object lessons, the one civil law and the other a moral law, the conclusion of "natural" conditions satisfied is an easy step.

tures than that held by the Rabbis. Like them he can insist that all is given in the Torah and all that is required is to turn it over and over to find what is sought. But the reason for this is not a unique event at Sinai but an event that goes back to the original creation of the world.¹²⁷ Moses does not lose his place as the great prophet. But he becomes a scribe who is also a hierophant of a mystery and that mystery is not a private or exclusively national possession but it is the whole world as a "temple" of the Most High God. The mystery becomes a philosophical account of nature which is to induce a religious and ethical way of life for every man who will become "initiated" by Moses into the rites of the cosmic temple.

Philo's use of myth and allegory does not therefore liberate a man from the limitations of this world by inducing a sense of identification with a soteriological kurios. But it promises to a man a conviction of kinship with God if he will assume the responsibility of thinking and acting in "accord with nature" as prescribed by the Decalogue. The ceremonial law therefore becomes the practical expression of a way of thinking that has been exemplified in the lives of biblical characters. They function both as mystagogues and as "natural laws". A man is to seek initiation by applying their recorded examples to his thought of God and to his practice of the "laws" they have left behind them.

It is evident that Philo does not ground the ceremonial law in pagan naturalism nor in a Jewish traditionalism. He attempts to bring these together in a principle that can justify both. It shall be our thesis that this principle is history. And we shall attempt to show how the principle grows out of Philo's allegorical method. He repudiates myth as such and he eschews the euhemerism to which traditionalism was tending. But in the very nature of the Midrashic form he finds the means of reconciling the inspirational values of myth with the social values of tradition. It is the opportunity afforded him by the peculiarly Jewish product, the Haggadic Midrash, that makes it possible for him to suggest a philosophy of history.

Before we enter into the discussion of Philo's principle of allegory let us summarize the influences about him that could provide

127 Cf. Pirke Aboth 3.19 (Rabbi Akiba, A. D. 50) "Beloved are Israel in that to them was given the precious instrument wherewith the world was created."

the stimulus for his efforts. There is a popular demand upon Hellenistic Jews to interpret their law in Gentile forms of thought and aspiration. There is prevalent a yearning for individual regeneration, moral guidance and universalistic sanctions. There is the successful application of allegory to the satisfaction of these needs as it becomes an instrument of religious education, philosophic research and ritualistic moral practice. There is a modification of the functions of the Synagogue as it responds to current needs in competition with the cults. There is Philo's personal achievement of a vision of God which reacts upon his view of the moral excellence of the law, the mission of the Jewish community and the individualization of the Messianic hope. There is the opportunity presented by the Haggadic sermon and the scribal school. There is the example of the professional schools of philosophy in which the allegorical method has become a respectable procedure. With these influences playing upon him it remains to be determined whether Philo's method of allegorization is dominated by the legalism and sociality of the Jews or the aestheticism and individualism of the pagans.

Brehier has suggested that in Philo's attempt to universalize the Jewish law there is a use of sacred literature that approximates later Christian practice more closely than Jewish and Hellenistic precedents. We wish to consider Philo's allegorical method in the light of this suggestion. The profusion of uses and devices of allegory that crowd the pages of Philo's works indicates how freely he has drawn upon Alexandrian syncretism. Certain distinctive uses of allegory together with their sources are apparent in Philo's repertoire. Perhaps these may be classified as rationalistic, legalistic and mystical.

Thus Philo parallels the Stoic practice of reading a current natural science into an ancient document and shows a similar predilection for etymological definition as well as other Stoic devices which Siegfried has enumerated. Yet Philo does not merely rationalize the Septuagint as the Stoics rationalized Homer to make it a symbolic natural science.

Philo shows a familiarity with Rabbinic Midrash as well as a concern that the Scriptures remain a practical guide for daily conduct. But his appeal goes beyond a practical legalism in an attempt to stir the philosophic imagination. He would be a scribe for a wider circle than Jews.

Again as Brehier points out,¹²⁸ Philo like the Pythagoreans deduces moral principles from the form of a myth or parable and shows a fondness for number symbolism and certain significant Pythagorean myths. Allegory now becomes an essential element rather than a discipline superposed upon a sacred text. In a manner not unlike the Orphic use of brief passwords, Philo indicates by symbols certain experiences common only to initiates and he suggests the characteristic theory of liberation.¹²⁹ However Philo does not give to numbers a mystical finality and he denounces the mystery cults for their obscurantism and their lack of passion for social justice.¹³⁰

The concurrent use of these three principles of allegory may be associated with the notion that each passage of scripture has its informational, its moral and its spiritual message. In addition to these more complete and deliberate uses of the allegorical craft there may be mentioned Philo's use of expository materials that suggest such sources as the Academy, the Peripatetics, the Cynic-Cyrenaics and the Epicureans. Methodological materials not strictly allegorical also must be mentioned, such as the Skeptic tropes and Stoic diatribes.¹³¹ Then there is a scattering of materials less easy to identify but which may suggest direct or indirect influence of the lore of Egypt, Babylon, Persia and the Orient. In short the Jewish savant would appear to have neglected very little of ancient methods of argument and exposition.

But for all Philo's borrowings it is obvious as Brehier has pointed out, that he has subdued the craft of allegory to the practical interest of education in the Jewish Law. This interest involves a method of inculcation that is characteristic of no one of his many contributors.

128 Op. cit., p. 42 sq.

129 Cong. 180.

130 Sp. L. I 319 sq. Willoughby has remarked that Philo in likening the allegorical reading of Scriptures to the initiation into a cult, "insisted on secrecy" (op. cit., 257). One must take care not to push to an absurdity, Philo's attempt to protect the Scriptures from profanation at the hands of pagans. His most striking admonition to secrecy is associated with the allegorization of the wives of the patriarchs (Cherub. 42, 48). The prevalence of phallic worship in Alexandria would seem to make the reason for Philo's admonition obvious. One must remember that he appeals to publicity in challenge to the cults. His works are obviously intended for general readers and his appeal for serious and devout reading is far above a superstitious occultism.

131 Von Arnim, Quellenstudien zu Philo von Alexandria.

CHAPTER III

ALLEGORY AND THE LAW

The Problem of Exposition

Alexandrian Judaism in Philo's day was apparently subject to several extreme influences which Philo is concerned to harmonize.¹³² There was a party of traditionalists at one extreme, a party of mythologists at another and between the two a public to be instructed.

The traditionalists might deliver the law to a euhemerism and its observance to a conventionalism that must either secularize it or narrow its appeal to exclusive nationalists. Such a treatment of the law must compromise its claim to be a unique revelation of the will of a universal God.

The mythologists on the other hand would throw open the written law to pagan indignities. The loftiness of Jewish monotheism together with the purity of Jewish morals must inevitably suffer from such treatment.

Yet the Scriptures must be interpreted by responsible scholarship lest the popular mind miss the unique excellence of the law by placing its own crude construction upon the sacred literature of Judaism.

It would seem that Philo's interpretative enterprise is pointed to the clearing away from the law a too narrow conventionalism, a too catholic mythologism and a too naive popular reading.¹³³ He provides an object lesson in the proper study of the law so that

"If, O my understanding, thou searchest on this wise into the oracles which are both words of God and laws given by men whom God loves, thou shalt not be compelled to admit anything base or unworthy of their dignity." (*Det.* 13).

To understand Philo's allegorical method we must investigate

¹³² Brehier, *op. cit.*, p. 56 sq.

¹³³ *Post.* 1-7. Philo rejects the literal (κῆρυξιολογικός) and the mythical (μυθικὰς ὑποθέσεις) in favor of the allegorical (ἀλλεγορίας ὁδόν). The literal is untrue. The mythical is impious and atheistic. The allegorical is philosophic. Cf. *Opif.* 157.

the principle by which the Law can be both the Word of God and the legislation of men. Josephus has pointed out¹³⁴ that the Jewish law differed from all other legislation because it alone integrated theory, practice and inculcation. The theology implied by the law, the social order expressing the law, and the educational enterprise that was the law, were but different aspects of one administrative principle which Josephus calls Theocracy. Under whatever name this administrative principle may be designated it involved for Philo no less than for Josephus an established social order, an informed consecration and a continuing instruction. These things are inseparably bound up in Philo's allegorical method. They are indicated by Brehier¹³⁵ as divisions of a method which is concerned at once for tradition, for research and for inspiration.

We shall organize our investigation by attempting to find Philo's answers to three questions. What is the law? How should the law be studied? Who compose the community under the law?

The first of these questions when considered apart from the others appears to bristle with difficulties. But this is due as much to the simplicity of the answer as to the complexity of Philo's exposition. The Law is simply the history of God's dealings with man as a moral being.¹³⁶

It is as Philo attempts to modify current analogies¹³⁷ by which moral law may be conceived without prejudice to a proper religious attitude, that this idea of the law as history emerges to meet his needs. He cannot accept a Chaldean fatalism with its astrology and its deism.¹³⁸ He cannot accept a Stoic natural reason with its pantheism and its self-sufficiency.¹³⁹ He cannot accept a Platonic aestheticism.¹⁴⁰ He can not go all the way with the Cynics in their individualism and their revolt from convention and political law.¹⁴¹ In modifying these modes of conceiving law he is apparently concerned for the suitable personal attitude to law more than

134 *Contra Apion*, II 164-189; cf. *Gaius* 210.

135 *Op. cit.*, p. 45.

136 Colson has aptly likened Philo's work to Bunyan's *Pilgrims Progress*. For an ancient parallel see the Socratic use of the *Odyssey*, *Xenophon*, *Mem.* I 3.7; II 6, 11-31.

137 *V. M.* II 49-52.

138 *Mig.* 184-186.

139 *Det.* 82 sq.; *Sac.* 1 sq.

140 *Opif.* 8-12; *Ebriet.* 133; *L. A.* I 19; *Post* 84-85.

141 *Mut.* 103-105; *Decal.* 4-13.

for a theory of law. But his attempt to describe the sort of law that can justify that attitude leads him to suggest now explicitly and now implicitly the objective features of a law appropriate to a faith in which gratitude, love, courage, and reverence may characterize conformity.

It may seem difficult to attribute the notion of a philosophy of history to an author who violates most of the proprieties of historical perspective in his treatment of the various levels of the Septuagint. It should be recognized however that the placing of ancient documents into historical perspective requires a technique that can develop only after the conception of a philosophy of history has become familiar. The rise of the conception as distinguished from its application to a sacred literature involves the meeting of issues that center in the use of precedents. When precedents become affirmed as things to be reckoned with in daily conduct regardless of any theory or sentiment associated with them the first condition of a philosophy of history has been fulfilled.

Now this attitude toward precedents is involved in the very nature of Midrashic deliberation. It is echoed in the concern of Philo that "landmarks"¹⁴² of custom and example be determinative of practice by a principle of "labor"¹⁴³ when spontaneous virtue does not suffice. There is no great credit in keeping the "written law" for this may be done in superstition or utilitarian "fear". But the ceremonial law, the "unwritten law"¹⁴⁴ of custom and example will be kept by an excess of virtue. Such "landmarks" are not naturalistic ceremonies but an austere discipline¹⁴⁵ that eschews "pleasure" or self-interest. Such an insistence upon the irrefragable nature of precedents may be correlated with a bibliolatriy that is accidental but not with a bibliolatriy that is essential. Hence if Philo's efforts to maintain one level of final authority for all portions of the sacred literature can be explained only by an essen-

¹⁴² Sp. L. IV 149-150; Deus. 63-69.

¹⁴³ Post. 84-101. Philo seems to contrast the Greek method of beautifying the immoral element in ancient rites and myths with the manner in which the Jews develop the ceremonial law when he plays on *πονηρῶν* and *πονηρᾶ*. The law may become *troublesome* but not *wicked*. It is not to be merely beautied but labored at. It then becomes holy, a more than beautiful labor. Cf. Sac. 34-45.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. "unwritten laws" in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, I XIII 12 sq.

¹⁴⁵ In De. Ebriet. 68-70, civil customs are made "effeminate" by contrast with sacerdotal practice which is "masculine".

tial bibliolatry there remains no choice but to follow Caird in his contention that Philo had no notion of developing revelation. If however the bibliolatrrous explanation breaks down then the significant rôle that precedents played in Judaism may be investigated for a possible development in Philo's view of the law.

To state the issue in other terms it may be said that if Philo permits the tradition epitomized in the sacred literature to become a ceremonial for the satisfaction of sentiment or the stimulation of speculation to the prejudice of irreplaceable rules for daily conduct then our case is lost. But if sentiment and theory are to be subordinated to practical obedience then we may ask whether or not the authority for such rules is grounded in history.

The Law Not a Symbolic Poem

Siegfried¹⁴⁶ has given us the typical explanation of Philo's exegetical efforts by the theory of an essential bibliolatry. According to this theory Philo is supposed to regard the Torah as a great symbolic poem delivered at one time in the past by the poet-seer, Moses. Philo's veneration of the Scriptures and the prophet Moses is to be accounted for by analogy with Hellenistic allegorizations of sacred myths and poems¹⁴⁷ and Hellenistic worship of the demi-god wiseman.

146 Op. cit., p. 159 sq.

147 A current example of the confusion that can arise when an inherited literature is not distinguished from verbal tradition may be found in Dr. Fosdick's, *The Modern Use of the Bible*, p. 65 sq. Here a canon is confused with a process of canonization. In his account of allegory, Dr. Fosdick posits among the conditions that give rise to allegorical interpretation of sacred literature, the antiquity of a finished literature and the acceptance of a theory of poetic inspiration. He assumes that these conditions were present in first century Judaism in a manner that justifies comparison with Stoic allegorizations of Homer. And yet he cites the fact that the Song of Songs was excluded from the Hebrew Canon for a long time. He then states, "But allegory won the day" (p. 71), and fails to note that the case runs counter to the theory of allegorical interpretation that he has built up. For it reverses his formula. The canonization of the Song of Songs does not "bear witness to the allegorical accommodation of an old book to a new age" (p. 71). On the contrary it bears witness to the allegorical accommodation of a comparatively new book to an older age. For the factor of antiquity that enters into the canonization of the Song of Songs is not its literary age, real or assumed, but the prestige of the national hero, Solomon and the tradition of a contract relation between Israel and God, things which the new book may be made to signify but not establish. Along with Ecclesiastes the Song of Songs bears witness to the fact that the Hebrew Canon was not closed in the manner required to support the theory of allegorical interpretation which Dr. Fosdick proposes. That canon was open in

To accept this explanation one is forced to impute an inconsistency to Philo when he repeatedly denies that Moses borrowed or composed myths.¹⁴⁸ And one must pass in silence the fundamental incompatibility of Midrashic deliberation with what Siegfried describes as the nature of poetry. Before considering these difficulties in the way of Siegfried's explanations it is important to note a number of things that make it impossible to suppose that Philo seriously considered the delivery of the law by analogy with the writing of a symbolic poem.

Philo's various descriptions of the delivery of the law can not be made to fit in with the notion of a book prepared at one time by a literary seer. He has it delivered in too many incompatible ways. The pervading idea of the theocracy of Israel as a pilgrimage cannot be made to fit the notion of a sect founded by the acquisition of a holy book. The various rôles assigned to Moses by Philo cannot be made to correlate with the functions of the written law as a literature delivered by a poet-seer. Finally the account of inspiration which Philo gives does not accord with the Hellenistic theory of poetic vision.

Philo's whole account of the delivery of the law treats of a past that is neither merely human nor extravagantly supernatural. It carries three themes concurrently. Jewish worship customs and celebrations have their divine origin, their universal meanings and their historical associations. Individual conscience has its divine origin, its common application for all rational men and its perfect historic statement of demands in the Decalogue. The leadership of Moses rests upon the moral example of a permanent service for all people oppressed by materialism rather than upon some artificial inspiration fable.

It is the lasting superiority of Jewish worship customs, Jewish moral practice and Jewish wisdom that warrants the claim for

a manner which permitted debate about the authority of these books on other grounds than their literary antiquity. Dr. Fosdick's account must presuppose a closed canon but his citation of the case of the Song of Songs is a recognition of the fact that this was not the case in first century Judaism. When allegory is made primarily a device for securing credit for texts already sanctioned by literary antiquity, its criticism as such may be relevant to Greek allegorism or to modern difficulties with the Bible that derive from bibliolatry like that of the ancient Stoics. But to force this criticism upon Jewish Midrash and the exegesis of the Hebrew Torah by a Jewish commentator is to disregard the transitional rôle which verbal tradition played in the canonization of both the Old and the New Testament.

148 Opif. 2; Gig. 58; Fuga. 122; Praem. 162.

special prophetic powers in the great Moses. It is the prosperity of Israel that makes manifest how excellent a lawgiver he was. Philo does not hesitate to embroider the claims for the greatness of Moses to suit the fancy or the sophistication of his readers, but such embroidery constitutes variant statements of a privilege established upon independent grounds. The privilege is not the cause but the result of moral character and the use of common knowledge to eulogize most suitably the goodness of God. God spoke face to face with Moses because Moses was "faithful in all my house"¹⁴⁹ a matter of individual consecration rather than personal privilege.

It is a notable feature of Philo's biography of Moses that it should contain the statement that all the things written in the sacred books are oracles of Moses¹⁵⁰ and yet contain no appropriate account of such an important event as the writing of the book containing those oracles should be, if that book were prepared at one given time. The biography contains a marvelous account of the translation of the Septuagint by a species of collective inspiration through which "the first light of interpretation shone forth".¹⁵¹ But it does not seem to be in line with Philo's purpose to give a corresponding account of the preparation of the original documents. There are several different accounts of origins for parts of the written law both in the biography and elsewhere. But in the biography the apparent neglect to enlarge upon the transcription of the original of a holy book stands in sharp contrast with the prominence of the idea of the Jewish community. The theocracy would appear to explain the delivery of the law as in Rabbinical literature¹⁵² rather than the accession of a holy book accounting for the constitution of a state as in the Greek tradition of philosopher lawgivers.¹⁵³ The various ways in which Philo suggests that the written law whether in whole or in part, came to be, lends strength to this idea of the priority of the theocracy.

149 L. A. III 103, 204, 228; II 67; Heres 258-265. The association of inspiration (ἐκστασις) (ἐνθεος) (μανία) with ethical excellence and patriarchal blessing is notable in this last reference. It is claimed for all the patriarchs.

150 V. M. III 188. "I am not unaware that all the things which are written in the sacred books are oracles delivered by him (Moses), etc." Is this a concession or a claim?

151 V. M. II 41.

152 T. K. 85 d; Mechilta, 67a, 67b.

153 Diog. Laert. IX 3.

Explanations of the origin of the written law as suggested by Philo must include the following types of deliverance. There is an accumulation of oracles arising out of various exigencies during the pilgrimage of Israel.¹⁵⁴ There is an institutionalizing of a divine colloquy at Sinai.¹⁵⁵ There is a day of judgment when a constitution is proclaimed for the purpose of allotting rewards and punishments among individuals for their moral achievements under a long training in that constitution, presumably familiar before the formal proclamation.¹⁵⁶ There is an accumulation of legal decisions rendered by Moses and his delegates.¹⁵⁷ There is a preparation for the life of the "cities" by an interpretation of experiences in the wilderness under daily care of God.¹⁵⁸ There is a memorializing of the life and thought of the ancients.¹⁵⁹ There is a patriarchal blessing delivered over a people in the form of a great hymn which recounts the glories of the past and predicts greater things for the future.¹⁶⁰ There is a moral intuition under the figure of the "voice" of God speaking directly in the reason of each man everywhere and constituting the creative act by which the natural world, the reason of man and the written law epitomized in the Decalogue became established upon the creative goodness of God without the agency of any prophet.¹⁶¹ Finally there is a delivery in which God dictates while Moses writes.¹⁶²

To attempt to press these various types of delivery into the idea of the writing of a symbolic poem is to fail to see that Philo's various accounts do no more than introduce different functions of the law. His description of these functions leads him to enlarge upon an appropriate mode of origin for each, without any apparent effort to make these enlargements agree among themselves. His whole account of the delivery of the law presents a confused array of traditional events, moral lessons and symbolic meanings. If there is any thread of order in that array filled as it is with anacronisms and inconsistencies, that thread is not the career of a poet-seer nor the preparation of an original document. That thread is

154 V. M. III 203; 217 sq., 236 sq.

155 V. M. III 71 sq., I 158; L. A. III 100-103.

156 Praem. 3-7.

157 Sp. L. IV 170-175.

158 Decal. 13-17.

159 Abr. 5-6.

160 V. M. III 288-292; Virt. 66-79.

161 Decal. 32-50; Praem. 2; Sp. L. II 188-192.

162 V. M. II, 11.

the pilgrimage of Israel from an undated antiquity to Philo's own day. Catastrophic and cumulative principles of delivery have a common orientation upon a theocratic administration.

That the priority of the functions of the Jewish community over the literary contribution of an individual genius like Moses, is normative to Philo's view of the written law may be seen in the very anachronisms by which scribism is placed back in the time of Moses. Moses is represented as both instituting the Sabbath and the scribal court and using the procedure of those institutions in legislating for his people.¹⁶³ Of course the anachronism may be regarded as merely a device for securing a sanction for the work of the scribes.¹⁶⁴ But even as such a device it reflects a readiness to subordinate the poet-seer to the scribal interpreter. But more than this is involved.

The question at issue concerns the Law itself. Does the practice of the Law come first or must the exact determination of its prescriptions precede obedience? And which of these views does Philo read into the account of the career of Israel? This question involved the Rabbis in debate concerning the priority of practical obedience and theoretical knowledge of the Law.¹⁶⁵ Philo seems to take the first alternative. He says that God-loving men will first practice the law by a sort of inspiration and they will then refer to the written law to demonstrate how good their practice has been.¹⁶⁶

This view of consecrated conduct followed by intellectual justification accords both with the account of the patriarchs as "unwritten laws" of example and with cultic preparations for illumination by ritualistic discipline. Applied to the career of Israel it places the ceremonial law before the written law in point of time. The Law is not "written" upon the souls of the children of Israel¹⁶⁷ merely because they derive their law from Moses. It has always been "written" there as the customs and dispositions of a people led of God even before Moses arose among them to codify their law and put it into literary form. Philo says that no one has ever discovered the beginnings of the chosen people.¹⁶⁸ They have a

163 V. M. III 209-216; Opif. 128.

164 Cf. Josephus, *Contra Apion*, II 175, 184; *Talm. Jer. Megilla*, IV 1.

165 *Pirke Aboth*, 2.2, 3.13, 3.22, 5, 25.

166 *Conf.* 58-59; cf. *Ebriet.* 80-84.

167 *Gaius* 213; cf. *Josephus*, *op. cit.*, II 178.

168 V. M. I 278-279.

human ancestry but their souls are of God. They are distinguished even before Moses can complete his mission, for their "laws" and their "remarkable customs".¹⁶⁹ Philo is not careful to date their "oracles" from some such event as Sinai but assumes that possession before Moses could have completed the giving of the law.¹⁷⁰ Their worship of the golden calf at the very time when Moses might be supposed to be receiving the law on the mount, is considered by Philo to be an apostasy and an abandonment of their "ancient ways" instead of a necessary ignorance of the provisions of the law.¹⁷¹ In short the ceremonial law is read back into the days of the patriarchs¹⁷² when the "written" law subsisted as a rational conscience in the heroes of Israel. It lay as an "unwritten" law for Moses to codify at the consummation of Israel's pilgrimage as a separate nation. Philo apparently regards this consummation¹⁷³ as marking the passing of the day when the law was in obscurity with Israel as a minor political state and the ushering in of a day when with the Diaspora it began to characterize Israel as a spiritual fellowship throughout the whole world. The vindication of a book as something other than laws and customs written on the soul of each Israelite and constituting both the social order and the personal character of a sacred people, is not an apparent concern of Philo. The contribution of Moses would seem to center in the fixing of a method of training rather than in a literary fetich.¹⁷⁴

169 V. M. I 295; III 193; I 31-33; I 73, 216, 238, 242; Sp. L. I 56.

170 V. M. I 207.

171 V. M. III 167; Sp. L. III 124-127.

172 Sac. 52 sq. In reading the Levitical Law into the symbolism of the names of Cain and Abel, Philo seems to distinguish the "greater mysteries" of Moses from the "lesser mysteries" of his interpreters and to throw the latter back before Moses by identifying them with natural conditions of daily life, the material "Egypt" that makes necessary the instruction in the revelation that Moses completed (cf. Cherub 49). By analogy with the cults the "lesser mysteries" would be the preparatory discipline of the ceremonial law by which the inspirational and intellectual significance in the written law becomes available to individuals. The ceremonial law would come beneath and before the true appreciation of the Sacred Book and hence in the life of Israel would be thrown back into the patriarchal period as a preparation for the work of Moses. Pagan naturalism and Jewish traditionalism would thus unite in Philo's application of the idea of initiation to the Jewish Law. Cf. Mig. 13-25.

173 V. M. II 42-44.

174 In *De Cherubim*, 124, Philo supports an argument by dogmatically asserting the authority of the "oracles which Moses wrote in the Sacred Books". It is noteworthy that Philo does this so seldom. To be sure he often refers to the oracular nature of Moses' law but he avails himself of

The task entrusted to Moses was not to introduce innovations but rather to approve the "truths that come from older days" as represented in the "elders".¹⁷⁵ Unlike Abraham, the ancestral father of the Jews, Moses was elected to the leadership of an already organized Israel.¹⁷⁶ He was not the pioneer of Jewish monotheism. He was confirmed in his leadership by God in reward for surrendering his princely rank in Egypt and as a testimony to his personal virtue and his benevolent care for his people. He presented as credentials to the Jewish elders, not a written law, but signs given him by the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, credentials that linked his authority with their own past.¹⁷⁷ He champions a religion already established instead of originating that religion. But he trains the adherents to that religion for a priesthood worthy to offer up prayers for all mankind. He acts as a judge over his people only after their exodus. His mission is consummatory rather than originaive. The law of hope begun in Seth, the law of justice begun in Noah, the law of inspired wisdom begun in Abraham, these reach their consummation in the law of devout care for all uninstructed men, the law of Moses.¹⁷⁸

Philo says that by the term *book* Moses means the "reason of God" as a timeless and invisible process of creation by which the things of sense and mind become ordered for the expression of one causal meaning.¹⁷⁹ Such a generic *book* constitutes a function of reference to a creative God. We must place the term among other terms like *day* and *reason* and *world* and *sabbath* and *synagogos*, a bringing together, to indicate a period, a process and a manifestation of one creative goodness.

the prestige of a Scribal tradition to share the weight of authority for his arguments. He need not and does not rest his case upon a literary form so much as upon the meaning which a suitable exegesis may discover. In short the procedure of Scribism bears as much of the weight of Philo's arguments as the prestige of the author of the literary instrument that centers that Scribism. It is what Moses said that is more important than the fact that it was Moses who said it. In these two considerations lies the dispute between Pharisee and Sadducee. Philo affirms both the sanctity of the written law and the right, nay the duty of exegetical procedure and thus well nigh depersonalizes Moses in ascribing authority to the Law. As we shall see below the greater becomes the authority of the law the less personal becomes the figure of Moses and conversely the more personal becomes the figure of Moses the less authoritative becomes his legislation.

¹⁷⁵ Sac. 77.

¹⁷⁶ V. M. I 148-153, 189; Praem. 57.

¹⁷⁷ V. M. I 72-90.

¹⁷⁸ Post. 173-175.

¹⁷⁹ L. A. I 19-21.

Such a use of the term "book" places the preparation of the sacred literature upon the same footing as the living of a consecrated life whether that life be considered as the life of an individual, a race or a world. It makes the term "book" synonymous with the manifestation of divine reason as a quality of excellence unprejudiced by cumulative or noncumulative modes of expression. Thus the command that forbids additions to or subtractions from the written law¹⁸⁰ is interpreted by Philo to mean that the parts of the written law are like the virtues. Each virtue is complete¹⁸¹ in itself and to increase or diminish its peculiar quality is to change it into a vice. To have one virtue in its purity is to have them all for they constitute a "harmony" and to accept one part of the law is to accept all other parts for they all testify to the same moral origin.

This qualitative unity of the sacred "book" makes the claim for its single authorship ambiguous. It could be a compilation of documents with a single purpose no less than an original composition of one author. Thus Philo says that psalms may be ascribed to the "sons of David"¹⁸² though written long after his time, because they manifest the same "virtue" which began with David. Likewise the "written laws" came long after the "unwritten laws" manifested in the natural lives of the patriarchs but express the same moral reasoning first revealed by the example of the ancients.¹⁸³ Again the "mysteries" of Jeremiah came later than the "greater mysteries" of Moses as more recent expositions of the same divine virtue and cause.¹⁸⁴

Now it may be said that Philo recognized a unity in the Hebrew Canon. It may be said that he accepted without debate the inspiration of each part of the sacred books. It may be said that he ascribed to Moses a profoundly intimate relationship with God and with the written law. But it cannot be said that he made these things explain each other in a coherent theory of poetic or verbal inspiration. The materials of such a theory lie together in his writings. But instead of formulating the theory he accounts for each of its parts separately. In short Philo does not appear to

180 Sp. L. IV 143-148; cf. L. A. III 169-173.

181 For the Stoic idea of the virtues as inseparable see D. L. VII 125; S. V. F. 295 sq.

182 Conf. 149; Agri. 50.

183 Abr. 5 sq.

184 Cherub. 49.

depart sufficiently from the traditional sense of the term *torah*, teaching, to feel it necessary to identify the Hebrew Canon with the sort of literature that must have its unity and authority depend upon an account of one special literary delivery. The unity of purpose in the work of Moses and the unity of meaning in the Hebrew Canon are to be grounded more fundamentally in the universality of moral insight than in the particularity of literary expression however marvelous.

Thus Philo suggests¹⁸⁵ that the manifestation of God's will in the insights of man is a *joy* which by a play on the Greek word "to create" or "to do", he calls "God's poetry". Such "joy" follows the abandonment of evil as "laughter" follows the removal of grief. This "poetry" differs from a charming literary art as the consummate harmony of nature differs from an artificial harmony. That is to say, revelation must be an intimately personal knowledge of ethical reality illuminating with "joy" both the person who has abandoned evil and those who recognize his achievement and "laugh with him". "God's poetry" is not like the aesthetic vistas in a literature that reveals hidden things to an individual but it is like the "deeds" of goodness which make a man shine forth among other men as a witness both to the divine character and to his own abandonment of evil conduct in thought and action.¹⁸⁶ The Jewish idea of "the joy of the law" is brought into contrast with the Hellenistic idea of aesthetic vision by the use of sacred myths.

This ethical emphasis upon revelation is the keynote of Philo's whole thought concerning it. He may leave at loose ends the various suggestions he makes concerning proclamations of the law because when once he has indicated the moral excellence of any part of the law whether in its literal statement or in an allegorization of that statement, its truth for him is laid bare. The debris of incompatible arguments that accumulate under his hand as he strives to display the goodness of the law gives him little apparent concern. For they do not prove or disprove that goodness, they merely stimulate its apprehension. To be sure the goodness of the law is both a personal and a cosmic significance that initiates many delightful speculations. But these speculations can neither

185 Det. 123-125.

186 L. A. II 82.

add to nor detract from its authority. There is a capacity in the moral excellence of the law to secure acknowledgment that seems to be assumed by Philo in a way that makes any studied theory of its verbal inspiration gratuitous.

Lawgiving and Prophecy

Turning now from things that make it impossible to suppose that Philo seriously identified the delivery of the law with the writing of symbolic poetry,¹⁸⁷ let us consider the fundamentally different sphere of thought which is involved in the very nature of Midrashic commentary.

Philo makes a distinction between a Moses who wrote a sacred book and a Moses represented as an actor in that book when he attempts to correlate certain rôles of Moses with certain functions of the written law. This correlation may throw some light upon the sort of literature that Philo associates with the name of Moses.

Starting from the Platonic idea of the philosopher as king and the king as philosopher, Philo divides the mission of Moses into four offices.¹⁸⁸ These are the rôles of king, lawgiver, priest, and prophet. They constitute a "harmony" like that of the virtues but more significantly considered under the figure of the graces. To have one of the graces in perfection is to have them all.

Now the graces as patrons of the various arts of learning may represent in this connection both the perfection of the efforts of Moses in these arts and the providential Logos of Stoic and Pythagorean interpretation of the myth of the graces. But as we consider the nature of this perfection as conceived by Philo we must be struck by his denial of special inspiration to all the rôles of Moses except the prophetic. As a king, a lawgiver and a priest Moses was subject to the limitations of human knowledge and only as a prophet was he especially privileged. This would mean that the work of Moses in the first three rôles whether as literature

187 If a fanciful picture of the delivery of the law is suggested by Philo's consistent association of the delivery of the Decalogue with the figure of a *voice* issuing from a trumpet, that picture is probably drawn from the Synagogue service where trumpets were blown as a part of the service and especially was this significant at the celebration of the feast of trumpets which Philo says commemorated the delivery of the law. The paschal feast is also associated with the delivery of the law. Sp. L. II 188-192; Decal. 33, 159; Praem. 2.

188 V. M. II 2-7; Praem. 53.

or something else, does not have a supernatural status although it is in perfect harmony with divine purposes apprehended by Moses in his rôle as a prophet.

It is clear that Philo does not regard such divine purposes as transcendent objects although they are beyond an unassisted human reason. They more nearly resemble personal motives with which a man comes to pursue a chosen art. The principle of prophecy would seem to lie in the capacity of a man to embody the personal motives which a benevolent God sanctions, by preserving that man's work for the instruction of future generations of men. No man can bring down from above the transcendent object required to convert his limited range of knowledge into a complete science. But a man without omniscience may bring his work into harmony with the Will of God by consecrating himself to God rather than to formal objects. And that harmony will be demonstrated by the endurance of his work rather than by its theoretical completeness.

Philo illustrates this view of prophecy by describing the art of the perfect lawgiver,¹⁸⁹ an art which by the principle of "harmony" must involve the three other arts or offices as well. Moses does not transmit formal statements emanating from God nor does he work under a divine intoxication. He thinks and acts as a man. But he brings to the art of lawgiving the ethical motives that are appropriate to that art. These are humility, the love of justice, the love of virtue and the hatred of iniquity. They are innate in the disposition of Moses. He first expresses them in his private conduct and then embodies them in his public words and deeds. The *good* was in the "hands"¹⁹⁰ of Moses in the sense that the expression of the good must originate in the spontaneity with which certain words and deeds forever witness to the creative goodness of God.

Now Moses could perform those deeds and speak those words because of his godlike motives. But the continuance of their ethical propriety for all men is accountable only by the providence of God. Thus Philo considers it a marvelous thing that Moses should have adopted just those motives that are appropriate to the

¹⁸⁹ V. M. II 8-11; Mut. 236-237.

¹⁹⁰ Det. 122.

art of lawgiving. No other man has ever done so. Yet this is no more than is to be expected of any man who places a Good God before his own private ends and public policies so that his sense for moral reality can be prompted into action by God. There is however evidence of a greater miracle in the work of Moses. It is that the deeds and words which Moses as a man used to meet the needs of his people and to express his own consecration to God should continue to be the norms of thought and conduct which can satisfy the ethical appreciations of all men since that time. This constitutes a stress upon the ceremonial law over the written law.

Philo takes pains to assemble evidence of this greater miracle of the law.¹⁹¹ It is no digression that leads him to turn from Moses to the evidence of the militancy of the law in Philo's own day. For however Moses deserves to be praised for his prophetic discovery, his person is not to be set up as an object of worship. Nor indeed is his wisdom and his natural science to be so regarded. The miracle could suggest these things but Philo does not beg the question by recourse to them. He appeals to the historical permanence of the law rather than to a theoretical omniscience of the lawgiver. The law is "stamped with the seal of nature" not as a theory of nature but as a statement of the actual conditions which have in the past and continue in the present to provide the means of witnessing to the unchanging will of God.

The sort of evidence which Philo sets forth indicates why the law is to be regarded as the work of a prophet. There is the remarkable fact that the Jews throughout a precarious history have continued to find an abiding excellence in the law. But this, however impressive it should be for a Jew is far less wonderful than the fact that other peoples prone to elevate their own laws and customs by despising the laws of others, should recognize the unique excellence of the Jewish law, and the more so as virtue is honored among such critics. A variety of laws and customs among different peoples and among the same people at different times have given rise to jealousies, revolutions and change. But

191 V. M. II 12-36. This constitutes praise of Moses as a lawgiver before turning to his "sacred writings" for evidence. Cf. V. M. I 4 where Philo claims to be better informed on the life of Moses because he supplements the account in the Scriptures with his intimate knowledge of the verbal tradition.

the Jewish law is not thus local and temporary for it has demonstrated its capacity to replace such temporary laws. Finally there is the great object lesson of the acknowledgment which the law has won in Alexandria both by its translation into the Greek and by the fact that it continues to become a satisfying discipline for increasing numbers of the most various peoples.

There are three different points made by Philo in appealing to the historical permanence of the law. It has remained unchanged in the guardianship of Israel both in its practice and in its verbal statement. It makes for a permanent social order. It satisfies the personal needs of a wide variety of peoples. These are marvels open to the public view and not theoretical claims of an esoteric sect or an erudite scholar who exploits a few similarities of customs among Jews and Gentiles.¹⁹² Philo's view of prophecy is bound up with the justification of the work of Moses by appeal to the sufficiency of the law to meet ever recurring conditions of moral living without any necessary dependence upon the person of Moses as a demi-god.

It is therefore the universal applicability of the law as a ritual which proves that Moses was a prophet, and not some theoretical omniscience in Moses that proves the universal truth of the law. Moses the man in legislating for his own people wrought far better than he could know at the time for it now appears that by the providence of God the work that he did has been preserved to bless all people. This is why Moses must be accounted a prophetic discoverer.

Now Philo's discussion of the rôles of Moses indicates the plan of the biography and its place as an introduction to the detailed description of the provisions of the law. That plan consists in weaving the history, the worship customs, the literature and the promise of Judaism about four offices performed by the law. The figure of Moses provides the symbol for the organization of these offices. The rôles of king, lawgiver, priest, and prophet constitute a "harmony" in the sense that the responsible actions, the considered words, the commemorative institutions, and the hope for the future, identified with the leadership of Moses who was a

¹⁹² Philo, like Josephus and Aristobulus, cites the prevalence of the Sabbath and "the fast". V. M. II 21-23; Josephus, *Contra Apion* II 281-283; Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* XIII 12. But it is to be noted that Philo does not stress particular customs but rather "natural" proprieties.

man of limited knowledge but of prophetic judgment upon personal motives, continue to provide the one perfect manner of witnessing to the unchanging will of God. Thus Moses as a responsible executive, an "unwritten law"¹⁹³ of example, the author of a "written law" and the consummator of a ceremonial law, is but the one symbol of godlike motives imbedded in the law as a natural instrument. The person of Moses does not subsist apart from his rôles as something needed to sponsor the law. But the spontaneous motives that give character to the whole Mosaic tradition remain therein as things that can be recovered and appropriated by any man who will accept the law as an art by which to express moral reality.¹⁹⁴

Moses the philosopher-king did not bequeath his responsibilities to any official or hereditary personages.¹⁹⁵ He left his perfected offices to a theocracy, the members of which are identified by their capacity to see the providential nature¹⁹⁶ of the law and by their willingness to administer the offices of Moses¹⁹⁷ in their private and public conduct. That is to say the law remains as a group of inseparable offices to be regarded both as the institutions of a community and the responsibilities of each of its members.

The law thus preserved is a "written law" in a metaphorical sense and in a literal sense. In the metaphorical sense it includes the history and institutions preserved in the "memory" of Israel, among which the sacred literature is but one feature. In this sense it is a law of "fear"¹⁹⁸ to be enforced by the fiction of a vengeful God when necessary but not by the fiction of a messianic administrator or judge. It is the "landmarks" of a people that constitute obligations upon daily conduct that must never be explained away

193 Decal. 1.

194 Mut. 125-129; Mig. 126-142; Praem. 79-84. In some manuscripts this last passage is entitled Benedictions.

195 Virt. 1-65.

196 Decal. 15-17.

197 Praem. 53-57.

198 Deus. 63-69; Det. 41-44. Joseph, the "political" mind, is to be instructed by Moses, the law, not as a myth maker or interpreter would train the imagination (the concern of Plato), but as a practical physician would put a patient through a regimen. That is to say the ceremonial law is a practical preparation for the imagination which "must be content to wait until God shall have equipped in addition the most perfect interpreter". The "deceit" which Moses practices on the "patient" is not doctrinal. It is the fact that the ceremonial law must appear meaningless until its practice has created that "health" of mind which can be enlightened by the study of the written law.

but must be observed by the free choice of each member of the theocracy.

Now to insure that this free choice shall be purified of superstition and self-interest there has been provided an educational enterprise by which to eradicate the "diseases of the mind", not indeed as a teacher would propound a convincing theory but as a practical physician would care for the health of a patient.¹⁹⁹ One is reminded of the educational project proposed by Plato in "The Republic". But there is this fundamental difference. Israel presents an object lesson in which there has actually been demonstrated the practicability of a community life founded upon the directive service of the Synagogue and scribalism. The rigidity of tradition and the freedom of conscience have become practically reconciled in the administration of that community. There is no need to construct myths calculated to inculcate the proper attitudes in this citizenry. Its own history has been rehearsed for that very purpose. There is no need to wait wistfully for the perfect philosopher-king. He has accomplished his work by giving the sort of law that makes his continued presence dispensable. The community that Philo eulogizes like the state that Cicero rationalizes draws its authority from the acknowledged success of an object lesson rather than the dream of a poet. Philo's theocracy is not a city coming down from heaven but a human pilgrimage directed by "oracles which are both the words of God and laws made by men whom God loves."

This educational enterprise which makes dispensable the continued presence of the philosopher-king, centers in a use of the sacred literature of Israel. Here is a book that teaches men how to think and act and worship as members of the theocracy. It teaches men how to exercise the offices of Moses. Consequently we find Philo dividing that literature according to the use that is to be made of it in the several rôles.

199 For Philo's protest against *physicians* see Brehier, op. cit., 56. "Physicians" are Jewish naturalistic mythologists. But Moses is a *practical physician*, one who educates through a ritual that is neither convention nor myth, but a training for the understanding of a philosophic allegory. Abr. 99; Ebriet. 81; Post. 7; L. A. I 59.

The Divisions of the Torah

As these divisions²⁰⁰ are examined it becomes apparent that they do not permit of a partitionment of the literature as such. Nevertheless they are not incompatible with an editorial authorship, a commentary on the lives and thoughts and moral examples of the ancients as is suggested by Philo elsewhere. (*Abr.* 5-6).

A comparison of various statements of the divisions throughout the works of Philo suggests that the principle of division is functional more than literary although the three parts of the Hebrew Canon bear some relation to the analysis.²⁰¹ We do not find degrees of authority for different parts of a sacred literature but we find different types of sufficient authority that are more or less relevant to different portions of the literature. There are three such types of authority and they correspond to the three divisions of the literature which Philo makes.

He distinguishes between things revealed by God himself, things revealed in dialogue between God and Moses and things revealed by Moses in his own person as a fully inspired prophet. These divisions should be compared with Philo's classification of "dreams".²⁰² Here we have "dreams" that record visions provided by God directly as though man as an inactive observer beholds a spectacle. We have also "dreams" in which the individual mind cooperates with the universal mind as though man learns by cooperative practice to forecast the future or outcome of such practice. And in the third place we have "dreams" that are man's own interpretations of obscure things of which he has individual knowledge. These are enigmatic expressions of individual experience which a man tries to explain to others.

The threefold division of "dreams" and oracles would seem to

200 V. M. III 187-191; II 45-48; *Praem.* 1-2; *Abr.* 1-5.

201 The Jews distinguished the Pentateuch, the Prophets and the Hagiagrapha or Writings. It was all *law* in a functional sense. Halakic Midrash might use texts from any portion of the Canon even though for purposes of classification the Prophets were regarded as commentary on the Pentateuch, the Pentateuch regarded as history as well as law and the Psalms regarded as consolatory. See Schechter, *op. cit.*, ch. VIII. It is in the meaning of *torah* as teaching whether as a general principle or a specific injunction that the functional unity of the Scriptures lay. Philo appears to enlarge the significance of *torah* to include the ceremonial law as *instruction* by practice in which the student is a participant before he is a thinker, a "hearer" before a "seer".

202 *Som.* I 1, II 1-6.

mean that revelation has three aspects. There is an objective aspect. Man must learn from things that are presented from without by God, things that are not projections of man's own mind but facts to be observed. There is an active aspect. Man must learn by experience and that experience is a cooperative enterprise in which the interplay of man and his world are like question and answer which teach man how to anticipate or foretell outcomes of conduct. There is an intellectual aspect. The insights which an individual achieves are framed in the form of parables or theories which are enigmatic or merely suggestive to other men. These three aspects of revelation may be called three ways of knowing, namely knowing by "seeing", knowing by doing and knowing by interpretation.

In the sacred literature the subject matter of these three classes of revelation is the same. It consists in an account of creation, a group of biographies and a legal code. Under the first classification, this content constitutes a history, under the second a liturgy and under the third a spiritual promise.

When Philo likens the written law to a natural history that reveals to man that God is both Creator and Lawgiver he seeks to identify its authority with the very nature of the world and man as rational. As we consider this claim we are reminded of the division which Philo makes by a dichotomy that suggests the customary distinction between *Haggadah* and *Halaka*.²⁰³ This dichotomy can not be strictly literary. The Creation account is not to be considered as finished with the close of the cosmological legend.²⁰⁴ Philo makes it run on into the "genesis" of moral traits in the biographies into the description of the temple worship and into the account of the creative act by which the Decalogue becomes the generic principle of a legal code. Similarly the legal particularizations of the Decalogue are not separable from the rewards and punishments manifested in the biographies where "general laws"²⁰⁵ are also particularized in human experience. Again the festivals and celebrations ordained by the law are inseparable from the deeds of God in natural and human history.

The dichotomy does not separate a prologue from a ritual and a legal code. It distinguishes the authority of a natural experience

203 V. M. II 45-48.

204 Cf. L. A. I 5-6, 16-18.

205 Decal. 19; Abr. 4.

which may be shared by all rational and devout men from the authority of a seer that must rest upon some prophetic privilege. It goes behind that privilege to more inclusive "general laws".

These "general laws" are the things provided by God Himself to train each man to virtue and happiness.²⁰⁶ That is to say, it is God alone Who provides a natural world a succession of human examples and a capacity in the reason of each man to apprehend the validity of the Decalogue. These things constitute a "right reason"²⁰⁷ the authority of which resides in the very "nature" of a benevolent God, a providential world and a moral intuition.

To such authority Moses can add no weight. He is himself but one of the "unwritten laws" of human example but he interprets the experiences of men in the "wilderness" of this world both retrospectively to comment upon the past and prospectively to apply a Decalogue which he did not originate to details of human experience which he does not fabricate. As an "interpreter" he is king and lawgiver but not priest and prophet. For although the king is a "living law" and the law a "just king",²⁰⁸ Moses does not make things right by commanding them. He commands things because they are right. He does no more than recommend the things already provided by God for the training of men to virtue and happiness. His greatness lies not in revealing a predetermined justice which will trap the violator and guarantee great treasure to even the fool's accidental observance, but in inviting men to make trial of a justice which invents a new and appropriate denouement for each man's spontaneous acceptance and use of such a justice.²⁰⁹ He offers a moral interpretation of God's deeds in nature and human affairs that any man can validate by appeal from the interpreter to the higher authority of his own moral experience.

The Law as History, Midrash versus Poetry

This first functional division of the sacred literature presents it as a great Haggadic Midrash rather than a sacred myth or philosophical poem. The two literary forms are bound up with two dif-

206 V. M. III 189; cf. Mig. 14-21.

207 Ebriet. 142-143; Prob. 46-47, 62; Ebriet. 80-81; Mig. 127-131.

208 V. M. II 4-5; Det. 141; cf. Clement, Strom. II 4; Plato, Sympos. 196 C; Girgias. 484 B; Aristot. Rhet. III 3.

209 V. M. II 45-53.

ferent habits of thought. The Midrashic form was almost without parallel outside Jewish literature. It subjected legend and folktale to a reworking by linking it with a biblical verse in homiletic fashion and drawing a moral lesson. The existence and importance of this form in Jewish literature might be expected to have a greater influence upon Philo's habits of thought than the prevalence of the Hellenistic theory of poetry to which Siegfried appeals. The fundamental difference is this. Midrash makes contact with moral authority while poetry according to the Hellenistic tradition makes contact with natural science. They involve different accounts of authority, of origins and of inspiration.

It scarcely seems surprising to find that for Philo the Jew there is a greater propriety in the Midrashic form as a vehicle for the teaching of moral law than there is in the form in which current treatises on law are to be found among other peoples.²¹⁰ Moses did not compose or borrow myths. He used legendary materials in a different manner than such things are used in the prologues to current treatises on law, the style for which was set by Plato. On the other hand Moses did not set up arbitrary or abrupt decrees like the laws of an autocrat or the maxims of the Stoics.²¹¹ He made the authority of the law persuasive in a manner no less philosophical than do the writers on law who use the device of the sacred myth or naturalistic poem.

The sacred myth was calculated to mediate a general truth by the use of symbols whose beauty could allay the skepticism and the impiety of the uninitiated.²¹² The works of Moses reveal "general laws" in the lives and reasonings of the ancients and the appeal of beauty is replaced by an oracle of God which allays indecision by stating, "This is my everlasting name; I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob."²¹³ Moral insight into the significance of the lives of the patriarchs replaces aesthetic vision into the essential nature of God. In poetry the

210 Opif. 1-6.

211 Cf. Cicero. De Finibus IV, ch. xix.

212 Siegfried, op. cit., p. 10-11.

213 Abr. 48-55. Here *grace* is a function of reference to God which in the lives of holy men indicates the moral quality of the end toward which they aspire. Grace is bestowed by God upon a certain type of "reasoning" as peculiarly appropriate to that "reasoning". Which is to say that moral quality is a characteristic of human reason imputed by God and witnessing to His moral character among men who can appreciate the Godlikeness of His human witnesses. Cf. Virt. 187-188.

wiseman by his "inward touch" may expect to read a final science. In Midrash the reasonable man may by the "voice" of God expect to read the Decalogue as the moral reasoning that underlies all Creation. In short Moses the scribe may be supposed to have gathered legendary materials and referred them to the "Word" of God proclaimed as oracles which attest the moral significance of the patriarchs and the rational significance of the Decalogue. The works of Moses are naturalistic in a practical sense. They provide a well attested prescription for the conduct of each "citizen of the world". But in the sense of a final knowledge, a natural science, the account of the world Moses gives is but the eulogy or hymn of a devout man attempting in a confessedly inadequate manner to praise the works of God.²¹⁴ They constitute a descriptive natural history rather than a final natural science.

Let us press the contrast between Midrashic wisdom and poetic vision a step farther by considering the account of origins which Philo treats in the genealogies. His play on such words as "genesis" and "generic" and "generated" and "general" in their Greek equivalents is of interest.²¹⁵ But it is the homiletic interest that we wish to note. Philo's account of origins differs from a pagan account as a moral succession differs from an animistic succession.²¹⁶ The latter leads back to a supernatural ancestry, the former to a human ancestry that "witnesses" to the moral character of God. The rise of moral traits among men is explained in terms of the "graces" of God. But these are not accidents of birth due to intercourse with the gods but endowments of reason redounding to the everlasting credit of the patriarchs. We do not trace our ancestry by accidents of birth, says Philo, but by the likeness of our conduct to examples in the past.²¹⁷ The descent from men first favored by intimacy with Deity runs through the moral lessons they leave to posterity rather than through any animistic continuity.

The law written upon the soul of each son of Abraham is not some reincarnation adding glamour to a proud race but a rational endowment by which an individual may test his adherence to a moral standard. However shadowy the figures of the patriarchs

214 Opif. 4-6.

215 Abr. 31-36; Det. 138-140; Sac. 5-10; Cherub. 4-10.

216 Cf. Cong. 44.

217 Virt. 194-198; cf. Praem. 152.

may become, their function as pegs upon which to hang the "unwritten law" of example and custom is to testify both to the practicability of the law, (its grounding in nature) and to the moral character of God. Instead of standing forth as heroes to be worshipped and reincarnated they are used to develop the idea of the Zakuth of the Fathers into a theory of individually enlightened conscience.

Philo suggests²¹⁸ that Noah and his predecessors constitute a law for all men, a minimum justice, while Abraham and his followers constitute a law for Israel, a moral fellowship rather than a racial tradition.²¹⁹ Moses is significantly neglected in the discussion.

Although the ancients in becoming norms of conduct are well nigh depersonalized they do not become abstractions manipulated in a moral formula. They are generalizations upon human experience, types taken from life²²⁰ rather than poetic figments to adorn a tale. As such it is irrelevant to regard them as good or evil spirits. They represent the human capacity to reflect various shades of moral quality according as they stand near or far from God in some particular trait.

Whether or not Philo was particularly interested in history, his homiletic presentation of the patriarchs and indeed of the Creation, required that he give them the equivalent of an historical status. This is required by the very nature of the effectiveness of Midrash.²²¹

The myth or poem may present good and evil in character and event without the need of historical grounding because the appeal is primarily aesthetic. But the myth must defeat the ends of moral exhortation by the very force of its appeal. It may present a good that one could wish might be or it may excite a horror of an evil before which one shudders. By the very nature of such appeals there is suggested an unusual privilege or a supernatural punishment which in proportion as they stir the imagination reduce moral conformity to a wistful futility or superstitious servility. In recognition of this, Plutarch²²² shows how the fictions of poets

218 *Virt.* 201-206, 226-227. "The seven precepts of the children of Noah" appear from the Talmud to represent a minimum law for all mankind. *Aboda Zara* 64 b; *Sanhedrin*, 56 b.

219 *Cf. Sp. L.* I 51-55.

220 *Abr.* 9-14.

221 *Cf. V. M.* II 59-60.

222 *On How a Young Man Should Read Poetry.*

unlike the historical object lessons of philosophers must be thoroughly humanized before they can be safely read by youths. He appeals from the authority of the poets to an impersonal Fate or Fortune. And this if he had applied it consistently would have made moral exhortation irrelevant. The lack of an historical claim in the moral appeal makes morality individualistic and irrational. Both "love" and "fear" lose their social media of expression.

It is to be observed that for Philo "fear" has little of the uncanny or eerie about it.²²³ There is no Satan in Philo's scheme. That is to say, "fear" has a minimum of the aesthetic about it. It is a social force, a pressure upon the individual to conform to group customs. Likewise "love" has little of the individualistic or personal element about it. It must not be permitted to lead a man from the social group toward the supernaturally beautiful where the group may not also go. The "love" of God is but half a virtue without the "love" of men.²²⁴ This failure to make "love" more personal must not be accounted a shortcoming in Philo's thought. On the contrary it is a moral strength pitted against the aestheticism that would make the ethical object supernatural and anti-social. Philo is embattled against that influence in the myths that tends to separate good and evil from a social context. He is preparing the ground for the claims of the Christians, claims that rest upon a personality that is both historical and transcendently beautiful.

It is required of a moral exhortation that is to be both effective and reasonable that its characters and events be grounded in the daily circumstances of social life. Such a status may be described as "natural" or historical the first being the general and the second the particular term to indicate the necessity of reckoning with those characters and events on the plane of human conduct. The

223 The formula *like a man* is correlated with the *fear of God*, God as an anthropomorphic lawgiver and hence vengeful while the formula *not like a man* is correlated with the *love of God* as merciful and benevolent, a lawgiver far removed from the petty and dictatorial human weakness. Deus. 69; Sac. 101.

Violation of the law brings, (1) poverty, (2) slavery under foreign enemies, (3) disease of body, (4) superstitious fears. Hell is a life of wickedness which makes a man a slave to sensuality (Cong. 54-57), and in general a turning from God to material things. (Heres. 77-79, 45; Som. I 151-152). However in Gig. 47 Philo does suggest the *fear of God* as superhuman.

224 Decal. 106-110; Abr. 208.

hortatory effectiveness of Midrash requires that its characters be stripped of special privileges and their example made practicable in order to carry the conviction of a reasonable moral obligation to emulate them. The patriarchs, says Philo, demonstrated that the law is both in accord with "nature" and practicable for each man.²²⁵ The principle is similar for examples of punishment. Such examples lose their force if made unnatural. Cain is not slain by an angry God.²²⁶ He is left to wander in superstition upon the earth.

So far as credulity is concerned Philo has little complaint to make against the supernaturalists. But his concern for practical morality and his inheritance of a form of exhortation developed about that concern required that the supernatural either be subdued or transferred to a plane of morality that is possible and therefore obligatory for ordinary men. A law presented in the Midrashic form must identify "nature" with history in order to emphasize moral obligation. The inevitable appeal of practical morality is to history.

Considerations of this sort explain what Philo means when he describes what the Jews do on the Sabbath day as a study of the "laws of nature" and indicates that what is studied is the philosophy of the fathers.²²⁷ The Jews study what ought to be done and said by bringing particular cases before the interpreters of what has been done and said by typical men in the past. The Synagogue is a school of natural philosophy and moral practice because it eschews the empty theory of the Sophists and the self-indulgence of theatrical amusements and idolatrous worship.

Philo's recommendation of the Synagogue service with its Midrashic form of deliberation must be considered in the light of what he would have it replace. It is to be a substitute for such various things as philosophic schools, courts of law, deliberative assemblies, games, pageants, celebrations of mysteries and rituals of worship. It is an all inclusive institution because its practical, its theoretical and its inspirational functions are inseparably bound up in what Philo calls a philosophy composed of intentions, words and deeds.

Thus Philo does not object to the myths on grounds of credibil-

225 Abr. 5.

226 Det. 163 fin.

227 V. M. III 209-216.

ity nor indeed to the mythological presentation of theology and ethics. What he deplores is the failure of these things to issue in moral practice and the tendency of them to pander to a self-indulgence that ranges all the way from sophistry to sensual lust. He gives an object lesson in the manner in which Caligula might have interpreted the fables of the gods whom he impersonated had he done what Philo considers the only legitimate thing to do in celebrating such fables, namely used them to stimulate an emulation of the practical services to men that they pictorialize.²²⁸

It would appear that the Synagogue service typifies for Philo the capacity of Haggadic Midrash to create a moral enthusiasm where the various uses of myths have failed because of the hedonism that has come to characterize their celebration. The "laws of nature" with which Haggadah deals have more to do with human nature than with natural science. But the term is suggestive of that austerity of the Stoics with which a Jew may concur in so far as it indicates moral duty. On the other hand the celebration of the Sabbath as the "birthday of the world" suggests the fervor of the cults. But no "fire" is to be handled. That is to say no art is to be prostituted and no private interest indulged. The "birthday of the world" indicates both the delivery of the Decalogue and the appreciation of the "sport" of God²²⁹ in creating a world which men are prone to take for granted in their familiarity with the daily conditions of life. On the Sabbath a man should contemplate the world as an ever freshly repeated deed of God making manifest that God lavishly supplies the commonplace necessities of man out of an exuberance of good will. Here is a miracle of providence repeated daily for no other reason than the high spirits of an incalculable Deity.

What might otherwise become a euhemeristic convention²³⁰ is to be lighted up with an enthusiastic gratitude. And what might otherwise be futile ecstasy or a selfish indulgence is to be disciplined by the prose of past experience.²³¹ Midrashic deliberation

²²⁸ Gaius. 76-114.

²²⁹ V. M. I 212-213.

²³⁰ Det. 18-21.

²³¹ Sp. L. II 46 ὥς ἐπὶ παλαιοῖς καὶ ἐώλοις ἀμαυρὰν τὴν ἀντίληψιν ποιουμένης. Stoic *imperturbability* and Epicurean *anticipation* are to unite in the proper attitude because unexpected things are robbed of their strangeness by the historical outlook. This is a *εὐπαθεία*. It describes a faith that finds the evidence of God's care not wholly unexpected nor fully deserved as would a man who is ignorant of God's workings in the past or is over sure of himself and his own judgment.

with its practical emphasis and its historic vistas may serve in lieu of both the orgiastic cults and the aesthetic contemplation of moral truths. Historical vision leading to moral practice is to replace aesthetic insight leading to empty dialectic.²³²

This conclusion would appear to be involved in the manner in which Philo suggests that the first functional division of the law may serve the purpose of a divine mystery and yet disclaims an inspirational authorship for the interpreting scribe Moses. Here the "voice" of God is mediated to each man and yet the material is written up by Moses in his most human and limited rôle. Here the agency of the prophet is disclaimed in favor of "truths that come from older days". This "division" of the sacred books is at once the most inspiring to the reader and the least inspired by the writer.

History and Moral Insight

This otherwise ambiguous status becomes clarified when we note the reasons which Philo assigns for the composition of the law as history and the manner in which history should be studied. He repudiates hedonism, authoritarianism and nationalism.²³³ He says that Moses wrote the law as a history for advantage and not for pleasure.²³⁴ It is not to be read merely for the delights of knowledge, for the fostering of civic virtue, nor for the prestige of ancient opinion, as worthy as these things may be. The law was written as history so that each student may be liberated from the teachings of men and rise to a self-inspired wisdom that comes only to "God's scholar, God's pupil, God's disciple". That is to say, the satisfaction of learning the sentiment of patriotism and the glamour of ancient wisemen, pale into insignificance before the broader vision that comes to a student who "sees" his heritage as more fundamentally the evidence of the providence of an ageless God than the teachings of men. He sees precedents as the deeds of God expressed in the words and actions of men. From such a view of precedents he may rise to fresh speculations upon the providence of God in thus indicating His purposes.

The student does not introduce innovations by interpreting the

232 Det. 72-78.

233 Sac. 76-79.

234 V. M. II 47-48.

lessons of the past. But he does find a novelty and freshness of insight by repudiating a servility before the prestige of teachers however famous, or customs however redolent of group sentiment. He is no longer a "hearer" of these things, but one who "sees" for himself that God has written into these precedents the lessons that need not be ascribed to human authority.

To read the law as a history is to become one's own scribe in the use of a body of precedents that ever suggest new meanings in old ways of conduct. It is to transform a social heritage into personal theocracy.²³⁵ One becomes his own "king, interpreter and law-giver". God speaks directly to him because he cherishes no illusions of dependence upon human authority. He has become responsible to God alone by coming to see how he may bring his deeds and his words into harmony with each other and with the world of common experience.

This use of the written law involves a certain conception of God which is correlative with a certain personal attitude. To describe this we must consider the different ways in which precedents as such may be received.

Now a precedent may be received with different motives that fall into one of two general classes. There is the servility of "fear" and the spontaneity of "love". A literalist must read the law in fear. For him it must represent God legislating for His people "as a man would instruct his son".²³⁶ He can rise to no higher conception of God of law and of lawgiving than that which follows the analogy of a human ruler and teacher who dictates tasks with penalties. The letter of the law must correspond with fear and punishment rather than with reason and final causes. As a literalist he must ever be haunted by the fear of transgressing a revealed knowledge, an ancient national custom or an authority delegated only to the divine Moses. In all this he entertains a low opinion of God no matter how punctilious may be his observance of the letter of the law. He is deceived by Moses for his own good as an ignorant patient must be deceived by a practical physician.

²³⁵ Abr. 22-30.

²³⁶ Deus. 47-76. It is important to note that Philo introduces the "fear" and "love" principles by the doctrine of freedom. It is this doctrine which requires as its complement a law which is neither fatalistic nor sentimentally idealistic. It requires a law of historical precedents as a principle, however poor the perspective of such "history" may be.

But this literalist will not improve his motives nor his conception of God by merely supposing that it is in a mythical sense alone that God instructs his people "as a man would instruct his son". He had better remain deceived by Moses and observe the precedents. For Moses was a practical physician²³⁷ and not a theorist. That is to say, Moses was not the sort of "physician" which Brehier²³⁸ suggests was identified by Philo with the naturalistic mythologists. Literalism cannot purify motives by merely turning to mythology. For the literalist and the mythologist are both anthropomorphic in their conceptions and their motives. They both hold superstitious notions of God. They both defer to human analogies for their view of law and lawgivers. They both show a servility before the opinions of ancient wisemen. They read the Word of God in "fear", that is to say with calculation for a personal advantage of some sort or other.

In contrast with both the literalist and the mythologist there stands the figure of the God-loving allegorist. He reads the written law with the same seriousness as the literalist. But he never confuses precedents for action with anthropomorphic authority. He looks for the inner "soul" or purpose that once expressed through the letter of the law a testimony to the creative goodness of God. He allegorizes precedents in order to eliminate superstition and selfishness from his practice of them. He observes the precedents as faithfully as the literalist but the compulsion of "fear" has become an eagerness to renew on the highest possible plane the ancient testimony to the goodness of God. To him "God is not as man" and the letter of the law provides the opportunity for frequent acknowledgment of that eternal fact.

However far apart the God-fearing literalist and the God-loving allegorist may be in their motives, their conceptions of God, their attitudes toward ancient customs and thought and persons, they may unite in the common bond of a minimum agreement on practice since they both accept the written law as the guide for that practice.²³⁹ The allegorist will not "remove his neighbors' landmarks" of tradition but observe them from his spontaneous virtue and good will²⁴⁰ The literalist will place himself under the law as

237 Sac. 43-44.

238 Op. cit., 56 sq.

239 Abr. 124-131.

240 Sp. L. IV 149-150.

under a good physician who will in time "eradicate the diseases of the mind" by practical discipline.²⁴¹ The alien to the law is not asked to accept that law on theoretical grounds but enjoined to "examine those who have already applied themselves to it and become its devotees," so that they may observe such men to be sane rather than mad with some fancy.²⁴² The appeal to practice as the indispensable sign of a man's acceptance of the law corresponds to its fundamental nature as a body of precedents for action.

Now the law as a history of the deeds of God among men indicates the "natural" conditions of virtue and happiness. As precedents these deeds do not derive their sanction from antiquity. The deeds of God are timeless.²⁴³ We need not think that these precedents must be considered as constituting a development of the world and the racial mind. They may stand upon one level as evidences of the everlasting providence of God made manifest in special events as men prepare themselves for that manifestation. Things are not young or old in point of time alone as though Time were God, but in point of a continuing activity of representing a living truth. The idea of the development of the racial mind and of an integration of the individual mind with the racial mind by instruction in the law, is a possible secondary implication of the claim that the law is history. The primary implication, however, is that precedents rest back upon an act of God rather than upon any learning, sentiment or opinion. The Word of God is an act that marks the beginning of all manifestations. The denial that Moses wrote myths and the statement that he wrote history is a way of enjoining the correct attitude in which the reading of scripture should begin. It should not be approached with the assumption that here is a beautiful legend or here is something the great Moses said nor even, here is something sanctified by antiquity. It should be approached with the conviction that here is a thing that God has done. Each text must stand out with the finality of an event, whatever its further meaning may turn out to be. And that event must be reckoned with, not because it is a unit in a natural process, nor a step in prophetic reasoning but because it is evidence of a providential act.

It may be observed that the distinction between a literal and a

241 Deut. 63-69; cf. Plato. Rep. III 389.

242 Det. 10-12.

243 Sac. 76-77.

metaphorical reading can hardly touch the nuance of meaning implied by the attitude required in accepting the law as historical Midrash. It must be taken seriously but not all of it literally. When taken seriously it involves a moral conformity of the sort that relies upon a truth that may not be beautiful, reasonable or profitable in itself, a truth that indicates a duty before it is embellished with beauty, reason and reward. This is the sort of truth in the law that Philo wants respected without superstition or fear. It constitutes the stark necessity of the law which must first be accepted before it can with propriety become overlaid with the glamour of allegory. It is a character of moral reality that can only be rationalized and sentimentalized by those who first put it into practice.²⁴⁴ It is the drastic nature of the good which must be realized in order to justify an honest discussion of it.

We have attempted to suggest what Philo considers that the law is. In its nature as history interpreted by Haggadic Midrash there may be suggested the explanation of that curious mixture of deploring superstition while naively accepting legend which is characteristic of Philo.

244 Says Philo (Det. 72 sq.), "Sophists are bound to find the powers within them at strife, words running counter to ideas and wishes to words in absolute and utter discord. They make our ears ache with their demonstrations of the social character of righteousness, the advantageous nature of moderation, the nobility of self control, the great benefits conferred by piety, the power of every kind of virtue to bring health and safety. On the other hand they dwell at great length on the unsociability of injustice, on the loss of health entailed by a licentious life, and prove ad nauseam that irreligion makes you a pariah, and that serious harm is occasioned by all other forms of wickedness. And nevertheless they entertain all the time sentiments quite at variance with the things which they say. At the very moment when they are singing the praises of good sense and moderation and righteousness and piety, they are found to be more than ever practicing foolishness, licentiousness, injustice, and impiety, to be confounding and overturning, you may well-nigh say, every ordinance of God and man. To these men one might rightly put the question put to Cain in the sacred record, "What have you done?" What have you wrought that has done you good? What benefit have all these harangues on the subject of virtue conferred on your souls? What portion great or small, of life have you set right? Nay, have you not done the reverse? Have you not furnished true charges against yourself, in that while you have shown yourselves lecturers of the highest order as far as the understanding of beautiful things and philosophical discourses are concerned, you are invariably caught cherishing sentiments and indulging in practices that are utterly base? May we not go further and say that in your souls all noble qualities have died, while evil qualities have been quickened? It is because of this that not one of you is really still alive." (Trans. Whitaker).

The Law as Liturgy

We turn now to the second functional division of the scriptures. Here we find the answer to the question of how the law should be studied. In this division we have revelations delivered in dialogue between God and the prophet Moses.²⁴⁵ This question and answer form suggests the procedure of the scribes in developing the Halakah. But it is apparent that in this division Philo is indicating the general principles of worship. The division is correlative with the rôle of the priest. However, Temple and Synagogue are for Philo houses of prayer.²⁴⁶ Through both of them Moses teaches men how to pray.

The general principles of worship include a due respect for all objects suggesting deity. God is not to be limited to any image or "name" but conceived as correlative with the eagerness of a man to honor the highest things. The principles include the consecration of the Sabbath to study and appreciation. They also include the provisional acceptance of the worship of all aspiring men who have not yet had the opportunity to become trained in the more excellent way of Moses which he established as his answers to prayer during times of perplexity in the pilgrimage of Israel.

As in the first division of the scriptures this second division involves the whole literature. It is the liturgy of a worship in which the Temple symbolizes both the natural world and hence the account of creation, and the soul of a devout citizen of the world and hence the deliberation on the law as conducted in the Synagogue.²⁴⁷ The national festivals and celebrations are also to be included as commemorating the providence of God in natural events and in special occasions during the history of Israel. The use of the written law as a liturgy is to teach men how to use all natural objects as a ceremonial of gratitude, how to pursue moral investigations with divine assistance and how to prepare the soul for a continuance of the divine guidance that has been manifested in the past throughout the life of a divinely guided people.

These various features of the law as a liturgy gather about the one idea of worship as a continued search for truth, a means of

245 V. M. III 192-245.

246 Sp. L. I 285-288.

247 Ebriet. 131-143.

communication with God the revealer of all truth.²⁴⁸ The authority of the procedure rests partly upon the inspiration of Moses in establishing the best worship customs and partly upon a source of truth not wholly contained in those customs. The principle is that of prayer, a prayer carried on as one would ask for guidance and look for the answer in the "happy conjectures" that arise as one attends devoutly to the study and practice of the written law. The record of how Moses found favor with God both for himself and his people constitutes a most fruitful regimen when used with the proper attitude.

As a priest Moses was unique for the way in which he arranged "human and divine things". He trained Israel to receive the regular approach of the divine without that mystical consternation and amazement that characterizes an unsophisticated and superstitious God-consciousness.²⁴⁹ It is because the law requires a worship that is always practical, philosophical and ethical that it prepares a man to expect the consciousness of God's cooperation as a natural thing rather than a prodigious event.

Philo gives us a description of the proper way to worship when he contrasts the pagan festivals with Jewish worship.²⁵⁰ Under the figure of a temple the soul of a man should be prepared for the reception of God. The parts of this temple consist in a foundation of utter sincerity and good teaching, a superstructure of virtuous conduct and an ornamentation of the learning of the schools. The temple is founded upon a quickness of apprehension, a perseverance and a memory. The good teaching produces a readiness to learn and a concentration. The virtuous conduct secures a possession of the good that cannot be lost. While the

248 Sp. L. I 345.

249 Mig. 56-69. The contrast is made between a continuous *memory* of God in daily walks (ἡ ἀδιάστατος περὶ μνήμη καὶ ἡ κατάκλησις) and a divine *seizure* (κατάπληξις) or consternation which Philo describes (Heres. 249 sq.) as the type of ἔκστασις that is to be associated with Pan and experienced as mob hysteria or in the lonely haunts of nature. This *panic* is indicated by Philo's play on the word πᾶν and his citation of texts alluding to Israel as a "multitude". He comes to his point in section 69 by condemning both atheism and polytheism. The "sacred assembly" of Israel enjoys a consciousness of God in daily life but repudiates naturalistic orgies in favor of a *right reason* of humane wisdom. The first type of ἔκστασις, insanity or *mindlessness*, παράνοια, is also involved in the emphasis upon its opposite, wisdom.

250 Cherub. 91 fin.

learning of the schools merely ornaments with beauty what is otherwise secured. The rearing of such a "house" among mortals raises high hopes of the descent of divine powers.²⁵¹ It promises that a commonwealth of virtue-loving souls may in daily walks know a happiness that no amount of wealth or power as mortals reckon such things, can insure. It entitles men to the boast of being "slaves" of God, a lot more precious than any freedom. It places the ceremonial law within the daily circumstances of life rather than making it a formal sacerdotalism. For all his unwillingness to surrender the ceremonial practice of the law Philo cannot abide an empty Phariseism. By broadening the law to the extent of identifying it with the natural circumstances of life he makes all living a ceremony of dedication. By insisting upon the written law as a guide he excludes the mode of life which pagan worship involves.

As under the moral law a man is a "citizen of the world" so under the ceremonial law a man is a sojourner in the "city of God".²⁵² The only true citizen is God. All created beings are in relation to each other, original settlers but in relation to God, aliens. They can possess nothing, not even themselves. All that they use is loaned by God. They should therefore make use of the things that they cannot possess as in a ritual of gratitude. Since God alone can possess He does not barter with men. He bestows his benefits with the promise that the "land shall not be sold at all," which is to say there can be no reckoning save only that gratitude for a loan which the honest man can see withdrawn without being guilty of that petulance which arises from making false claims.²⁵³ There can be no sense of loss, no grief at bereavement for the man who fully appreciates that what he has lost never was his but only by a gracious providence given to him to use for a while.

This attitude of gratitude in the use of things over which man never can assume possession although he can rejoice in the promise that they will not be "sold" as an estate would pass from a tenant, constitutes an insight into what Philo calls "nature-truth".²⁵⁴ It does not arise from a sense of the nothingness of man. It arises

251 Cherub. 106.

252 Cherub. 121.

253 Cherub. 118.

254 Cherub. 121.

from the sort of experience with which the Jew was familiar as an alien and sojourner, the experience of being dispossessed without losing hope, the experience of being exhorted to the proper appreciation of past blessings. Philo develops it into a sublime conception of the truly worshipful man. Even though a man may be an alien and a sojourner with no place that he can lay claim to as his own, he is nevertheless a dweller in the "city of God" and has benevolently bestowed upon him the free use of the many blessings of this world by the "grace" of the One Possessor. To be sure he is in the hollow of God's hand with no rights to press against the power over him. But God is neither capricious nor unkind and gives a promise that covers the use of His bounty without payment. A man with such a view will always find in his past experience evidence of the providence of God and in his present situation grounds for hope in the continued mercy of God.

Philo embellishes this conception with the idea of the interdependence of all the parts of the universe.²⁵⁵ But this is hardly the Stoic (though it may be a Pythagorean) conception of a world process. There is no inalienable dignity in man, no "self-possessed soul". There is only the overwhelming sense that gratitude alone is the right of man. Philo also introduces the fourfold analysis of cause which Aristotle made. But here again The Goodness of God as the final cause reduces the others to mere modes of expressing that Goodness.²⁵⁶ The conception of Philo is rooted in the idea of perspective, a perspective by which man empties himself of all selfishness in his grateful acknowledgment of past blessings and his consecrated use of all things that he finds provided in the present. It is a conception of the truly worshipful attitude of a man who has contemplated the marvelous dealings of God with man through history and it has nothing to do with the attitude of the man who views the world as a pageant of nature deities. The ceremonial law is enacted in daily life as an appreciation of the things learned in the Haggadic sermon.

255 Cherub. 109-113. No part is complete in itself but its "need" is supplied by God Who *lends* parts to parts. They thus constitute a *harmony*, testifying to the goodness of God. It is not the *κράσις δι' ὅλων* of the Stoics but the *συμφωνία* of the Pythagoreans. Cf. Conf. 183-198.

256 Cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 29 E Philo has been describing the worshipful disposition which in the "house" of praise corresponds with the *ἀγαθότης* of God in creating the world. Cf. the Pythagorean myth in Plant. 131 and Qu. in Gen. I 58. ed. Aucher.

The conception of true worship cannot be complete if left with too great an emphasis upon the dependence of man. There is in it a note of daring, a freedom which the passion for righteousness permits a man to exercise under a God whose holiness is not stifling to human initiative. It is the daring of the artist who claims nothing less than the expression of the divine as the object of his quest. There is a divine ἀγωνισμα that marks the truly faithful man who dares appropriate God as his "heritage" not in the sense of a possession but in the sense of the final cause for all goodness.²⁵⁷ Like the artist engaged in an Olympian contest the man of faith consecrates all his efforts to representing in himself the object that can justify that faith. This is a form of prayer. Unlike the artist who works in a material medium and thus represents his vision in a form that invites the worship of things made by human hands, the man of faith works in the medium of his own conduct and character and thus represents the divine as a beautiful life.²⁵⁸ His example becomes a symbol that can teach all men that the "heritage" of God lies not in material things but in the daring consecration by which a man imitates God,²⁵⁹ stands in the place of God as a citizen before men within the "City of God".

The liturgical use of Scripture therefore adds to the historical use a ceremony of moral practice which invests a man with the divine appearance as the practice of an art invests the artist with the divine fire of creative genius. Only the virtuous are free because they represent the authority of the King of kings, and the God of gods. The ceremony of virtuous conduct is like a dialogue between man and God such as Moses instituted when he established through prayer the perfect way of life for Israel.

We have then the second significance to search out when reading the written law. A given text will first supply us with a precedent. It will next supply us with a procedure which must be used with a prayer for the needs of men, to indicate the practice that is appropriate to a God-loving man.

²⁵⁷ Plant. 70-72.

²⁵⁸ Decal. 69-75. It is to be noted that Philo condemns priestcraft along with idolatry.

²⁵⁹ Prob. 41-50. The imitatio Dei of Philo is a companionship with God by which man in freedom comes to take on the dignity of a delegate or envoy of God to men but without prejudice to other men's privilege to do likewise. Cf. Decal. 96-120, 64-81; Heres. 81-85; Sp. L. IV 179-192; Fuga. 63; Mut. 57-60.

The Law, a Promise

We come now to the third and last division of the written law, the promise. Here are things delivered by Moses in his own person as a fully inspired prophet.²⁶⁰ Again we do not have a literary division but general principles indicated by the citation of texts. The division begins significantly with the "beginning of the prosperity of Israel" as Moses assumes leadership and with a divine foresight conducts a people from an "Egyptian" materialism into a disciplinary pilgrimage. The divine foresight consists in exhorting to those attitudes and dispositions which can insure prosperity on such a journey. They are faith in times of peril, reliance upon God for "heavenly food" ever freshly supplied as needed, a disposition to see the One God behind all natural events, a repudiation of all materialistic worship and an eagerness to defend the honor of God as His peculiar priest and thus to acknowledge the leadership of Moses, His prophet.²⁶¹

The distinction of this the most fully inspired function of the written law lies in the accuracy with which Moses predicts the fruit of certain attitudes and dispositions in the human types he delineates. Philo elaborates the types by giving symbolic meanings to the names of characters presented in the Mosaic writings. The authority for such elaboration would seem to lie in the suggestion that Moses in pronouncing his patriarchal blessing upon the people just before his death, predicted the future for the tribes and for the typical individuals representing them. A scribe who reviews the past becomes a prophet predicting the future on the basis of the observed characteristics of the people he has thus become familiar with. That past is established in the first division of the law as no invention of Moses. But the predictions are the inventions of Moses alone and the fact that his predictions have in many cases come true indicates that he was inspired and that all his predictions may be expected to come true in the future.²⁶² That is to say Moses by his prophetic insight into the motives of men could predict the course of their lives and such predictions

²⁶⁰ V. M. III 258-292.

²⁶¹ While religion is a *caring for God*, this is not because God can be benefited or harmed by man, nor can man barter with God as in Plato's argument. Philo holds that it is the unselfish dedication of a man's life that both glorifies his character and binds him in love to God. Cf. Det. 55-56 with Plato, *Euthyphro* 13 A sq.

²⁶² V. M. III 288.

may be verified both by a man's own insights into his own character and by the fruits of similar traits of character in the lives of typical men.

Now the prophecies delivered by Moses in his own person include both those pronouncements which are like exhortations at critical periods in the pilgrimage of Israel and the more formal proclamation of rewards and punishments which Philo describes as the delivery of a constitution to a people long trained under the leadership of Moses. The exhortation to certain attitudes and the codification of the law are two sides of but one thing. Moses in his own person elaborates the Decalogue²⁶³ as he also in his own person predicts the fruit of certain dispositions. The work of the fully inspired prophet is none other than the work he does as a reasonable lawgiver. The written law that accords with natural right revealed by God alone is the same law by which a seer may foretell the spiritual destinies of men.

We have then in this third division of the written law the instrument of judgment. It is of interest to note that at this point Philo approaches as near to Messianism as he ever gets. From his description of the proclamation of the law by Moses as a day of judgment he rises to a Messianic vision of the day when the law shall have become the universal order among men.²⁶⁴ It is to be noted however that whereas the vision pictures the future to come by a catastrophic act of God,²⁶⁵ the judgment lies in the past and is set up by the consummation of the work of Moses.²⁶⁶ There is no personal Messiah to come but there is a Messianic mission inherent in the law. It would seem that Philo has eliminated the escatological features of Messianism in favor of a conception of the moral regeneration²⁶⁷ of men as the law becomes progressively the order of this world.²⁶⁸ There is selected out from all nations one by one the individuals who achieve the moral excellence that the law inculcates. These gather together to take over the management of affairs, to re-establish the ancient theocracy. Judg-

263 Decal. 175.

264 Praem. 1 fin.

265 Praem. 169. Cain and the fratricide would seem to symbolize a *fall*, (67 sq.), but *saviours* are all good men and the catastrophic act of God is a bringing men back from Cain-like wanderings (112-117).

266 Praem. 3-4.

267 Praem. 36-40.

268 Praem. 160-169; Virt. 119-120.

ment is not something to be feared. It is the means by which a man may purify his own motives and may recognize those who belong to the fellowship of virtuous comrades.²⁶⁹ It is the test by which are identified those who compose the community under the law.

In summary of the significance of the three functional divisions of the written law, it may be said that the sacred book as a whole and any given text therein is to be regarded first as a precedent for action, next as a procedure of moral dedication and finally as a promise of things to come out of certain motives there revealed.

Behind this use of scripture stands the Synagogue where Haggadic sermons, Halakic determinations of practice and a faith in God rewards the aspiring search for Him by bestowing happiness and resplendent character upon those who pursue this search with motives that are also the fundamental conditions of social justice. Thus the Synagogue represents a type of "good education" which identifies the true disciples of God by the manner in which they study the law whether they stand within the traditional ranks of Israel or are scattered abroad among the nations in that spiritual fellowship which testifies to the theocratic administration among men.

We shall call this method of studying the law the sacramental use of scripture. For it transforms both legalism and aestheticism into a symbolism by which is revealed the moral character of a man rather than the transcendent nature of a God. This character which is both the "nature-truth" of the law and the inner quality of a righteous man is a single disposition. It is a gratitude that disclaims "possession" by the manner in which it makes use of the "grace" or gifts of God, a manner that admits all men to equality, that judges all doctrines as offerings in the temple of praise, that trusts the motives of good men. This disposition is the product of an appreciation of past blessings which are the Creation in which is found the daily necessities of life, the examples of great men²⁷⁰ in which are found the inspiring means of correct living, and the comfort of honest motives in which is found the promise for the future. It is a single and "harmonious" disposition because it throws the Creation the life of man and the

²⁶⁹ Praem. 165; Virt. 102-104.

²⁷⁰ Prob. 74 sq.

moving principles therein into one moral perspective by which all fear for the self becomes lost in the sense of fellowship with all God's creatures, as these creatures unite in the common bond of a love of God.

The method involves a pseudo historical perspective. For it aims at regaining the inspirational implications of the words and deeds of men in the past without removing those men from the world of natural events but by adopting their apparent motives. Thus by suitable allegorizations one places his own religious insights into the words and deeds of Moses with a freedom that subordinates the person of Moses to the rank of a fellow worshipper of the same God. One takes assurance from the prestige of Moses as a religious leader that the example he set was a way of expressing the same religious conviction that the reader holds. Likewise with all the saints in the past the reader takes comfort by virtue of the illustrious company in which he has gained a place.

The principle furthermore establishes the prestige of Holy Writ without limiting its religious meaning to the exact form of its statement nor to any particular form of its allegorization. For the allegorization is admittedly a personal eulogy of the works of God. To be sure there is a rigid form in the Decalogue and in the examples of the saints. But this form is for practice while allegory is the intellectual virtuosity permitted to the devout because they conform to that practice under no sense of compulsion. The prestige of Holy Writ therefore rests upon the testimony of the practical lives of those who love the law. This has been so from the patriarchs on down. As Philo puts it the saints first obey by a divine inspiration and they then turn to the law to prove that their actions are good. There can be no caviling with the practical obedience but once that is performed in love there is the widest freedom of allegorical embellishment.

CHAPTER IV

ALLEGORY A SACRAMENT

The method of allegory in Philo is a technique by which an individual may knit his own deepest thought into the traditions of the past and may convince himself of the essential solidarity of ancient and modern ideals, enthusiasm and procedures. In proportion as the allegorical method is rich in devices, the allegorist, powerful in imagination and the motive ethically sincere, the result must be as the opening of a window upon another world, the world of an inspiring past seen not as a wistful retrospect but as an eternal fellowship under God.

For a parallel to Philo's thought in his use of allegory we must turn not to Plutarch, to the Stoics or to the cults. We must turn to the New Testament where in *II Peter* I 16-21 there is collected in a few verses the criteria of authority that may be found scattered through the prolific elaborations of Philo. Here is a similar repudiation of "cunningly devised fables", a similar "hearing" of a "voice" from heaven by those present with the prophet "in the mount", a similar figure of a "light" that must be heeded, a similar transfiguration of the appearance of the prophet,²⁷¹ a similar distinction between private opinion and individual consecration in reading Scripture,²⁷² and a similar suggestion of a Holy Spirit to aid in interpretation.²⁷³ If these things constitute a formula of attestation to the Word of God it is one which grounds its appeal in an event that is witnessed by ordinary men as well as by God.

It is well to recall how Philo presents Moses. Upon a prophet pre-eminent for his "love of God", his "love of man" and his "love of virtue", Philo places just those limitations to his prophetic powers that make vivid his perfect example of true worship and true care for his people. His great wisdom is acquired by the most through education but it fails him at just those times when the evidence of the guiding hand of an approving God most dramatically manifests that although Moses is a man, God is with.

²⁷¹ V. M. III 70.

²⁷² Det. 155.

²⁷³ Det. 44; Gig. 52, 26-27.

him. Moses is never an object of service, he invites no hero-worship. His success encourages men to hope for similar aid from God by attending to the means that he used. But Moses unlike the Christian Kurios is but one of the patriarchal "unwritten laws" so far as his person is concerned. He is the best though by no means the only example of the general truth that "every wise man is a ransom for the fool, whose existence could not endure for an hour, did not the wise provide for his preservation by compassion and forethought."²⁷⁴

The wise man must die as all human benefactors die and leave the people without a protector. In his place Philo provides no Messiah or Kurios but rather the combined blessings of correct worship customs and models of consecrated thought. A soteriological apotheosis is not required for the authority of Moses because in the enduring theocracy of Israel there has been preserved the "habit of service to God" the symbol for which is Levi and the fruits of "labor and progress of which Jacob is the symbol, (and which) have their source in natural ability".²⁷⁵

With the passing of the wise man, "the strongest force to insure stability belongs to those aspirations of the reason to wisdom and knowledge which the lawgiver in his parable calls on grounds already stated 'ransom' and 'firstborn'".²⁷⁶ Though error be frequent, "healing" is no less frequent in the theocracy where worship is correctly practiced and thought has become a consecrated reason. The theocracy endures as individuals relive the revelation preserved in Israel's worship customs and moral reasonings.

Thus Philo subdues the mythological excess which Christology entertained when he enhances the human or "natural" element over the supernatural element involved in the use of the revelation at Sinai as a type of the historical manifestation of God's testimony to a prophet before his disciples. Philo places the law as a natural possibility before the soteriological lawgiver as a supernatural probability. Philo is more concerned for repeatable experiences than he is for aesthetically eternal personalities. Institutions endure as persons and theories cannot endure. It is just this feature of Philo's allegorizations that makes him outline a moral psychology more prominently than an aesthetic cosmology. The conditions of inspiration depend upon the possibility of re-

²⁷⁴ Sac. 121.

²⁷⁵ Sac. 120; L. A. III 18-22.

²⁷⁶ Sac. 120.

living²⁷⁷ revealing events rather than upon any inherent quality of a unique personality or any inherent validity of a beautiful theory.

The Enlightenment Experience

Let us examine Philo's account of his own inspiration²⁷⁸ and observe how his explanations of that inspiration fit into the view of his allegorical method which we have proposed. The act of revelation is more significant than its content. Thus in Philo's account of his own inspiration the marvel of the fact that God had touched his mind is in no way minimized because the content of his inspiration is attributed to his own thinking. He claims no special validity for those thoughts as though they were some newly delivered message of God. It is the ability to think them that constitutes the inspiration. There is no vision of a spokesman, no mediating personality, no mention of a book nor a Logos. There is the traditional study of the Torah, referred to as "my usual employment of writing on the doctrines of philosophy" and an unexpected illumination of the student's mind. Philo is suddenly conscious of wide vistas of meaning as though enacted ideas, things that ought to be done, are "seen".

The virtue of this inspiration seems to lie not very much in a new truth discovered but emphatically in an old truth "seen". It is not a discovery of something *new* but a re-discovery *that* the *old* is true. The "ears" are exchanged for the "eyes".²⁷⁹ A revelation once enacted and since preserved in a tradition that is faithfully recounted from generation to generation now becomes re-witnessed by a special act of God in the mind of the man whose thought and practice are already saturated with that tradition. The practical Jacob instructed and informed by what he has "heard" has his "name" recoinced into the "seeing Israel". The God who spoke from Sinai once for all men speaks again for each man who will prepare himself as men there prepared themselves for the individual revelation. Faith in the mere account of the revelation long supported by no more than its hopeful rehearsal in thought and practice now becomes rewarded by the privilege of

277 Praem. 170-172.

278 Mig. 34 sq.

279 Mig. 38 sq.

attestation in the individual's soul, by God Himself. This individual henceforth knows that it is a true tradition and that there is the Supreme Deity behind it. He who walked by faith may now walk by "sight".

There are several features to be noted in Philo's discussion of this inspiration. It is like an "additional seasoning" that provides vitality and "sweetness" to otherwise sterile and "bitter" human thoughts. In *Post.* 157, Philo explains this text by saying that God the Saviour provides a "love of labor" as "food" to replace a "hatred of labor". The text involves regenerative significances as well as suggesting the symbol of "irrigation" found in the Isis myth, a myth that Philo seems to indicate definitely elsewhere.²⁸⁰ But the discussion that leads up to Philo's personal confession undoubtedly indicates an experience like that of the Rabbis who "rewitnessed" in their own souls the revelation at Sinai as they pondered the traditional account of that event in their study of the Torah.²⁸¹ In Philo's case it is the Passover that centers the meditation that leads to his personal confession.

The Passover signifies the "departure" from "Egypt" the realm of selfish materialism and the taking of an *exodus* on a pilgrimage toward God. But there was a Hebrew, "one who passes over", namely Joseph, the "political" mind who although "appointed by God" to minister to bodily needs, does not embark on the pilgrimage with Israel. Philo seizes upon this traditional circumstance to allegorize the figure of Joseph about the theme that it is possible "even while in Egypt to have a desire for real life".

Although Joseph does not appear to embark on the pilgrimage yet he may "boast of being of the race of the Hebrews" who "pass over" because instead of making a "treaty with the body", Joseph foresaw the day when God would make a Covenant with the "seeing Israel" and would ratify that Covenant with an Oath. And just as Joseph remained "alive" while in "Egypt" by "passing

280 Ebriet. 27-31; Cherub. 49-50. The double significance of degeneration and regeneration seems to be reflected in Philo's discrimination of the Jupiter-Mnemosyne myth (*Plant.* 127-131), from the Proteus myth (*Ebriet.* 35 sq.). Regeneration as an enlightening *change of mind* *μετάνοια* is not animistic. We shall indicate the significance of *μετάνοια* in another place.

281 For a description of this experience in terms of *memory*, and involuntary *forgetting* and an instructive *recollection*, see *Mig.* 205-225. The revelation would seem to be an individual insight into the racial mind by a study of tradition. Cf. *L. A.* III 90-94.

over" from the allurements of the "body" and foresaw the Covenant of Grace, just so may any man "pass over" from the things of the "body" by "seeing" God through the Law. Of course the figure of Joseph includes the further significance that the Law as a political instrument may be recognized by its "brethren" as a "work of God" even when subordinated to the sacerdotal significance that the prophet Moses imparts to it. But the correlation of this subordination with the rôle of a patriarch whose regeneration is recognized as anticipatory is striking evidence of the ruling conception of the Law as a revealing pilgrimage. The stages of this revelation are significantly indicated throughout this treatise.

It would seem despite embellishments with cultic imagery that Philo intellectualizes a regeneration experience by dwelling upon the traditional account of the emigration of Abraham, the Exodus and the Passover. His "labor" is turned to "joy" by frequent but unpredictable insights that accompany the study of the Torah. This "joy" is not the achievement of a longed for personal salvation but rather a personal conviction of the historical validity of a divine agency in the establishment of the Law. The thing "seen" is neither a vision of God nor the events on Sinai as in a mystery play. Philo significantly cites texts alluding to that revelation but his account concerns the very nature of the relation between faith and knowledge. What is "seen" is a "divine light" by which other things are made visible. Like wisdom it reveals that it is present by setting other things in perspective. As Wisdom reveals Wisdom and Art appreciates Art so faith corresponds to knowledge in the "self-taught". The faith of God is equivalent to knowledge. The faith *in* God is the acknowledgment of His imageless presence as a cause. The will to believe issues in a faith that acts like knowledge under certain circumstances. Philo suggests what these circumstances are,²⁸² over and above the consecrated study of the Torah.

God's knowing is an act rather than a content. For Him to take cognizance is to confer a creative approval. It was thus that what Moses said and did required only the "nod" of God to establish it.²⁸³ It was thus that the events at Sinai became authorita-

282 Mig. 40-44. There is a play on the words πίστις and ἐπιστήμη. It is Abraham the man of *faith* who is the type under discussion. Cf. Fuga. 132-165.

283 V. M. I 81-84. It is of interest to note that the water of the Nile is involved in this passage, another Isis cult symbol.

tive. For on that occasion and on similar occasions men were by their own choice and within the natural surroundings provided for them by God, seen to be thinking and acting in a manner He would approve. This approval was an act. Indeed it is the only act of knowing that ever occurs. It is the act of God in "knowing" his creatures, an act compared with which every other act in nature and man is but hypothetical, faith rather than knowledge. By this act of approval the world was created and the things done at Sinai and on similar occasions in the pilgrimage of Israel, became "good". Men whose practice touched the natural world and whose minds touched the noetical world received a creative moral sanction for that coincidence.

This event may be called the "divine light". Symbols of practice some "bodily" and some mental become fixed by this event. Things "heard" are like "bodies" in procession, a formal discourse. Things "seen" are like the mental perceptions of such "bodies". But in inspiration a "voice" unlike either of these things is both "seen" and "heard".²⁸⁴ That is to say, the tradition of Israel is to be received neither as a tale that is recited to "hearers" nor as a sacred myth that makes a theory impressive but as an event by which God set the stamp of approval upon a definite manner of acting and thinking among men. The historical imagination and the moral reason unexpectedly agree upon the moral meaning of an event that had previously lacked such explicit sanction. The hand of God is seen in the affairs of men to illuminate them with moral significance.

The mission of Israel has been to teach men this lesson, the lesson of the "seeing Israel". Israel has retained its "self-taught" character and an "uninterrupted memory of God" by preserving in daily customs and thought, in "life and language" the things approved by God on certain occasions.²⁸⁵ God chose Israel for this mission because of this capacity for faith, a faith that is not thrown into mystical consternation at the approach of the divine. God loved them for their "right reason", their orderly preparation for His coming and His guidance.²⁸⁶ The faith of carefully prepared habits and thoughts receives the inspiration, an inspiration that

284 Mig. 43-52.

285 Mig. 53-56.

286 Sp. L. IV 179-192; Som. II 172-180; Abr. 98-102.

convinces of the providence of God in handing down those habits and thoughts from generation to generation.²⁸⁷

Gratitude for this preserved excellence is no occasion for a pride that might crystallize into a claim for some formal creed. Thus Philo says that Moses was cautious in stating the testimony to Israel's faith.²⁸⁸ God testified not to what is shown but to what will be shown. The revelation was not in the content of Jewish customs and thought nor in their natural circumstances but in the promise of things to be shown by the use of these other things. A faith that continues to practice the form and to reinterpret the substance of the revelation to Israel does not seek for weapons of controversy but for the assurance that God was and ever is in that revelation. Such a faith has the promise of divine aid. This aid may be hypostatized for rhetorical purposes and called "the most perfect interpreter". (*Det.* 44). It is no more than the reciprocity of a faith that fulfills conditions, with a good faith that renews the promised approval. The Holy Spirit is the correlation of periodic achievements of an enlightened conscience with the promised approval of God. There is no guarantee of this approval save the good faith of God. The great distinction of Israel has been the care with which that people has preserved the rites suitable for such approval as it has been received in the past. The "seeing Israel" is a race that "remembers" how divine approval most frequently occurs.

Summary

In conclusion and summary of Philo's allegorism we suggest that Philo has divided the revelation to Israel into a "greater mystery" of Moses which is the written Law and a "lesser mystery" of his interpreters which is the ceremonial law.²⁸⁹ The first is the norm of devout thinking and the second the norm of devout practice. The "greater mystery" has a logical priority as a justification for the "lesser mystery". It is the revelation of the "reason of God" that explains the inner movement of purpose in the Creation and in the lives of the patriarchs. The "lesser mystery" has a

287 Cf. *Mut.* 97-124.

288 *Mig.* 43-44.

289 τῶν ἱερῶν νόμων καὶ ἔτι τῶν ἀγράφων ἐθνῶν ἐνὰ νομίζειν. *Gaius.* 115; cf. *Mig.* 89-94.

chronological priority as (1) the preparation of initiates for an understanding of the Torah, (2) the "natural" conditions for righteous conduct, (3) the social structure of Israel which Moses transforms into a spiritual fellowship, "a priesthood that might offer up prayers for all mankind".

By such treatment of the law Hellenistic Judaism is presented as furnished with a ritualistic preparation for an all inclusive illumination in competition with the cults. (Aaron and Moses).²⁹⁰ Jewish education is presented as furnished with an "encyclical instruction" leading up to moral wisdom in competition with the schools. (Hagar and Sarah).²⁹¹ Stoic and Pythagorean interpretations of naturalistic myths with the Decade centering the famous "harmony of the spheres" is matched by a Decalogue that centers a "natural law" of conduct deduced therefrom. (Moses and Bezalel).²⁹² The Law as a political instrument is affirmed but subordinated to a spiritual fellowship. (Joseph and Israel).²⁹³

Thus far the law has become a ceremonial, the practical features of which constitute the world as acts of man and God, and the mental features of which indicate a coherent Logos. If Philo had stopped at this point he would have presented an allegorism not unlike that of Cleanthes and Sallustius. But into this ceremonialism Philo weaves Jewish traditionalism. He pushes the euhemeristic conventionalism of his nationalistic compatriots back to a Sabbath Day which was also the "birthday of the World". Upon that "day" begins the pilgrimage of Israel. This is not to be regarded as a myth but as a series of events attesting that the "oracles which are both the words of God and laws given by men whom God loves" mark the path of "sojourners" who are being trained by an experience of this world into a knowledge of virtue. This pilgrimage is a great quest the rewards of which accumulate as men progress.²⁹⁴ The path of progress is marked out by "landmarks" which are records of human experience rather than mystic rites. The power of progress is provided by the periodic encouragement of God Who alternates "labor" with "rest" or renewal of His creative blessing. Man has a goal and a path by which to

290 Det. 38-40.

291 Cherub. 3-10; Det. 135-137.

292 L. A. III 95-103.

293 Mig. 21-25; Det. 28-31.

294 Sp. L. I 345.

seek that goal. The vistas ahead are infinite but guidance and encouragement are assured both by the signs in the past and the acknowledgment of the "grace" of God in the present. The pilgrimage is a social one. Like the Israelites led by a pillar of cloud by day and of fire by night, men may move from the bondage of materialistic "Egypt" to the promised land. Man's name is Hope and his path the Law.

Thus Philo intellectualizes the Messianic Hope. At the same time he emotionalizes and individualizes it to meet the competition of the cults and their doctrines of regeneration. But his regenerative experience is of the type common to the Rabbis who "re-witness" the revelations of the past by devout study of the Torah. This view of the Law involves philosophical and theological problems belonging to a world view that does not arise from the contemplation of nature myths. We must now turn to Philo's treatment of such problems.

PART II

THEOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

CHAPTER V

THE EGOCENTRIC PREDICAMENT

Having suggested the presuppositions of Philo's theology and philosophy, it now becomes our task to attempt to draw up the leading tenets of his doctrine. There is a sense in which Philo denies the possibility of a significant theology. For he says that the essence of God is unknowable and it is His nature to be indescribable. But after all this is no more than a way of saying that for Philo the problem of theology centers in a relation to God rather than in a definition of God. Theology, or for that matter philosophy, should not be an academic study but the cultivation of a unique experience.

Philo is insistent that this shall not mean that some peculiar sort of self-induced enthusiasm may be substituted for theology and philosophic research. Religious enthusiasm when sought as "wine" by the self-indulgent is a way of delusion.¹ The experience of the divine must be something that happens to a man by no selfishly calculated preparations. The unexpected visitation of God within the soul of the disinterested suppliant does not reduce a man to a Corybantian reveller but transforms him into a peculiarly sane and humanitarian wiseman.² It is beneath the dignity of a man to be "possessed" as a beast ridden by the earth spirits. It is the glory of man to be "possessed" of God in the sense of becoming a champion of human welfare and blessing. Man may become conscious of a relation to God by a dedication that makes him the best social servant in his community.³ To investigate the meaning of this relationship we must first inquire what it is that constitutes the self of man that may know itself to be "possessed" of God. Philo calls that self the mind, νοῦς.

Mind and the Self

The mind which is "man in man, the better in the worse, the immortal in the mortal", (*Cong.* 97) is to be conceived as a dis-

1 Ebriet. 119 sq.

2 Mut. 39; Det. 12.

3 Sac. 121 sq. The wise man is a "ransom" for others and himself dedicated to God. Cf. Mig. 118-123; Virt. 164-174.

tensible reality⁴ whose locale is coterminus with the universe. That is to say it is by nature integral. But man cannot penetrate the essence of this mind by retreating into himself nor by reaching beyond himself.⁵ For he cannot *possess* a self. To do so it would be required that he transcend that self in the exercise of an activity other than the self as "possessed".⁶ And in doing this he would cancel the independent or integral reality of the self against the initiative of the cause of its being "possessed".

Hence if man is to enjoy a self it must be as a passive existence that the self is enjoyed.⁶ He must forego all claims to "possess" and must acknowledge an objective Cause. Whatever the essence of his mind may be, the Cause of its functioning must obtain without man. It is only thus that the self of man can be definable as something "possessed" rather than an illusion without guarantee as a "possession". The distinction between "possessor" and "possessed" is the same that discriminates a functional Being from a formal being-in-relation-to that function. It is the distinction between Creator and creature, between universal mind and particular mind, between functional Godhood and formal godhood. (*Plant.* 72 sq.).

Man's experience as a self may surmount a merely animal existence if that experience begin as an acknowledgment of God as the First Cause. The composite of faculties such as the senses, the reasoning faculty and the generative powers which make up the self,⁷ these may be *used* as things *loaned* although they can

4 Opif. 69-71; Det. 84-90; cf. Ovid, *Metamorphoses*.

5 L. A. I 90-96.

6 Cherub. 77 sq.

7 The chief elements of the self are (1) thought, (διανοητική or λογισμός), (2) perception, (αἰσθησις), (3) growth, (φύσις), (4) life or consciousness, (ψυχή), (5) form or, holding together, (φυτική or ἔξις). These are modes or "parts" or "powers" (δύναμις) of the one function, mind (νοῦς). As a particular mind man is without spontaneity. He is but a "part" or "power" of the universal mind. Hence without the spontaneity of God man can be no more than a *habit*, (ἔξις), or skill of the Creator. But with the spontaneity of God to stimulate him man becomes a process of particularizing that stimulus through the various modes of action which lie dormant as faculties within the mind of man. Philo borrows both Stoic and Platonic classifications for the elements of the human self. What he adds to these is the notion of modality in the interest of ascribing all originating activity to God. L. A. II 20 sq.; Cong. 144 sq.; L. A. I 28-30; Post. 125-129; Deus. 35 sq.; Sac. 65-68; Sobriet. 34-43; Qu. in Gen. III 3 ed. Aucher.; Fuga. 173; Post. 170-171; Heres. 132; Conf. 127; L. A. III 67-68; Det. 100-103.

never be "possessed" by man.⁸ But man must acknowledge the Cause as absolute and not as instrumental. For if in the use of faculties the source of whose activity lies beyond him, man regard the First Cause of that activity as the means for which he himself is the end, (my grace instead of Thy Grace)⁹ he must reduce himself to an *ad interim* emptiness awaiting realization.¹⁰ He makes the cause formal rather than functional, an opinion rather than a force. But if he regard himself as the instrument through which the First Cause is invited to operate he may then enjoy the rôle of a cooperator in the purpose of the faculties set in motion by that Cause. It is *by* God and never *through* God that man may function, says Philo.

To emphasize the significance of this situation Philo makes use of the skeptical tropes,¹¹ a battery of arguments designed to disprove the possibility of knowledge. As Von Arnim has pointed out Philo thus attempts to clear the ground for a theosophical doctrine. Perhaps we can illustrate the situation which Philo suggests. The life of man may be likened to a puppet show where things happen as though someone behind the scenes were pulling strings to make the puppets dance. From the point of view of a puppet the dance must be a fantastic jerking about.¹² Things happen without notice in the most confusing manner for the puppet can have no inkling of what is about to happen to it. It is thus with a man who does not acknowledge God as the Contriver and Operator of the World. Such a man must live in a fantastic dream as one "asleep" and for whom fantasies come and go and change their appearance in utter confusion.¹³ Now all that is required for such a puppet of a man to "awake" is to acknowledge God as the Cause. For no sooner does he make this acknowledgment than he ceases to view things from the point of view of a puppet and begins to view them from the point of view of a purposeful God. He need not be a wise man or a profound scholar. The single capacity to exercise faith in God¹⁴ is like a power to

8 Cherub. 113 fin.; cf. Plant. 18-31.

9 Post. 41 sq.

10 Agri. 169-173; L. A. III 53-54.

11 Ebriet. 166 sq.

12 Post. 22-32.

13 Joseph as the type of "political" or secular wisdom is an "interpreter of dreams". Jos. 122-148.

14 L. A. III 228 sq.; Deus. 97-98.

stand at that point of vantage from which the world of his inner thoughts and the world of his daily experience begin to take on order and meaning. He has ceased to be a puppet, a mind "asleep" and has become a self-conscious man.

Human selfhood consists in the acknowledgment¹⁵ of the operation of a transcendent Cause through the instrumentality of things "loaned" for "use". Man is an agent representing God.¹⁶ Thus human passivity cannot be described as neutral observation nor inertial force. It must mean self-conscious experience made possible by the acknowledgment of the self as caused from without. It is the relation of cause and effect that provides the analogue by which self-conscious experience is to be conceived. The acknowledgment of being "known" is the intellectual aspect of man in the rôle of an effect. He must first be impressionable before he can formulate an impression.

This capacity to be impressionable is not a power to act but a willingness to be acted upon.¹⁷ It is reciprocation with the Cause by assuming an attitude favorable to the purpose of activity. Thus the ground of intellectual and moral experience is one. It is the ground in which the relation of cause and effect operates. The willingness to be no more than an effect involves a moral choice, a choice of attitudes rather than of private ends. The acknowl-

15 Philo calls such acknowledgment, *hope* (ἐλπίς). Det. 138-140.

16 The real life experience of man begins as a "hope in God". Som. II 219-267; Det. 138-140; Praem. 10-11; Abr. 7-40; Qu in Gen. I 80 ed. Aucher.

17 Philo seems to combine an Epicurean account of affectability, (πρόληψις D. L. X. 33) with a Stoic account of judgment by consent, (συνκατάθεσις). He replaces the Stoic principle of interaction between stimulus and consent by ἀπάθεια. This places the Epicurean account of affectability before the Stoic account of a response or rise to the objective stimulus. In the Epicurean account there is no resistance to stimuli. (D. L. X. 46-55). It is this idea of complete surrender that Philo emphasizes as a primary condition. He then turns to the Stoics for an account of a dominant will that when once quickened by God continues to persevere in Godly practice. Philo's fusion of the two accounts is for moral reasons. The Stoics would say that an act is moral because it is rational. Philo says that an act is rational because it is moral. The basic religious significance of obedience determines Philo's thought. Cf. D. L. X. 63-64 and L. A. I 48-52 and Cherub. 67 sq.; Som. II 250-254; Det. 46, 123-125; L. A. II 82-83; Mut. 161-171.

Perhaps ideas concerning regeneration have an influence on Philo's psychology. But the same basic idea of a rise from passivity to activity lies in Epicurean psychology, cultic rebirth mysteries and Jewish submission to God in obedience.

edgment of the transcendent Cause involves an ontological declaration. Man finds his "place" in the realm of things "known" by recognizing the relation he bears to God.

When therefore a man essays to judge the Cause or to evaluate the experience of causing he unavoidably interprets himself in relation to antecedent conditions of his opportunity to pass value judgments. Being objectively real only as a thing "known" by another, his judgments to be valid must be admissions rather than initiations of meaning. He must accept the Active Cause of what he is as the Final Cause by which to interpret himself and never as something interpreted by what he is. To be realistic his thinking must be a consequent of and a moral cognate to an experience of the Cause.

Retrospection Versus Introspection

Human thinking should be reconstructive. It should be a "memory"¹⁸ of the purpose by which man was brought into being. It should be an endeavor to "honor" in formal expression the reality of an antecedent activity. By retrospection rather than introspection a man may illuminate the otherwise obscure condition in which he now finds himself. God is not in man exercising reason as the Stoics would say. Rather man is in God reviewing the creative prologue to his present condition.

A man more truly interprets what he is by reviewing his past than by speculating upon his future. He reveals in his life and language what God has meant and continues to mean to him. But

18 Philo suggests a doctrine of experience using ideas like those of the skeptics concerning phenomena as revived or recollected sensations. (Sext. Emp., Adv. Math. VIII 288). Thus Philo (Praem. 9) means exactly the opposite of Plato (Meno. 80) when he says that all learning is due to experience or *recollection*, (ἀνάμνησις) rather than to innate ideas, (μνήμη) or *memory*. Philo uses μνήμη to indicate unbroken loyalty to God and it must indicate a will or purpose or instinct rather than a formal instrument of knowledge. This is not unlike the Epicurean use of μνήμη and πρόληψις (D. L. X 33). It is applied by Philo to immediate apprehension of God in contrast to a comprehension of God's "shadow" the cosmos. Undoubtedly Philo conforms his use of these terms to the Hebrew religious counsel to remember God at all times. Cf. L. A. III 15-17. Dwelling upon the memory of sense experiences makes the mind a slave to those things but *fleeing* from such memories makes him *free*. Thus *memory* is associated with the will and its training. For further discussion of μνήμη, ἀνάμνησις and λήθη see below. For references see Mig. 205-207; Cong. 39-42; L. A. III 91-105; Mut. 270.

he cannot guarantee anything for the future concerning himself or God, save by faith. His reason is not prescriptive. His faith is the intellectual aspect of his career.

In none of the stages preliminary to his present experience, his childhood, his youth, his manhood, in none of the things "loaned" for his "use", his mind, his reason, his sense-perception, in none of these does he find the essence of his soul, the self that threads these things together. As the percipient of experience, he may trace periods of growth, cumulative stages in the "use" of things "loaned". He may mark the direction of living, the end of which, like an experience yet to be lived,¹⁹ remains unknown to him. It is only by faith that he is "possessed", it is only by an abiding conviction that he is held by God in the path provided for growth, that things are happening to him by a divine plan; it is only by believing in the unity of the First and the Final Cause that he can enjoy the "use" of his borrowed faculties and speak of himself as a "citizen" of the world. (*Cherub.* 113-123; cf. *Opif.* 77).

The very vitality of man²⁰ consists in his capacity to "suffer", his readiness to experience, his ignorance of constrictions upon his own soul. He is essentially an attitude, a freedom to reveal himself by a declaration and pursuit of ends. (*L. A.* II 17-18). Philo attempts to give to the principle of self-revelation through observable experience,²¹ a metaphysical grounding in the dogma of τὸ ὄντως αἴτιον, (*Sac.* 54), the God Who dominates all beginnings and all ends. The principle of judgment as it is found in the New Testament, (e. g. *Luke* 6; 37 sq.) becomes in Philo's hands a philosophical as well as a moral doctrine.

It lies in the very nature of value judgments according to Philo,

19 In *Cherub.* 114 Philo apparently comments upon the Stoic doctrine of a general conflagration survived by the souls of the good. He rejects the idea that the soul could have any foreknowledge of a state attained by radical transformation. He seems to imply that a self is an achievement rather than a permanent possession and that achievement is conditioned upon faith in God rather than any inherent nature of the self. (Cf. *Jos.* 126 sq.).

20 Philo reads *Deut.* 8:18, "Remember the Lord thy God who gave thee strength to get power." *Sac.* 56; *Agri.* 172; *Virt.* 165; cf. *L. A.* II 84 sq.; *Som.* II 222 sq.; *Det.* 112-118.

21 Philo gives as a sufficient reason for the "descent" of souls to "earth", the need for "instruction" (*Conf.* 77-78). Like Abel the "God-loving disposition", a "soul" merely hypostatizes a sentiment that must be realized in practical discipline (*Mig.* 70-75). Similarly in Philo's nominalism men proclaim affinities by the "names" they give to phenomenal objects. Thus the empirical provides both the test and the instructive discipline for the free life of the soul (*L. A.* II 9-18).

that an ontological declaration be made either explicitly or implicitly. Such a declaration is a choice between the inescapable alternatives of a transcendent God and a solipsistic man. All choice must originate as anthropomorphic or theocratic.²² This is the fundamental condition of the use of rational faculties.

Now Philo expends some effort to prove that anthropomorphic choices must ultimately contradict themselves and therefore stultify reason. Selfishness not only gives rise to moral delinquency but it also presents a bar to clear thinking. For Philo ego-centric reasoning is a futile attempt to reverse the rank of cause and effect. As he puts it, the ego-centric thinker boasts that he "pursues" when in reality he is "pursued" by his own vanity.

It is fundamental to Philo's thought that man cannot exist as "uncreated", ἀγένητος, in the sense of operating as a first cause or final standard of his own experience. But he may appear "degenerate", ἀγεννής (*Cherub.* 77-78; cf. *Det.* 158 sq.) in the sense of failing to acknowledge his debt to the Creator.

Just as a son cannot be other than a son by neglecting his parents, yet he may appear "unfilial" in the sense of failing to discharge his natural obligations to those parents.²³ And just as a son appears to enhance his own dignity without in any way lowering the dignity of his parents when he shows love and respect for them, just so a man though only a creature produced by an unknown Creator may appear as a "man of God"²⁴ when he shows reverence for the Author of his being, however inadequately conceived.

Ethical Manhood

We touch here upon the fundamental ethical faith that underlies Philo's conception of relation to God. It is this faith that dis-

22 Virtue as the *choice-worthy* (αἰρετή see D. L. VII 85-91) for the Stoics is grounded in ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος of Nature, cosmic and human. Philo adapts this etymology to his own needs by adding αἰρεταί to the etymology. Virtue is *lifted up* or "heavenly". Choice lies beneath rather than within the rational faculty and the choice-worthy lies above rather than within the cosmic reason. By analogy with art and beauty Philo makes judgment a matter of religious disposition rather than innate reason (*Heres.* 240-242). Cf. the allegorical elaboration of Abram's sacrifice. The man of faith offers up his own "son" but God "provides for himself" a more suitable sacrifice (*Abr.* 167-207; 98-106).

23 L. A. III 7-10, 99-108; *Plant.* 59-64.

24 *Gig.* 60, 64; *Deus.* 138-139; *Conf.* 39-43; *Heres.* 57-62; *Mut.* 15-26, 125-129.

tinguishes the Jewish sense of a mission from both the Stoic conception of duty and the Platonic contemplation of the ideal. And while Philo strives to impart to the ethical mission something of the stern rationalism of the Stoics and something of the appeal of the Platonic ideal, he is not content to commit that mission to a natural reason or to a supernatural beauty. The mission rests more securely upon a faith in God and that faith may levy upon both reason and beauty so long as it witnesses to the Will of God. Philo is unwilling to surrender either the dignity of man²⁵ or the transcendence of God.

Now if the nobility of man is regarded as a tragic splendour that stands out against the background of a Great Unknown conceived as imposing upon man conditions of life that man cannot control, the nobility of man becomes an aesthetic spectacle rather than a moral selfhood. It is here that Stoicism reveals its weakness as an ego-centric rationalism.²⁶ And Philo is keenly aware of this weakness. The strength of a Sisyphus is after all the human weakness for objectifying its own "passions".²⁷ Philo goes to the root of the matter when he says it is not because man speaks against God that he sins but because man sins that he speaks against God. Man is not a slave who must concur in divine fiat and whose very disobedience would therefore be an evidence of strength. He is a free man who is permitted to reap the fruits of his own decisions. He does not choose between real punishments and real rewards. He chooses between false punishments or self-delusions and real benefits or unexpected gifts which God is ever ready to shower upon him.²⁸

The conception of ethical manhood which Philo brings into philosophy from Judaism presents the saint as one who is eager to satisfy an unpayable debt. Such a moral selfhood manifests itself by the "love of God" that forever strives to express that which cannot be adequately revealed by a mere man. Such love is lik-

25 Sp. L. IV 14; Prob. 43-44.

26 See Cicero, *De Finibus* Bk. IV ch. xiii-xx for a criticism of Stoic ethics. *Quid autem minus consentaneum est quam quod aiunt cognito summo bono reverti se ad naturam ut ex ea petant agendi principium, id est officii?* (xvii 48) *Quae est igitur causa istarum angustiarum? Gloriosa ostentatio in constituendo summo bono.* (xxv 68); cf. Bk. V ch. xxviii.

27 Cherub. 74-79.

28 L. A. II 76 sq.; Cherub. 12-13.

ened by Philo to a "sweetening branch" which God the Saviour casts into the soul thus

"producing love of labour instead of hatred of labour, for being the Creator He knew that it is impossible for use to rise superior to anything whatever, unless a vehement love of such effort be implanted in us. No pursuit that men engage in, where affection does not draw them, gains its fitting end. For complete success love must be added and the heart must be absorbed in the object of its desire. This is the food of the soul of an earnest striver, to deem labour not bitter but most sweet." (*Post.* 157).

About such love Philo throws repeated warnings against hedonism of any sort.²⁹ It must be a purity of motive that claims no merit for itself and for that very reason makes the more apparent that the object of aspiration is transcendent. The lover of God is marked by a confession of his unworthiness to serve God and by his bold exercise of the happy privilege to serve God.³⁰ Like all sincere lovers he is keenly aware how far short of what the beloved deserves are the gifts that he can offer. And yet by the divine illogicality of love he also knows how disloyal to the beloved it would be for him to withhold those inadequate gifts. By love he becomes greater than his gifts. And by the "Love of God" man becomes greater than man although far below God. How different from Platonic idealism the Philonic "love of God" is, may be seen by comparing the aesthetic vision in the Phaedrus with the ethical dedication of Philo's God-loving man. The goodness of this motive cannot be regarded as some class of thing dispensed at creation and shared by all men as an inalienable right. It is nevertheless from within and is the very evidence of a vital striving, the mark of a relationship to the Divine Will. The Name of God may be "hallowed" in the life of man.

Fundamental Dispositions

An explanation of the essential nature of the human soul lies in Philo's postulation of a series of fundamental dispositions which are "gifts" or blessings which God bestows upon those who would

²⁹ Gig. 43 fin.; L. A. III 138-178.

³⁰ Plant. 70-72; Decal. 69-75, 96-120; Heres. 81-85; Sp. L. IV 179-182; Fuga. 63; Mut. 57-60.

"live". These are hope, repentance, justice, faith, joy and love.³¹ Hope is the disposition by which the soul is born for without it man is no better than an animal. Repentance is the stage of improvement by instruction and a "change of mind", *metanoia*. Justice is the disposition by which the understanding of the natural order becomes an insight into moral law when that order is referred to God. Faith, Joy and Love mark the mature fruitage of an observance of the Law. When a "good natural disposition", "learning" and persistent "practice" of the Law are combined a man reaches that stage where he receives the inspiration of God.³² He then knows the "joy" of frequent insights and becomes "self-taught". He is moved only by the "love of God, the love of man and the love of virtue". He continues to practice the Law and to study it. In short the integrity of the human soul is established if, when and as long as certain attitudes are in "harmony".

The conditions of life for the human soul may be reduced to two that represent the respective parts played by God and man in their relationship. These two important conditions are faith and grace. Let us indicate in a preliminary manner the use which Philo makes of these two terms.

Faith

What seems to be the central focus of meaning of faith for Philo lies in the idea of a pledge³³ that is given, accepted and interpreted. In God such faith is the guarantee of truth.³⁴ In man it is a virtue by which all faculties are orientated on the One.³⁵ By this most "perfect of the virtues" man refers the tools of sense of reason and of "soul" or life to God.³⁶ He thus acts by an anticipated knowledge, a *gnosis*, that leads judgment as the very energy of justice. He returns a "deposit" by restraining temptations to default. Faith is the settled conviction before knowledge that

31 Mig. 1-126; Abr. 7-118; Praem. 7-66; Post. 145.

32 These features of the inspirable mind are typified by Isaac, Abraham and Jacob respectively. διδασκαλίκης ἀρετῆς, φυσικῆς, ἀσκητικῆς, Abr. 52 sq.; cf. V. M. I, 76; Mut. 12; Ebriet. 82-83.

33 Som. I 12; Deus. 101; Plant. 82-83.

34 Sac. 93; Mut. 175-187.

35 Abr. 268-276; Cherub. 85.

36 Fuga. 148-156; Praem. 28-30; Ebriet. 36-45; 203-205; Mig. 41-47.

God now and always will bestow His gifts upon those who trust in Him.³⁷

In short Philo considers faith from two points of view at once. It is that intimacy between "friends" who extend mutual reliance before the event. It thus precedes descriptive knowledge. It fixes the guarantees to be worked out in action and motivates that action.³⁸ It is that informal exchange of pledges by which "friends" cooperate without preformed plans. Thus God and Abraham are represented as exchanging pledges,³⁹ faith for faith and thereafter acting in apparent independence but without discord. Man beholds and is beheld of God by faith. Faith is the guarantee of knowledge that may be dramatized by man before it is completed in God.

Philo suggests that knowledge, *ἐπιστήμη*, is to faith, *πίστις*, as a "deposit" entrusted to a "guardian".⁴⁰ Such a "guardian" is a genius for apprehending, for persistence in doing and for tenacity in holding in "memory" the highest and best things. By this figure Philo seems to comment upon Plato's philosopher-king. That he is thinking of the popular scribe of Judaism rather than oligarchic wise men is evident from the context. Nevertheless Philo reflects in this passage a conviction that arose in the Hellenistic age to modify the earlier confidence in a philosopher-king. The aspiration for concord, *ὁμόνοια*, based upon good will and good faith among individuals and states is reflected by Josephus when he substitutes *συμφωνία* for the usual *φρόνησις* among the four cardinal virtues of Platonism.⁴¹ If Wisdom is to rule the state there must be in each individual a personal attitude in harmony with such Wisdom.⁴² In Judaism the conception of a contract relation was broad enough to include the social, the legal and the personal aspect of orderly life.

By associating good faith with knowledge Philo carries the Stoic idea of *ὁρθὸς λόγος* into a social setting that subordinates individualism but guarantees freedom of thought. Philo indicates this

37 L. A. III 164.

38 Plant. 79-84; Som. I, 92-119.

39 Abr. 268-276; Mut. 270.

40 Det. 65-66; L. A. I 53-55; Heres. 105-111; cf. Mig. 40-44; Fuga. 132-165.

41 Contra Apion, II 170; cf. Cicero, De Officiis Bk. III ch. xxix on good faith and the oath of Jove.

42 Cf. the Stoic etymology of *fidem* from *fiat*, good faith is to make good. Cicero, De Officiis, Bk. I ch. vii.

by repudiating the irresponsible individualism that must have "guardians" and "instructors" placed over it.⁴³ When this is applied to the figure of the "faithful guardian" it would seem to mean that each individual may be his own scribal interpreter to seek knowledge in the Law but he will not by his individualistic interpretations break faith with the traditions upon which the social structure rests.⁴⁴ Freedom of thought is guaranteed only by "guarding" the deposit of wisdom that lies in the social heritage as a covenant but also constitutes a discipline for individual enlightenment. For the authority of aristocratic wise men Philo would substitute the "good faith" of devout students of the law. The subject matter of study would seem to be the covenant as a symbol for history.

Knowledge may be unexpressed or even inexpressible, "speechless". It is the source and sanction for reason rather than a part of reason. This is not the relation by which the Stoics distinguished inner reason, *Logos Endiathetos* from expressed reason, *Logos Prophorikos*. Nor is it the relation by which apparent form participates in the Platonic ideal. It is the Jewish paradox of faith and works. Nevertheless Philo makes use of both Stoic and Platonic terms to indicate that faith is neither irrational nor emotional like "sense".

Faith is an unselfish expectancy whose issue is the "birth of laughter". The "joy of the law" justifies the expectant labor in secular learning, moral deliberation and practical instruction. It is more intense and personal than mere logic, more warm and colorful than mere learning, more passionate and abandoned than mere understanding but it nevertheless contains the germ of all these things. Reason grows weary with details but faith imparts strength to reason for it rests upon God.⁴⁵ It is the developing capacity to "see" God, to become instructed, delighted and inspired of Him. Man must be born by hope but he must live by faith.

43 Det. 141-149.

44 In describing the "political" or social wisdom of Joseph, Philo stresses responsibility to the people. The statesman is neither a private individual nor an absolute ruler. His office is a "halter" as well as an honor. Leadership is a matter of delegated responsibility. Jos. 148-150.

45 Praem. 28-30.

Grace

Let us turn to Philo's use of the term grace, *χάρις*, the medium through which faith gains expression. However empty and shadowy are all things save God, those things take on a radiance as "witnesses" for Him. The beauty of nature, the inspiring examples of devout men, the exaltation of sublime thoughts, these are Graces that symbolize the divine care exercised over His creatures. Empty in themselves these creations overflow with meaning and glory when once the grace of God is appreciated. (*Som.* II 245-249).

Angels, Daimons, Souls and *Logoi* are other names for the Graces. They are aesthetic hypostases, *ἡ τοῦ καλοῦ φαντασία*. (*Gig.* 20). In them is symbolized the whole-part relation.⁴⁶ The promiscuous "many" in which there is no "art" or purity of form, *ἀφύης*, is set off by a perception of the "one" arresting or desirable excellence, *εὐφύης*.⁴⁷ Whole and parts are "opposites" in the sense that a harmony arrests and pleases while a confusion distracts and annoys. But the aesthetic hypostasis itself may have a good or bad moral significance according to the "spirit" it reveals.

It is a bad Daimon when it is regarded as an invitation to sensuous indulgence or selfish desire of any sort. It then represents or reveals the material *pneuma* or "life" of the fleshly nature and the particular mind. The whole-part relation is then vitiated either by a superstitious notion of Daimons as polytheistic finalities or by the selfish will to regard the life of the flesh and of the particular mind as self-sufficient. Such superstition, hedonism or egotism cannot be harmonized with the more inclusive grace of the One God. The promiscuous "many" are given first place when aesthetic perceptions are regarded as selfish desires. Like contentious opinions these desires conflict and breed "strife" instead of harmony and "peace". The "spirit" is then an animistic principle divided among many contending appearances. It is the life of material natures that are changeable and fickle.

Aesthetic appearances do offer occasional glimpses of a higher beauty. The authentic "spirit" does indeed shine through the

46 *Gig.* 1-29.

47 In *Sac.* 120 τὸ εὐφύες ἀρχή is made to signify the disposition to labor and progress in contrast with πηγὴ τὸ θεραπευτικῶς ἔχειν. The good disposition that is "natural" is like a happy genius for progress but the source of blessing is in God's service.

kaleidoscopic change of appearances from time to time like a messenger from God to offer comfort and guidance. Men never sink so low into the "fleshly" nature of pleasure nor the egotism of the particular mind that they do not enjoy an occasional glimpse of the truly good. What they then behold is the "spirit of God". This "spirit" is not an animistic property of material things, nor a rational faculty innate to man nor even an eternal beauty inherent in a pure form. It is purely intellectual in the sense of an instructive truth that comes from the larger realm of spiritual life of which man and nature are but minor parts. Such a truth though beautiful like an Angel is of the nature of the monad.⁴⁸ The selfish desire of material and sensuous things has been removed like dross from an intellectual concept the beauty of which is pure and simple.

Now it is to be observed that Philo pushes Stoic, Platonic and Pythagorean conceptions to a climax by exploiting the whole-part relation. What is next to be noted is the manner in which Philo's Judaism plays its part in personalizing the significance of the angelic messengers.

The man of faith⁴⁹ will cast aside superstitious credulity by discounting the animistic "essence" or "soul" in the "messengers" of God. He is skeptical of that "essence" as a fiction of his own selfish desires. By this criticism he makes the "messenger" personal in the sense of an "anthropomorphic idea", an idea in the form for men to understand and profit by.⁵⁰ The mind of man en-

48 Sp. L. I 66; Gig. 52; cf. Opif. 139.

49 Abr. 107-132.

50 Cf. Som. I 140-152 where "angels" are ranked like "steps" in a "ladder" and hypostatize guidance "up" or "down" according to "earthly" or "heavenly" desire. A pictorial consistency is not essential to the ideas set forth by this allegory. Philo seems to be teaching, (1) a moral lesson not unlike that of St. Paul in I Cor. 12. The "spirit" or "spirits" should be tested by a moral criterion. (2) A doctrine of learning. Between "pure mind" and pure "earth" there must be a transitional stage because mortals require "speech" as a "mediator". Which is to say that man cannot understand things until they are expressed in a form suitable to his comprehension. And such a form is like a discourse that leads him from the things near at hand up to the highest or down to the lowest significance. The "angels" are object lessons to be teleologically interpreted. (3) There is a vitalistic doctrine here. The realm of experience is like a mixture of the purely intellectual and the simply animal "life". In this experience good and evil mingle as though two guide posts stood side by side but pointed in opposite directions and thus offer an opportunity for the traveler to choose his own way. It is to be observed that Philo guards his lesson from a pantheistic or polytheistic interpretation by saying that God Himself "walks" in the

tertain a "messenger" from God when he regards his own critical insights as personal instructions from the Most High. The whole-part relation still obtains. To make this apparent let us present this abstract relation in the imagery of Philo's allegory of the visit of the three angels with Abraham.

According to the allegory the mind of Abraham may be likened to a household about to receive guests. The women folk are the senses or perceptive faculties and they bustle about to prepare for the accommodation and feasting of the visitors. Abraham the host is like reason and he entertains his guests by polite inquiry into their news of affairs in the world at large. The visitors have come with a message. It is a portentous message and hard to be believed. Abraham and his wife are promised a "son". Their union is to be pleased by a "gift" of God. They both "laugh" incredulously but hasten to apologize and to deny their apparent lack of faith in the promise. Thus is described the attitude with which the devout mind and its faculties of perception entertain heavenly "messengers". In humility it disclaims the credit for its own fruitage of insight and study but nevertheless accepts that fruit as a "promise" or "gift" of God by which to serve Him. The insight is like a "son" given of God and like a "wise man" counseling the household in the manner in which God may be served. Thus Philo goes on to liken the heavenly visitors both to certain "powers" of God and to certain ways by which dispositions may offer acceptable service to Him.

Turning to another allegory in which the heavenly messengers are treated⁵¹ we find Philo likening the flock of Jacob to ideas and perceptions that mingle and are fruitful. Jacob is the man of practical conduct and the insights that come to him are represented as exhortations, corrections, motivations and generative principles. In short the insights of men are arresting perceptions of pleasant, painful, informative and alluring experiences. When these arresting perceptions are referred to one disposition to see anything as a sign of divine instruction they all become knit into one harmonious manifestation of the guidance of God. The disposition in

"mind" of the "purified" while the "angels" are the instruments of those that need improvement. The vitalism is thus intellectualistic rather than animistic. "Life" is graduated on a scale of enlarging horizons of truth, having as its negative limit the animal or "earthly" experience and as its positive limit the mind of God.

51 Som. I 189 sq.

man which is able to behold that harmony is φιλόθεος and θεοσεβής. This disposition to serve God through all the faculties of the soul is itself a faculty to which the "messengers" of God are apparent. By assuming that each experience he encounters externally or within his thought, is a message of individual counsel, reward, punishment, information or in general, "instruction", man takes a personal relation toward God. He penetrates each experience as a symbol of instruction, learns its lesson, and proceeds to a still higher unity. The principle of that unity lies in the disposition of man to serve and the gracious acceptance of that service by God.⁵² Within that principle all consecrated service becomes like the parts in a great harmonious whole.

Now Philo assigns to "grace" the rôle that he denies to material finality. He makes of "grace" a quality or essence that satisfies the conditions of knowing and localizes all cause in God.

"The righteous man exploring the nature of the Universe makes a surprising find in this one discovery, that all things are a grace of God, and that creation has no gift of grace to bestow, for neither has it any possession since all things are God's possession, and for this reason grace too belongs to Him alone as a thing that is His very one". (*L. A. III 78*).

For Philo grace testifies to the benevolent activity of God without in any way depleting or diminishing His power to give nor limiting his "gifts" to a formal purpose. The conception is vitalistic. Grace is more than the expressive work of an artist by which an idea is embodied. It is more like the everlasting overflow of a fountain the hidden source of which remains unknown. It objectifies a function rather than a form. It is the hypostasis for good will.

Thus though "grace" may be likened to a substantive "gift" its nature is that of a relation between a creative and an appreciative mind. It cannot be predicated of a man by himself. This would make man the "measure of all things" and man's ideas a "grace" of his own mind, the folly of Protagoras and Cain.⁵⁴ Grace is like an experience of divine quality, the effect of which may be known but the cause for which remains unknown.

⁵² Θεοφιλῆς δόξα. Abr. 123. A figure used by Philo to signify this vital relationship is the *tree of life*. Opif. 153-156. See also Som. I 231-241.

⁵⁴ Post. 35 sq.; cf. Conf. 83 sq.

By "grace" therefore man integrates his thought of God as he dramatizes the Divine Will in the objects of his experience. To see a benevolent will behind all the separate events of human experience is to organize that experience into one meaning the inspiring quality of which is the "grace" of God. When Philo says that all nature rests upon the "grace" of God instead of upon some material substratum he merely says that the benevolent will of God undergirds all natural experience. This natural experience is the "covenant of God's grace". By that covenant God "gives things to themselves". Which is to say that God is not incarnate in nature or creation but rather He has set free the creatures that He has made so that they may of their own volition praise Him for their happy lot in being bound only by ties of love and gratitude to their Maker. (*Som.* II 219-227). Grace is like an aesthetic vision of God that stands as the symbol for, but not as, the reality of God. It is not only legitimate but even a most praiseworthy act of worship thus to represent God, so long as man does not regard the symbol as superior to the Reality.

Summary

We have indicated in this preliminary manner Philo's conception of human selfhood as a capacity to respond to a transcendent Cause the nature of which remains unknown. Such a conception of the self or "mind" of man can hardly form the premise upon which a rational theology may be constructed. It merely describes the psychological conditions for individual investigation into the nature of God. It is exactly because God is not subject to formal definition that the life of man may become enriched in thought and aspiration as man responds to the urge to reach higher and more ennobling conceptions of Deity. It is exactly because God is dynamic rather than static that His ineffability may be as intimate an experience of the plastic mind of man as His Name is above all other names. Transcendence for Philo does not imply great distance but simply, "otherness". In respect to the created world, God must be thought of as high above created things but in respect to the mind of man He is ever present to hear when called upon. He is simply not man nor creation. He is the guarantee to man that man is not deluded in supposing himself to exist and to have a high mission in this world. That mission centers in

learning and doing the Will of God. And included in that mission is the privilege of investigating the nature of God. To describe this mission is to describe the universe as a stage where there is being enacted the great drama of God's dealings with man. Let us begin the description of this drama by considering Philo's ontology.

CHAPTER VI

ONTOLOGY

God the Object of All Reference

The designation for the Supreme Deity which is used most significantly by Philo is τὸ ὄν, The Being. It is an inquiry into the use of this term that must first engage our attention.

In the first place, the name τὸ ὄν indicates the one fact that may with certainty be known concerning God.⁵⁵ We can know that God is real, that His being is a fact. To go beyond this fact by giving names or applying attributes to God is to enter upon hypothesis.

With a due understanding of the hypothetical nature of applying names, one is justified in enriching the meaning of the name τὸ ὄν. Indeed such an enterprise manifests the true love of wisdom.⁵⁶ Nevertheless we must first understand what is involved in the discipline of naming or applying attributes.⁵⁷ The application of a name makes manifest the character of the namer rather than the character of the object named.⁵⁸ Again the name is but a shadow of the object named and lacks the unique essence which constitutes the reality of the object.⁵⁹ Thus a name is no more than denotative, merely an indication of the direction in which meaning lies. It suggests research into a content but faintly adumbrated.⁶⁰

Description and attribution must therefore fall short of accuracy by just that difference which distinguishes the real from its symbol. This becomes a critical difficulty in probing the nature of Deity because here that difference must be the dividing line between that which can be trusted and that which is relatively unreal. It is in the very nature of God to "be" rather than to be described.⁶⁰

Nevertheless from the known fact of God as τὸ ὄν and in the

⁵⁵ Deus. 62; V. M. I 75; Post. 167-169; Sp. L. I 32-50.

⁵⁶ Fuga. 141; Sp. L. I 36-40.

⁵⁷ L. A. II 15-18; Cherub. 56; Qu. in Gen. I 20-22 ed. Aucher. Philo's nominalism includes, (1) the *why* of naming. This is to test a man's character by his declaration of affinities, (2) the *what* of naming. The name is only a symbol for that declaration. Thus only the wiseman can apply felicitous names or symbols that reveal the value and meaning of objects, for wisdom includes proper dispositions as well as learning.

⁵⁸ Decal. 82.

⁵⁹ Mut. 65-70 ἐσκιαγραφεῖτο.

⁶⁰ φησὶν ὅτι "ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ ὢν", ἴσον τῷ εἶναι πέφυκα, οὐ λέγεσθαι. Mut. 11, cf. Gig. 52.

light of an understanding of the discipline of naming and applying attributes, certain deductions may be made concerning the meaning τὸ ὄν as the name of Deity. Let us follow Philo in these deductions. They are two. τὸ ὄν must be unique as an object and τὸ ὄν must be unique as a quality. The first may be briefly indicated but the second involves considerable discussion.

Τὸ ὄν must be unique as an object because the positive category of "being" must subsume to itself the categories of "place"⁶¹ and relationship. God as a place unto Himself and the only such Being must precede and support all possible relationships within the category of being. It is the nature of God to "be" rather than to "be-in-relation-to".⁶² All objects other than God are therefore but hypothetical. They must depend for their "place" upon some relation to τὸ ὄν and such relation cannot be reciprocal in an ontological sense. Objects other than God are modified beings while τὸ ὄν Who is identical with "place" is the only unmodified objective Being.

Hence it is incorrect and an abuse of terms, says Philo, to speak of Deity without the article.⁶³ There is only one such substance and in speaking of that substance, ὁ θεός is correct while θεός is correct. τὸ ὄν is not a distributive quality but a unique object. He is indeed the objective reality upon which all objective categories must depend for their relative reality.

Ousia

To indicate the distributive quality of "being", Philo uses the term οὐσία. Three technical meanings of the term οὐσία were used by the ancients. It might mean ontological primacy,⁶⁴ true definition,⁶⁵ or individuality,⁶⁶ the status of species. We wish to indi-

61 Philo says that ὁ τόπος may have three different meanings, (1) that which is filled by body, σῶμα, (2) the Divine Word, ὁ θεῖος λόγος which God has completely furnished with incorporeal powers, ἀσωμάτοις δυνάμεσιν (3) God Himself for He circumscribes or limits all things without Himself being limited and because all things *take refuge* καταφυγὴν in Him. Som. I 61-67. Philo's conclusion is that God is "place" because He is the Cause of all things. Cf. Conf. 134-140; L. A. III 51; Fuga. 75-76.

62 Mut. 27. τὸ γὰρ, ἡ ὄν ἐστίν, οὐχὶ τῶν πρὸς τι.

63 Som. I 228-230; cf. Det. 160.

64 Plato, Phaedo, 65 D, 78 C, 92 D; Aristotle, Metaph. 6.1, 5; 2.2, 12.

65 Plato, Phaedrus, 245 E.

66 Aristotle, Categ. 5, 1-13; 5, 1; Metaph. 4.8, 1.

cate that Philo qualifies each of these meanings by maintaining the necessity of reference to τὸ ὄν. The status of an essence must be fixed by a relation to τὸ ὄν before it can obtain as real.

It is to be noted that Philo never speaks of οὐσία as uncreated, ἀγέννητος. In using ἀγέννητος almost a hundred times he only twice associates it with οὐσία and in both instances this is to contrast God the Uncreate with οὐσία the created. In one instance the contrast is between the spontaneity of the Uncreate and the need of the created οὐσία.⁶⁷ In the other instance the contrast is between many gods as created οὐσία to whom divinity is falsely ascribed and the One God Who is Uncreate and to Whom the misapplied attribute of divinity really belongs.⁶⁸

It is probable that the more popular meaning of οὐσία as property or possessions is involved in Philo's use of the term. He affirms that God alone can truly "possess".⁶⁹ It is in the problem of knowledge that Philo emphasizes that the essence of God is forever beyond man. God cannot be "possessed" by another in the sense of being fully known. But this does not mean that οὐσία cannot be ascribed to other things than God in that sense. The essence of God cannot be circumscribed in any sense but οὐσία as the end point of an act of knowing may be ascribed to anything other than God and "mind". It would seem that Philo's position is that although we cannot know *what* God is we cannot escape knowing *that* He is.⁷⁰ οὐσία as the "what" of knowing is merely the distributive being which a descriptive reason imputes to the objects of definition. That imputation may be correctly made for all objects save God and the mind. These cannot be described. It can only be known that they exist.

Thus an essence is a principle of need in contrast with τὸ ὄν, Who monopolizes the principle of spontaneity.⁷¹ Essences are passive in contrast with pure mind which is an active cause,⁷² a statement which Brehier⁷³ regards as an explicit contradiction of *Timaeus* 30 A where a primal stuff is regarded as self-moved.

⁶⁷ Som. II 253.

⁶⁸ V. M. II 71; cf. Sp. L. I 17-20.

⁶⁹ Cherub. 65 sq. κτήματα and οὐσία.

⁷⁰ Atheism is an "intentional forgetfulness" (ἐκούσιον λήθην). Decal. 62; cf. Post. 8-9.

⁷¹ Som. II 253.

⁷² Opif. 8-9.

⁷³ Op. cit., p. 79.

Similarly in *Som.* I, 76, God originates as well as orders in His act of creation.⁷⁴

Ousia and Soma

Zeller has considered that Philo uses οὐσία as an equivalent for σῶμα, body, to imply with the Stoics a material substratum.⁷⁵ (*Phil. der Griech.* vol. III, p. 387). Before such an equivalence can be granted it is important to observe the influence of Epicureanism upon Philo's definitions of "body".

Among the Epicureans we find that the immediacy of the sense perception of a whole had been introduced to make more precise the notion of "being". In the definition of "body" the logical precedents such as qualities, magnitudes, shapes and such categories are not to be understood as either existent or non-existent.⁷⁶ They obtain only by that coordination of them which is the immediate sensual "body". Thus logical finality had been distinguished from ontological reality.

This separation gives to σῶμα a meaning which is not reserved to materialism but rather to a favored mode of cognition. All that is required to exploit this meaning for an anti-materialism is the claim that immediacy of perception may be achieved by other means than by sense, such as by intuition.⁷⁷

It may be suggested that what the Epicureans had done in defining σῶμα by immediate sense perception was paralleled by the Rabbis when they insisted that God can be experienced by direct revelation but that no "name" can be descriptive of his Being.⁷⁸

74 Cf. *Mut.* 54-55; *Opif.* 17; *Sp. L.* IV 187; *Cherub.* 77; *Ebriet.* 35-45. The passage in *De Som.* I 76 reads οὐ δημιουργὸς μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ κτίστης αὐτὸς ὢν.

75 The Stoics distinguished ἄποιος οὐσία and τὴν πρώτην ὕλην from τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους an infinite from a finite substance. *D. L.* VII 150; *Stob.* I ii, 5 c; *Plot. Enn.* II p. 114 (*Arnim.* II 375). Aristotle made ἡ ἄποιος ὕλη a potentiality of body δυνάμει σῶμα. *Dexipp. Arist. Cat.* p. 23, 25 (*Arnim.* II 374).

76 *D. L.* X 67-71.

77 Philo makes *sight*, which is the "best of the senses", cover all cases of direct apprehension whether perceptual or conceptual. To *sight* the Epicurean κατηγορεῖται are *visible*. *Opif.* 120; cf. *D. L.* X 68. See also Philo, *L. A.* I 19; *Abr.* 147-166; *Virt.* 11-14.

78 Schechter *op. cit.*, pp. 39-45; cf. Josephus, *Contra Apion*, II 167 καὶ δυνάμει μὲν ἡμῖν γνωριμὸν, ὁποῖος δὲ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστὶν ἄγνωστον. Cf. Philo *Som.* I 231-237; *Heres.* 170.

They did not hesitate to apply many and various names. But the substance of God was only to be known directly while "names" were but logical deductions from certain characteristic activities of Deity. The heresy combated was the tendency to hypostatize names into many gods or aeons, thus to compromise the unity of God. What in effect is accomplished by the Rabbis is the definition of "name" as a logical instrument never to be confused with an ontological independence. Rabbinic Theology and Epicurean physics are much more evident in Philo's use of the term οὐσία to indicate the immediate intuition of a whole, than is the influence of Stoic materialism. Zeller is perhaps correct in saying that Philo uses οὐσία as an equivalent for σῶμα. We would add ὄνομα as a third equivalent.⁷⁹ But the implication is not materialistic. It is logical finality that is meant.

The Stoic Apollodorus in agreement with Aristotle had defined "body" as that which has three dimensions. (*D. L. VII 135*). Philo in adopting this definition draws it from στερέωμα as equivalent to σῶμα and renders the definition a geometric tautology, body, cubicity, and three dimensionality meaning the one thing, namely commensurability. (*Opif. 36-37*).

When however Philo explains why corporeality is called "heaven", οὐρανός, the reasons are given by a supposed etymology from ὅρος a boundary and ὁράω, to see.⁸⁰ The "heaven" is created as a "boundary" or whole and as a first sense object. This may be compared with another Stoic definition, probably from Chrysippus, which declares "body" to be that which produces an effect. (*D. L. VII 56*). But Philo considers the "heaven" to be created and not an active cause. The Epicurean test of a cognitive whole is used.

First Principles

This treatment of the "heaven" is according to the "three" stage that underlies the "adornment" or materialization of the cosmos by the number "four".⁸¹ In his exposition Philo collects Pythagorean

⁷⁹ Cherub. 56; Post. 112.

⁸⁰ Cf. Plato, Rep. 509 D; Cornutus, Theol. Gr. c. 1; Philo Opif. 37.

⁸¹ Opif. 47. The six days of creation are made to correspond to six "numbers", the events of each "day" corresponding to a Pythagorean principle.

rean, Epicurean and Stoic first principles about the whole-part relation.

The Pythagorean formula exploits the arithmetic fact that the sum of the first four digits equals ten. Thus as "ten" symbolizes "all" as the limit of the digits, so "four" symbolizes "all" as the potential unit which by additive elaboration may represent all material extension. What "ten" is actually, ἐντελεχεία, "four" is potentially, δυνάμει. "Four" stands to "ten" as a variable to a limit. But the number "four" is not a material atom for it is analysable into the more primitive digits, "one", "two", and "three". It represents the material universe as a sum of parts that are not themselves material elements. The numbers represent dimensions and it takes four dimensions to represent materiality.

"It is this number (four)⁸² that has led us out of the realm of incorporeal existence patent only to the intellect, and has introduced us to the conception of a body of three dimensions, which by its nature first comes within the range of our senses. Anyone who does not understand what I am saying will catch my meaning if he calls to mind a very familiar game. Players with nuts are in the habit of setting out three nuts all on one level and of adding one to these, thus forming a pyramidal figure. The figure of the triangle on the level only reaches the number three: the added nut produces in number, four, but in figure a pyramid, a body rendered solid by its accession." (*Opif.* 49-50).

In terms of Epicurean physics Philo speaks of the cosmos as created in full fruit or complete but says that the diminutive "seed" are the *first perceptibles*.⁸³ The whole-part relation which in the number symbols is not unlike a theory of limits becomes a theory of cognition in Epicurean terms. The "parts" of "body" are sense perceptions⁸⁴ and the relation of part to whole is likened to the process of natural growth.⁸⁵ The significance of natural

⁸² In the treatise *De Som.* I there is an elaboration of the "four" principle as "mind" and "light".

⁸³ *Opif.* 41; cf. *D. L.* X 58-59.

⁸⁴ Cf. *L. A.* I 21-24 πρὶν δὲ γενέσθαι τὰ κατὰ μέρος αἰσθητά, ἦν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο γενικὸν αἰσθητόν. (22).

Cf. *Heres.* 132, τὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν εἰς καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν καὶ ἀκατάληπτον.

⁸⁵ The Epicurean theory of cognition in which minima though not themselves in motion are seen as continuous, seems to be matched by Philo with a vitalism in which the minima though not themselves "alive" are experienced as a continuity of life.

process seems to lead Philo off into Stoic first principles and he symbolizes the πνεῦμα as a gentle nourishing "breeze".⁸⁶ He then goes on to indicate the *Logoi* as principles subsistent to the "seed".⁸⁷

General and Particular Ideas

In this conflation of first principles it seems evident that Philo is distinguishing between particular and general "ideas". The particular "ideas" are perceptible instances of the general "idea". The general "idea" is a functional whole of which the particulars are formal parts.⁸⁸ This is to make the incorporeal "idea" of Platonism intrinsically a sense object. And Philo is quite aware that he has done this.⁸⁹ By generalizing "sense" as a comprehensive mode of perception he has removed from matter or "stuff" the exclusive function of a sense datum and has ascribed that function to the nature of a whole.

The Platonic "idea" is considered functionally and formally.⁹⁰ Considered functionally it is like the monad, a basis for multiplicity in contrast with the "incorporeal power" of God which may also be called "idea". Considered formally it is a minimum essential in contrast with a sterility or non-being, ἀμορφος ὕλη.⁹¹

Thus the "power" of God touches no confused material substratum but deploys a generic "power" the "idea" as a unit of measure, to create species or "ideas" as particular effects of such a function.

The removal of the "idea", general or particular, is the removal of that by which qualities exist. It is to be noted therefore that Philo has removed the characteristic mark of Plato's definition of

86 Opif. 41. There is evidently a play on Stoic terms κρᾶσις and πνεῦμα in τῆς ἐνκρασίας τῶν πνευμάτων.

87 Opif. 43, σπερματικὰς οὐσίας κτλ. In Det. 79-83 Philo suggests a vitalism by introducing Semitic ideas of *blood* and *breath* into his discussion of the soul. πνεῦμα is the "life of the 'soul'" and αἷμα the "life" of the "flesh." οὐσία indicates each principle. But neither is a finality. For they both draw their support from God. In L. A. I 37-42 πνεῦμα is distinguished from πνοήν in similar fashion. For the Semitic ideas of "blood" and "breath" see Peters, *The Religion of the Hebrews*, pp. 448 sq.

88 Det. 75-78; Mut. 77-80; Cherub. 51-52.

89 Ebriet. 133; L. A. I 19; Plant. 45 sq.

90 Sp. L. I 327-330.

91 τὴν στοιχείων οὐσίαν, versus ταῖς ἀσωμάτοις δυνάμεσιν; τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην οὐσίαν, versus θλαδίας; for στοιχεῖον and the monad see Heres. 190; cf. Plant. 75-78.

matter as outlined in *Timaeus* 51. For Plato the "invisible and formless something"⁹² is a fertile "mother" in which qualities are inherent but undefined. For Philo this "something" is "sterile" and the qualities inhere in the function of measurement.⁹³ Thus for Philo the "idea" includes Plato's "being" and "generation". "Idea" is synonymous with "seed".

It is in the sense of focusing hypothetical qualities that Philo uses οὐσία as an equivalent for σῶμα. The same meaning is ascribed to ὄνομα. The three terms are interchangeable in their designation of an immediately apprehensible whole, the first appropriate to logical, the second to sensual and the third to conventional objects. No one of these objects is guaranteed ontological reality merely in terms of its appropriate avenue of apprehension. The objects indicated by such terms are representations of τὸ ὄν.⁹⁴ As such they facilitate the apprehension of meanings but "true being" is not circumscribed by any one of them.

Atomism

What Philo does is to reinterpret the atomism of the Epicureans⁹⁵ by borrowing idealistic thought and adapting both to the Hebrew idiom for dedication or consecration. He makes "I have taken" and "Take for Me" mean "separation" or "division" in the sense of an appointment or reference of things to God according to His expressed Will. This theme runs through all of Philo's treatment of material things.

Thus where the Atomists say that qualities do not inhere in

92 Plato, ἀνόρατον εἶδος τι καὶ ἄμορφου; Philo, τὴν ἄμορφον καὶ ἄποιον ἐκείνην; Plato, μητέρα; Philo, θαλάσσης.

93 Sp. L. I 48; For οὐσία contrasted with ὕλη see V. M. I 65; Cong. 145; with σῶμα as well as with ἀσώματον. L. A. I 91.

94 Post. 166-169.

95 Philo identifies hedonism and atomism in condemnation (Fuga. 148). He uses the term ἄτομος to designate a particular unit whether of "sense" or "mind" (L. A. I 1, 22), of imperceptible minima (Heres. 142; Mut. 180), of a "body" reducible to minima in "opposition" (Heres. 131), as a felicitous expression for "divisions" or parts (Agri. 134). The term ὄγκοι indicates material minima. (Heres. 131; Det. 90, 113; Som. I 22).

the atom itself but in the configuration of atoms," Philo says that meaning does not inhere in instances of the Universal, such as in particular "bodies", "names" or "essences" but rather in the relation of "opposition" among them⁹⁸ which must be "reconciled"⁹⁹

97 Diog. Laert. X 54-60; Lucretius, II 333-521, 859-864, III 185-202: Epic. Frs. 288, 289, (Us.); Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. IX 335. The atomists inconsistently admitted different sorts of atoms. Nevertheless in Diog. Laert. X 68-71 *accidents* (συμπτώματα) are made relations among parts and rejected as independent existences or permanent properties of a whole. This is to affirm the germinal idea of a configuration theory.

98 Heres. 128-132 τῆς μὲν οὖν θείας ἐπιστήμης ὄρνιθος τρόπον τὸ αἰεὶ μετεωροπολεῖν ἴδιον, τῆς δὲ ἀνθρωπίνης αἰδῶ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἐμποιεῖν, ὧν τὸ ἐρυθριᾶν ἐστ' οἷς ἄξιον. δείγμα ἐναργέστατον. "ἔλαβεν δὲ" (Gen. 15, 10.). φησὶν "αὐτῷ πάντα ταῦτα" τοῦτ' ἐπαινός ἐστι τοῦ σπουδαίου, τὴν ἱερὰν ὧν ἔλαβε παρακαταθήκην, ψυχῆς, αἰσθήσεως, λόγου, θείας σοφίας, ἀνθρωπίνης ἐπιστήμης, καθαρῶς καὶ ἀδόλως μὴ ἑαυτῷ, μόνῳ δὲ τῷ πεπιτευκότῳ φυλάξαντος. εἴτ' ἐπιλέγει. "διείλεν αὐτὰ μέσα," τὸ τίς μὴ προστιθείς, ἵνα τὸν ἄδεικτον ἐννοῇς θεὸν τέμνοντα τὰς τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξῆς ἀπάσας ἡρόμσθαι καὶ ἠώσθαι δοκούσας φύσεις τῷ τομεῖ τῶν συμπάντων ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ, ὃς εἰς τὴν ὀξύτατην ἀκονηθεὶς ἀκμὴν διαιρῶν οὐδέποτε λήγει. τὰ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ πάντα ἐπειδὴν μέχρι τῶν ἀτόμων καὶ λεγομένων ἀμερῶν διεξέλθῃ, πάλιν ἀπὸ τούτων τὰ λόγῳ θεωρητὰ εἰς ἀμυθῆτους καὶ ἀπεριγάρους μοίρας ἄρχεται διαιρεῖν οὗτος ὁ τομεύς, καὶ "τὰ πέταλα τοῦ χρυσοῦ τέμνει τρίχας" (Exod. 36, 10), ὥς φησι Μωυσῆς, εἰς υἷκος ἀπλαγές ἀσωμάτοις γραμμαῖς ἐμφορές. ἕκαστον οὖν τῶν τριῶν διεῖλε μέσον, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν εἰς λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον, τὸν δὲ λόγον εἰς ἀληθές τε καὶ ψεῦδος, τὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν εἰς καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν καὶ ἀκατάληπτον. ἅπερ εὐθὺς τμήματα "ἀντιπρόσωπα τίθησιν ἀλλήλοις", λογικὸν ἄλογον, ἀληθές ψεῦδος, καταληπτὸν ἀκατάληπτον, ἀπολιπὼν τὰ πτηνὰ ἀδιαίρετα (Gen. 15, 10). τὰς γὰρ ἀσωμάτους καὶ θείας ἐπιστήμης εἰς μαχομένας ἐναντιότητας ἀδύνατον τέμνεσθαι. Cf. Heres. 214), παλαιὸν γὰρ εὔρεμα Μωυσέως ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἐναντία τμημάτων λόγον ἔχοντα ἀποτελεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἐναργῶς ἐδείχθη. (Cf. Gig. 41-42).

For Philo's association of the text, Gen. 15, 10 with a "fifth element" see Qu. in Gen. III 6-7 ed. Aucher.

99 Philo classes the philosophic schools among the things that are reconcilable. For their common enterprise is the investigation of "nature". Their disputes are mere matters of opinion. And this is because truth eludes an unconsecrated human understanding. The situation calls for prayer and revelation. And so Philo launches off into an account of ἔκστασις. The type of revelation that he recommends is that which rewarded the faith of Abraham, a man learned in natural science and secular wisdom who offers up his opinions (son) in ethical dedication to God (Heres. 246 sq.).

as the Word, by reference to τὸ ὄν.¹⁰⁰ The configuration of minima is not left to "accidents" of form nor to the "opinion" of an observer but is accounted for by ascribing to τὸ ὄν the function of the intelligent Active Cause.

The Whole-part Relation

This Cause is purely functional for no formal whole can "contain" Him. The interpretation is a speculation upon the whole-part relation. Philo indicates explicitly and clearly the principle of this relation when he says,

"Now if the part is an image of an image, it is manifest that the whole is too, and if the whole creation, this entire world perceived by our senses, (seeing that it is greater than any human image) is a copy of the Divine image, it is manifest that the archetypal seal also, which we aver to be the world described by the mind, would be the very Word of God".¹⁰¹

Which is to say that the largest whole which can be comprehended by the "mind" is the neotical world and this stands in a functional relation to the world of sense but in a formal relation to the First Cause which it represents.¹⁰² The principle of cause and the principle of cognition are but one relation operative in opposite directions. This may be deduced from several propositions concerning the whole-part relation. (1) The container always stands in a functional relation to the contained.¹⁰³ (2) Form is always relative to a larger whole.¹⁰⁴ (3) Perception is always an experience of relation to a whole.

Philo not only states these principles explicitly¹⁰⁵ but also applies them consistently to his psycho-physics. Thus "sense" and other faculties peculiar to the concrete "soul" are but "parts" of the

100 Philo interprets Deut. 5, 5 and Num. 16, 48 to mean that the Word or Reason is a mean between two limits. The Word is a mean between Creator and creature and it characterizes the good man who is a mean between natural man and God. This mean is an "opposition" which without God would be a strife or confusion among the parts of the universe but by reference to God becomes a hostage of "peace" and harmony. Opposition without a standard is chaos but with a standard of judgment an instrument of understanding (Heres. 201-214; Som. II 228-236).

101 Opif. 25; cf. Opif. 7-12, 170-172.

102 Cf. Fuga. 101-105.

103 Heres. 227; Mig. 180-186; Sobriet. 63-65; cf. Decal. 106-107; Fuga. 170-182.

104 Det. 86-90; Sac. 80-85.

105 Heres. 213-214.

"mind" while "mind" is the controlling factor over these "parts". Nevertheless "mind" is but a "part" or particular in relation to the Divine Cause and hence stands as a perceptive faculty, a "sense of sight" with relation to God and as a response to the causal force of the Divine Cause.¹⁰⁶ Parts are formal in relation to their functional container and functional in relation to their formal contents.¹⁰⁷

Thus the causal efficacy of God is mediated through ever diminishing or "smaller" wholes down to the minima. This is illustrated by Philo in the case of the "first man" and his relation to subsequent generations, by the figure of the magnet which draws a series of particles with diminishing strength.¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless this causal series is not an infinite regress because the minima receive precisely the degree of attraction or causal efficacy which is appropriate to their proportions as "parts".¹⁰⁹ This is illustrated by Philo when he says that God apportions to His creatures precisely the degree of benevolent care which each creature can bear or "contain".¹¹⁰ We shall attempt to illustrate the many applications of the whole-part relation in Philo's thought as we proceed. Let us now return to the further treatment of οὐσία.

Οὐσία, σῶμα, and ὄνομα designate a coordination of parts in a whole which may become descriptive of an object that exists, whenever it is illuminated by God as by a "light" shining through a form, for it is God Who provides that immediacy of apprehension to "mind" that becomes detailed among the "senses" and the other faculties of experience. True "being" is therefore not to be confused with a distribution of particulars¹¹¹ for such particulars depend for their final guarantee upon the causal function of τὸ ὄν.

106 L. A. I 24-30; Deus. 33-50. The terms used are Stoic. But Philo seems to represent the meditation of God, (μετανοία) as a *habit* (ἔξισ) or cycle process which by emanation from God is a causal efficacy like *irrigation* and in return to God is the experience of His creatures. Thus man is not an initiator as with the Stoics but only responds as with the Epicureans.

107 See Philo's attempt to relate the arts and the faculties in Cong. 139-145; cf. Plato, Timaeus, 29 C; Rep. 511.

108 Opif. 140-141.

109 Opif. 23; Post. 142-145; Sp. L. I 120-122.

110 Mut. 216-223.

111 Deus. 109-110. κατὰ τὸ εἶναι μόνον, versus εἰδικωτέρων οὐσαν.

Ousia Logical and Ethical

The problem of "opposites" involves the term *οὐσία* and Philo's use of the term in that problem is a comment upon the Aristotelian terms, *δυνάμει* and *ἐντελεχείᾳ*. Philo regards "opposites" as parts within a whole and cites this view as a Heraclitian principle which Moses anticipated. We have already indicated the bearing of this principle upon "grace". It is in the allegory of the "tree of the knowledge of good and evil" that Philo indicates the use of *οὐσία* in the problem.¹¹²

The "Tree of the knowledge of good and evil" is a figure for the logical deployment or formulation of ideas. Among these ideas a distinction is made between those that are merely "beautiful to look upon" and those that are also "suitable for food". The distinction is not unlike that made by Panaetius between contemplative and practical virtue.¹¹³ But Philo's contrast is between the knowable, *γνωστός*, and the livable, *ζωός*. He says that the "tree of the knowledge of good and evil" may be present in the "paradise of virtue" in *οὐσία* but not in *δυνάμει*. This would seem to mean that *οὐσία* can provide a logical status for the deploying of ideas and perceptions, aesthetic hypostases for both good and evil things.¹¹⁴ This is a contemplation of significances of "opposite" quality. But among these things that are contemplated only those that are good may be said to be potential. Thus *οὐσία* is only a logical finality that provides a status for "opposites" some of which have ontological possibility and others merely the capacity to exist in "word".¹¹⁵

Discarding then the *οὐσία* that is not potential we turn to the good ideas or perceptions.¹¹⁶ The figure for these is the "tree of life". The minima of this whole are not final entities. For potentialities are not *αὐτοκρατῆς*, says Philo.¹¹⁷ Like successive im-

112 L. A. I 60-62.

113 L. A. I 56-59; cf. Diog. Laert. VII 92; Aristotle, *Metaph.* V 1.

114 Philo's geographical illustration from which it might be inferred that evil can be *present κατ' οὐσίαν*, *δυνάμει δὲ οὐ δύναται*, should be compared with L. A. III 53 where evil is *placeless*, *ἄτοπον δὲ ἐστὶ κακὸν δύσθετον*.

115 Cf. L. A. II, 86.

116 Strictly speaking there is but "one" good idea, for moral "opposition" of the logical *οὐσία* disappears when these minima are not regarded as "bodies" or sensuous particulars but as "reasons" that contribute to moral choice. See L. A. I 100-104; III 246-247.

117 Opif. 46.

pressions stamped upon wax they can only be actual, ἐντελέχεια in their appointed time, place and order by reference to the "first good" guaranteed by God.¹¹⁸ Thus Philo says the "soul" comes furnished with all its potentialities, the objects of thought that favor its growth.¹¹⁹ Of these only some can be actual for other potential goods are like ends yet to be realized in "life". But ends can be realized by reference to the Active Cause and thus the life of the soul is a progression of actual experience of a continuity of ends.

Οὐσία is therefore thrice qualified. As a status of many "opposites" it can only be a logical distribution of ideas and perceptions. Among such οὐσία those that are also δυνάμει are "suitable for food" or modes of living. Among such potentialities those are ἐντελέχεια which are ontologically related to τὸ ὄν as the Active Cause or First Good.

Summary

Οὐσία in general is a term that must have an adjective or attributive word of some sort to give it meaning. When applied to aught else but God it is merely the status of definition, the distributive being which a descriptive reason requires for deploying meaning. It may be corporeal or incorporeal, visible or invisible, moveable or immovable, formal or informal or any other set of opposites that logical comprehension can devise.¹²⁰ Philo uses οὐσία in this way and distinguishes it from τὸ ὄν to indicate that the circumscription of God by logical terms is impossible.

In contrast to οὐσία, τὸ ὄν is a unique qualifying originality.¹²¹ It is a tautology to speak of τὸ ὄν as a quality just as it would be to speak of God as divine or to seek to define the essence of being. To attempt this is to contemplate the "principle essence" and to be

118 Mut. 30-31.

119 L. A. II 71-74.

120 E. g. οὐσία as one of the ten categories dependent upon time and place, Decal. 30; ἀόρατων καὶ ἀσώματων Mut. 7; ὁρατός, Sp. L. I, 20; Abr. 69; ποιότητος Sp. L. I, 327; Conf. 186; ἄποιος, Conf. 85; Heres. 140; σωματικῶς, Opif. 132; Post 163; τῆς ἀσωμάτου καὶ νοητῆς οὐσίας, Opif. 49; τῆς τε ἀσωμάτου καὶ σωματικῆς οὐσίας, Opif. 92; ἀθανάτου καὶ θνητῆς οὐσίας, Decal. 107; φθαρταῖς καὶ γενηταῖς οὐσίαις. V. M. II, 171; cf. Det. 76.

121 L. A. III 206-208; (τὸ αἴτιον).

"blinded by light" in the conviction that an object of comprehensive quality does indeed exist but that nothing definitive can be known of that object. (*Fuga*. 163-5).¹²² That which defines cannot itself be defined or the definition becomes a tautology. Definition must therefore end with the positive experience that a unit of definition exists. οὐσία can have meaning only so long as it is not identified with τὸ ὄν.¹²³ When so identified it loses all prescriptive meaning and becomes the reiteration that He who Is, is.

122 Cf. Post. 166-169; Mut. 7-14, 54-55.

123 It is to be remarked that in Philo ἄπειρος οὐσία never refers to God but always to the confused state of perception (σύγχυσις) or opinion or will that is for Philo the material aspect of things. For references see note 126 below.

CHAPTER VII

THE IDEA OF PURITY, HARMONY

The Problem

The second deduction to be made from the meaning of τὸ ὄν is that He is unique as a quality. This uniqueness may be indicated by the term ἄποιος, meaning pure or beyond classification.

Drummond has explained Philo's use of this term as an attempt to indicate an all-inclusive class.¹²⁴ Billings¹²⁵ has observed that ἄποιος indicates a uniqueness without *χαρακτήρ*. (*Deus*. 55).

It is well to remember that Philo does not confine the term ἄποιος to the nature of God.¹²⁶ A more significant meaning which is restricted to God is cause. It would seem that attention should be directed to the relation of cause to quality rather than class to quality. For Philo's use of ἄποιος is bound up with the nature of value judgments and their causes.

Perhaps attention should be called to Philo's apparent play upon the words ποιέω, to do or make and ποιότης, quality. (E.g. *L. A.* II 79-81). This is one of several indications of an attempt to consider the Universal by other means than the pyramiding of classes. Philo regards particularity as a periodicity that is defined only when the conditioning Universal so prescribes. (*Cherub*. 51-52). Peculiarity is a phenomenon of causality.

Now to ascribe a *χαρακτήρ* to the Universal would require a value judgment the making of which must reverse the dynamic order of cause and effect. This is a matter to which a formal logic may be indifferent but an ontology must avoid. A "being" and a "being-in-relation-to" have no inherent order of occurrence in a formal logic. It is only by a value judgment that the precedence of the one over the other may be affirmed.

According to Philo we must not regard the Universal as limited by the periodicity of value judgments. For by such limitation

¹²⁴ Drummond, *Philo Judeaus*, vol. II, pp. 23-34.

¹²⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 18.

¹²⁶ About half of the occurrences of the term refer to the material chaos that would obtain without God to order things. *Conf.* 85; *Heres.* 140; *Fuga.* 8-9; *Sp. L.* I 328; *Praem.* 130; *Opif.* 22; *Sp. L.* I, 47; IV, 187.

there will arise the inadvertent reversal of the functions of Universal and particular. We attempt final definition for the part before the whole is known. We consider the effect as though it were the Cause.

Brehier¹²⁷ has pointed out that Drummond's explanation of Philo's use of *ἁπλοῖος* can hardly cover all that is meant. For that use is not bound to Greek speculation. It echoes a sentiment of the Hebrew prophets when they ascribed "purity" to the Deity and to the holiness of the saint. However when Brehier complains that Philo fails to reconcile the subjective and the objective aspects of *ἁπλοῖος* because the "purity" of God is held to be unattainable by man, he makes a criticism of Philo that must gain its force from the explanation of Drummond which he has considered inadequate.

We propose to examine Philo's use of the idea of purity and of the category of quality in general by making several different approaches. We may announce these several approaches by drawing up in advance the conclusions which each suggests.

(1) Purity may be considered as a "harmony" and therefore a category of order. Under this head we shall examine the several types of relationship that Philo seems to consider and indicate his use of such ideas as "separation" and "inseparables".

(2) Purity may be regarded as a category of value involving the relation of "betterness", *κρείττων*. Any mode of excellence such as virtue, truth, beauty and goodness remains but an abstract idea until it is made concrete by exemplifying the "betterness" of God.

(3) Purity may therefore be associated with the integrity of a "witness" that represents God in the sense of pointing out that there is a higher power operating as the cause for its testimony. This involves the idea that quality is an incommunicable experience of an individual who may however point toward the source of the experience and invite others to make trial of the testimony.

(4) Purity regarded as an incommunicable experience may be thought of as a quality of life conversant with goodness in its most comprehensive sense. The vitalistic conception of goodness may be examined by considering the modes of excellence comprehended under the generic good. These may be reduced to three and for convenience considered under the meanings of beauty, *καλός*, goodness, *ἀγαθός*, and holiness, *ἅγιος*.

¹²⁷ Op. cit., p. 72.

(5) The vitalistic conception of goodness involves a view of moral purity by an all or none principle. The soul as a moral entity is either moving forward or falling backward. It cannot be doing both things at once. Thus moral purity is positive or negative as progress or failure to progress. This significance is considered under Philo's figure of "nakedness".

Order, Harmony and Quality

Philo's conception of order seems to be grounded in the idea of perspective rather than of class. And ἁπλοῖος may indicate either the positive or negative limit of order so conceived. The limits are indicated by the terms "harmony" and "confusion" or chaos. The positive limit may be "known" of God alone but may be represented by the God-loving disposition, the man of God or the Creation of God. The negative limit is an unmitigated subjectivity, ἀμορφος ὕλη, and ἁπλοῖος οὐσία, a lifeless matter, a variable without a constant to define it, a sensory manifold without an objective reference to fix its quality.

The ideas that enter into this conception of order are apparently derived from two different sources. Some of the ideas involved are from Greek sources, probably an eclectic Stoicism. But others seem to indicate the theme of "witnessing" and hence a Jewish source. This theme of "witnessing" pervaded first century mysticism but had also received some logical development among the Rabbis. It is a theme that Philo might be expected to use directly or indirectly in gathering together the terms of Greek philosophy, the results of Rabbinical deliberation upon moral and religious issues and the more mystical conceptions of the day.

Philo explains his use of the two terms, "harmony" and "confusion", when he describes three types of order. (*Conf.* 183-198). An accidental aggregate is called a μίξις in the case of solid particles and a κράσις in the case of fluids. The μίξις represents the absence of a predetermined order and the κράσις the apparent interpenetration of parts that are unhindered from falling away from the temporary whole. These two cases describe but one type of order, namely a tentative whole that lacks a principle of permanent significance or stability.

For an order that is other than accidental there are two possi-

bilities. It will be a σύγχυσις¹²⁸ if it represents an interpenetration of parts to the mutual destruction of each part. It then constitutes a new and different whole but one without any objective standard to give it meaning. It represents a negative whole, a chaos.

But when parts interpenetrate in such a way as to surrender their characters to the structure of a new and different whole by reference to one positive consummatory value, then such an order is called a συμφωνία. Each part is then guaranteed a place in the "harmony" by the unique objective standard that spans them all. Parts are not then destroyed but are guaranteed a "place" within a containing whole that is different from each and from their sum.¹²⁹

Philo's discussion of these terms constitutes a criticism of the Stoic doctrine of the universal interfusion of all things.¹³⁰ A "harmony" is to be distinguished from a "confusion" as an order created by an objective Cause is to be distinguished from one that depends upon a subjective principle. The "universal interfusion" of all things as taught by the Stoics offered no extra dimensional point of reference for coherent relativity. Where all is relative no relations can be assured and relativity becomes a negative concept the very significance of which is questionable. When however relativity is regarded in terms of particular projections of a common value as in a "harmony", reason and value complement each other in an "art" of creative meaning. An implicative system can become significant and stable only when a unique evaluator supports it from without.

In general a "chaos" will represent an abortive will to deny values, a destructive evil, a vanishing incoherence, a thing that cannot be defined save as the positive objective significance which it denies is surreptitiously acknowledged. A "harmony" will represent the will to acknowledge value, the coherence and order that is guaranteed by a transcendent qualifier, "the harmony of the virtues arranged and cherished by God".

The Theme of Witnessing

In his exposition of the text (Gen. XXII 16 sq.)¹³¹ in which .

128 σύγχυσις Conf. 183, but σύγκρισις Praem. 130.

129 Cf. Cherub. 109-112, and Epictetus, I 12-16.

130 See Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, pp. 131-133.

131 L. A. III 203-210.

God is represented as taking an oath that includes the statement "in blessing I will bless thee", Philo apparently plays upon the word *εὐλογος* to bring it into the circle of ideas concerning "witnessing". The discussion involves a constellation of metaphors that recur in other passages¹³² in a manner that suggests a central theme. Such metaphors include beside the Oath the significance of "possession", "inseparables", whether by Stoic or other definition, *Logos Hermeneus*, mind as universal and particular and various meanings for *εὐλογος*.

Philo's exegesis of the text suggests an application of several Rabbinical principles of "witnesses" and "testimony". These include (1) a man's testimony is not valid for himself, (2) a witness is to be judged intentionally false only when his testimony reduces to false self-testimony, (3) a witness may testify by works performed.¹³³

In the matter of God taking an oath Philo disagrees with those who say that it is inappropriate for God to swear. Nevertheless he does agree that an

"oath is calling God to witness to a point that is disputed; so if it is God that swears, He bears witness to Himself, which is absurd, for he that bears witness must needs be a different person from him on whose behalf it is borne. What then must we say? First that there is nothing amiss (*ὑπαίτιος*, nothing in dispute or no responsibility to another) in God bearing witness to Himself. For who else could be capable of bearing witness to Him?" (*L. A.* III 205; cf. *Sac.* 90-97).

This conclusion would seem to suggest the idea that "witnessing" involves self-revelation, an idea familiar to the general theme of "witnessing". As Philo goes on to emphasize the idea that "nothing that can give assurance can give positive assurance concerning God, for to none has He shown His nature", he queries even the attributes, *ἄπειρος* and *ἀσώματος*. Colson has followed Heinemann in supposing that Philo is here giving voice to ideas from the Skeptical School. But the thread of Philo's argument and the terms used both here and in other passages bearing the same theme suggest that it is quite a different realm of thought that controls Philo's discussion. It is the circle of ideas concerning "witnessing" such as are found in the Fourth Gospel, the

¹³² *Sac.* 91-97; *Cherub.* 65 fin.; *Sp. L.* II, 1-38.

¹³³ See Odeberg, *The Fourth Gospel*, p. 230.

Mandean Literature and in Jewish mysticism generally. (See Odeberg, *The Fourth Gospel*, p. 217 sq.).

Odeberg's summary of some of these ideas will help to indicate the trend of Philo's argument. Odeberg says in part, "Thus self-testimony . . . means not merely testimony concerning oneself but an act of severance from the center and fountain-head of the spiritual world, the establishment of oneself as an independent or self-dependent being; such an act of self-assertion in the spiritual realm at once relegates the subject of that act to the class of beings "who are of the lie", "who hate the light" . . . "who seek their own glory", or who "come in their own name". . . To express the antithesis between the spiritual and the terrestrial the teachings might be worded thus: in the terrestrial world it may be possible to give testimony of oneself as an independent or self-dependent being, but in the Divine-spiritual world this is impossible since in the Divine world there exists no separateness". (*Op. cit.* p. 219).

In the light of such ideas as these many of Philo's metaphors take on a new meaning. The figure of Cain for example becomes clearer when his claim to "possess" is understood as a testimony to creaturehood which is true in the terrestrial realm but false in the spiritual realm. The twins, Cain and Abel, and the fratricide by which Abel is both "dead" and "alive" and Cain "slays" himself by "slaying" Abel, the God-loving disposition, but nevertheless "flees" on the earth forever, these figures become a bit clearer when the principle of self-testimony is understood as a revelation of integral quality that means creaturehood in the terrestrial realm but "witnessing for God" in the spiritual realm.

Turning now to the types of relation that Philo considers under the apparent influence of the theme of "witnessing" we need first to note that for Philo the figure of a "tent of testimony"¹³⁴ seems to center a number of different applications of the notion of "separation" and "separables". The theme includes such terms as

¹³⁴ L. A. II 54-59; III 41-48; Det. 159-162; Gig. 53-55; Ebriet. 97-106, 131-143; cf. Mut. 134; Post. 57-62; L. A. III 151 sq.; II 26-30. This phrase suggests Philo's emphasis upon institutional mediation over a personal mediator. Perhaps there lies here the germinal idea of "The Great Synagogue", the "Universal Church" and Augustine's "City of God" with the mystical conceptions involved. See Philo's treatment of the office of Melchizedek, (L. A. III 79-84; Cong. 99), where consecration of individuals within an institution is predominant over a priestly mediator. Compare this with the more personal treatment of the office in Hebrews, 5, 4-10.

"flight", "emigration", "departure", "going out from the camp" or "country", "dwelling apart" or "together", "withdrawing", "dividing", "adding and subtracting" and the like. Philo apparently gathers his meanings into the term *ἀντικρύ*.¹³⁵ For under this term he indicates three types of relation. These relations would seem to be the disjunctive, the hypothetical and the relation involved in dedication.

The Disjunctive Relation

The principle of the disjunctive relation is stated by Philo as "addition and subtraction". "The addition of one thing implies the removal of some other as in the case of arithmetical quantities or of our successive inward thoughts". (*Sac.* 1). This relation applies to things that cannot "dwell together". But it is applied to three different subjects in different ways. Good and evil are things that cannot "dwell together". But when good and evil are merely logical concepts they lie side by side in the "womb of the soul".¹³⁶ Their disjunction is a condition of rational choice. They are present in "essence" but not in "potentiality".

When however good and evil are matters of disposition rather than logical conception the disjunctive relation involves an all or none principle. Good and evil dispositions are alternatives that cannot coexist. Thus for logical terms the disjunctive relation is merely a formal opposition but for moral dispositions it involves ontological alternation.

Philo applies the disjunctive relation to the "soul", a thing that comes under the head of "inseparables". In this case the active and passive "are found in the same subject. And they are found not at different times and in relation to different subjects, but at the same time and in relation to the same subject".¹³⁷ Thus the "soul" must needs "suffer what it seems to do". This seems to mean that when the "soul" denies by affirming or affirms by denying its action is reflexive. It chooses "life" or "death" according as it affirms God by denying the creature self or denies the creature self by affirming God or on the other hand denies God by

¹³⁵ Cherub. 11-20.

¹³⁶ *Sac.* 3-5.

¹³⁷ *Det.* 49-51; cf. *L. A.* III 201; Cherub. 79-82. The Stoics classified things, (*σώματα*) as (1) *δισσώτα*, e. g., an army, (2) *συνημμένα* e. g., a house, (3) *ἡνωμένα* e. g., animals. (*S. V. F.* II 366 sq.).

affirming the creature self or affirms the creature self by denying God. In short the attempt to glorify the creature is a choice of "death" while the attempt to glorify God is a choice of "life". The "soul" holds its own "life" and "death" in its hands because God presents to it a choice which when exercised is reflexive. In the spiritual realm freedom of choice involves a disjunction which is like suicide set over against regeneration.¹³⁸

Philo calls the suicidal choice, ἐχθρότης or enmity and the regenerative choice οἰκείωσις, or likeness. The first of these is a spiritual death or "flight" from God. It is a choice of "confusion"¹³⁹ for it affirms the subjective principle upon which no order can be established. It would seem that Philo has combined the Stoic principle that there are no gradations in virtue and vice with the ideas of regeneration and of spiritual integrity that are involved in the mystery cults and in the theme of witnessing.¹⁴⁰ But we must indicate several things about ἐχθρότης before we pass on to the second general type of relation.

The type that exemplifies the relation of ἐχθρότης is Cain, (my possession). By his claim to "possess" he (1) incurred spiritual death, (2) reduced his world to chaos, (3) but remained as a creature in flight from God on the "earth". Cain continues to enjoy a creature status and even constitutes an indispensable principle of human individuality, a mind not yet quickened into spiritual life.¹⁴¹ Cain cannot be an absolute negation but only a condition of the will to deny God. He may rise from his spiritual "grave" in the "body" whenever he chooses to turn toward God. He represents an unacknowledged opportunity. Unlike the ethical absolutism of the Stoics, Philo's doctrine is one of "grace" and forgiveness. And the metaphysical foundation for such ethical hope is the idea of the variable and the constant.

To indicate the negative side of the principle of self-testimony let us examine the "earthly" status of Cain. By his affirmation of

138 Deus. 45-50. The presentation of alternatives to man by God implies the *gift* of, (1) knowledge of good and evil, (2) capacity to reason, (3) exercise of free will.

139 Cherub. 12-13.

140 Philo's view would seem to be that there are no gradations in life and death and that since life and virtue are synonymous in a spiritual sense the life of virtue is the disposition to progress toward God or "witness" for Him in all possible ways. This imitatio Dei is at once a "life toward God" and a "death toward the creature". See Fuga. 53-82.

141 Det. 167-170.

self-sufficiency Cain not only denied God but by making all things relative to himself denied his "natural" obligations or moral responsibility. "But," says Philo, "if these things prove to be a necessary part of our experience, they must be treated not as good things to be sought for their own sake but as means to and productive of the good." (Det. 156 sq.). If the "bonds that cannot be broken, imposed by the body and bodily requirements" are not regarded as skills worthy to be used for higher ends than self then these things must be regarded as self-sufficient finalities such as Fate or Chance or sensuous lust or private opinion. (L. A. III 28-35). When the natural law is not regarded as a "tent of testimony" it is regarded as a self-sufficient finality. But such self-sufficiency cannot represent spiritual autonomy. It can only represent the "opinion" of a rebel who "separates" himself from the spiritual significance of his natural obligations by regarding material things as the rewards or "grace" of his own "mind". The self-sufficient creature must reduce himself to mere "earth" for he makes of "earth" and its rewards the end of his endeavors.¹⁴²

By choosing to limit his life to "earthly things" Cain reduces himself to a mere animal, however crafty he may be in securing his selfish ends. It is to be observed that the principle of self-revelation applies to Cain's claim to "possess" no less than to God's oath. God does not swear in order to settle a dispute as though the very unity of the Godhead could be in question. He swears as an act of revelation. But this is no less true of Cain's claim. For Cain's claim is a self-revelation of the non-spiritual nature, the nature that makes of material things a "bond" rather than a skill. As a "mind" with opportunities for spiritual life Cain refuses those opportunities and uses his creaturehood to represent a negative quality, a spiritual suicide. He does not thereby establish material finality. Rather by Philo's principle of reflexive activity he becomes a self-changed flux, a variability like the Heraclitian phenomena of "strife". And yet this phenomena can only be representative of a negative principle. It can only testify to an absolute need, an unmitigated dependence, a moral and spiritual negation or evil. Thus if we represent God's Oath as the

¹⁴² Cf. V. M. I 134-162. To use material things selfishly is to change them into a "river of blood" but to use them "piously" is to find them as "sweet water" for the nourishment of "life". Material circumstances are opportunities from which *much booty* may be wrested on the pilgrimage of virtue.

affirmation of a spiritual sanction for the natural order we must represent Cain's claim as an unacknowledged need for that sanction. In terms of wholes and their integrity we must say that God represents the affirmative All and Cain the negative all, the null class. But the natural order as the Logos is merely the technique of expression by which either meaning may be indicated although but one can be real.

Whether Philo intends it or not, his treatment of Cain as a type is a criticism of the Stoic ideal of self-possession. Furthermore Cain takes the place of a Satan in Philo's scheme. But this Satan is not an adversary of God. He is rather a principle of spiritual need within the human soul, and need that has the ambiguous meanings of opportunity for the service of God or opportunity for the selfish life that at once plunges a man into spiritual suicide.¹⁴³ Thus Cain provides the explanation of the origin of evil in the human soul. By deliberate turning from God to self a "fall" is incurred. The evil is not in the natural world itself but in the disposition to use that world for selfish ends.¹⁴⁴ It is because free will involves alternative dispositions that man is privileged either to partake of spiritual life by "witnessing for God" or to sink to the level of an animal by "witnessing" only to himself. Man is a dual creature not because his body and soul are two different "possessions" of one being but rather because his free will permits him to alternate between positive and negative limits.¹⁴⁵ He is a creature on the confines between God and the natural world. As he moves forward he is all spiritual and as he moves backward he is all material. He flashes from the heights to the depths as he chooses the good or the evil. Hence his great need for God's Word to guide him.

The Hypothetical Relation

The second relation which Philo discusses under the meaning of ἀντικρύ, he calls judgment, ἐπίκρισις. He derives this meaning by

143 Cf. Som. II 181-184.

144 The "sign of Cain" is negative and cannot be concrete. It means that evil is "deathless" in the sense that the willfulness of man is forever possible. It is a *forever dying* without the possibility of gaining its end. It is the eternal vacillation between a real goal and no goal. It is the suspense of a tortured "fear" as though one lay between Scylla and Charybdis. Det. 177-178. Philo apparently alludes to Odyssey XII, 118. ἥ δὲ τοι οὐ θνητή, ἀλλ' ἀθάνατον κακὸν ἔστι.

145 Som. II 228-237.

generalizing the relationship between ceremonial conduct and spiritual initiative. In ceremonial conduct rewards and motives are ambiguously involved. There is an appearance of order but its inner maxim, γνώμη, and its derivable meanings, ἐνθύμημα, are "hidden".¹⁴⁶ The mere form of conduct does not reveal the bearings of subjective motives upon formal ends, of private interests upon logical outcomes. Consequently, Reason as a priest and prophet must place the soul "over against" the Lord for "judgment". Ends and motives must be thrown into perspective for the sake of passing upon their congruity.

Now the likeness of ends and motives is not determinable by comparing two given qualities. The requisite qualities are not available. It is exactly because such inner things of the soul are "hidden" that formal manifestations are ambiguous. The congruence of ends and motives can only be judged when the ceremonial order they involve is viewed by both subjective and objective reference. Which is to say that a given form remains accidental or as Philo would say "involuntary" until it represents the coincidence of an end with the will to realize that end.

Involuntary actions involve no moral responsibility for man or God. On the part of man such actions are not worthy of praise or blame.¹⁴⁷ They may represent ignorance that is easily remedied by instruction or ceremonial impurity that is readily cleansed by sacrifice. In either case it is conscience that instructs and reconsecrates the will.¹⁴⁸ And it is the Law that provides the instrument for this correction.

In a more general sense involuntary actions represent the things that happen unexpectedly to man by the Will of God.¹⁴⁹ They then typify the external conditions of life. Such things are good or bad only as a man voluntarily judges them to be rewards and punishments of his conduct. This is not unlike the Stoic doctrine

146 For γνώμη and ἐνθύμημα as logical forms see Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, II, 21, 2; I 28. γνώμη is to ἐνθύμημα as premises to syllogisms. The γνώμη is a moral maxim, general rather than particular. The ἐνθύμημα is a rhetorical syllogism. It is drawn from probable premises and is therefore not strictly a demonstrative proof. Philo seems to use the two terms to mean that neither a man's personal motives nor his probable objectives can be known from the form of his conduct.

147 Post. 88; Mut. 242.

148 Fuga. 113-118; Post. 48; Deus. 128 sq.; Sp. L. I 238-256.

149 Fuga. 65-105.

of the proper use of impressions.¹⁵⁰ However Philo differs from the Stoics in that he does not confine moral responsibility to a subjective will by distinguishing the things a man can control from the things he cannot control. Moral responsibility lies in actions, (the hand) intentions, (the heart) and expressed reason, (the mouth). Philo's distinction is between the disciplinary and the rewarding aspects of experience. Pleasure and pain are both goods in disguise. They are instructive subordinate agents of God.¹⁵¹ They may appear to beguile and to thwart man. In this respect they are not unmixed with evil. But such evil lies in the disposition of man to assign final cause where there is only instructive appearance.¹⁵² Let him penetrate the disguise of God's disciplinary agents by accepting them only as instructive signs and he finds a way toward a peace that subordinates the selfish will to the Final Cause.

This peace lies in the "silence" of "speech" or reason.¹⁵³ And such "silence" is not a retreat into an inner citadel but a "warlike" practice. The "silence" of reason may be the militancy of harmonious practice. The mission of man is to be emphasized over a theory of nature. When "speech" or reason is "silent" human judgment is suspended but human conduct is the more aggressive. It is faith rather than doubt that complements this type of reason.¹⁵⁴ Man does not "assent" to external conditions like one caught in the wheel of fate. This would be to accept a "confused" theory of nature, one in which functions rotate without meaning. One "stands" on his "hands" and "grasps" with his "feet", like a

150 Cf. Epictetus, Bk. II ch. V; Bk. I, ch. xxv.

151 Unintentional homicide is a figure for the repudiation of idolatry. Intentional homicide is a figure for the abuse of servants, which is to say that external conditions must be taken as instrumental. Sp. L. III 120-136; Sac. 128 sq.

152 Fuga. 77-86; cf. Epictetus II, 8. The Stoic counsel is much the same as Philo's. But the anthropocentric sanction is anathema to Philo. Cf. Sac. 70-75; Post. 33-48.

153 Conf. 37-38 sq.; Som. II 283-302.

154 In Fuga. 132-142, Philo apparently comments upon Stoic "judgment" and Skeptic "suspense of judgment". (ἐποχή). The Stoic $\tau\epsilon$ i. e. "quiddity" is "manna" the Word of God that "feeds". Philo apparently reinterprets these technical terms to teach faith in God and His promises. That this faith is a practical reason rather than an ecstatic vision is made clear by Philo in Ebriet, 162 sq. when he condemns cohabiting with Counsel and Consent (βουλή and συναίνεσις) as in a "drunken" or ecstatic experience. The "suspense of judgment" is a "sober" practical faith but it has a religious grounding.

man on the helix or water wheel. A fatalistic theory of nature is a moral opportunism that alternates the places of practice and purpose in an endless rotation expressing no meaning. Unless first things are placed first there can be no expression of meaning in reason.

Instead of "confusing" reason by opportunistic morals and fatalistic theories of nature, man should be "silent" and "wait"¹⁵⁵ in the expectation that "God will provide" for Himself, by His own initiative. External conditions are then viewed as a stage that is set and from which the "voice" of God is about to sound forth. Reason is an instrument of expression, a "speech" whether in man or in nature. It is never a merely cyclic process without a transcendent meaning. When the reason of man is "silent" man refrains from reading a theory of necessity or any anthropomorphic theory into his external circumstances. He rather presses on in practical faith expecting that what appear like accidental circumstances may become revealed as signs of God's will for him. He is neither a fatalist nor an opportunist but a ceremonialist.

The "silence" of reason may be called *ἄλογος*. In the case of man's personal responsibility this means that his unintentional errors are "not counted".¹⁵⁶ They are incomputable, not reckoned up against him by God. In the case of external conditions the unintentional is irrational in the sense that man is ignorant of import until he has made a practical choice, given his "assent" in commitment to practice and not accepted the sensuous irrationality of things by deliberate neglect to discipline his choice making privilege.¹⁵⁷ In the sense of revelation *ἄλογος* means "inexpressible" and refers to the moral authority of the Law.¹⁵⁸ Such authority may be mediated through practice and visioned in revelation but never limited by a formal theory. Apelt¹⁵⁹ has called attention to Philo's parallel with Posidonius and Galen in the double meaning for *ἄλογος*. But Philo gives a triple meaning to

155 Philo likens judgment to a "waiting for the salvation of the Lord" under the symbolism of "horses" as passions that may overthrow or be mastered by a rider and under the symbol of Dan, and a "serpent" waiting in the path. L. A. I 72-76, II 94-108; cf. Som. II 34, 39.

156 Agri. 78; Deut. 86-103; L. A. I 17.

157 Sac. 45-51; Heres. 167.

158 Det. 35-44; cf. Deut. 86-103.

159 Op. cit., pp. 96-101.

the term and that meaning is a comment upon "judgment" in the light of Jewish ideas.¹⁶⁰ Neither the "assent" nor the super-rational vision of man can establish a final meaning in nature. For nature like the Law is an expressive Word and that word instructs choices through practice and thereby improves man's capacity to make judgments. Man cannot control what happens to him nor can he control his natural tendency to make errors.¹⁶¹ What he can control is his will to be instructed. And that is done by obedient practice. In that practice man learns how to control both his judgments and his practice. He begins without power and he accumulates power through practice. That power is moral, intellectual and practical. In proportion as a man does not retreat into his own soul as the Stoic's advice but strikes out in adventurous practical experience, man becomes a free soul. Nature is merely a collection of skills and the purpose for those skills lie in the mission that God has for man.¹⁶²

A creature "standing over against" the "all penetrating eye" of God for "judgment" is a metaphorical description of an analytical proposition. It does not mean that God is compared with a creature as a quality would be assigned to a form. It means that the congruity of formal ends with subjective motives is forever under the "eye" of a judge who can transcend both the originative and the consummatory aspects of formal expression.¹⁶³ An analytical

160 ἄλογος may mean, (1) πανουργία, ἐκούσια, θυμὸς, ἄφρων (Sac. 45-51; L. A. III 123-127). (2) ἀκούσια ἀμαθία (Sac. 45-51; Heres. 167), (3) created helper of the mind, βοηθὸς (L. A. II, 4-8), (4) inexpressible faith, ἄριστον ἐρρημέα (Det. 34-44). There are but three meanings, (1) animal sense is an instructive object lesson, (2) defiance to reason is a surrender to passions, (3) faith in God's Word is willingness to be instructed by the emotional aspect of experience without surrendering to the purposelessness of emotion. Emotion should be representative rather than directive.

161 Cherub. 66.

162 Philo is in thorough agreement with such Stoic counsel as is given by Epictetus, II, 18. He differs only in the sanction for such counsel. See Cicero's criticism of the inconsistency of Zeno in grounding the good in natural motives. "Nam enim in selectione virtus ponenda erat, ut idipsum quod erat bonorum ultimum aliud aliquid acquireret". De Finibus, IV, 17.

163 παρ' ὃν (Θεόν) αἱ συγχίσεις καὶ αἱ διακρίσεις τῶν πάντων. Som. II 24; cf. 21-31. Philo describes a "double harmony" namely that which obtains among parts and that which obtains between harmonized parts and the standard of that harmony itself, namely God. Not only must a man's thought and conduct be in harmony but it must then be referred to God by a disinterested self criticism. This is a double purification, a purification of the sacrifice and of him who offers it up. This means that tem-

judgment conditions the establishment of parts as members one of another as in harmony. Without that judgment the parts must remain as discrete significances incapable of coherence as in a "confusion".

This meaning of ἀντικρύ contributes to Philo's discussion of a κρᾶσις by suggesting the elements of a hypothetical order. Such an order must involve outward form and inner principles that may or may not belong together. The formal data that are apparent and the inner principles that are "hidden" must be referred by reason to "Him who can see the soul naked". The inner principles are psychological conditions to be set "over against" a determinative function in God. The material aspect of the outward form is not some discoverable quality inherent in that form but rather a relationship between the postulated "soul" of that form and the "judge" who can testify concerning it. Thus the relationship between "hidden" inner principles and apparent form is contingent upon the more fundamental conditions of "harmony" or "confusion" between a subjective and an objective will.

It is to be observed that Philo does not discuss this meaning of ἀντικρύ as a Greek philosopher would subject a given idea to dialectical analysis. He does not assume the point of view of a disinterested observer interpreting an object presented to view. His point of view is that of a devout Jew expounding the Law to himself. The Will of God is to be considered from three points of view at once. Honesty of motives, consequences of conduct and the form of the law are to be reconciled. The conclusion that Philo reaches is a generalization of the ethical proposition that conduct is neither good nor bad until God has passed upon both the motives in undertaking that line of conduct and the outcome which that conduct however motivated may involve.

Thus the "cherished motives", (*Cherub.* 17) that Philo represents as brought to light and passed upon do not represent the "consent" of Stoic judgment but rather the private interests which an unprejudiced reason submits to an unprejudiced judge. The whole situation therefore involves an attitude or state of mind

poral things must be dedicated and then the motive for dedication must be purified of all self interest. In general terms motives and ends must be congruent and then tested by a criterion of value. The disinterested judgment of human reason offers an hypothesis for the judgment or attestation of God. Cf. *Cherub.* 96-97, λῶβαις ἀκουσίοις versus ἐκούσιον γνῶμην.

favorable to an analysis of the springs from which particular reasonings arise. From the judgment described in the discussion there does not arise some ideal upon which a rational system might be founded. The matter is personal. The soul after meeting its judge departs condemned or exonerated.

Repentance

It was suggested in the discussion of the disjunctive relation that the presentation of alternatives for choice represented an opportunity. The fruitful choice would represent the first stage of the "real man" which Philo frequently calls "hope". Such "hope" is one of the "gifts" of God. In a similar manner we may associate a second stage or "gift" of God with "repentance", *μετάνοια*, a stage or "gift" which Philo frequently describes as that of an improving soul. The meaning of *ἀντιχρῦ* in the sense of *ἐπίκρισις* probably owes more to a development of the meaning of "repentance" than it does to a logical analysis of the concept of order and form. For Philo apparently gives to *μετάνοια* a meaning that suggests the operation of conscience as a principle of progressive orientation among ends and motives. The meaning applies to the wise man as well as to the reformation of delinquents. *μετάνοια* involves a principle of intellectual enlightenment as well as moral change. It has an objective and a subjective reference.

In "repentance" God nourishes a "suppliant" reason (*L. A. III* 211 sq.) by engendering a felt approval¹⁶⁴ or disapproval within the acts of the mind of man so that such acts may be ordered in accord with their worth. Or to say it in non-theological terms, the fact that "repentance" is an actual experience of man is evidence that man is not without some knowledge of the good.¹⁶⁵ But even more than this, repentance is evidence that the deed that is deplored is in a moral sense unintentional.¹⁶⁶ For although the purpose or inner maxim of conduct is equivalent to the completed

¹⁶⁴ Cf. *V. M. I*, 83-84.

¹⁶⁵ *Gig.* 21-23.

¹⁶⁶ Philo argues that a voluntary (*ἐκούσια*) change of practice is evidence that the practice so changed was not expressive of the will but an involuntary (*ἀκούσια*) error due to lack of skill. (*Det.* 96-108). Self-mastery is perfect in its inception but it requires the aid of God to become skillful in its exercise. Evil can be only relative while good is intrinsic. (Cf. *Fuga.* 71-76; *Ebreit.* 124-129).

act in so far as moral judgments are concerned yet repentance is evidence that the source of the unintentional sin lay in a relatively superficial impulse, the things of the "earth" and "sense".¹⁶⁷ Repentance is evidence that the fundamental disposition of the soul is not evil. What is required is an improvement of practice so that the things of "sense" may be employed only for the sake of the highest value. In repentance the disposition is already good but there is required an improvement in practice. This improvement must begin in the mind. It must change its ways so that they can conform to the Will of God. For He accepts repentance as the first condition of instruction.¹⁶⁸

On its subjective side *μετάνοια* indicates a "change of mind" by a self-analysis that facilitates improvement in conduct. The soul is not judged by the evil or good ideas that it harbours for these are but logical concepts. It is judged by the purposes it undertakes to complete in practice as soon as that practice begins and whether it is completed or not. Thus Cain could not know repentance so long as his disposition was away from God. For he had no guiding objective vision by which to improve his conduct and change his actions to keep them in conformity with a divine will. The repentant man on the other hand is an improving man for he is ready to change in accordance with each new vision of the good. This interpretation of repentance is inherent in Philo's doctrine that it is God who engenders in the mind of man each new insight into the true and the good. It means that intentions and conduct must be kept abreast of each other so that God may be immediately obeyed whenever He speaks in the heart of man through the voice of conscience.¹⁶⁹

Philo's suggestive metaphor for this "change of mind" represents such a soul as a musical instrument in process of tuning.¹⁷⁰

167 The repentance of man and the forgiveness of God constitute one act by which man is (1) released from the attraction of sense and passion and thus, (2) gains an insight into the proper use of impressions so that, (3) they may be skillfully employed to (4) witness for God and thus (5) secure man's happiness. *μετάνοια* includes moral regeneration and intellectual enlightenment. (Det. 91-95; Som. II, 100-109; L. A. II 78; Praem. 15-21; Mig. 225).

168 Mut. 233-260.

169 Virt. 175-186. Repentance is *θεοφιλής*, a saving "recollection", a recovery from illness, a rock of safety, (Post. 178) conscience, (Som. II 292) but impossible without the grace of God. (L. A. III 211-219).

170 Deus. 23-32.

Each part is becoming more closely attuned to each other part so that the whole may sound forth in an ever increasing harmony with the unchanging will of God. It is of interest to compare this view of repentance with the application of the hypothetical relation to the moral life as made by Epictetus.¹⁷¹ We should live, says Epictetus, "as if" the external conditions of life were like parts assigned in a play and we should accept those parts in the spirit of actors who having accepted the play proceed on that hypothesis to fill the assigned part with the gusto of good players. Thus we may enjoy the play even though the part assigned would not have been to our liking had we been writing the play. The view of Epictetus is dominated by the desire for happiness or failing that happiness the release from disappointment. And he with keen insight proposes a way by which a man may make the most of his circumstances whether they be pleasant or otherwise. Philo's view might be offered to a man of little faith in somewhat similar terms. We are to act, says Philo, "as if" the highest conception of the good we know is a direct command from God to each one of us individually. We may then disregard the pleasant or unpleasant aspects of that command and "witness" for God in our lives. We may thus improve our faith and our conduct until we shall have such a sturdy faith in God's readiness to guide us that we no longer regard the voice of conscience as our own reasoning but a divine voice ever ready to offer comfort, counsel and illuminating discoveries. The soul is like a variable that may have an abiding principle of improvement operating upon it as it refers its life to the unchanging Will of God.¹⁷² It is like an all responsive faculty that requires some objective to give it an identity that can be judged and changed.

On its objective side, *μετάνοια* does not mean a "change of mind". For now it is applied to God¹⁷³ in Whom there is no change. *μετάνοια* now means to ponder in the mind as a thinker having conceived an idea and a plan proceeds to review and elaborate upon it. It is not self-analysis but constructive speculation. In this exercise God "beholds" or approves his creatures in their several stations and stages. In explaining this act of God, Philo reviews the various stages of creation as God has appointed. Thus under

171 Bk. I ch. 25-26.

172 Cherub. 19-20.

173 Deus. 20 sq.

the meaning of *μετάνοια* Philo represents a developmental order from the two points of view that define it. He represents God reviewing His creatures as set off for His approval or correction. And He represents man as a free mind confronted with a rational course marked out by the immanence of good will in the practical exercise of choice. The freedom to choose and the freedom to approve choices represent the two poles between which a rational discourse may develop without arbitrariness or lack of purpose.

It is to be noted that Philo's discussion of *μετάνοια* (*Deus.* 16 sq.) follows upon the declaration that a psychological hedonism is anti-rational and solipsistic. Only the disinterested can be rational. But such disinterestedness lies not in a Stoic "apathy" but in a love of God that forgets all private ends in a service of God that increases in enthusiasm as it continues. Such a love has little of thought for personal salvation but much of that reasonableness of repentance which begins in the untrained man as a regenerative change and ends in the wise man as a divine humility of faithfulness. We might sum up the moral application of the hypothetical relation by saying that if there is a God then the man who reveals a life of triumphant progress through repentant changes when necessary, must be His appointed "witness". Such a man forever stands "over against" the Lord for "judgment". And whether he depart condemned or exonerated he receives such judgment as instruction rather than in pride or fear closing his mind to God's further commands.¹⁷⁴

Οἰκείωσις

We come now to the third meaning of *ἀντιχρῶς* under which the relation involved in dedication is indicated. Philo calls this likeness, *οἰκείωσις*. A "friendly" relation is indicated by the double meaning of "like", a preference and a fitness. As an artist contemplates and portrays his model or a friend freely serves his beloved or as a man worships his God so is this relation to be un-

174 Repentance is second only to perfection (Abr. 26). The very errors of good men are superior in good to the best deeds of others for the good cannot bear to commit intentional sin. Thus while virtue is not relative, the skill in expressing virtue is relative to good intentions (Sp. L. I 245-246). There is less of casuistry in this than there is of bold faith in a good will that may serve clumsily but honestly. Repentance is a flight from evil to good. Praem. 15-21; V. M. III 146-151; Det. 120).

derstood. Two intentions have become alike. They are not "separables" as two causes for one deed but rather one will expressed. Unity of purpose is the mark of moral integrity. In tracing the dispositions of the soul, says Philo, the paradox of "coming out into" or "going in outward" is not to be confused with change of place.¹⁷⁵ It is the paradox of friendship by which two free minds may be in communion without prejudice to the individuality of either. It is this sort of communion with God that Philo indicates under his figure of the "tent of testimony". The "going out" from the "body" is not a negative asceticism nor a mystical trance but rather a sacramental use of material circumstances and conditions of human life so that in daily conduct a man may "witness" for God in all he does. Philo gathers together several of the texts that belong to the theme of "witnessing" when he says that although perfection is not "found", εὐρίσκω, in any creature yet it "appears", προφαίνω, in them from time to time by the "grace" of God the Great Cause of all things.¹⁷⁶ This seems to mean that the creature cannot "speak for itself" when it "manifests" the good but can only reflect the Cause of its blessing. Man cannot "invent" or "discover" the good in himself but can "foreshew" or indicate the good in another.

In discussing this manifestation of the good Philo distinguishes duties, καθήκοντα, from loyalties or pledges of faith, that have become "purified", κάθαρσις. To become "purified" duties must not be regarded as "baits" but as an opportunity, καιρός. Philo's word play seems to be a comment upon Stoic duty and pagan rites of purification as well as upon a utilitarian observance of the Law. The "good faith" that characterizes ethical and religious dedication is not, (1) expiation, (2) a religion of barter, (3) a utilitarian ethic. Not only is good will, εὐνοία,¹⁷⁷ a desire that one's neighbor shall enjoy good things for his own sake but that good will has definite religious meaning that leaves no place for superstition. The "purification" of duties comes about by the unselfish service

175 Heres. 81-85.

176 Plant. 93-112.

177 Cf. L. A. I 56-58; Abr. 99-102; Sp. L. I 317; Deus. 99-103; Clement of Alexandria seems to follow Philo in reading a deeper religious meaning into εὐνοία than the Stoics do. Paed. I, 97 p. 156. P; III 53 p. 285 P; Strom. II 28 p. 444. For Stoic use see Diog. Laert. VII 107 sq., Cicero, De Officiis, I, 3; III, 3, 7. The Stoics identified duty and expediency whereas Philo rejects expediency as defiling duty.

of man and God. Philo does not quite say that in serving men there is "witness" made to God. But he does say that the love of man and the love of God are two sides of one complete virtue. The principle point to be noted is that neither the love of man nor the love of God can be a love of self. It is unselfish but intelligent and unsuperstitious service of man and God that "witness" is made to the perfect good. To be sure this "witnessing" involves mystical teachings in Philo's various treatments of the texts involved.¹⁷⁸ There are mountain top experiences of revelation and great joy. The relation of "likeness" includes a "drawing nigh" to the power of God.¹⁷⁹ Nevertheless Philo views "likeness" as representative rather than as formal identity.

Philo frequently cites the principle that like attracts like as an account of the affinity of parts within one principle. But when he describes the creative goodness of God this principle of likeness becomes modified. He consents to the sentiment expressed in *Timaeus* 30 where God is represented as willing to share His happy lot with finite creatures. (*Deus*. 74-103). But such consent seems not to be given in recognition of an inclusive class required to guarantee the unity of creation. It is rather a tribute to the manner in which God mingles mercy with justice.

The Mercy of God

God pities while He judges and judges while He pities. Between the God who exercises mercy "toward the good actions of even the unworthy" and the creature responsible for such actions there can be no simple correspondence. The God who knows the soul as deserving of punishment both before and after sentence is passed is a God upon Whom there devolves a much greater work of benevolence than that of providing the ideal to be copied "in so far as may be possible".¹⁸⁰ To include mercy within the creative

¹⁷⁸ Exod. 33, 7; Lev. 19, 23; Gen. 28, 21; Num. 5, 15; Lev. 13, 12.

¹⁷⁹ Conf. 29-32.

¹⁸⁰ In *Timaeus* 69 D the inferior agents of creation perform their tasks "as best they may". Philo parallels this idea when he says that Moses could only inadequately express in human speech the "name" of God as "I am He that is". Nevertheless Moses was a perfect man. The inadequacy of his description of God has nothing to do with the perfect manner in which he "witnessed" to God's will for man. One does not make the revelation of Moses faulty by making the God of that revelation perfect. One makes God greater by understanding the marvel of that revelation. Det. 160-162.

benevolence of God is to require of that goodness a much more positive principle than the permissive lack of envy. And to account for mercy as rational Philo needs a broader principle of correspondence by which to account for the "friendship" between God and His creatures than that of qualitative affinity.

Philo seems to outline such a principle in terms of Stoic psychology. As the light of the sun coming from without meets the responsive "light" of the eye¹⁸¹ and there is thus engendered a comprehension by "sight", just so the absolute or "unmixed" powers of God become "mixed" or measured when they are received by finite creatures.¹⁸² God's goodness consists not in the transcendence of His power but in the care with which He adapts that power to the particular needs of His finite creatures. The arbitrary transfusion of a form with quality does not merit the name goodness no matter how excellent that quality. It must be tempered if it is to benefit the faculty of "sight". Man would go mad with god-consciousness if God did not temper "love" with "fear".¹⁸³ Until rewards and punishments become particularized with respect to a finite will the benevolence of God remains a transcendent but incomprehensible purpose in which the practical significance of good and evil are indistinguishable.

Now Philo maintains the doctrine of transcendence in order to assert the primacy of God as Cause. But he has scant patience with a sentimentalism that would shirk the responsibility for practical goodness by making virtue transcendent. He cannot agree with a rationalistic teleology that knows no goodness save aesthetic propriety. The creative goodness of God is for Philo an ethical faith which makes "love" and "likeness" matters of personal attitude rather than formal principles of classification. Consequently Philo will say that however unbounded and incomprehensible to the finite creature the virtues of God may be, let that creature display a willingness to receive and God will impute the exact measure of virtue which such a willingness can bear. The correspondence between God and His creatures is not one of kind but of readiness to give and to receive. The Creator assumes a

¹⁸¹ Deus. 77-81.

¹⁸² Deus. 82-85. Philo associates the "mixed powers" with the Epicurean account of hearing in which configuration is involved. (Cf. Diog. Laert. X, 52-53) Philo frequently typifies immediate apprehension by "seeing" and discursive comprehension by "hearing".

¹⁸³ Post. 143-145; cf. Som. I 141-145.

care over the work of His hands and the creature returns gratitude to the Author of its being.¹⁸⁴ The will to give and the willingness to receive are not alike in quality but reciprocal in action. It requires therefore an absoluteness of activity and an absoluteness of passivity to account for the creative benevolence of God. The conditions for the expression of value both practical and theoretical is an intercourse in which the Active Cause δραστήριον αἴτιον and the passive subject τό παθητόν secure the transformation of goodness into a comprehensible system of values.¹⁸⁵ For a creature to "witness" for God he must combine in his disposition the readiness to give to others and the readiness to receive from God that indicates an unselfish desire to be a Word of God before men.¹⁸⁶

We may summarize the three meanings of ἀντικρύ by saying that there are three different ways in which a thing may be "set apart". (1) A thing may be "set apart" in the sense of exclusion.¹⁸⁷ We then have a disjunctive relation which may be exemplified by logical terms but not by ontological opposites. This relation means need and its figure is the abortive "flight" of Cain from an omnipresent God. (2) A thing may be "set apart" for criticism.¹⁸⁸ We then have a hypothetical relation which may be exemplified by moral dispositions but not by formal conduct alone. This relation means improvement by the correction of "the all penetrating eye" of God. (3) A thing may be "set apart" in dedication.¹⁸⁹ We then have a relation of likeness by which a representative performs the will of its principal. The meaning of this relation is sacramental. Testimony is made to an otherwise unknown Deity by an indication of the intended use of things provided by that Deity.

These three relations may be regarded as three different ways

184 Opif. 10-11.

185 Opif. 8-12.

186 Virt. 164-174.

187 χωρίζειν, διαχειρυστονέω, διάκρισις, ἀπόκρισις. Sac. 3-4, 47-48, 109, 139; Post. 62; Mut. 91; L. A. I, 50, 107-108; II, 95-96; V. M. III 202; Conf. 64-69; ἐκβάλλειν, Det. 150-160; ἀφορίζεται, L. A. I, 65.

188 ἐπικρίσις, Sac. 136-139; Heres. 179-181; Cong. 89 fin.; Post. 96-97; προκόπτω, L. A. III, 140-144, 174-175; ἀποστέλλω, ἀπόθεσις, Post. 44-48; Cherub. 1-10; L. A. III, 11-14; 133-137.

189 ἀναφέρειν, L. A. I 50-1; καταλείπειν, Det. 150-160; L. A. II, 49-59; L. A. III, 15-48; ἐκλείπειν, Fuga. 124-131.

of reading one fundamental relation, namely the causal relation. When the causal relation is regarded as involving two terms on the same level we have a disjunctive relation in which there can be logical opposition but not ontological alternation. When the causal relation is regarded as involving two terms in a process we have an hypothetical relation in which there may be a generative significance but not a formal completion. When the causal relation is regarded as involving two terms in an act of expression we have a representation that can testify to a meaning but cannot initiate that meaning.

The Cosmological Interpretation of God's Oath

Now these principles of relationship may be given a cosmological interpretation¹⁹⁰ by applying the theme of "witnessing" to God's Oath. In swearing by Himself, God utters the Word that may "witness" to the unique Being of God by testifying that it has been caused by another than itself. This act constitutes a "severance" of the Word from the Cause. It is a creative as well as a revealing act which we shall discuss under the meaning of Logos Tomeus. We may now call the uttered Word, *Logos Prophorikos*. Its "severance" from the Cause subjects it to the terrestrial conditions of a witness. It may testify to itself as a self-dependent being only so long as it does not contradict itself, does not involve itself in false self-testimony. *Logos Prophorikos* may therefore witness to an integral Being, namely God, so long as it does not identify itself with that Being by claiming to be self-caused. It cannot guarantee the quality of God. For integral being in the qualitative sense must testify to itself to become revealed, to be seen as that in which there is no separateness.

Thus *Logos Prophorikos* must consistently indicate that it is subject to another if its testimony is to be trustworthy. To be able to do is better than to need help says Philo in discussing the Oath. (Sac. 92). In this sense the Logos as an appearance of activity testifies to the superiority of God as the Cause of activity. Without the appearance of activity no superiority could have been revealed. That which is seen to act without apparent cause is the evidence of God as the First Cause.

¹⁹⁰ Mig. 180-195. The activity of the mind of God is creative while man's knowledge must be gained by a critical study of himself and his world, cf. Sac. 88-96.

This application of the principles of witnessing, to God's taking of an Oath unites the categories of spontaneous activity and integral quality in an eternal "better than" by maintaining: (1) God is knowable only when He acts, (2) His activity is a superiority over produced effects, (3) The consistency with which all apparent effects testify to themselves as other than their cause is evidence of the independent reality of God as the First Cause. We may therefore argue that God by uttering the Word as a "crutch to our weakness" not only created the world but provided reason, the Logos as His witness.¹⁹¹ Reason may testify to the integrity of God as the Cause, in so far as reason is found to be a trustworthy witness within the terrestrial conditions of testimony.

To determine whether reason is trustworthy it is required that the principle of self-testimony be applied to reason as its own witness. For reason is subject to the terrestrial conditions of witnessing and cannot therefore be arbitrary. It must testify consistently or be convicted of intentional falsehood.

It is apparent that an application of the principles of self-testimony to Reason as a witness must involve a progression of witnesses to witnesses and testimony to testimony. In such a progression each term must be regarded as integral, functional and qualitative with respect to its following term and merely apparent, formal and interrogatory with respect to its preceding term. Such a process of witnessing may be represented as an emanation, a discourse of reason or as a series of "numbers". It will be a monadological speculation.

The speculation will depend for its meaning upon the cumulative significance of terms and functions as these lead back to the originating Cause. There the final trustworthiness of the progression will depend upon the fact of a self-caused Cause. Thus the progression when read in the direction of emanation will have an ontological significance, the significance of being caused or brought into existence. This significance is verifiable only by the experience of being caused by another. God alone can know what it is to BE in the absolute sense. All others may know what it is to be caused. They may witness to the author of their being.

When the progression is read in the direction opposite to emanation it will have a cumulative value significance, a significance

191 Sac. 91-97.

verifiable only by a progressive revelation of the integral Cause as a superior quality, an eternal "better than". Thus a "flight" from God in Philo's figure represents a diminishing value accompanied by a multiplication of the formal bonds of causal servitude approaching an absolute necessity and need of value. An approach toward God will represent an eternal enrichment of value and a progressive liberation from the formal bonds of causal servitude that condition the approach to the absolute Being.

A monadological speculation along the lines suggested by a progression of "witnesses" or "numbers" would seem to be involved in Philo's cosmology. Various stages are represented as concentric spheres each of which provides an environment, a stimulus and a limiting value for the sphere next within. There will be five such spheres and they may be designated respectively, Deity, Virtue, Reason, Soul and Habit. Each sphere may be considered by a triadic formula in which beginning means and end are "equal".¹⁹² The general plan will be a process in which a unit develops until it reaches a stage of transformation, is then changed into a higher unity which in turn develops toward a second transformation and is then turned into a still higher unit and so on until the stage of Deity is reached.

The Spheres

The innermost sphere is called "habit".¹⁹³ It represents a cycle of activity that constitutes the "bond" of material things,¹⁹⁴ the skills by which a purpose is realized and the constitutive activity which the creative Mind uses as the concrete unit for development. Thus "habit" obtains according to "energy" and "condition", a change of place and a change in place.¹⁹⁵ These together constitute a skill.¹⁹⁶ Habit as the fundamental unit is a law of activity which requires a cause of activity to complete it.

When the cycle of "habit" is regarded as a whole it is a "perfected" "seed".¹⁹⁷ The environment for this "seed" is Nature

192 Opif. 42-44; Qu. in Gen. II, 5, ed. Aucher.

193 For the Stoic use of $\epsilon\tilde{\xi}\iota\varsigma$ see Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, pp. 167-168.

194 Deus. 35-36.

195 Sobriet. 34-35.

196 Qu. in Gen. III, 3, ed. Aucher; Mut. 121-123; Sobriet. 35-43.

197 L. A. II, 37; 22-24; Sac. 98-102.

and the process of growth the order of Nature. Nature regarded as a whole is the "life" or "soul" as animal activity.¹⁹⁸

When plant and animal life is distinguished from human life the "soul" is regarded as moving in a next larger environment called reason. In this sphere we have "sense", "imagination" and "mind" for the triadic formula.¹⁹⁹ "Sense" represents the parts of "mind" and imagination the structure by which "sense" is organized into the complete whole, "mind".²⁰⁰ In human life "imagination", *φαντασία*, takes the place of the "appetite". Thus in human life "sense" has two meanings, that which applies to the animal man is "appetite" and that which applies to rational man is "imagination".²⁰¹

Now when the rational soul is developed in the larger environment of "virtue", the "mind" of that soul is considered as a formal technique for pursuing its own ends.²⁰² This mind represents theoretical virtue. It is the formal beginning of the life of virtue. But when that mind is considered to act as a whole its functioning is practical virtue or a growth in virtue.²⁰⁴ The three terms of the triadic formula here are "memory", "recollection" and "forgetting". "Memory" represents the immediate consciousness of God or the constancy of purpose by which human life develops Godward.²⁰⁴ "Recollection" represents instructive experience. Thus the wisdom of the race becomes available to the individual through "recollection". The social heritage is not immediately known by individuals but is acquired as a recall of past human experience becomes an instructive equipment for individual progress in virtue. "Forgetting" represents the alternative by which a free will turns from God to the immediate satisfactions in "sense" and thus loses contact with the purpose of virtuous living.

The final sphere of Deity provides the Cause which operates at both limits of the cycle of development. It operates through "habit" as a compelling force and through "virtue" as an im-

198 Fuga. 172-173; cf. Post. 170-171.

199 L. A. I, 28-30; Agri. 30.

200 Conf. 127; L. A. III, 67-68; Post. 126.

201 Mut. 118, 257; L. A. I, 28-30; Heres. 132.

202 L. A. I, 53-55; Mut. 125-129.

203 Det. 6-21; Sp. L. III, 202.

204 Mig. 205-207; Praem. 9; L. A. III, 91; Mut. 97-102, 270; Sobriet. 28-29; Cong. 39-42; Sac. 55-58; Mig. 16, 56; Ebriet. 137; Mut. 83-87; Post. 148.

pulling force.²⁰⁵ Thus it both precedes and follows human living as the One Cause to bring man into existence and to draw him toward higher developments by engaging his will to live toward God.

This cosmological schema is found in Philo's allegorizations of earth, water, air and fire as well as the astronomical spheres. It is a cosmological schema that in ancient physics considered the elements not as constituents of one "stuff" but as spheres of activity through which an "upward" and a "downward" course of the soul carried its career through various transformations. It follows the tradition of Heraclitus and Parmenides as distinct from the atomism of Democritus and Epicurus. It provided the schema for various doctrines of the soul from Plato's allegory of metempsychosis in the *Phaedrus* to the extravagant Gnostic visions of successions of heavens.

What we are particularly concerned to note in Philo's speculations is the possible conjunction of the Greek cosmology according to the idea of spheres or cycles with the idea of integral quality in the theme of "witnessing". The antithesis of God's Oath and Cain's denial not only involve logical principles of testimony but also many ideas of unity and separation that belong to monadological speculation but not to Greek dialectic. The conception of units within units so common to many mystical speculations is not necessarily bound up with a logic of classes.

It is in discussing Cain's lament at being abandoned of God that Philo says,

" . . . the body perishes if the soul quit it and the soul if reason quit it and reason if it is deprived of virtue. Now if each presence that I have named becomes an occasion of loss and damage to those abandoned by it, how great a disaster must we infer that those will experience who have been forsaken by God." (*Det.* 142).

From the opposite point of view Philo says,

" . . . and the most ancient Word of the Supreme Being is clothed with the world as a garment, (for it has put on earth and air and fire and water and the things that proceed from these elements) but the particular soul is clothed with the body and the mind of

205 *Det.* 60.

the wise man is clothed with the virtues. . . . for the Word of the Supreme Being is the bond of everything as has been said before, and it holds all things together, and binds all parts, and prevents them from being loosened or separated. . . . And the particular soul as far as it has received power, does not permit any of the parts of the body to be separated or cut off contrary to their nature; but as far as depends upon itself, it preserves everything entire, and conducts the different parts to a harmony and indissoluble union with one another. But the mind of the wise man being thoroughly purified, preserves the virtues in an unbroken and unimpaired condition, having adapted their natural kinship and communion with a still more solid good will. (*Fuga*. 110-112).

"Since then all steadiness and stability and the abiding forever in the same place unchangeably and immovably, is first seen in God, (τὸ ὅν) and next in the Word of God, which He has called His Covenant, and in the third place in the wise man, and in the fourth degree in the improving man, by what aberration could the wicked mind which is liable to all sorts of curses, think that it is able to stand by itself, while it is in reality borne about as in a deluge, and dragged hither and thither by the incessant eddies of things flowing in through the dead and agitated body?" (*Som.* II 237).

CHAPTER VIII

ἌΠΛΟΙΟΣ AS BETTERNESS

It does not follow that because Philo says that no creature can attain to the "purity" of God, he must therefore say that no creature can be morally "pure", nor indeed "pure" in some other mode of excellence. For the "purity" of God is not peculiarly a moral attribute nor indeed an attribute within any particular mode of excellence such as Philo enumerates, namely virtue, truth, beauty or goodness. (*Opif.* 8). God transcends all particular modes of excellence. The value significance of such transcendence must therefore lie in the uniqueness of the relation of "betterness", *κρείττων*.

The transcendence by which God is "better" than virtue, truth, beauty or goodness must be the condition by which these things may be concrete examples of excellence. They will not constitute a class of abstract things, ideals that are, as Philo says, beyond land and sea. They rather furnish the means of exemplifying in various ways the unique relation of the "betterness" of God.

Now for any excellence to be "pure" as God is "pure" would involve the absurdity of that excellence being "better" than itself, the absurdity of placing the two terms of a relation upon the same side of the relation. For the very character that makes it possible for an excellence to represent God, namely its "betterness" with respect to those for whom it represents God, that very character in God Himself makes it impossible for a representative to be classed with God.

Before the idea of value as a relation of "betterness" the logic of class must break down. Thus Philo says that the "God-loving" man is more than man but less than God.²⁰⁶ He cannot be classed with man nor God. His likeness both to God and to man cannot be referred to some third class of thing such as a God-man. For he does not include both God and man but rather lies between God and man. What he does is to exemplify a relation to God by becoming "better" than man. The relation of "betterness" involves representative excellence rather than essential excellence.

206 Som. II, 228-237; cf. Gig. 12-15.

Self Qualification

In the place of qualification by inclusion within a class Philo substitutes self-qualification by the voluntary choice of a "better". Excellence is made concrete by the manner in which its representative chooses to exemplify "betterness". Thus Moses is given as a "god" to Pharaoh, the "mind" as "god" to the "body", because the manner in which Moses chooses to be "better" is by faithfulness and consecration to God. The excellence of such consecration, says Philo, "soars above genus and species alike", for in it there is no "room for adding or taking away". It exemplifies the Word by which God framed the universe. That which chooses God alone for its "better" is no ordinary excellence but a representative godhood.²⁰⁷

Philo says that a man only injures himself when he slanders his betters but he benefits himself when he exalts his betters.²⁰⁸ In either case the "better" is only nominally affected but the judge has placed himself lower or higher on a scale of actual values.²⁰⁹ Again under the figure of descending in order to ascend, the descendant judges itself by the attitude it assumes toward the ascendant.²¹⁰ And under the figure of procreation, (*Cherub.* 43-53) Philo explains that virtues or values are impermanent particulars until made genuine, αὐθιγενής, and pure, ἀκήρατος, by the vital functioning of God. They do not then qualify God, however. They qualify the will to acknowledge God in their pursuit.

It seems fairly obvious that much of what Philo says concerning value and value judgments falls in line with the New Testament maxim concerning a man as judged by the judgments he himself makes.²¹¹ Furthermore Philo's exhortations to unselfishness include a recognition that mere self-depreciation is an in-

²⁰⁷ Sac. 8-10.

²⁰⁸ One does not convict the wicked by retirement from society but by an example of the proper use of social intercourse and the proper appreciation of all worthy men. To adopt an ascetic life is either hypocrisy or a confession of poor management. The conviviality of the good man rebukes the license of the profligate and noble service in high places convicts the petty seeker for preferment. *Fuga.* 23-47.

²⁰⁹ Det. 52 sq.

²¹⁰ Post. 136 sq.; *Fuga.* 194-196. The ἀνάβασις and κατάβασις of the theme of witnessing is apparently involved. See Odeberg, op. cit., p. 33 sq.

²¹¹ E. g. Matt. 7, 1-2; Luke 6, 37-38; The principle pervades rabbinic counsel such as is found in Pirke Aboth.

verted egotism. Neither by hedonism nor by asceticism may egotistic particularity be exorcised.

Concreteness

In the allegory of the brazen serpent,²¹² Philo explains that neither a sensuous nor an immaterial identity can make virtue concrete. For both in the flux of sensation, and in the solitude of thought the "mind" is susceptible to a hedonism that will "scatter" or reduce its virtue to a lifeless egotism. For virtue to be concrete in a vital sense it must be like an effluent from the wisdom of God.²¹³ It must rest upon a "self-mastery", σωφροσύνη, for the sake of God rather than for pleasure or pride.

It is to be noted that in this discussion Philo recognizes that a value may be said to be concrete either because it appears sensuous or because it invites contemplation. He would contend however that the concreteness of value by either definition is only representative. Sensuous concreteness may represent intellectual concreteness but intellectual concreteness is itself subject to a "scattering" unless it in turn represents an activity of God.

Thus Philo builds a hierarchy in which God may be represented by His Word and that Word by sensuous things.²¹⁴ We say may be represented because the relation involved is not a relation entailing logical necessity. Things that obtain in "word" only or merely by naming and classifying may be the same as non-existent. It requires a dynamic factor to determine the reality of such things.

Thus the relation involved in Philo's hierarchy is not logical as in genus and species but dynamic as in cause and effect. God is the generator or prime mover under no compulsion to make con-

²¹² L. A. II 79-81.

²¹³ In discussing the cardinal virtues of Platonism, Philo identifies the form and function of each virtue with man but refers both to God. (L. A. I, 63-87). The virtues are ways of praising God rather than ends in themselves. Of course Philo says with the Stoics that virtue should be sought for its own sake but for Philo this is not to make it a "possession" but an "offering".

²¹⁴ Gerhard Nebel has indicated the place of Philo's treatment of the noetical world as a transitional stage between Plato and Plotinus. The emphasis upon the dynamic over the formal aspect is associated with Stoic influence. This transition will be misread, perhaps, if the vitalism of Judaism is forgotten and the materialism of the Stoics over emphasized. Plotins Kategorien der intelligiblen Welt. pp. 26-33, Heidelberger Abhandlungen zur Philosophie und Iherer Geschichte, 18.

crete all the things that may be conceived in the mind. Mental concepts even though they invite contemplation and admiration do not constitute a class of values like Platonic ideas. They merely represent ways in which God may be conceived as acting and have no concrete existence until God has acted through them and they thus become a Word of God. The intellectual aspect of value is an idea that is subject to change in accordance with the manner in which it exemplifies a dynamic relation to God. Thus the *summum genus* itself is only interrogatory. Of this we shall have more to say in another place.

Perhaps enough has been said to suggest that for Philo "betterness" indicates an irreversible relation within which a free will qualifies itself. "Purity" will mean the will to represent the "better". When applied to God such "purity" will indicate an activity in process of expression. When applied to aught else it will indicate a passivity or willingness which reflects some aspect of the active God.

Thus to say that God is good is to enhance the significance of goodness by suggesting that it is operative. While to say that aught else is good is to limit the significance of goodness by prescribing its effect. Similarly all values may be treated singly in exemplification of the relation of "betterness". Though otherwise unclassified each conceivable value will become concrete when used to exemplify the "betterness" of God. When the "purity" of God is one of the terms in the relation of "betterness" it is not required that other terms be deficient in particular modes of excellence. They may be perfect in several modes and yet the "purity" of God be "better" for He is perfect in all modes of excellence. Thus Noah was perfect in justice, Abraham perfect in faith, Isaac perfect in insight, Jacob perfect in practical labor and Moses perfect in prophetic leadership. Yet God is perfect in a unique way because all of these perfect traits are made concrete by relation to Him. He cannot therefore be an abstract perfection but rather a dynamic that makes values concrete, which is to say individual.

Unity by Free Choice

We have said that the conception of value as a relation to God as "better" involves a doctrine of free choice as an alternative to a technique of classification. To classify is to rationalize an as-

sumption of municipality. To evaluate is to rationalize the assumption of one standard. A God, who as Philo says, bestows upon His creatures the exact measure of "grace" that each can bear, does not crystallize things into rigid classes but rather appoints for each a destiny conditioned only upon the will of each to glorify the Creator in some one particular manner. Under such a creative Deity the forces of nature may be viewed as "gods" who in their regular movements may appear to be compelled by law but who may in reality achieve their unswerving order by their incorruptible devotion, their free allegiance to the Creator.²¹⁵ We describe the same universe of order and regularity by saying that all things are rigidly determined as in a well classified manifold or by saying that each thing has a free will but devotes itself in obedience to one standard of excellence, variously exemplified. The fact of order is accounted for in both cases but only in the second description is justice done to the benevolence of the Creator. For it is just the opportunity to disobey²¹⁶ that makes of obedience a virtue and only the opportunity of each creature to be worse that makes its actual state "better". The very value of the Creative God becomes expressible only in a universe where freedom is precariously real. And Philo's eulogy of nature as a concert of worshipping creatures²¹⁷ is merely the aesthetic side of a fundamental emphasis upon real freedom.

It is the principle of precarious freedom that imparts to each creature the peculiar excellence of the particular manner in which that creature serves the Creator. Should that service be denied, freedom would become chaos and the creature without a standard by which to exemplify value. Freedom must be described as the individuation of a character rather than the character of an individual. The freedom that is chaotic can be neither individual nor concrete. Individuality itself must be regarded as the only quality conferred by relation to God and as a quality that can only be conferred by that relation. There are two ways of saying this and Philo employs them both. They cover the two cases of activist and formal conception of the universe.

In terms of an active universe²¹⁸ Philo says that each part of

215 Sp. L. I, 17-20; V. M. II 71; Conf. 171-175.

216 Opif. 72-75.

217 Heres. 206.

218 Cherub. 109-113.

that universe is incomplete in itself and therefore strives to complete itself by seeking out its counterpart. As each thing yearns in "love" for its complement and satisfies its need by seeking out that complement the universe is bound up in reciprocal relations of love and harmony. And all such creatures return thanks to God in a love for Him who provides for the need of each. In this world there is neither strife nor monotonous likeness but variety in harmony and free activity for each creature. This is a doctrine of freedom as an impelling need continuously being satisfied by the providence of God.

In such a world to be a "slave of God" is the highest freedom for in such service there is the recognition of a higher need than can be supplied by the partial things of the finite world.²¹⁹ Impelling need becomes particularized in a way that dispels all finite limitations by the very uniqueness of its relation to the infinite God. The freedom of God as the only complete individual becomes a concrete quality of God's consecrated representative. A theoretical slavery becomes a practical freedom because all bonds save one are broken and that one bond relates the "slave of God" to the infinite.²²⁰ A Stoic would reverse this order and make a practical slavery become a theoretical freedom, a Socrates in prison being a free soul in his own self-possession as Epictetus would say. For the Stoic the sense of need is to be suppressed and forgotten in so far as possible so that the insistent call to action may not disturb the soul. For Philo the sense of need is to be nourished so that the insistent call to action may be heard and a man may follow that call without pausing to dally with the things of sense and body but hurry on toward God.

Thus in his daily life a man may become more and more of a complete individual by cherishing his sense of need for God until it becomes a "love of God" that finds in all the bounteous provision for body and mind the occasion for gratitude and consecration. The nourishment of the sense of a need for God is the separation of the God-loving man from all service that does not befit the representative of God. The greater the sense of need the greater the active search for Him and the farther from selfishness. By claiming that God alone is his "better" the man may exercise that

219 Conf. 91-97.

220 L. A. III 186-199.

freedom which Philo describes in the story of the lion that when taken captive by men turned those captors into his grooms by terrifying them. In an active universe he is free who knows the greatest need, who represents by free choice the highest power, who permits himself to be satisfied by nothing short of the farthest goal.

Dynamic Versus Formal Unity

Philo says this same thing in terms of a formal universe when he says that each part of the universe is a unit and the whole a unit because the Creator made it like Himself. There can be but one world for the principle of unity qualifies the universe both in whole and in part. The uniqueness that is God is neither the unity of the whole nor of the parts but the unique power by which wholes and parts may come into unity.²²¹

This argument for one world is not the same as the argument in *Timaeus* 30. For Plato argues that there cannot be two perfect wholes because in such a case two units would resemble a third class of thing, namely perfection, and would therefore no longer be wholes but parts of the class called perfection. Plato's argument makes individuality formal. It assumes a will to multiplicity that must be held in restraint by a formal necessity. Philo's view makes individuality qualitative. It assumes a will to unity that is released from a constraint by qualitative differentiation. Plato's argument restricts perfection to the formal unity of God. Philo's view restricts formal unity to a will to imitate God. The one view makes perfection equivalent to what God is. The other view regards as perfect anything that God does.

To say as Philo does that God gives things to themselves²²² is to say that individuality and freedom are the same thing. Formal unity is a mode of the many. Qualitative unity is a mode of the One. Thus a man may never know the essence of God, for a man may be only one of many. Nevertheless a man may be free as an individual form. Likewise each creature that exists represents some individual form in which the power of the One God operates. There is nothing outside the world binding its parts together says Philo but it is the law of the One God that operates as a power to

²²¹ Opif. 171, 25; Heres. 157-160.

²²² Som. II, 219-227.

“persuade” its many different parts to remain in a harmonious whole.²²³ Or to say this in terms of “being”, there is a quality of existence conferred by God upon individuals that remain in harmony with Him. Thus formal unity is neither inclusive nor exclusive but only representative.

It is important to stress this dynamic and qualitative interpretation of unity over the rationalistic and formal interpretation, because Philo’s frequent use of the idea of archetype and model does not involve the idea of many relations among many self-sufficient entities but many examples of one relation. This relation is the unique “betterness” of the universal over each concrete example of that universal. Concrete examples are individual because each illustrates one of the many possible effects of the First Cause. This is like saying that a value judgment is the arbitrary reversal of the dynamic relation of cause and effect for the purpose of assigning to the effect a concrete value.

223 Plant. 5-10.

CHAPTER IX

QUALITY AN INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE

Clarity and Truth

Philo indicates that quality is an incommunicable experience of an individual.²²⁴ This is why reason is limited. For although by reason one can describe in words and symbols an object which has been experienced, he cannot convey by such means the exact affect, πάθος, to be associated with the object. Thus if the object were a sensuous thing he might describe its form but he could not convey a feeling of its color and taste. In order that such things be experienced the object described must itself be present or remembered as an individual experience. It must act as a cause to complete the account which a descriptive reason offers. If an object is to be judged, a distinction must be made between the form which reason can describe in words and symbols and the quality which must be present or remembered in individual experience.

If then judgment is to be an act of reason it must have, says Philo, both clarity and truth.²²⁵ By this he means that there must be a use of well known symbols in description and there must be immediate reference to an experienceable cause to complete the account which the symbols give. Clarity will be the arrangement of ideas which are themselves impressive to intuition as colors would be to sense.²²⁶ And truth will be the reference to an object

224 L. A. III 129 sq.; cf. Plant. 18-22.

225 σαφηνεία in contrast with σύγχυσις, ἀληθότης in contrast with θυμός L. A. III, 123-124; Decal. 33; δήλωσις, ἀλήθεια V. M. III, 113-126; cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 12, 6.

226 As noted above Philo distinguishes a "sense" according to "habit" or condition from a "sense" according to "energy". (L. A. II, 44-45). Similarly the sense object may be considered under two aspects, that which is perceptible and that which is objective, τὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν εἰς καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν καὶ ἀκατάληπτον. (Heres. 132). In relating the "soul" or life (ψυχή) to the arts he calls it, αἴσθησιν τις αἰσθήσεων, (Cong. 144). Thus σαφηνεία must describe a different experience than the Stoic καταληπτικὴ φαντασία. It is not the immediate perceptual aspect of things but the arrangement that is "clear".

which can act as a cause to complete the meaning of the clear arrangement of ideas. Philo illustrates his argument by saying that if a teacher clearly pronounces the word "alpha" he has spoken distinctly in the sense of causing his pupil to catch the exact sound which symbolizes a letter in the alphabet. But if the teacher while thus using a symbol distinctly should point to the letter gamma while pronouncing the word "alpha" he would not speak truly. For his pupil would remain ignorant and deceived as to the complete meaning of alpha, namely its sound when spoken and its form when written. In Philo's oft repeated analogy, a pupil must "hear" clearly and "see" truly if instruction is to be complete.

Thus truth implies correlation. There must be an object which can complete the meaning of symbols and there must be an honest teacher to point to the correct object as well as an honest pupil to hold its attentive gaze in the direction pointed out.²²⁷

The Subjective Condition

It is this subjective condition of truth that we must examine first, the thing we have called honesty in both teacher and pupil, for without it reason may be clear and distinct but untruthful. This subjective condition is a certain disposition in man which Philo calls, "holy resolves" and "holy and purified opinions".^{227*} By this Philo does not mean some mysterious sanctity peculiar to the saint. He means rather a simplicity, a naive honesty, a frankness, an ingenuousness, a disinterested directness, an unselfish curiosity. This disposition is as characteristic of the wise man as it is of the lowliest pupil at the start of his education. It is, says Philo, a knowledge that is not far from ignorance for it is the sign of a plastic mind which no amount of learning or no lack of learning can harden into prejudice and self-opinionatedness. Truth corresponds with this informal disposition rather than with some formal idea. It directs the gaze of the honest rather than forming the necessary conclusion to a rigid discourse of reason. It is the correlation between the point of view of the "holy" student and the instructive God Who stimulates his thinking and feeling.²²⁸

227 Cf. L. A. III 228-245; Cherub. 128; Post. 105-6.

227* L. A. III, 125-126.

228 Abr. 123.

The "holy" disposition is impossible for men who yield to the temptation of dwelling upon the "pleasure" of symbols. They are enamoured of the sensuous character of objects and delighted by the appeal of ideas for their own sake. As Philo says they are prone to build a "city of reason" which is like a domain where bodily pleasures and private ambitions and intellectual pride and stubborn opinions and plausible guesses are so arranged by reason as to pander to the selfishness of man rather than constituting a disinterested research.²²⁹ In short reason becomes ego-centric when "pleasure" of body and mind is permitted to compromise the teachableness of the will to be acted upon.

Self-Mastery

To insure such teachableness men must acquire a "self-mastery", σωφροσύνη, as a point of view from which all symbols for experience may be "seen" in perspective. Such "self-mastery" differs from "pleasure" as a "versatile virtue" differs from a "fickle affection".²³⁰ It attends to something beyond the private delight in symbols whether sensuous or mental in the effort to receive an impression from the informing God behind those symbols.²³¹

Now "self-mastery" does not describe a sedentary ego. It is not the "temperance" of hedonism, the rationality of the "self moved" Platonic soul, nor is it the "self-possession" of the Stoic soul. It is ἀπάθεια,²³² the patience in which is maintained the point

229 Conf. 107-133.

230 ἡδονὴ γὰρ ἐναντίον σωφροσύνης, ποικίλῳ πάθει ποικίλη ἀρετὴ καὶ ἀμυνομένη πολέμιον ἡδονήν. (L. A. II, 79).

231 L. A. III, 239-242.

232 Philo argues that while "waiting" on the Lord, one cannot be busied with sophistical wrangling nor the indulgence of passions. Hence in God's service the "passions" of desire and dispute are laid aside and man is rescued from their power. The subduing of passions is not by a frontal attack but by a "falling backward". While one is busy in practical service he shows the best "judgment". L. A. II, 100-108; III, 127-144. The clarity and truth of his course becomes known in his practical service. This service brings peace and great joy, a thing quite different from a philosophic aloofness. Abr. 255-261; Plant. 98; Philo definitely rejects the *apathy* of the Stoics in Mut. 166-171. The Joy of the Law has a practical as well as a religious significance. For the Stoic view of ἀπάθεια see S. V. F. III 443, sq. For Philo's answer to the Stoic argument for the passionless man see the conclusion to *Plant*. Passionlessness must be predicated of either an inanimate being or a divine being and hence not of man at all. To speak of the wiseman as passionless is to speak of him only in his rôle of wisdom and not in his rôle of man. Philo's treatment of "drunkenness" is an attempt to distinguish the Jewish Joy of the Law from the extreme of cold rationalism on the one hand and impractical enthusiasm on the other.

of view from which a man may, "behold God Himself" as Philo says. It is a "waiting for the salvation of the Lord".²³³ It is that "suspense of judgment" which is the soundest judgment because it yields to no "passions", not even to the temptation to be skeptical.²³⁴

This description of judgment owes its principle neither to asceticism, intellectualism nor skepticism. It derives from ceremonialism and is akin to an experimental faith. All the elements of individual experience, whether they be sensuous or mental are to be referred to the "grace" of God and to be arranged into a perspective by reason in the expectation that the First Cause may then be "seen" to act.

Communication a Witnessing

We may say then that the incommunicable experience of quality may be approximated by reason in queries concerning the first or True Cause. The question "is it like this or that?" means, "was this or that the cause of my inexpressible experience?" To answer such questions by the use of reason alone one must hypostasize the Active Cause. Philo's hypostasis is "manna" the *summum genus* or "somewhat"²³⁵ used interrogatively as the generic

233 Virt. 14, Philo derives σωφροσύνη from σωτηρίαν τῷ φρονούντι, a "salvation of the thinking part". In this passage he is discussing courage and likening the mind to a penetrating eye. He says that the "health" of the soul consists in a harmony of its faculties and such a harmony is conditioned upon a courage in which simplicity and humility are characteristic. There is an apparent parallel with Plato's allegory of the chariot in the Phaedrus as well as an apparent influence of the Stoic doctrine of a dominant reason. But Philo's interpretation of courage and temperance or self-mastery introduces a humility that is quite foreign to Greek teaching. That the thinking faculty of man is to be saved or perhaps the harmony of his faculties is to be saved, is quite foreign to the Greek emphasis upon the authority of reason. For further reference to a parallel with Plato's allegory of the chariot see below.

234 Abr. 268-271.

235 For the Stoic use of $\tau\iota$ i. e. "quiddity", as the most all embracing term see S. V. F. II, 333, 329. Philo plays on certain uses of interrogatory and indefinite particles. Thus $\pi\omicron\upsilon\epsilon\iota$, *where* art thou? and *what* hast thou done?, admits of three answers. The evil must answer, nowhere and nothing accomplished. The good will answer, here ready to serve. The intermediate will answer, here willing to be corrected by Thy judgments. The particle $\tau\iota$, *what* is it? *why* is it? and *what caused* it?, is answered, somewhat or it is indescribable, to test my character, and the ineffable God. L. A. III, 49-68; 161 sq.; II, 86; II, 16, sq.; Fuga. 132-136. Manna as the nourishing Word, "feeds" man, tests his character and convinces him of the care of God. V. M. I, 191-213.

Word or name for the Active Cause. It is this term "manna" that satisfies the formal definition which Drummond assigns to ἄποιος. And this formal *summun genus* is interrogatory while ἄποιος may be either affirmative or negative.

"Manna" is not the Cause but it indicates the direction from which the Cause may be expected to operate. It hypostatizes the functions of "feeding" and "nourishing". It formalizes a limit to which reason may go in an attempt to represent an event. The repetition of that event cannot be guaranteed by reason for the validity or truth of reason depends upon the repetition of the expected event.

By reason therefore, one man can point to the symbol for an event that has happened to him. Another man looking in the direction pointed out must wait for the event to happen again and to him. Reason cannot determine that the event will be the same for both men. The symbol for the event, the "rock" from which the "water" flows, as Philo says, may indeed be the same for both men. But the operation of the Cause may appear different as the dispositions of the men differ while they read the symbols of reason. They assign to the symbols a quality that represents their own individual appraisals of the Cause.²³⁶

The command "make for thyself"²³⁷ illustrates this by a play upon ποιέω and ποιότης. The play is lost in the English but may be suggested by saying "interpret for thyself" the experience which suggests an active Doer behind the world where sensuous and mental symbols express His "deed". The command "make not to thyself"²³⁸ means that by no self-conceit or sensuous delusion shall that Doer be qualified or interpreted anthropomorphically. He is ἄποιος, the Active Cause and may never be claimed as merely a subjective quality of experience.²³⁹ That is to say the reason of man cannot circumscribe the cause of his experiences. Man can only attempt by reason to describe his experience by pointing to familiar symbols and admonishing others to wait for an event that will validate the reasoning by which he has symbolized the expected.

236 L. A. II, 86; III, 174-181.

237 L. A. II, 79; Agri. 95.

238 L. A. I, 48 sq.; Sp. L. I, 22; Cherub. 15; Det. 18; Sp. L. IV, 66, 169; Plant. 95; Virt. 156.

239 L. A. I, 48-52.

Now if the promised event occur two other things must also happen at the same time. The one who has pointed must be characterized as truthful in his forecast and the one to whom the event occurs now for the first time must be said to be instructed in the truth. Description of the active cause, the validity of reason and the manifestation of quality are bound up with "uttered speech" in "testimony" to character. It is not the active cause that is characterized but the prophet is characterized as trustworthy and the pupil is led into an individual experience of the fact that there is an objective Cause however indescribable the experience by which he becomes convinced of that fact. God as the Active Cause is not a theory but a convincing fact to which ignorant men may be led by those who have met God in their individual lives. The ignorant man need only order his thinking in expectation of God's active presence by heeding the direction pointed out by those who have known God. The act of conviction rests with God. He will convince the suppliant of His reality.²⁴⁰

Eulogos

In order to approximate the unique quality of an individual experience there must be offered an expressive "word" which Philo calls *eulogos*.²⁴¹ Philo plays upon this term to indicate three different types of disposition that become expressed by a use of reason. The first of these dispositions is "holiness". The reason used to express this disposition is clear. For it is the testimony of a "fixed state and disposition charged with benediction".²⁴² *Eulogos* in this case means *blessing, say it is well and well be it*. By a creative fiat God guarantees the reasoning of the holy man by repeating that man's experience in the lives of other men who ingenuously attend to the words of the holy man. "For these things arise together, felicity of expression, (εὐλόγιστος) and holiness, (ἁγιος)." ²⁴³

240 Cf. Abr. 107-146; Det. 65-68.

241 The skepticism of the New Academy of Arcesilas and Carneades had developed a doctrine of probability, εὐλόγος. It included probability for practice and hence moral connotations and probability for knowledge and hence a denial of certainty. Philo makes the probability of reason or "speech" rest upon the disposition of the speaker and this disposition is defined by his relation to God. Philo rejects the plausible and contingent as mere guess-work, εἰκός and πιθανός. Sac. 12-13; cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric, I 2, 15.

242 L. A. III, 203-210; cf. Mig. 86-117.

243 L. A. I, 17-18.

The second disposition that is expressed by reason is that of the "inclining man".²⁴⁴ In this case *eulogos* means *probable* or *happily reasoned*. The inclining man uses reason to lay out a course for experience which he has not yet realized. He is the man that Philo often describes as improving, whose inclinations are toward a goal to which he cannot bear witness for he has not yet made that goal an individual experience. It is only probable for him.

The third disposition is that of a man given to "passion" and whim. In this case *eulogos* means *cleverly worded*. For it is now the testimony of a sophist, one who has never begun to experience the good that he describes by his pretty speeches.²⁴⁵ When he discourses upon the true or the good he gives the testimony of a "dead" soul, one who has no vital contact with the things he professes to describe.²⁴⁶

The principle involved in the play on *eulogos* would seem to be that the life and language of a man is an "uttered speech" a *Logos* that commits its user to the arbitrament of a promised event. According as that event turns out, the character of him who made the forecast becomes revealed as given to truth, probability or plausibility. Thus reason may be regarded as an interrogatory discipline that is always relevant to the character of its user but also involves claims upon a revealing event. Reason may be likened to an oath, a vow and a prayer.²⁴⁷ It may be called *Logos Hermeneus* the interpreting Word, for it both interprets the character of its user and it reveals the relation of that user to the Deity that registers vows and answers prayers.

Reason Like an Oath

Whether intentionally or otherwise God is always called to "witness" when reason is used. For it is only by the providence of God that a promise, a vow, a prayer or a forecast of any sort can be transformed from a "word" into a "deed". Like the vow, reason involves an "if" and a "then" which compares a given word or premise with an accomplished deed or conclusion. Both the integrity of the appellant and the validity of his reasoning is bound

²⁴⁴ Post. 100, sq.

²⁴⁵ L. A. III, 123-124.

²⁴⁶ Cf. Sac. 12, sq.; Cherub. 116; Det. 38.

²⁴⁷ Plant. 79-84.

up with the future deed implied by his word. The nature of the Deity, the Providence or whatever it might be that can guarantee the future event, is not in question. It is assumed as the one condition that can justify the appellant in his forecast.

Self-Testimony and Witnessing

Thus when reason is likened to an oath or a vow or a prayer it may be submitted to the canons of "testimony" and suggests several functions of the Logos. To swear by another is like submitting one's inner intentions to the arbitrament of deeds over which one professes to exercise no arbitrary control. *Logos Pro-phorikos* the spoken word, may symbolize a deed to which an inner reason or will, *Logos Endiathetos* has been committed. *Logos Endiathetos* becomes equivalent to *Logos Hermeneus* as conscience. For the purpose of him who swears by another is reviewed within the soul before ever the deed can testify to the integrity of the will. Such an oath can be taken without prejudice to the integrity of him who swears only on condition that he can forecast but not dictate the deed which his oath involves. He can call future events to witness but he cannot arbitrarily control their testimony. Thus conscience is like a use of reason which stakes the integrity of the will upon the consent of God to approve the deeds of that will when they have become manifest. The integrity of this inner reason depends not upon its purity of purpose but upon the willingness of God to attest that purpose by lending power so that it may become a deed.

To swear by oneself differs from swearing by another. It involves the power to usher into being the witnesses to the integrity of him who swears. It is like giving a promise on no security save the power to perform one's word if one wills. No responsibility can be involved. He who swears by himself must be trusted solely because he is powerful. His is an unpredictable will, the revelation of which must come about only as he chooses. His word is his deed for there can be nothing to arbitrate between them.

Such an oath can only be taken by God and by the "lover of God". It can be taken by God because He dominates the appearing of all things as witnesses to His Will. It can be taken by the "lover of God" for his word is his deed. For with the "lover of

God", God exchanges pledges. faith for faith. He rewards a faith in Him by treating such an one as an equal rather than as a subordinate. He undertakes to justify the deeds of the faithful man so that that man may appear to forecast the future by his own reason. Reason has become a covenant between God and the faithful man. As "friends" without prejudice to the freedom of each other may cooperate in a common task by faith in the intentions of each other, so God and man may as "friends" maintain their respective integrities by removing all arbitrariness from their use of reason. A disinterested man and a benevolent God may come into intercourse as in a bond of friendship that unites rational minds. When "word" and "deed" are symbols for reason and law it may be concluded that reason and law are never arbitrary. For they constitute pledges to the integrity of all spiritual wills. They must never be regarded as identical with the spiritual realm but always indicate that free activity is an integral spiritual quality.

We have been considering holiness in relation to truth. Let us turn now to its meaning as a vitalistic good, the "tree of life".

CHAPTER X

QUALITY AND THE VITALISTIC GOOD

Beauty, Goodness, Holiness

Life Is Perfect

A living creature is perfect in quality at birth but imperfect in quantity, says Philo (*Fuga*. 13). The evidence for this, he says is the increase of quantity throughout the stages of growth while the quality remains the same, "having been stamped upon it by the divine Word which abides permanently and never changes." This constant that abides with the creature throughout its formal changes is nothing other than its life. And the source of all life is God. (*Fuga*. 198). As the source God must be regarded as superior to life or to say the same thing in another way, all particular forms of life are relative to the life of God. (*Heres*. 45). The inner quality by which each creature is perfect may be regarded as its vital relationship to God.

Now the "tree of life" is generic virtue, or goodness in its most comprehensive sense. To investigate this vitalism is to examine the species of goodness comprehended under generic virtue. The initial distinction to be made is between non-personal and personal senses in which creatures may be said to be "living" things.

The world itself taken as a whole may be said to be a "living creature" and each of its parts therefore, partakers of "life" in some sense. (*Heres*. 155). But man is a "living soul" in a way that is not appropriate to other parts of the world. He differs from them in being granted a free use of reason.²⁴⁸

This difference involves degrees of excellence but not a complete disjunction of the rational and the irrational in terms of goodness. It is a distinction between a goodness that is "beautiful to look upon" and a goodness that is "suitable for good". (*L. A.* I 56 sq.). The ranking which Philo makes concerns aesthetic and ethical aspects of goodness.

248 *Deus*. 45-50; *Det.* 83-85; *Opif.* 72-75.

Goodness and Beauty

The terms beauty and goodness may perhaps suggest a sharper distinction for us than the corresponding *καλός* and *ἀγαθός*. We really need a third term to set off the elements of the generic good which Philo deals with. For his analysis of the good includes formal, practical and personal excellences. He goes deeper than the contrast between contemplative and practical virtue that Panaetius made. He seeks a ground upon which things may both "appear" good and "be" good. He cites the Stoic dictum that the morally beautiful alone is good but he speaks of an inner principle of selflessness that is quite foreign to Stoic dignity. (*Post.* 133 sq.).

The term most congenial to Jewish sentiment in this connection is "holiness". In this term aesthetic and ethical meanings are inseparable from a personal consecration that can hardly be suggested by the more impersonal "beauty" of Greek aestheticism but which is fundamental to Philo's conception of goodness.²⁴⁹

Display Versus Care

In order to isolate the personal significances of "holiness" we may approach the problem by taking note of Philo's use of two different conceptions of creative activity. He says that there is one sort of creation which is a bringing of things into existence and another which is a transition from a higher genus to a lower species. (*Deus.* 119 sq.).

This contrast may be clarified by observing Philo's treatment of the same theme under the figure of the artist and the physician. It is a contrast between a display of creative power and an exercise of creative care. (*Post.* 141-142 sq.). The first sort of activity produces an aesthetic spectacle while the second is a figure for the rise of a moral conscience that at first convicts the soul of inferiority only to raise it up again to a healthy living. We have a fiat creation associated with the artist and a soteriological creation with the physician.

Philo brings these two types of activity together in the figure

²⁴⁹ Philo seems to combine the practical and the mystical significances of holiness represented in the Hebrew terms, *sedakah* and *chasiduth*. This would seem to be the result of his attempt to sacramentalize conduct, thought and motive in one system. The motive of the saint is not only the reward of his consecration but also the momentum of his practical conduct.

of the teacher. The teacher may give in quantity for display or he may give in kind to meet particular needs. We may have the good as a virtuosity of a self-sufficient artist-teacher or the good as it is found in the moral teacher. In this contrast lies the difference between the aesthetic quality of an external display and the ethical quality of attention to needs.

Now both these qualities represent benefits conferred by creative power but the one works from without and the other from within the soul. The one glorifies the teacher as an artist. The other centers about the pupil's need. It is good to pour forth blessings in profusion for this engenders confidence in the skill of the teacher. But it is better to apportion blessings to particular needs for this enables the pupil to share with the teacher in so far as the pupil's capacity to receive admits. When however the two things are done, occasion arises for both wonder and gratitude. The creative teacher is seen to be both great and good.

Now when Philo says that it is by His goodness that God creates, we do well to distinguish the aesthetic from the ethical aspects of that goodness. There is an aesthetic sense in which Philo says that the world is the abode of one of the powers of God, namely His goodness, whereas His Being lies beyond such a world. (*Mig.* 180-183). For although the world is not an object or process that can embody the essence of God, none the less can it fail to bear witness to the greatness and variety of His powers. It suggests the majesty of God as a spectacle indicative of sovereign will. In itself the world is incapable of recalcitrance, it is without spontaneity. (*Opif.* 46). It forever does honor to the Creator by the unresisting response it makes to His creative will. Before that Omnipotence the materials of the world are "supple and easy to work". (*Opif.* 136).

Thus when Philo parallels *Timaeus* 32 c and says that God both prepared and used up the exact amounts of materials required in the creation, he is not concerned about the aesthetic character of precise proportions, he is intent upon showing that it is impossible to circumvent God. God's omnipresence is a mode of power and the world shows this as a work of art would indicate the genius of its creator in every detail. Precise proportions indicate a good will toward particular needs. But the world as a work of art indicates the more fundamental fact of omnipotence in the Artist. Thus the power to make the world "appear" is an aesthetic

attribute while the care in maintaining the world is an ethical attribute.²⁵⁰

Philo applies this theme of beauty and goodness to personal qualities when he describes how Abraham was privileged both to "appear" and to "be" good. (*Mig.* 86-117). He gained a "great name" or reputation for goodness because the "multitude" agreed to regard him as good. Which is to say that when the many face the one in agreement upon a formal excellence the good "appears". When however it was given to Abraham to "be" good this was by his "nature". It is when the One selects from among the many that the inner nature of the good is established.

The One and the Many

This play upon the one and the many is repeated by Philo when he says that God in creating the world worked alone, there being no other that could assist Him. But when creating man He said "let us make" to signify "helpers". Creation as an expression of Beauty by which the divine is made to "appear" is an event by which many things may be seen to be orientated upon one creative power. But creation as an expression of ethical reality is an event that marks the rise of a power to select among many possibilities. The first creation suggests the transcendence of the First Cause, the majesty of God. The second creation makes real the immanence of the good in a disposition to select for honor, a first among many possible loyalties.

God gives two things when He creates. He gives to all His creatures the capacity to "appear" in testimony to His Grace. He gives to the rational mind the capacity to select among appearances. When God creates He ushers into being many and various witnesses to His Grace. Some of these are gifts bestowed as object lessons. Others are receivers of the gifts. The Grace of God includes both the expressive character of His gifts and the *rapproch* of the receiver with the giver. Thus Philo says, "Other beings bestow gifts which are different from the persons who receive them. But God gives not only those gifts but He gives also the very persons who receive them to themselves, for He has given me to myself and every living being has He given to himself; for the

²⁵⁰ Det. 154; Opif. 10-11; 19-25.

expression, 'I will establish my covenant with thee' is equivalent to, I will give thee to thyself." (*Som.* II, 219-227)

When the creative activity of God is understood as a display of His "grace" its object is the world of "appearances" both sensuous and mental. But when that creative activity is understood as setting apart an individually existent thing its object is a capacity to turn toward the Creator in acknowledgment of His beneficence.

We may distinguish aesthetic from ethical goodness by contrasting creative display with creative care. Philo suggests that in the first sort of goodness there is a union of sense and reason. In the first case "sense" is active and reason is formal as a variety of qualities might unite in glorifying one form. (*Opif.* 139). In the second case reason is active and "sense" is formal as a "memory" might come to life in a moral will through practical instruction. (*Post.* 148-152 sq.).

Beauty

For Philo beauty is no more than "pleasure" without the unselfish purpose or "self-mastery" that reason in the form of judgment can impose upon "sense". (*L. A.* II, 74-93). As the peculiar excellence of the presentational function, Beauty has a positive value as a means to higher knowledge. But Beauty for its own sake is mere "pleasure" whether it be grossly sensual or highly intellectual. For the moral will to be an active reason all hedonistic rewards must be, in Philo's phrase, "ground down fine" or reduced to mere symbols²⁵¹ by which experience may be guided with a minimum of distractions from selfish "pleasure". (*Post.* 153-164).

Thus for Philo Beauty plays three rôles. As "pleasure" it acts as the seductive temptress which disciplines the moral will in a negative fashion, "pleasure" and "virtue" being both likened to women who offer their charms.²⁵² The one offers gain without effort and thus debilitates the soul. The other offers gain by stern labor and thus strengthens the soul. In the one case we have the

251 διαίρεσις. The idea of the play on κατακόπτω and ἐπιλαίνω would seem to be that "pleasure" is explained away when the various sense attractions are classified as no more than instructive goods of the "body". There is a catharsis of sensuous "pleasure" effected by analysis. *Post.* 158-164.

252 *Sac.* 19-42.

good as a selfish goal. In the other the "joy of the law" which "smiles through tears". Both of these conceptions are aesthetic. But the one is the hedonistic good of Hellenism and the other is the passion for righteousness of Judaism.

The second rôle of Beauty is simply presentational.²⁵³ Symbols are empty and abstract unless some quality shines through them to illuminate their form. For Philo this quality is the Grace of God. It is as a light shining through a medium. By repudiating the sensuous and merely profitable aspect of things men do not thereby render them abstract and coldly rational. He rather views them as lighted up with the purpose of God for him, the Grace of God in providing them for instruction. Experience becomes symbolic of a beautiful plan, a gracious covenant, a sign of God's will. This is the beauty of the Word of God, a perfect instrument for sounding forth the praises of God. Moral beauty has in it much of the appreciation of rational intention, of appropriateness of plan, and of intellectual wonder. It is the joy of knowing the will of God.

The third rôle of Beauty is more truly aesthetic than the other two. For here it is that Philo has no further purpose for Beauty to serve. In this rôle Beauty becomes an attribute of God. This does not lie on the surface of Philo's words. For as we have indicated in a previous chapter Philo's interest in a practical morality leads him to repudiate aestheticism. It is nevertheless a fundamental trait of Philo's thinking to emphasize the Majesty and the Power and the Sovereignty of God. And this sense of awe before a God of Might however good, is reflected in Philo's uncompromising declaration of the absolute God in terms of final Authority. It is also to be remembered that Philo is exceedingly fond of music as his frequent illustrations indicate. The conception of harmony, the sense for recurrent themes, the contemplation of creation as a hymn, these are more than mere borrowings from Pythagorean metaphor. Philo would make Beauty the servant of theology as well as of morals and philosophy.

Philo indulges himself but rarely in what might be called "purple passages" or literary flights. Whether this is because of a literary incapacity, or pedantry, or seriousness of purpose or is an effort to avoid what he calls "tickling the fancy", the fact remains

253 Cf. L. A. III, 184-187.

that he is more often dry than inspiring and singularly difficult to quote. Nevertheless there is in Philo's thought and words a reminiscence of the stern grandeur of Hebrew prophecy for all that this is overlaid with the elaborate culture of Hellenism. Richness and grandeur and sublimity and stern dramatic passion lie in Philo's concepts. From time to time this becomes apparent in his eulogies of labor, of the nobility of the virtuous, of the audacity of the free spoken man, of the courage of faith, of the temerity of man in daring to emulate God, of the Kingship of God, of the summons to "suffer" and to subordinate the world to the service of God. This is a positive discipline and not a negative asceticism.²⁵⁴ For Philo's impatience with a superstitious asceticism is only exceeded by his denunciations of a selfish hedonism. The ascetic significance in Philo's thought has often been remarked. But it is not often traced to its true source. That source is the aesthetic appreciation of the powerful as distinct from the merely lovely. He sees God as the sweep of an invincible force. He regards life as a challenge to the utmost that man can give. He calls to a moral life of struggle and adventure and fierce joy in conquest over evil. He regards with disgust the weakness of sentimentalism. He argues that the good is afar off only for those who delay to do the good.²⁵⁵ It lies in the hands of the valiant. The goodness of God is only for those who love God. And to love God is a lifework of service to man and God. Philo would not call the appeal to courageous righteousness by the name of Beauty. It is nevertheless an aesthetic appeal which he presents. It makes of virtue an even greater duty than the Stoic envisaged. The Stoic had only his own soul to consider. Philo calls to a mission in which the desire to save one's own soul would be the first mark of unfitness the first weakness to be overcome. Philo is enamoured of the courage that dares to emulate God in the full knowledge that such a task is impossible. And he reminds his readers that God the Saviour will graciously assist in that task, not to assure them that the task is easy but to emphasize the wonder of God, the power of God by which the impossible is to be achieved. The statement that all things are possible to God is not a smug transfer of responsibility but a call to faith in endeavor.²⁵⁶

254 Fuga. 23-27.

255 Sac. 52-72.

256 Sp. L. I, 299-307.

Thus Philo sees life not in tragic terms but in terms of stern adventure. His is the aestheticism of the difficult quest. Let us then turn to the personal significance of goodness by which the term "holiness" is to be distinguished from "beauty" and "goodness".

Holiness

Creature man may appear formally perfect as something "beautiful to look upon" and yet lack the very substance which constitutes true manhood.²⁵⁷ For the substance of manliness lies in moral intent rather than in beautiful content, in a "hope" in God rather than in an achieved excellence. The first created man Adam, was "in truth both beautiful and good, καλός and ἀγαθός. (*Opif.* 136). He leaves Paradise²⁵⁸ not because he is ignorant of virtue but because he is powerless to grow in virtue. He was a composite creature, an "earthly" man inferior to that other man who is set in the "garden" of the virtues to "till" them and to "guard" them. This other man is superior to a formal perfection, a collocation of beauty and goodness in just the capacity to grow amid the virtues.²⁵⁹ Such growth is not a formal increase of virtue but a quality of personal life imparted to the virtues.

This quality is best described as "holiness". It represents a constancy of life. "And by the tree of life he signifies reverence toward God, the greatest of the virtues by means of which the soul attains to immortality". (*Opif.* 154). The God-loving disposition, grounds an immortality that may be likened both to a quest that outruns formal excellence and to a constancy by which the soul may ever "stand" close to the divine. (*Post.* 12-32). It is an existence by persistence, a permanence by continuous reconnection. (Cf. *Sp. L.* I 263-295).

257 Philo frequently argues that the various animals exceed man in strength, fleetness, keenness of sight, acuteness of hearing and the like. This is not unlike the Stoic theme of things that a man may boast of. E.g. *Post.* 160-161.

258 It is to be remembered that the Paradise represents both contemplative and practical virtue. Adam in the Paradise represents the contemplative mind, (πλᾶστος νοῦς) and may be exiled from the virtues unless he "guard" as well as "till" them. Adam in exile represents the merely theoretical virtue that may be present in οὐσία but not in δύναμις. But the mind that "guards" is qualified by God, ὃν ἐποίησε, and represents *memory, practice and apprehension* of virtue. L. A. I, 53-55; III, 246-247.

259 *Mut.* 15-26; *Cong.* 45-48; *Sobriet.* 51-69; L. A. III, 88-89.

The perfection peculiar to mankind lies not in a formal beauty by which the divine may "appear" in man. For in any case man must witness to the power of God. His creature life is a continuous testimony to the mercy of God. In this formal sense all men from the worst to the best are perfect object lessons. (Cf. *Sp. L.* I 313-314). And too all men have the capacity to "hope" in God so that an instinctive divinity unrealized and unfelt is not the peculiar glory of a perfect man.

The perfect man is he whose moral character represents a progressive growth. Human perfection is a constancy in vital progress. Man is immortal in the ethical sense. He is then living the divine life among men. He is personifying the virtues. He is "hallowing" the name of God. Such immortality as a personal quality cannot be described as continuous or discontinuous. The constancy of the immortal life in man is the consciousness of divine direction, a thing no less perfect in anticipation than in realization of its end. For as a God-consciousness it spans both means and ends. It is perfection as the capacity to improve without limit, which is to say with God the infinite as its limit. (*Som.* II 223-236).

The God-loving disposition is "holy" whether in Abel the symbol for its point of origin, or in Moses the symbol for mastery and transcendence of formal excellence, or again in Abraham the man of faith to whom it was granted both to "appear" good and to "be" good. Although Abel and Moses represent the widest disparity of formal achievement they are identical in the quality of "holiness". (*Sac.* 5-11, 56 sq.).

The constancy of life described by "holiness" and by faithfulness has its opposite in a variability represented by "self-love" the symbol for which is Cain. We do not have "life" and "death" as antinomies. We have "living" and "dying" as endless increase or failure to increase in the one quality of "life". Philo's expressive figure which contrasts a flowing fountain with a porous cistern can hardly be improved. (*Fuga.* 194-201). From the fountain there ever flows a living stream. But into the cistern there ever falls lifegiving water that seeps away in dispersive dissipations. This figure makes more suggestive the double play upon the "sending forth of death". Life increases as selfish passions are eliminated and life decreases as selfish passions multiply.

We have an upward or onward course contrasted with a lack of direction, a moral "life" which is a permanence in progress contrasted with a moral "death" which is a fitful "tossing" about. It is the "living" that defines the "dying" the steady advance that defines the aimless dalliance with life. (*Post.* 44-45, 69-74).

Becoming is therefore consequent upon Being and never an antecedent to Being. As a change in quantity it is merely formal. An original "inheritance" may be frittered away or may be entered upon for continuous enjoyment. Life may recede into a "forgetfulness" of its source interspersed with fitful "recollections" or it may retain a vivid "memory" of that source.²⁶⁰ It may fall into a "dream" fantasy fitfully asserting its claims. Or it may grow into a self-knowledge, a real experience of itself in relation to its source. Which is to say that life is a quality that may obtain as a thing "known" but unknowing or may become self-conscious. It may drift into an ignorance of its "heritage" or it may continue to be instructed in its divine destiny. (*Fuga.* 13-86). These two stages of life represent living as an animal on the plane of immediate sensation and living as a rational creature on the plane of progressive self-knowledge. Both stages of life are good but in different senses, they are good as a spectacle that instructs and good as an experience that reveals.

Summary

We may summarize the discussion of generic goodness as a vital experience in three propositions. God nourishes the living soul by providing for its affective faculties a beauty that will stimulate them into activity. God nourishes the living soul by providing for its rational faculty a goodness that will guide it beyond the realm of appearances. God nourishes the living soul by inviting that soul to imitate Him in its personal growth. Thus Beauty gives life to appearances, Goodness gives life to reason and Holiness gives life to the person who uses Beauty and Goodness as consecrated offerings to God.

Holiness as personal progress or improvement involves an all-

²⁶⁰ By *memory* a man may cling to what is necessary to his life, namely a "hope" in God. By *forgetting* he may allow his attention to be distracted by sensuous things or things of "opinion". By *recollection* he may return to himself by revisiting the promise of his tradition. See Mig. 205-225; Ebriet. 124-139.

or-none principle. It is a direction of change rather than a finished achievement. As Philo says, the good and the evil cannot dwell together. They are mutually exclusive. In terms of progress this is like saying that the soul never stands still but is either going forward or falling backward. Philo has various ways of applying this principle of mutual exclusion. And it is important to note how the principle applies to the moral purity of the soul. Let us turn to this aspect of purity.

CHAPTER XI

MORAL PURITY

Coordinate and Alternate Opposites

Under the figure of "nakedness", Philo describes three senses in which purity or innocence may be taken. (*L. A.* II 53-70; *Ebriet.* 4-10). These indicate the rôle of choice as a condition of the presence of virtue or vice.

There is an innocence which is an ignorance of opposites, an innocence which is a guileless and simple habit of conduct and an innocence of truth which lays bare all opposites.

Now Philo says that virtue and vice spring from the mutually exclusive principles of pleasure and pain. They are not logical opposites but temporal alternatives. A knowledge of one does not involve an ignorance of the other but the presence of one does involve the absence of the other. (*Sac.* 134-139).

It is to be observed that Philo does not identify virtue with pleasure and vice with pain nor vice versa. Nor is a judicious combination of the two possible as in an aesthetic morality. It is the principle of mutual exclusion which centers his thought. And he makes this principle temporal and psychological rather than rationalistic. It is a principle of all-or-none choice. There is a "sense" which can discriminate between virtue and vice like the "sense" which can recognize pleasure and pain as these are presented alternately.

The Moral Faculty

Such a "sense" of discrimination must involve the power to choose without requiring the presence of alternatives, for the alternatives it reviews cannot coexist. Now the point of Philo's illustration is that ignorance of good or evil, like ignoring pleasure or pain, is a state of the will rather than a matter of information: The faculty of moral discrimination is will as a primary "sense" or responsiveness. But unlike the Stoic principle of will it cannot retreat within itself. It cannot be made "drunk" by enthusiasm

nor insensible by rejecting knowledge. It cannot pose alternatives. It can only choose between those presented to it. It is a freedom of choice, never a freedom from choice. Philo likes to say this in scriptural terms.²⁶¹ God presents to the soul the alternatives of good and evil. They are mutually exclusive like life and death. God bids the soul choose and from that command to choose the soul can never escape.

Even in its ignorance the soul may choose whether that ignorance shall be good or evil, an innocent deficiency of skill, ἀνεπιστημοσύνη or a stubborn rejection of instruction, ἀπαίδευσις. It is from this latter willful ignorance says Philo, that all the errors of the soul arise.

Original Ignorance

Philo can not be said to hold a doctrine of original sin, a doctrine of necessary moral delinquency as the original state of the soul. His view might be described as a doctrine of original ignorance, an educable conscience as pure in its origin as in its most highly developed enlightenment. It is the purity of this conscience that Philo describes under the figure of "nakedness". Perhaps we can summarize this allegory in the following manner.

The soul that disinterestedly rejects all "bodily" or selfish considerations for the "love of God" may be said to be "pure" in the sense of an established state of virtue.

The soul that involuntarily falls into sensuality or even harbors evil thoughts without committing them to overt deeds may not be said to be "impure" for the knowledge of opposites need not involve the presence of the things they represent. So long as an evil intention is not present in overt deed, its opposite good intention cannot be said to be absent in overt deed.

The soul confronted for the first time with sensuous and non-sensuous alternatives, things of the senses and things of the mind, such a soul cannot be said to be "impure" for it then represents that innocence which is an ignorance of opposites.

²⁶¹ Deut. 30, 11-20; Deut. 50; Fuga. 58; Post. 12, 69; Cong. 134; Post. 85; Mut. 237; Som. II, 180; Virt. 183; Praem. 80.

The Moral Will a Purpose

This last proposition rests upon Philo's dictum that it is God who initiates the activity of the human mind by presenting to it the alternatives between which it must choose. Thus when the things of "sense" and the things of "mind" are not presented as alternatives the will of man cannot be said to act. It is then innocent in the way in which a child is innocent. It is ignorant of opposites and cannot express preferences. It is innocent as a man who is about to choose must await the presentation of things in a form that makes choice possible. Philo makes a distinction between the alternatives presented in inner and outer experience. But they are both offered to the conscience by God as the opportunity for the mind to act and for the will to declare its moral quality. Thus moral purity involves three stages of will as a continuity of activity. In the first stage it is a patient waiting for God to present alternatives. In the second stage it is a choice of the unselfish end. In the third stage it is the performance of the unselfish deed for the sake of God and not for the sake of consequences. It may never be said to be a thing which has a purpose of its own. It must rather be said to be a purpose consecrated to God.

PART III
TELEOLOGY

CHAPTER XII

GREEK AND HEBREW EUDAEMONISM

The Platonic Source

Many expressions of Philo's teleological doctrine at once remind the reader of Plato. The cosmological setting of the thought seems to point to the *Timaeus* as a source. Brehier¹ has collected a number of parallels with that work and Billings has indicated similar parallels with other writings of Plato where the theme of creative goodness finds expression. There are, however, certain significant figures by which Philo treats teleology which not only are peculiarly Jewish but offer distinct advantages for a criticism of the doctrine. Notable among such figures are God's Oath, and the Covenant. Traditionalism has its teleological aspects no less than rationalism.

It may be suggested that there is very little in the teleological idea itself that could have been novel to a philosophical Jew like Philo. Judaism was permeated with teleology as the fecundity of messianic ideas must indicate. One may well believe that the discovery of eudaemonism in Plato formed no small part of the basis for the claim that Plato borrowed from Moses. In the case of Philo's teleology one may go still farther. One may remark the absence of a Satan and a Fate in Philo's scheme of things. One may note the distinction between the moral and the epistemological rôles of sense "appearances".² These are signs that a formal teleology has been broadened to include elements of experience to which Platonism would give scant place in the realm of mind. Philo's teleology is not based upon a division of labor imposed from without but upon a direction of will operating from within. In Philo it would seem that a theory of limits has replaced a theory of form. Philo may be more plausibly understood as exploiting the prestige and clarity of expression of Plato than of coming as a stranger to the essential eudaemonistic thought of the Greek

¹ Op. cit., p. 78.

² L. A. II, 71-93, III, 184-185.

Master. And too the Pythagoreans and the Stoics are levied upon to support what is essentially a Jewish faith, namely the sense of a Mission.

Immanent Purpose

Philo never tires of reiterating that God is the Source and Author of all good things and that He is not circumscribed but surrounds and limits all things. But Philo does not separate First Cause from Final Cause by interposing a temporal process between the inception and the realization of a purpose. He rather distinguishes a transcendent from an immanent goodness. The good is not far off but in the heart and hand and language of man.³ This immanence of the good indicates that purpose is to be regarded as a function of the will rather than the denouement of a rational process or of temporal order.⁴ Motives are with men and rewards with God but these rewards are like opportunities to begin and to enrich a life rather than like things that come at the close of life. The ideal is a thing of experience. It is like a thankoffering or like a life set apart to an "Olympian contest", a votive work of art in praise of the Deity.⁵ Such things are tokens that acknowledge an answered prayer. For dedication is not a giving of what one possesses but an acknowledgment that what one appears to possess belongs in reality to another.⁶ By a daring faith God Himself may be regarded as an "inheritance" in the sense that He may be emulated by a consecrated will.⁷ Such an inheritance is a program of action, a working upon one's own life as an artist would work in marble. It is a dramatized prayer. Its aim is neither righteousness nor glorious character. These are its byproducts. Its aim is to "witness" for God.

Philo, like the Stoics, insists that a right motive must accom-

3 Mut. 220 sq.

4 Virtue or vice as a state or condition, *σχέσις*, is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy. For there must be opportunity, *καιρός*, for expression before praise or blame can be assigned. Philo makes virtue sacramental rather than intrinsic or extrinsic. His Jewish view of righteousness includes the Cynic emphasis on practice and skill, (Diog. Laert. VI, 70-71) and the Stoic view of sincere reasoning. It stands in contrast with the Posidonian view in which intellect and "health" are self sufficient and virtue not self sufficient. (Diog. Laert. VII, 127-128; 103). Sobriet. 1-50; Mig. 126.

5 Plant. 28-141; Som. I, 231-256.

6 Deut. 5-15; Som. I, 92-119.

7 Plant. 70-72; Sac. 65-75; Decal. 69-75; Cong. 131-138.

pany a right action.⁸ But with Philo this is not a rationalism that acts only on principle. Nor does he substitute faith for reason. The key to his thought on justifying purpose or final cause lies in the association of the idea of dedication with the idea of opportunity.⁹ The text for this thought is "for whose sake thou hast done this thing". And under this text Philo distinguishes the eudaemonism of coveted happiness from the blessedness of a dedicated life.¹⁰ Philo can conceive of no happier state than a life thoroughly dedicated to God and such happiness may begin whenever the will becomes a God-loving disposition. It is then and only then that it becomes a final cause, a "first-born",¹¹ a thing "older" in point of excellence though it may appear "younger" in point of time.¹² For the "first-born" is peculiarly dedicated to God. It is an inner virtue which Philo likens to an anchorage.¹³ It is secured by the Oath of God. It is that inner condition of the soul by which life becomes ordered, harmonious and peaceful so that clear reasoning can begin.

Peace

Perhaps we can suggest the manner in which Philo brings together the Jewish conception of dedication and the Greek conception of the ideal as a final cause if we call attention to the meaning of "rest" and "peace" which Philo brings over from the Hebrew.¹⁴ "Rest" does not indicate release from labor but from

8 S. V. F. III, 516, 517.

9 Mut. 264-766; Post. 171 sq.; cf. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 142 εὐταξία, εὐκαιρία and *opportunitas*. Philo pushes the Stoic view that reason is an *opportunitas* for orderly conduct one step beyond ethics by grounding that opportunity in the covenant secured by the Oath of God rather than by natural reason. Cf. Mig. 7-20; 126 sq.

10 L. A. III, 209-219.

11 Sac. 72 sq.; Conf. 124; Som. II, 71-77; Sp. L. I, 247-250, (self dedication) Sac. 134, (continued reconsecration), Som. I, 202, sq. (the disposition to see the world as a harmony) cf. φύραμα and συμφόρημα, Sac. 107-111.

12 Philo frequently distinguishes χρόνω μὲν πρεσβύτερος from δυνάμει δὲ νεώτερος, e. g. Mig. 205. Potentiality is viewed as a value significance rather than a temporal condition. For a parallel with Plato on the passion of youth and the wisdom of age see Philo, Sac. 15 sq.; Sobriet. 7-30; Plato, Rep. I 329.

13 Sac. 88-90; cf. Som. II, 221-260, (peace).

14 See Journal of Biblical Literature, vol. L, part III, 1931, p. 207. Philo says, εἰ μὲντοι καὶ τὸ φάναι "κατέπαυσεν" οὐχὶ "ἐπαύσατο". L. A. I, 6.

trouble and the attacks of enemies. It is a condition that follows confusion and strife and in which orderly pursuits are enjoyed with a calm unworried mind. This meaning of "rest" was associated with the primitive myth of a god that "rests from his anger" when his wrath is appeased by the sweet savour of sacrifices. The god and his subjects have become reconciled by the mediation of accepted sacrifices. It is some such pattern of ideas which Philo applies to the problem of creation both in its cosmological aspects and in the problem of the regeneration of man's soul.¹⁵ The same God who brought order out of chaos so that the world might be a harmony expressive of His will, that same God brings peace to the soul of the dedicated man¹⁶ so that in witnessing for God there may come order and harmony in his life and thought.¹⁷ The same significance is attached to the Sabbath, a "day" or time that both celebrates the "birthday" of the world¹⁸ and affords the opportunity for worshipful philosophizing by which the life of man becomes tranquil and whole. There is established both in the world and in the soul of man an inner principle which like a sacrifice, a dedicated will, reconciles to order and tranquillity the creative deeds of God and the creative endeavors of man. Dedication provides the opportunity for order as purpose provides the point of orientation for reason. Philo would substitute the principle of a dedicated will for the *summum bonum* principle by which Greek rationalism sought to define the good.¹⁹ Philo's principle of dedication places the order bringing purpose within the God-loving disposition of man.²⁰ The *summum bonum* principle placed such a purpose above and beyond man as the aim for his reasoning. The one is purpose as a principle of cause, that which initiates order. The other is purpose as a principle of explanation, that which justifies order. The one is an opportunity for

15 Cong. 114-120. Here Philo associates the figure of the sacrifice with the Decalogue. This would seem to bring together the Semitic idea of the appeasing sacrifice, the Pythagorean ideas of the Decade and the Stoic ideas of moral reason.

16 Post. 183-185; Ebriet. 74-76.

17 L. A. I, 16-18; Decal. 178; Cherub. 87-90; Gig. 51-52; V. M. I, 304.

18 Post. 63-65.

19 Cong. 5-10; Abr. 27-47; Post. 69-72.

20 Som. II, 250-267; Mig. 126, sq. *ἐνκαρπία*.

right action the other a reward for clear thinking.²¹ Philo associates the "first-born" as a dedicated life, a redeeming activity, an inspired faith with a conception of purpose that is an ever present "saving" activity rather than some far off event, some glorious goal to which all things tend. We need therefore to recognize in Philo's teleology a distinction between purpose as a principle of explanation and purpose as a principle of opportunity. For he uses both principles.

21 Philo distinguishes the primary good of dedicated wisdom from the secondary good of secular learning in a number of ways. Thus Moses the prophetic mind is better than Aaron, his mouthpiece or Bezaleel his craftsman. Abram the man of "heavenly" learning must have his "name" changed to Abraham the man of faith. (Mig. 164-175; Mut. 83-96; Heres. 96-99). Similarly the name of Hagar signifies a *secular learning* that is requisite for preparation but inferior to *moral wisdom*, Sarah, the generic virtue or enlightened *conscience*. (Cherub. 3-10; Cong. 5 sq.). The story of Penelope and her suitors had been allegorized in somewhat similar fashion as early as Aristippus. (Diog. Laert. II 79). For Philo moral wisdom and religious dedication are one. Philo's distinctions between two "ways" parallel distinctions that in Philosophy go back at least as far as Parmenides, and in religion as far back as the "greater" and "lesser mysteries" of Hellenism. Philo's use of the distinction is apparently an adaptation of the ceremonial and the written Law to the double interest of moral practice and intellectual enlightenment. He unites them in the *fear* and the *love* of God. Som. I, 160-165.

CHAPTER XIII

TRADITIONAL AND RATIONAL TELEOLOGY

There are two types of teleology which may be conveniently distinguished as a teleology of traditionalism and a teleology of rationalism. Both types may be developed until they reach certain agreements with each other although these agreements are reached from opposite points of view. In the first case there is an emphasis upon the authority of some divine event in the past while in the second case there is an emphasis upon the inevitability of some divine event in the future. To be sure, past and future may become so overlaid with significances that have little to do with temporal distance that they come to represent two quite different insights into the nature of teleology rather than representing events that depend upon time. And it lies in the nature of these two different insights that different accounts of the origin and use of reason and different sanctions for constructive and interpretive endeavor should characterize the respective teleological doctrines that are developed. We have first to observe how retrospective and prospective aspects of thought are related in the rationalization of teleology.

By retrospection a present condition is explained as an *ad quem* by tracing backward over events that appear or are supposed to lead up to that *ad quem*. Each event is regarded as a reason for it following event and the whole series a rational order that explains the present condition.

Now if the series thus formulated is to be regarded as a program of action rather than a rational explanation we no longer regard the *ad quem* as a present condition to be explained but rather by placing the present with an *a quo* conceived as an activity we regard that activity as directed toward an *ad quem* to be realized in the implied future.

Thus we may regard a teleological series of events as a rational order when that series is read from *ad quem* to *a quo* and satisfies the interests of explanation. And we may regard such a series as a program of action when that series is read from *a quo* to *ad quem* and satisfies the interests of purposive activity. The direction

taken is declared either deliberately or tacitly by regarding a present condition either as something to be explained or as an opportunity for enacting a purposive program. The interest in explanation and the interest in practice will constitute *a priori* principles for two different types of teleology.

Perhaps we can distinguish the teleology of traditionalism from the teleology of rationalism by comparing the functions that each assigns to the present condition whether deliberately or tacitly. Traditionalism with its emphasis upon the retrospective view assumes an immanent purpose in the present state of affairs and seeks to explain that purpose by pressing backward toward the First Cause which having acted in the past may provide the explanation of the present. This requires that the *ad quem* be taken on faith until the retrospective view shall have led to an intuition of the First Cause. But traditionalism insists that in the meantime the things handed down from the past even though unexplained constitute a program of action for the present. And the enactment of such a program in the present constitutes a dramatization of the immanent purpose whether that purpose is explained or not. The authority for that program of action lies in some event in the past rather than in some known purpose for the future. A faith in the Efficient Cause is more important than a knowledge of the Final Cause. Thus the teleology of traditionalism becomes more significantly a doctrine of the Efficient Cause as active in the present than of Final Cause as known in the present. The rationalization of this teleology depends upon an intuition of the First Cause which can justify a faith in the Final Cause.

Now the teleology of rationalism with its emphasis upon the prospective view assumes a transcendent purpose for the present state of affairs and seeks to explain that purpose by pressing forward toward the Final Cause which like some far off divine event may provide the explanation of present trends. This is equivalent to casting doubt upon the *a quo* until the prospective view shall have led to an intuition of the Final Cause. But rationalistic teleology insists that in the meantime the things that are present even though only potentially real constitute a formal explanation. And the study of that form in the present constitutes a procedure by which the transcendent purpose may be known even before it has acted as a cause. The authority for that formal procedure lies

in some event in the future rather than in some known cause acting in the present. A knowledge of the Final Cause is more important than a faith in the Efficient Cause. Thus the teleology of rationalism becomes more significantly a doctrine of the Final Cause as known than of the First Cause as active. The rationalization of this teleology depends upon an intuition of the Final Cause which can justify the activity of the First Cause.

It may be observed that the teleology of traditionalism provides a program of action the rationality of which is based upon an intuition of the First Cause as an unexplained activity which nevertheless explains events. And the teleology of rationalism provides a formal plan the rationality of which is based upon an intuition of an unrealized purpose which nevertheless causes events. Traditionalism assumes an immanent purpose which may first be dramatized and then known. Rationalism assumes a transcendent purpose which may first be known and then dramatized.

To reconcile our two types of teleology we must forego all attempt to distinguish the *a quo* from the *ad quem* by temporal alternation. We can agree that a teleological series is composed of both causal sequences and rational implications by agreeing that the beginning and end of the series unite in one Cause that both constructs and explains the series. But even after such a reconciliation the traces of traditionalism and rationalism will remain according as a greater confidence is placed in the intuition of active cause or in the intuition of justifying purpose. We wish to indicate the manner in which Philo's teleology retains the marks of traditionalism despite the fact that it has become reconciled with the other type of teleology in some respects.²² Such marks of traditionalism are the immanence of a justifying purpose or motive which may be dramatized before it is explained, the insistence that the Cause may be known more significantly as active than as a completed denouement and the higher regard for the interpretive reason of retrospection than the constructive reason of prospective vision.

22 Philo identifies eternity, (αἰών) with the benevolent power of God and time, (χρόνος) with the regulative sovereignty of God. These are two "equal" powers through which God functions. These two powers are "divided" or as we would say related, by Logos Tomeus. Heres. 165-167.

Time and Its Analogues

To interpret our teleological series we shall need three analogues for present time, the one representing the *a quo*, the other the *ad quem* and the third, that which relates the *a quo* to the *ad quem*. Philo suggests three such analogues or modes of time as attributes of God.²³ Under the name Everlasting God we are to understand that God pours forth benefits unceasingly and also stands as the Eternal One in a value significance. Here then is the *ad quem* which provides the fruits of labor. Under the name of *Chronos* we have time as a regulative order. This is not God Himself in the sense of Fate but rather a display of the powers of God as the Efficient Cause. Here then is our *a quo*. For our third analogue we have God as Opportunity to provide an ever present *whenever* to signify that He has provided a Law as the way of happiness always open to him who would take that way. Now Eternity as a value significance and time as a definitive order were common enough ideas in philosophy before Philo.²⁴ But the notion of *Opportunity* suggests the exploitation of certain ideas from Judaism. For in Judaism the notion of an accepted time, an appointed time, a great day, a fitting point for beginning significant undertakings, provides a far more flexible conception of beginning than similar notions among the Greeks. It describes a pregnant *now*

23 αἰών, Plant. 89; καιρός, Mut. 264-266; δημιουργός δὲ καὶ χρόνου Θεός, Deus. 30.

24 Philo reflects various accounts of time given by the schools:

(1) Plato's account as astronomic intervals, Tim. 36 B, 39 B, Philo, Opif. 60; L. A. I, 2.

(2) The Peripatetic view of, (a) counting, (b) continuity. (See Zeller, Aristotle and E. P. vol. II, p. 46); Philo, Opif. 60; L. A. I, 3, III, 25; Fuga. 57.

(3) The Epicurean notion of accidents, (συμπτώματα) relative to states of motion, rest and feeling. Diog. Laert. X, 72-73. Philo, Opif. 34-35; Sac. 64-72.

(4) The Stoic view of the relativity of moving bodies. Diog. Laert. VII, 141, Philo, Sac. 67-68.

These various accounts both overlap and present inconsistent ideas. Without apparent attempt at reconciliation, Philo nevertheless (1) denies the inaccessibility of "eternal" values, (2) the fatalistic implications of regulative order. By making goodness and sovereignty two modes of God's will, Philo holds that the cosmos is a law of "opportunity" by which man may learn the will of God through discipline and enlightenment. Thus "opportunity" represents both an attitude and a sanction by which disciplinary or instrumental values and goodness or intrinsic values are both related to a common Cause. Qu. in Gen. I, 100, ed. Aucher.; Post. 122; Mut. 265; Deus. 143.

as the opportunity for a creative activity. (*Sac.* 52-71; *Opif.* 59).

Let us indicate the features of Philo's teleology by drawing up several propositions which his treatment seems to suggest. These propositions concern the nature of the good, the nature of cause and the nature of reason. (1) When the good is something to be explained it must be regarded as an immanent purpose. (2) When the good is something to be enacted it must be regarded as conduct dedicated to God. (3) As the Efficient Cause²⁵ God may be directly known by an intuition of the active principle that explains the results produced. (4) As the Final Cause God may be emulated but never known directly in the sense of knowing what His purpose is. The intellectual aspect of emulation is faith rather than knowledge. (5) Reason as the interpreter of events must be grounded in the intuition of God as the Active Cause. (6) Reason as a program of action must be guided by a sense of God's Presence to bless the cumulative achievements of that activity. Let us take up these propositions in their order and observe their mutual relations as a teleological doctrine in Philo's discussions.

²⁵ Philo comments upon the fourfold analysis of cause as made by Aristotle. (*Cherub.* 125-130; *Qu. in Gen.* I, 58, ed. Aucher.; *De Providentia*). But Philo deprives the material and the instrumental causes of final significance and views the matter from the point of view of a theory of limits or a number series.

CHAPTER XIV

CREATIVE GOODNESS

Knowledge of the Good Versus Faith in Providence

Philo parallels Plato when he says that it was by His goodness that God created the world.²⁶ But this statement can mean two quite different things. It can mean that because the world is good its Creator must be good or it can mean that because God is good the world He created must be good. The difference lies in whether we are accounting for the goodness of the world or the goodness of God. One account may do little more than posit a Great Artificer while the other may be an expression of gratitude and faith in Providence. This difference is obscured by speaking of the goodness of the Giver and the goodness of His gift as but one thing, namely a benevolent purpose in giving. A goodness immanent in the gift that can be experienced even without a final knowledge of the Giver and His purpose is confused with a transcendent goodness that can only be experienced when the Giver and His purpose are known.

Now Philo makes it clear that for him goodness is more significantly immanent than transcendent.²⁷ And he draws this doctrine from the Jewish conception of the Covenant and not from Stoic ideas of immanence. He holds that goodness is inherent in a practice that can be performed even before its perfect virtue is experienced as an object of knowledge. He says that it is impossible both to arrive at a goal and to apprehend that one has arrived.²⁸ For between the arrival and the knowledge of arrival there lies an "ignorance" that is not unlike a "knowledge". This would seem to mean that truth is immanent in practice as a sort of wisdom that is not contemplative. Man knows by doing and

²⁶ Plato, Tim. 29, E; 30, A; 42 D, E; Rep. 379, B, C; 380, C; 617 E; Philo, Plant. 53; Deus. 108; L. A. III, 73; Conf. 179; Agri. 129 sq.; Fuga. 79-80.

²⁷ Mut. 224 fin.; Ebreit. 4-13; Plant. 43-45; Det. 122; Som. II, 172-180; Fuga. 56-82; Deus. 45-50; Post. 69-72; 12; Virt. 183-186; Praem. 79-84; Sp. L. I, 229-307; Sobriet. 51-69.

²⁸ Agri. 159-164; Sac. 37-41; cf. Mig. 117-147.

therefore the wise man is one whose "mind" is "plastic", a function of knowledge rather than a form of knowledge. Being keenly aware of his own ignorance²⁹ he defers claims to certainty until practical experience reveals the immanent truth. What he cannot claim for himself he can reveal to others by his practice,³⁰ namely the immanence of the good which others contemplate in him as an object of knowledge. Philo's view would mean that a man reveals to others what he cannot see in himself. For he must disclaim private opinion and foreknowledge of consequences if his conduct is to reveal that purity of faith and humility of mind which is an integral element of the good.³¹ This view would be a contradiction in terms for Greek idealism. For there the good is regarded as an object of knowledge and to arrive at that object without knowledge of it would be futile.

Philo develops his theme of a good that is immanent in practice and hence a sort of ingenuous wisdom by elaborately distinguishing a "husbandman" from a "tiller of the soil", a "shepherd" from a "keeper of sheep" and a "horseman" from a "rider".³² The one point of the three figures is that expertness whether in the field of natural science, the field of sense experience or the field of motives, "passions", cannot be gained by devotion to particularistic or "selfish" ends or ideals for these several fields. Expertness can only be achieved when labor in these several fields is a disinterested

29 Plant. 79-84.

30 V. M. I, 155-162; Som. I, 52-60; The modesty of Socrates is compared with the faith of Abraham.

31 Sac. 52-72.

32 Agri. 1-125; L. A. II, 94-108; Philo develops a midrash on Exod. 15, 1 and Gen. 49, 16-18, that is suggestive of the allegory of the chariot in Plato's *Phaedrus*. But Philo's midrash is quite different in meaning from Plato's allegory of the soul. For Philo the passions are impetuous and irrational, being condemned entirely rather than being good and bad. The "rider" is overthrown and perishes. The "horseman" "falls backward" and is thus rid of runaway passions, (horses) to await the "salvation of the Lord". The meaning of the midrash is precisely opposite to the meaning of the allegory. The midrash teaches that the soul can escape the impetuosity of passions by a faithful "waiting" on God. The allegory teaches that aesthetic vision is a passion that leads reason to glorious heights. In L. A. I, 72-76, Philo seems to parallel the Platonic allegory without mentioning the "horses". It is to be noted that he gives a practical emphasis to *φρόνησις*, and in 67 unites both its form and its function in man by reference to God.

service of God.³³ The good like the object of knowledge develops and enlarges with practice so that the more expert a man the more conscious he is of his ignorance and the more good he is the more conscious he is of his shortcomings. The very limitlessness of the good and of knowledge is guaranteed by the fact that it is immanent in practice rather than determined by practice. It offers the opportunity for practice rather than constricting practice.³⁴ This is merely an abstract statement of the attitude in which the Jews would have the Law observed.³⁵

Philo apparently develops this line of thought as a philosophical elaboration of the passage in Deuteronomy (XXX:11-20) where the Covenant is established between God and His people. The statement that God presents to man good and evil, life and death and bids them choose offers to Philo a text about which he gathers current ideas concerning the alternatives of good and evil and of rational choice. For Philo like the Stoics good and evil lie in the choice making faculty of man. But it is not his judgment, his knowledge or his own natural reason that represents the immanent good. It is his privilege of declaring loyalties by his practical choices that represents the immanent good. And the authority for ascribing such freedom to man lies in the text that represents God as conferring that privilege by an Oath.

In commenting upon the argument from design³⁶ Philo uses the figure of one "open treasury" of good things and many "closed treasuries" of evil things. The figure seems to indicate several things. God is quick to reward and slow to punish. He bestows a minimum of blessing upon the unjust as well as the just by providing the natural conditions of life for all creatures.³⁷ But what

33 Philo classifies the good as pertaining to the external world, the body and the soul as Aristotle and the Stoics had done. Det. 3-12; cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. I, 1098, B; Politics, 1323, sq.; S. V. F. III, 136. But Philo makes each a necessary part of the good and the harmony of them a moral "beauty" conditioned upon the voluntary dedication of them to the service of God. Thus moral beauty is not self-sufficient in the same sense as with the Stoics. Cf. Post. 133 sq.

34 Sac. 85-87.

35 Agri. 49-53; Sp. L. IV, 137-141.

36 L. A. III, 95, sq.

37 L. A. I, 33-42: It is to be noted here that Philo distinguishes the Stoic *πνεῦμα* from the life of man that has not yet been developed by training. *πνοή* is the "breath of life" that God breathes into the "mind". This is common to all men. It is only the man who practices virtue that gains the robust strength of reason, *πνεῦμα*. Cf. Det. 80-90.

Philo is particularly concerned to point out is that the goodness of the world lies neither in the pleasures or pains that constitute the natural conditions of life but in the providential arrangement by which God creates the world as a system of rewards and punishments.³⁸ The goodness of the world lies in the educative value of natural experience by which men are trained to virtue, the "tree of life". (*L. A.* III 107 sq.). The "treasury of good things" is always open but the many "treasuries of evil things" are "closed in the day of vengeance". The disasters that attend a natural experience are not visitations of the wrath of God but instructive experiences that make men pause and reconsider their ways before God. Such disasters cannot disturb those who have faith in the benevolence of God. For them the blessing of God is an ever "open treasury". The goodness of God is not to be inferred from some merely pleasant experience of this world nor is it to be vitiated by unpleasant experience of this world. It is rather that the world presents a series of object lessons which teach men what to seek and what to avoid. By faith and gratitude the world may be viewed as a providential arrangement behind which the benevolence of God forever operates. The world is thus explained as good in an educative sense but the infinite goodness of God is acknowledged rather than explained.

The Continuity of Ends

Now this conception of providential arrangement is far from pagan ideas of Fate and Fortune. It is a principle of teleological causation. And it is intimately bound up with Philo's conception of creation by stages. God does not construct a plan and then retire to watch it operate like the wheel of fate. He is forever creating. His most recent work marks the highest point to which the good has attained. To say that it is by His goodness that God creates is to describe an experience which marks a point at which God creates and man experiences an insight into the fundamental "justice" of the world. This is the experience typified by Noah who first came to see the rationality of the world.³⁹ God creates the world as good by illuminating man's mind so that man can understand that goodness. There is a distinction between the

³⁸ Det. 109-118.

³⁹ Det. 120-123; Deus. 86-126; Abr. 27-59.

justifying end as a theoretical goodness and the justifying end as a practical experience.

"So at last all things stood together at once (as one). But standing thus together some sort of ranking was necessarily laid down for them for the sake of the production of them from one another, soon to take place. Now among things produced in part the principle of ranking is this, to begin with the inferior and to end with the most excellent of all". (*Opif.* 22).

All the things which God creates are like perfect ends each with its own function to perform and each perfectly designed to perform that function. Each such end is related directly to the goodness of God. But among themselves these ends do not stand as discrete values but rather form a continuum which constitutes a program of action. It is in the detailing of these ends as features of a program that creation consists. We do not have a time order within which ends are ranked. We have a ranking of excellences which makes manifest a time order. Philo says this when he describes time as a "grandson" to God.⁴⁰ The world made its own "motion" the creation of time. This conception of time is associated with the Platonic idea of time as the intervals of astronomic movements. But Philo allegorizes astronomical phenomena in accordance with his view of creation by stages. The result is a principle of teleological causation in which a progression of excellences unfolds a growth in achievement. God is not afar off as the goal to be reached. He is rather at the point of present achievement to create by establishing the value of that achievement and to regulate its manifestation at just the proper stage where it belongs. Thus the end is always present rather than future, but present as an activity moving on to exhibit yet higher stages of excellence. God is always present not merely as good but as "better". His works trail out behind Him as stages of excellence whereby the approach to Him is made easy as "one would ascend a flight of stairs".⁴¹ The good is not contemplated by a prospective vision. It is God that is thus contemplated. The good is contemplated by a retrospective view of the stages that lead up to the present and it may be enacted by adopting those stages as a

⁴⁰ Deus. 30.

⁴¹ Post. 112-130 sq.; cf. Plato. *Cratylus*, 211 C; Det. 112-118.

program of action. It is always what God has created that reveals the good and not what He will create in the future. The future is taken on faith that God will remain true to the promise revealed in the past.

"For God gives to the soul a sign, a most beautiful gift, to show that he has ordered all essences which were previously devoid of order and has stamped with a particular character that which previously had no character and has qualified that which was without quality and having perfected the entire world, He has impressed upon it an image and a purpose namely His own Word". (*Som.* II 45).

The Educative Good

Perhaps a negative statement of the principle of creative goodness will sharpen its meaning.

"For it is not as Ruler and Governor employing the absolute power of sovereignty that He destroys the body, but in the exercise of goodness and kindness. For 'God' is the name of the goodness pertaining to the First Cause, and it is used that thou mayest know that He hath made the inanimate things also not by exercising authority but goodness, even as by goodness He hath made the living creatures. For it was necessary with a view to the clear manifestation of the superior beings that there should be in existence an inferior creation also due to the same power, even the goodness of the First Cause. And that goodness is God. When, then, O Soul, wilt thou in fullest measure realize thyself to be a corpse-bearer? Will it not be when thou art perfected, and accounted worthy of prizes and crowns? For then thou shalt be no lover of the body, but a lover of God".⁴²

This passage distinguishes Philo's position from the ethical dualism that pervaded first century thought. The things of the body are instrumental goods created by God.⁴³ It is only when they are regarded as ends in themselves that they become evil. And then it is not the body but the love of the body that is evil.⁴⁴ The body provides a useful lower stage by which higher stages of excellence may be made manifest. It is given as an *a quo* from

42 L. A. III, 73; cf. L. A. I, 95-96.

43 Cf. Cicero, *De Finibus*, Bk. IV, ch. 14.

44 *Deus.* 140-144 sq.

which man may rise to higher things. And when a man has thus risen he becomes a lover of God and may look back upon the things of the body to observe how good God has been to provide a world in which even the inferior and inanimate things have their appropriate uses. The body is thus "destroyed" as an end in itself whenever a man comes to see that the love of God is to be cultivated rather than a love of God's inferior gifts. The lover of the body is also "destroyed". God does not punish such a man in wrath. He withholds the act of creative goodness by which that man might come into being on a higher stage of excellence than the body. The man is like a body without a soul, until such time as he becomes a lover of God. He cannot quite know that he is a "corpse-bearer" until he has risen sufficiently above the body to realize that it is good only as a lower stage. Not only does God's goodness create ascending excellences but that act of creation reveals things as instruments of a progressive revelation rather than arbitrary acts of power.⁴⁵

Thus a man may explain the good to himself by contemplating God's creative care in providing the stages of excellence through which progress has already been made. But when the good is to be enacted a man must no longer contemplate the lower stages as sufficient. He must by a "love of God" press forward along the path that was marked out by his retrospective view.

"Therefore every wise man, who is not so much man as actual intellect, walks backward, that is to say, he sees what is behind him or future, as if it were placed in brilliant light; and seeing everything on all sides of him with a perfect sight, and looking all around him, he is found to be armed, and protected and fortified, so that no part of his soul is ever found naked or in unseemly plight, on account of any accidents which occur unfortunately." (*Qu. in Gen. II 72*).

This "light" which guides is the love of God and it provides a stimulus, a joy and a sense of direction in the quest of God.

"With the lovers of God, then, in their quest of the Existent One, even if they never find Him, we rejoice, for the quest of the Good and Beautiful even if the goal be missed, is sufficient of itself to give a foretaste of gladness. But the self-loving Cain we commiserate, for he has left his own soul bereft of any conception of

45 Mig. 7-30.

the Existent One, naving deliberately blinded the organ by which, alone, he could have seen Him." (*Post.* 21).

The lover of God need not await a far off divine event for he carries in his dedicated soul the immanent goodness that both guides and blesses his quest of God.⁴⁶

It may be observed that Philo's doctrine of creative goodness differs from Platonism as a mission pursued with courageous faith differs from utopian aspiration.⁴⁷ It differs from the Stoic conception of Providence as transformation differs from preformation. It differs from pagan regeneration mysteries as the adventurous quest of God differs from an identification with God. By creative goodness the creature is not transformed into the Creator but takes one step nearer to the Creator. The ideal is forever being realized as happiness in the pursuit of God and forever providing an enlarged program of action for higher achievements in that quest. God is forever providing precisely what is needed to transform a good stage into a better stage. He cares for and benefits His creatures by measuring out goodness according to the capacity to receive.

Creation Implies the New

By faith and reason and a love of God man may so conduct himself as to be ever on the threshold of fresh discoveries of the goodness of God. He undertakes a pilgrimage marked out by the hand of God and led by the presence of God. This metaphor of the pilgrimage and the quest provides a fundamental pattern of thought for Philo's teleology. And this pattern of thought dominates the Platonic metaphor of the Great Artificer and the Stoic conception of an all-permeating spirit. God does not first create and then operate a world like a Great Mechanician. God is forever leading into new and transforming experiences. He never ceases to create.

"For God never leaves off making, but even as it is the property of fire to burn and of snow to chill so it is the property of God to create, nay more so by far, inasmuch as He is to all besides the source of action", (*L. A.* I 5) "but we have pointed out that God

⁴⁶ *Opif.* 144.

⁴⁷ *Laws*, 739.

when ceasing or rather causing to cease, does not cease creating, but begins the creating of other things since He is not a mere artificer, but also Father of the things that are coming into being". (*L. A.* I 18).

Philo sometimes expresses this thought by saying that every end is a fresh beginning.

"For it is the case both that the fruit comes out of the plant, as an end out of a beginning, and that out of the fruit again, containing as it does the seed itself, there comes the plant, a beginning out of an end." (*Opif.* 44).

But such a representation of recurrence is not a doctrine of mere cycles of change in Philo's thought as it is in Stoic thought. Philo's thought is permeated with a vitalism that is quite different from the mechanistic implications of recurrence. Creation is not repetition but rather an emergence of the new and fresh. We must observe how this theme of the ceaseless creative activity of God fits in with Philo's account of what it is to know God.

CHAPTER XV

TELEOLOGY, ITS SANCTIONING INSIGHT

The Modes of One Cause

Philo says that God does not exist according to unity but unity obtains according to God.⁴⁸ When therefore we consider the nature of God under the two categories of Efficient Cause and Final Cause, we must regard these two categories as two ways in which God works and two ways in which a knowledge of God may be sought rather than two finalities to be reconciled to each other without reference to God. These two ways of knowing God correspond with the retrospective view and the prospective policy. The first leads to an immediate knowledge of God, the second to a discursive knowledge, a knowing by doing. By the first we may learn that God is. By the second we adopt a program of action without knowing what the final purpose for that program may be. The intuition of the Active Cause gives rise to knowledge but the intuition of the Final Cause is a faith that must be worked out in practice.

The Intuition of Cause

Now the retrospective view is the retracing of cause and effect sequences in search for the Efficient Cause that explains the present experience. For Philo this search is not an infinite regress. For although the Efficient Cause like an artist must ever differ from His handiwork for "that which makes is ever beyond the thing made", (*Post.* 19) nevertheless it is possible to have an intuition of the presence of the Active Cause.

Philo argues that the very activity of events reveals the presence of an Active Cause despite the fact that the form of those events cannot reveal the nature of that Cause beyond the bare fact of activity. This is not merely to argue that because an event appears there must have been an active cause to make it appear. Philo goes a step farther and says that we may "see" or have an

48 L. A. II, 2-3.

intuition of the spontaneity behind apparent activity. The knowledge of the Active Cause is not an inference but an intuition.

"But the Being that in reality *is* can be perceived and known, not only through the ears, but with the eyes of the understanding from the powers that range the universe and from the constant and ceaseless motion of His ineffable works". (*Post* 167).

Now Philo is aware that this statement may be misunderstood. For he has previously stated in this same treatise that God cannot be "seen". In that previous statement he says,

"Out of this quest there accrues to him a vast boon, namely to apprehend that the God of real Being is apprehensible by no one, and to see precisely this, that He cannot be seen". (*Post*. 15).⁴⁹

What Philo means is that it may be "seen" *that* God is but not *what* God is. In the earlier passage he is speaking of the Final Cause and the intuition of purpose and he affirms that no one can know what that purpose is. In the latter passage he is speaking of the Efficient Cause and the intuition of active cause and he affirms that we may know immediately that God acts.

"When we say that the Existent One is visible we are not using words in their literal sense, but it is an irregular use of the word by which it is referred to each one of His powers". (*Post*. 168).

To "see" events as "powers" of God is to "see" God in action by an intuition of cause.⁵⁰ The powers do not explain themselves or God. They are explained by the sense of God's invisibly active presence.

⁴⁹ ὁράτος is contrasted with ἐμφάνισόν μοι σεαυτὸν to indicate that God must manifest Himself by acting upon man. For unless God *acts* man cannot *apprehend* His presence much less comprehend His nature. In *Som.* II, 221, God is represented as ἐμφανῆς to distinguish the "manifest" *certainty* of God from the uncertain *opinion* of the ego-centric man who "thinks he stands". φῶμην ἐστάναι, versus ὥδε ἐγὼ ἐστῆκα ἐκεῖ πρὸ τοῦ σὲ ἐπὶ τῆς πέτρας ἐν χωρῇβ. (*Ex.* 17, 6). In *Post.* 166-169 a similar contrast between the certainty of apprehension and the uncertainty of comprehension is made by bringing the text, ἴδετε, ἴδετε ὅτι ἐγὼ εἰμι. (*Deut.* 32, 39) together with the text, τὰ μὲν ὀπίσω θεάσῃ, τὸ δὲ πρόσωπον οὐκ ὄψει. (*Ex.* 33, 23).

⁵⁰ Cf. *Ebriet.* 107; *Som.* I 39-40.

"Thou shalt behold that which is behind Me, but My Face thou shalt not see". "This meant that all that follows in the wake of God is within the good man's apprehension, while He Himself alone is beyond it, beyond, that is in a line of straight and direct approach by which (had it been possible) His quality would have been made known; but brought within ken by the powers that follow and attend Him; for these make evident not His essence but His presence by the evidence of the things He accomplishes." (*Post.* 169).⁵¹

It is as though we may observe God in action as the sweep of a mighty power all the effects of which fall into an order when once we direct attention to the center of activity. And although we see plainly that there is an Active Cause at work we cannot overtake that Cause to discover its nature but may only keep pace with the effects it produces.

"It follows then that not only other things with which we are familiar, but that whose movement surpasses them all in swiftness, the mind, would come short of the apprehension of the First Cause by an immeasurable distance. But the strangest thing of all is that whereas the heavenly bodies as they go past moving objects are themselves in motion, God Who outstrips them all is motionless. Yea we aver that remaining the same He is at once close to us and far from us. He takes hold of us by those forming and chastening powers which are so close to each one of us; and yet He has driven created being far away from His essential Nature, so that we cannot touch it even with the pure spiritual contact of the understanding." (*Post.* 19-20; cf. *Det.* 86-90).

"When then He invites a man to the good peculiar to Him, He says, 'Do thou stand with Me' not 'I with thee'; for in God's case standing is not future but an ever present act. But when He comes to that which is proper to creation, His words will quite rightly be 'I will go down with thee' for to thee change of place is appropriate. Accordingly with Me no one shall go down—for I know no turning or change—but one shall stand, seeing that quiescence is dear to Me. But with those who go down in the sense of changing their place—for change of place is near of kin to them—I will go down, in all-pervading Presence without any alteration of locality, seeing I have filled the universe with Myself. I do this in pity for rational nature, that it may be caused to rise out of the nether world of the passions into the upper region of virtue guided step by step by Me, Who have laid down the road that leads to

51 Cf. Plato, *Laws*, IV, 716.

heaven and appointed it as a highway for all suppliant souls, that they might not grow weary as they tread it." (*Post.* 30-31).

The Guiding Presence

This last passage would seem to suggest that the intuition of God as the Active Cause provides a sense of a Presence that guides the soul step by step along a path provided by God in His rôle as Final Cause. The passage is significant because it dispenses with the idea of an intermediary spirit and stresses the omnipresence of God Himself. God remains other than man but He does not stand afar off like some goal which man must reach unaided. He comes down to guide the soul of man by His Presence rather than remaining forever out of touch. God's solicitude for man is not hypostatized into some divine representative. It may be immediately felt. (Cf. *Gig.* 45-52).

Philo's use of the Stoic term *τόνος*⁵² to indicate the dynamic presence of God as a guide raises the question of the theological interpretation of the intuition of active cause. Does the interpretation of this intuition involve a pantheism along Stoic lines or is Philo using this idea of "tension" in illustrative fashion without subscribing to its physical connotations? Is Philo's thesis of guidance by God compatible with such statements as this?

"For not even the whole world would be a place fit for God to make His abode,⁵³ since God is His own place, and He is filled by Himself, and sufficient for Himself, filling and containing all other things in their destitution and barrenness and emptiness, but Himself contained by nothing else, seeing that He is Himself One and the Whole." (*L. A.* 1 44).

The Theological Interpretation of the Intuition of Cause

Let us attend carefully to just what is involved in the intuition of active cause *per se* so that we may decide whether its theological

52 See also *Sac.* 68. For the Stoic idea of *tension* see Zeller, *Stoics*, p. 140. It may be well to be reminded that among the schools the Stoics were the traditionalists and it is they who develop the emphasis upon *δραστήριοις αἰτίαις*. It is the more to be remarked that Philo seems to guard against the one feature of their doctrine which he cannot abide, namely materialism, when there are such close parallels with Judaism in their moral earnestness and their adherence to tradition.

53 For the purely moral sense in which God makes His abode in man see *Cherub.* 98-100; *Sobriet.* 59 sq.

interpretation may be more accurately rendered by pantheism than by some other theology. Now the sense for active cause does not identify that activity with its observed effects but rather discriminates the activity *per se* from the effects produced. It is an intuition by which effects become formalized because an active principle is sensed and it is precisely the opposite of inferring an active principle because a given form is understood. The inference from form gives no account of how the form was given but provides an explanatory idea of how the form may be used. It provides a meaning inherent in the form. The intuition of active cause on the other hand accounts for the giving of the form by resting upon something outside the form, namely the constructive spontaneity which it claims to sense immediately. Thus the intuition of active cause gives rise to the conviction of the existence of an independent or absolute motion rather than an inference of determinate meaning. The issue involved in the theological interpretation of this conviction lies in the legitimacy of different descriptions of God as absolute motion.

The Inadequacy of Pantheism

Pantheism would describe such a God as a quality present anywhere and everywhere within a containing Universe. Thus when the Stoics said that God and the Universe are one this meant that there is no God save Nature.⁵⁴ Nature is self-caused and God is the active factor present in all parts of the world of Nature. The omnipresence of God is made relative to the World as a quality

54 Diog. Laert. VII, 134-143: For Philo's explicit denial of pantheism which he calls "Chaldean opinion" see Mig. 180-195. God is transcendent in respect to *being*, (τὸ εἶναι). It is His goodness that is immanent as a power, (δύναμιν). To study God one should study the nature of man for like a son man is not his own creator but nevertheless a man may learn something about his creator just as a son by understanding himself cannot fail to gain some notion of the father who begot him. Philo's point comes very close to the statement that one can gain a conception of God only by the study of personality. He says that when the mind properly understands itself it comes very close to an understanding of God. But Philo seems to be withheld from a conception of personality *per se* by his interest in the denial of a self-sufficient man or world. His point is that the Creator or Cause cannot be contained in the creature or effect. Man's mind does not create his body nor establish his own ideas. Man's mind can only understand as an effect can testify to a cause . . . God's mind, on the other hand can create or produce the effects which man apprehends. For further reference to Philo's denial of pantheism see Heres. 96-99; Cong. 48-49; Deus. 62.

contained in a form. There can be no distinction between God and the material substratum of the World. Such a pantheism does not discriminate between cause and effect but rather makes cause and effect identical. It can hardly be regarded as an accurate rendering of the intuition of active cause in theological terms.

Now when Philo says that the universe is caused by God and yet God penetrates that universe without being contained by it, this means that there can be no world unless God acts. As an absolute motion God is radically different from a material and formal universe.⁵⁵ To describe the omnipresence of God as such an absolute motion requires a quite different analogy than that of a quality contained by a form. Philo's analogy of a quest is closer to the requirements. But this analogy raises logical difficulties because of the very discrimination which the intuition of active cause makes between God and His localized Creation. These difficulties lie in the inability of formal logic to deal with radical distinctions and they do not reflect upon the authenticity of the intuition of active cause. Let us indicate why it is that formal logic is inadequate to criticize the intuition of active cause.

The Inadequacy of Logic

Formal logic deliberately or tacitly translates the intuition of causal activity into a relation between two objects that are called cause and effect. This relation is then interpreted by means of some such categories as time or place or form or quality. Thus what is reported to intuition as a radical distinction between cause and effect becomes defined by formal logic as only a relative difference within such categories as time, place, form or quality. Such categories are thus regarded as more primitive than causal activity by their very postulation as conditions of analysis.

Now such a translation of the meaning of causal activity into terms regarded as more primitive, removes from active cause precisely the meaning by which intuition indicates the nature of active cause, namely unlimited spontaneity. And the same translation removes from effect, precisely the meaning by which intuition indicates effect, namely unlimited dependence. For the radical dis-

55 Det. 83-90; cf. Timaeus, 91 E.

inction between efficacy and inefficacy there is substituted a relative difference within such categories as time, place, form or quality. The intuition of causal activity is denied by being explained away.

What formal logic describes is a causal process composed of terms in relation to each other. And this description is made at the expense of precise meanings for active cause and actual effect. The active cause is reduced to a joint cause, one of two conditions for causal activity and thus regarded in one sense as an inactive effect. It is regarded as an inactive effect in the sense that the very effect of its activity constitutes a limiting condition upon that activity. Similarly the effect is regarded as a joint cause, one of two conditions for causal activity. It is regarded as an active cause in the sense that as one member of causal activity it can impose conditions upon that activity. The meanings of active cause and actual effect become distributed indiscriminately among terms in relation. Causal activity when regarded as a relation defined by more primitive terms becomes a Heraclitian flux, a process in which "all things interchange". As Philo says, this "combines as joint causes God and creation, two mutually exclusive natures, whereas there is but one single Cause, even He who doeth all." (*L. A. III 7-8*).

Thus if the theological interpretation of active cause is entrusted to formal logic the omnipresence of God as the active cause becomes a dual or multiple presence among the temporal, formal, local and qualitative features of creation. The Heraclitian dictum of "the universe one" is equivalent to the denial of the omnipresence of God as the active cause by explaining the unity of creation as a process of "strife" among many different active causes.

The Finality of the Intuition of Cause

Since formal logic cannot describe the intuition of active cause the notion of omnipresence must rest solely upon that intuition. When thus grounded the radical distinction that is made between cause and effect remains as the very condition of precise meaning for active cause and actual effect. It is the strength of Philo's position that he does adhere to precise and radical meanings for active cause and actual effect. If there is anything upon which he is consistently emphatic it is the radical difference of God

from Creation by a "whole genus". That genus is not a class of classes but Active Cause. Now to regard this radical distinction between God and Creation as an ontological dualism is simply to deny the authenticity of the intuition of causal activity and to require that efficacy be described as something other than efficacy. For when Philo says that it is the nature of God to exist and not to exist-in-relation-to-something-else, he does not deny the existence of the world. (*Det.* 160-162 sq.). He affirms the causal activity of God. And when he says that it is the nature of creation to be changed and not to pre-exist as a limitation upon God, he does not deny that the world changes according to plan. He affirms that that plan is caused by God. The categories of time, place, form, and quality are effects of an active cause and not limitations upon causal activity. (*L. A.* II 33 sq.).

It is well to take note of several of the radical distinctions which Philo makes. Thus God is a "place" unto Himself and this place may be described as "everywhere" and "nowhere".⁵⁶ God is not local by reference to creation. But creation is localized by a causal act of God. Similarly God does not create in time. His creation is a causal act that initiates time.⁵⁷ Again God is in no way formal. It is by His causal act that Creation receives form.⁵⁸ God is *ἄπλοος* or beyond quality. It is His creative act that gives rise to particular qualities.⁵⁹ To sum it all up God is in no way comparable with Creation nor with anything other than Himself. He cannot be paired. For that matter neither can creation, for pairs arise within creation.

"And indeed within these pairs, because they have been the subject of creation, we do find fellowship and kinship of each for its opposite, but God has no likeness even to what is noblest of things born. Such things were created in the past and will be passive in the future, but God is uncreated and ever active." (*Gig.* 42).

The radical distinction which Philo makes has nothing to do with the coexistence, identification or separation of objects. It is a reiterated insistence that whenever God the Active Cause is mentioned, He shall be regarded as active cause and not surreptitiously

⁵⁶ Conf. 134-141.

⁵⁷ Opif. 2-4.

⁵⁸ Det. 86-87.

⁵⁹ Som. II, 45.

defined as a relative effect. And when creatures are mentioned the meaning of creature shall remain creature and not surreptitiously used to indicate creator. The discrimination which the intuition of causal activity makes is neither to be denied nor explained away. It provides the one condition of both apprehending One Active Being and understanding the creation He has produced.

The theological interpretation of the intuition of active cause may be described as what Dr. Otto has called theopantism in contrast with pantheism. All is in God rather than God is contained in all things. In order to indicate the reality of God as the Active Cause we must represent Him as an absolute activity that penetrates without being penetrated, contains without being contained, limits without being limited. The omnipresence of God is to be regarded as an ever exercised causal efficacy by which created things are held from passing out of existence.⁶⁰

"How must it not be impossible to recompense or to praise as He deserves, Him who brought the universe out of non-existence? For it was an exercise toward us of every virtue". (*L. A.* III 10).

According to Philo, then, the intuition of God as the Active Cause is both possible and normal for a lover of God but a knowledge of God as the Final Cause is quite impossible.

"One receives the clear vision of God directly from the Cause Himself. The other discerns the Artificer, as it were from a shadow, from created things by virtue of a process of reasoning". (*L. A.* III 102).

This twofold statement is after all but a single definition of what it is to know God. To know God directly is to have an immediate apprehension of the efficient cause at work, a sense of the moving principle behind events. By the very nature of this intuition of cause God is known only as active, informal, dynamic, invisible, indescribable and yet as evident to the sense for cause as light is evident to the open eye. This is not a mysterious ecstasy reserved to the privileged mystic. It is like a native capacity of any rational mind. By this capacity there is known all that can be immediately

60 *Mut.* 54-55; *Sac.* 40.

known of God. But after all no more need be immediately known. For this intuition forms the basis upon which reason can operate.

To learn more about God than the intuition of the active cause conveys is to turn attention from the cause itself to the effect or creation of that cause. By such a change of reference one begins to contemplate form and to interpret meaning and purpose for that form. One strives to infer the intention of the cause, the purpose of creating. In so doing one is not contemplating the cause directly but rather reading into that cause the tentative meanings and possible functions implied by the created form. One makes the cause the end point of a rational speculation. This is to enter upon an endless quest. For it lies in the very nature of the intuition of cause that what is discerned is other than the cause. And the interpretation of the created form is an attempt to describe in formal terms what was "seen" as informal. Of this the observer is fully aware. He knows himself to be attempting to describe what is essentially indescribable for he must in description use formal terms to indicate that he has "seen" an informal activity.

"But although he is aware that he is enamoured of an object which entails a hard quest, nay, which is out of reach, he will nevertheless struggle on with no relaxation of his earnest endeavor, but honestly and resolutely enlisting all his faculties to cooperate for the attainment of his object. So see him enter into the thick darkness where God was,⁶¹ that is into conceptions regarding the Existent Being that belong to the unapproachable region where there are no material forms. For the Cause of all is not in the thick darkness, nor locally in any place at all, but high above both time and place. For He has placed all creation under His control, and is contained by nothing but transcends all. But though transcending and being beyond what He has made, none the less has He filled the universe with Himself; for He has caused His powers to extend themselves throughout the universe to its utmost bounds, and in accordance with the laws of harmony has knit each part to each". (*Post.* 14).

61 In his several treatments of the text, Exodus, 20, 21, Philo says that Moses, by entering the "darkness", (τὸν γνόφον) where God was, (1) did "see" God, (2) but did not learn His nature, (3) nevertheless did bring back the underlying plan or scheme of things. This seems to mean that an intuition of the Cause does explain effects but does not explain the Cause itself. *Mut.* 7; *V. M.* I, 158; cf. *L. A.* III, 100-103; 204, 228; II, 67; *Sp. L.* I, 41; *Mig.* 139, 166; *Som.* I, 64, 195.

CHAPTER XVI

THE STATUS OF REASON

The Argument from Design

We come now to the propositions concerning constructive and interpretative reason. These propositions are suggested by Philo's treatment of two teleological metaphors. These are the metaphor of the house and its builder and the metaphor of the Oath. By the two metaphors a distinction is made between affirming reason as the antecedent or as the consequent of causal activity.

When Philo cites the famous argument from design under the figure which likens the world to a house and God to the Great Artificer, he says that this argument leads to a conception of God "by means of a shadow cast" and "from created things by virtue of a process of reasoning".⁶² For Philo the argument does not establish the existence of God. It explains how it came about that men should have conceived the idea of God. There is a hypothetical relation between the appearing of form and the presence of purposive activity.⁶³ And men may have an intuition of this relationship and thus conceive the idea of God.

There are two grounds upon which Philo rejects the argument from design as a demonstration of the existence of God. The first of these is psychological. Philo holds that a man cannot exercise the faculties of his mind by his own initiative until God first acts as a cause to set those faculties in motion.⁶⁴ Hence to know God as existing is to be aware of a causal force operating upon one's thinking. And to be aware of such a force is to know that the ideas produced by thought are interpretations of an experience and not the cause of the experience. One apprehends God immediately, "from Himself" but describes that experience by ideas

62 L. A. III, 97-103; cf. Sp. L. I, 32 sq.

63 Opif. 24. Philo's meaning seems to be associated with the Hebrew conception of "signs". A sign might be (1) a memorial, (2) a confirmation, (3) a prophecy. Philo associates the formal aspect of the Word or reason with the first two meanings but the prophetic significance is associated with reason as a promise the nature of which is personal both as motives of good will in man and the confirmatory Oath of God.

64 L. A. II, 69; Conf. 122-133.

that are consequent upon rather than antecedent to that experience. As inferences the interpretive ideas may be perfectly valid but they are not causes.

This psychological situation reduces the argument from design to descriptive hypothesis whether it is applied to God or to any other object. It makes the proof of the existence of an object rest upon an immediate experience of causal force exerted by the object. The validity of the interpretive ideas is not in question. It is their source that is in question. What is insisted upon is that the object described be immediately felt as a cause in order that the ideas be tested. And of course this insistence makes the argument from design pointless. The ideas are like a "shadow cast". It is reasonable to suppose that something has cast the "shadow". But until the object which casts the "shadow" is immediately felt as a cause the presumptions that reason makes concerning it cannot be tested.

The second ground upon which Philo rejects the argument from design as a demonstration of the existence of God concerns the nature of the "shadow" as a design. Here Philo is concerned with the grounds for formal reason. He disparages all attempts to find the nature of the Creator in the form of the creature.⁶⁵ Of course this disparagement rests upon moral and religious presuppositions. Nevertheless it amounts to a recognition of the fallacy known as affirming the consequent. Philo's treatment of the metaphor of the house when compared with his treatment of the metaphor of the Oath constitutes a criticism of the attempt to reverse an "if God then an orderly world" to a "since an orderly world therefore God". Such a criticism is inherent in Philo's view of the Law, its origin and its interpretation. That view is fundamentally a "since God therefore an orderly Law" and never a reversal of that order of antecedent and consequent.

The Figure of the House

The analogy of house and builder tacitly lays stress upon the idea of a completed pattern corresponding with the intention in the mind of the builder. But if this formalism is pushed too far it sets up as a finality the existence of a formal order in proof of

65 E. g. Decal. 44-81; Conf. 98-100.

the existence of a purposive activity without regard to the fact that the very notion of purposive activity under the figure of a builder was first invoked to explain the appearance of formal order. The argument moves in a circle when the appearance of form is tacitly regarded as given instead of standing as a thing to be explained. The metaphor of house and builder offers no opportunity to distinguish the appearance of form as a result of interpretation and the creation of form as the result of prior construction. The metaphor leads to the neglect of an important distinction between the intention of the interpreter and the intention of the builder. And this oversight leads to a begging of the very question at issue. Does God exist as the purposive activity that created the world as a house or is God merely the idea the interpreter used to make the world appear as an orderly house? Philo's position is that the appearance of order in the world raises the presumption of a God. The evidence of a purpose in the apparent form of the world gives rise to the idea that there must be a God. But when it comes to a demonstration we must no longer beg the question by tacitly assuming that the appearance of order in the world is a given fact.⁶⁶ We may have invested that world with order by interpretation. We must regard the world as a mere shadow, something that appears but meaningless in itself. To interpret that shadow we must "see" the object which casts the shadow. Like the work of an artist the shadow cannot be interpreted unless we know something of the mind of the artist by direct knowledge of him. His works are apparent, to be sure, but his intention may have no relation to the intention that we read into those works by our own criticism. The situation is not unlike prospective teleology. We push the rational interpretation of form like a trend of meanings in history, into the unknown regions of the artists intentions and attempt to prove that there must be just such an intention and just such an artist as our interpretation of his works, our idea of his existence, indicates. We end by

⁶⁶ Sp. L. I, 32-50. It is to be observed that Philo's use of the argument from design proceeds from the declaration that ignorance of the fact of God's existence is due to a moral atheism. The dispelling of this doubt does not entail the discovery of the οὐσία of God but merely the rehabilitation of a moral faith by contemplation of the teleological implications of the cosmos. A moral faith is equivalent to a conviction that God exists. Where there is a belief in God there is a moral purpose for creation. Where there is no such belief there can be no explanatory idea of creation.

assuming God without ever having an immediate experience of Him. We posit God to square our reasoning instead of squaring our reasoning by knowing God.

But if we regard the world as a mere shadow and seek to "see" the object that casts that shadow, then we are like one who goes directly to the artist and by knowing his will, learn to interpret his works correctly. As Philo puts it, there must be

"a mind which gains its knowledge of the First Cause not from created things, as one may learn the purpose⁶⁷ from the shadow, but lifting its eyes above and beyond creation obtains a clear vision of the uncreated One, so as from Him to apprehend both Himself and His shadow. To apprehend that, was as we have seen, both the Word and this world." (*L. A.* III 100).

Now the introduction of the ambiguous term Logos offers a connecting link between the metaphor of the house and the metaphor of the oath. Let us turn to the second metaphor and observe the advantages it offers for a criticism of formal reason.

The Figure of the Oath

Under the figure of the Oath, Philo likens the order of the world to a Word, a Deed, a Law and a Promise. But however orderly the Word may appear it has in itself no trustworthiness which can establish the trustworthiness of its Author, God. It is God Who establishes the trustworthiness of the world as a Word. "He it is Who has shown to all others plainly the signs by which they may know the truth".⁶⁸ Such signs can obtain only because they are effects of a Cause. They cannot explain the Cause. For they have no independent status whereby they can testify without prejudice. To argue thus from the analogy of the house would mean that the apparent order of the world no matter how correctly read does not correspond with the transcendent purpose of the Great Artificer either because the order of the house is incomplete or because the builder has no definite purpose in giving the house its apparent form. But to argue thus from the metaphor of the Oath is quite a different matter.

Under the figure of the Oath the order of the world is like the

67 μένος, force, strength, bent, wish, temper, disposition, intent. Philo seems to distinguish that which explains from that which is to be done.

68 *Sac.* 91 sq.; cf. *L. A.* III, 203-210.

testimony, of a single witness. And just as the "speech" of a single witness must be accepted or rejected according to our faith in the integrity of that witness, so the rationality of the world must be accepted or rejected according to our faith in God. And just as the testimony of the single witness cannot establish his integrity nor reveal his purpose in giving that testimony no matter how reasonable it sounds nor how clearly we see that it is being given by one who stands before us, just so the world as a Word cannot establish the reality nor reveal the purpose of God in creating that world no matter how orderly it appears nor how convincingly it is seen to be produced by the Active Cause. All we can do is "see" the Cause and trust His intentions until by experimental practice we test the meaning of His Word in our own individual experience. The form and meaning which is reason as an organized experience remains without grounding until faith unites two minds so that such form and such meaning are created and appreciated as one practical law.

The Wager of Faith

Philo argues that the world is rational because there is a God to make it rational but holds that to argue that there is a God because the world appears rational is merely to place more confidence in reason than in the Establisher of reason.⁶⁹ This is like taking the words of a single witness naively and without regard to the honesty or hidden purpose of that witness. In the very nature of the case we have no *a priori* test of that honesty or purpose. We must believe, disbelieve or suspend judgment. But we must not let the charm of words delude us into thinking that we know anything more about our witness than the bare fact that he gives us his story. So it is with reason as a Word. We must accept reason because we cannot know the nature of God. Nevertheless we must be aware that in accepting reason we are exercising an act of faith. We swear by the Word of God, *Logos Hermeneus* (the interpreting word), because we cannot swear by God Whom we do not know. And swearing by *Logos Hermeneus* is like wagering that the rational order of the world is a Law of experience by which a knowledge of God's purpose may become known.

69 L. A. III, 228-233.

The wager of faith is like exchanging pledges with God.⁷⁰ Hence the significance of the Oath of God as a "mere crutch to our weakness". Since we cannot get out of ourselves to penetrate the nature of God as one would anticipate the threading of a maze by providing oneself with its key plan, since we cannot have prior knowledge of that sort we must accept on faith that there is a purpose for the apparent order of the world as a Word and with that faith proceed to explore the world of our experience as though from the point of view of God. Our faith becomes a purposive activity that seeks to experience the rational order of the world in the way in which the Creator intends that order to be traced. The order that we find in experience is a result of our purposive activity rather than a premise from which the existence of God can be proved. We find in natural experience a reflection of our faith in God.

Of course the figure of the Oath is for Philo much more than a metaphor by which the rational order of nature may be likened to a Word that must be taken on faith because men cannot know the final purpose of the Creator. It is the Covenant that represents the sanction for Philo's teleology. The figure of the Oath as Philo treats it distinguishes a teleology based on reason from a teleology based upon the traditionalist's faith in the power of God. Reason must rest its claims upon some future event which can reveal whether or not the order of nature is rational by providing a final justifying purpose for that order. In the meantime the order of nature can have no teleological justification. But the traditionalist's faith in the power of God rests its claims upon the ability of God to control the order of nature for His own ends. And the evidence for that power lies not in some unknown future event but rather in past and present events that indicate that nature is indeed under control in so far as order is apparent. The order of nature may be regarded as teleological since it makes apparent the operation of a Supreme Ruler even before the purpose for that operation becomes known. The realization of purposes implied by the order may rest more securely upon the apparent Will to order than upon some unknown rational purpose. It is to be observed that the figure of the Oath emphasizes the omnipotence of God rather than His goodness or His reasonableness. It is not

70 Heres. 206.

because God is good or reasonable that He gives His Oath, however great a boon that Oath may be. It is because no other can guarantee finalities of any sort that God gives His Oath as "a crutch to our weakness".

By faith in the power of God the order of nature may be accepted as a Deed and a Law through which the Will of God is being realized. Thus we need not know what God's final purpose is in order to enact His will. We need only adopt as a program of conduct those things which have come down in tradition and are observed in the present to reveal how God works among men. We may thus dramatize the immanent purpose of God even before we know what the final purpose of the Law may be. We need not await a prophetic vision of God's purpose. We may swear by His Word as the Name of God by accepting the Law as a mode of conduct and thus realizing the good. It is because the good rests upon a promise made in the past rather than a promise as some future event that its realization in the present is a matter of practice rather than knowledge.

"Now the covenant of God is an allegory of His gifts of grace, and it may not be that any of His gifts should be imperfect. Thus all the bounty of the Uncreated must be perfect and complete. But among all existing things the one that is complete is virtue and virtuous actions". (*Sac.* 57).

To accept God's covenant as a law of conduct is to have imputed to that conduct the virtue that God intends for man.

CHAPTER XVII

THE DIVINE NAMES THEOS AND KURIOS

We have indicated that the intuition of active cause is in accord with the teleology of traditionalism and is in conflict with the teleology of rationalism at certain points. The intuition supports the conviction of the presence of the hand of God in the affairs of men and the world. The longer the retrospective view the more clearly can be seen the hand of God. History becomes an open book. But the final outcome of history remains a matter of faith. Its trend is clear but its denouement is only faintly discerned by projecting that trend into the unknown future. The Efficient Cause is as certain as experience itself but the Final Cause is an interpretation by a process of reasoning based upon faith, a faith that the trend of history will continue in the direction marked out by past events. This view makes God transcendent and the "Image of God" as a promise of things to come, immanent in all His works.

Such transcendence and such immanence do not yield to an analysis in terms of Efficient and Final Cause. For it is the transcendence of God that is immediately known by the intuition of active cause. And it is the immanence of God that cannot be known save as He is emulated in practice. To give precise meanings to such transcendence and such immanence we must say that the "Image of God" is the mind of man as an experience to be lived out and the transcendence of God is the Cause which is producing the effects continuously being recorded in the mind of man as a growing experience. Active Cause is a divine experience. Passive recording is human experience. The interpenetration of these two experiences is the world of rational order. This does not mean that man is not a free moral agent. It means that it is only when man is active under the stimulus of God that he can realize the good. It means that man's activity as both rational and good is a response to God as the divine urge impels both by "fear" and "love". The reconciliation of the two insights into the nature of teleology lies in Philo's treatment of two names for God.

Two names of God, *Yahweh* and *Elohim*, had already been used in Judaism to indicate the attributes of mercy and justice. (See

G. F. Moore, *Judaism*, Vol. I p. 387 sq.). The Rabbis speculated upon the significance of these two attributes of God as conditions of an enduring creation. But Philo reverses the significances which the Rabbis give to the two names. The name *Yahweh* indicated the merciful attribute and the name under which God was peculiarly the champion of Israel. The name *Elohim* indicated the attribute of justice and the name under which God was the stern sovereign over all nations. In the Septuagint *Yahweh* is rendered *Kurios* or Lord and it is this name that Philo uses to indicate the sovereignty of God. The name *Elohim* is rendered *Theos* or God and it is this name that Philo uses to indicate the goodness and mercy of God.

This reversal of the names arises partly from Philo's etymological exegesis of the Greek words. But there is more than an artificial exegesis involved. It would seem that the reversal of names reflects a process of universalizing and personalizing the religious object, a process actively at work in the theology of Philo's day.

Under the name *Kurios*, God as the peculiar deity of Israel would rank as only one among many naturalistic and cultic Lords. Philo is apparently concerned to combat a compromising henotheism which would be implied by permitting the national and cultic name of Israel's God to characterize his theology. This concern is apparent in Philo's interpretation of Exodus 18:11 as a polytheistic declaration. To acknowledge the God of Israel as a "Great Lord above all other Gods" is to reduce *Yahweh* to a cultic *Kurios*. The Hebrew God is condemned by slight praise. (*Ebriet.* 41-45). It seems therefore that Philo universalizes the *Kurios* or Lord of Israel by removing all nationalistic and cultic significances and he exploits the naturalistic significances of the name *Kurios* by associating that name with the power of God to rule nature.

The name *Elohim* had already been universalized in Judaism by its indication of a power of justice over all nations. But in the Psalms this name is used in devotional address and thus in some degree indicates a relation to the devotee that is not nationalistically prescribed. Philo uses the name to indicate the attribute by which God draws all men in love, namely His goodness. Whether or not Philo's use of the divine names is a deliberate modification of Hebrew terminology the fact remains that his use of the Greek equivalents constitutes an attempt to transform the exclusive

monotheism of Hebrew worship to an inclusive monism of philosophic speculation. The mercy and the justice of God not only draw men and discipline men but also ground all creation in a two-fold principle of *Might* and *Goodness*.

Such a mixture of attributes would constitute a Heraclitian "strife" of contending opposites for most Greek thinkers. For Philo no less than for the Rabbis it constituted a "peace" and "harmony" among two requisites for an enduring creation. (*Heres.* 201-214). It is not the interplay of multiple principles that produces a meaningful world. It is the meaningful One that generates an expressive manifold. Philo's philosophic problem is not concerned with how an Efficient Cause and a Final Cause can be one. The problem is how can God be both merciful and just?

The Mystery of the Names

Philo uses the two names *Theos* and *Kurios* to indicate two primary functions of God and two fundamental "virtues" or traits of human nature. A discussion of these two names involves a threefold interpretation of a "mystery". This "mystery" constitutes the religious experience that lies at the center of Philo's thought. Its theological interpretation is a description of the religious object of Jewish aspiration. Its psychological interpretation is a description of an almost defiant faith such as finds expression in the book of *Job*. Its philosophic interpretation is the Philonic Logos doctrine. By the term "mystery" we are not to think that the two names of Deity form an occult riddle which Philo proposes in order to escape hard thinking. He seems to mean that the "mystery" is a fundamental truth that can only be fully appreciated by a personal faith in God. It is such a faith that leads Philo to an intuition that he calls a "voice in my soul". The "mystery" is a personal experience by which two radically different attributes become ways of apprehending One God rather than two principles that must be reconciled to each other.

The Divine Attributes

"The voice told me that while God is indeed one, His highest and chiefest powers are two, even goodness and sovereignty. Through His goodness He begat all that is, through His sovereignty He rules what He has begotten. And in the midst between

the two is a third which unites them, Reason, for it is through reason that God is both ruler and good. . . . O then, my mind, admit the image unalloyed of the two Cherubim, that having learnt its clear lesson of the sovereignty and beneficence of the Cause, thou mayest reap the fruits of a happy lot. For straightway thou shalt understand how these unmixed powers are mingled and united, how where God is good, yet the glory of His sovereignty is seen amid the beneficence, how where He is sovereign through the sovereignty the beneficence still appears. Thus thou mayest gain the virtues begotten of these powers, a cheerful courage and a reverent awe towards God. When things are well with thee the majesty of the sovereign King will keep thee from proud thoughts. When thou sufferest what thou wouldst not, thou wilt not despair of betterment, remembering the loving kindness of the great and bountiful God". (*Cherub*. 28-29).

In this passage Philo brings together five features of the "mystery". The goodness of God is to be correlated with a "love" for God. The Sovereignty of God is to be correlated with a "fear" of God. And the reason which unites the powers of God is a courage in man which does not give way to selfish optimism or pessimism. Let us turn to a passage in which these things describe the religious object.

"When God came attended by His two highest powers, sovereignty and goodness, He, the one between the two, called up before the eye of the soul, which has power to see, three separate visions or aspects. Each of these aspects though not subject itself to measurement—for God and His powers are alike uncircumscribed—is the measure of all things. His goodness is the measure (standard) of all good things, His sovereignty of all obedient things and the Ruler Himself is the measure (standard) of all things whether corporeal or incorporeal, and it is to serve Him that these two potencies assume the functions of rules and standards, and measure all that lies within their province. It is well that these three measures should be as it were kneaded and blended in the soul, that she, convinced that God who is above all exists—God who overtops His powers in that He is visible apart from them and yet revealed in them—may receive the impression of His sovereignty and beneficence. Thus too, being admitted into the innermost mysteries she will learn not to babble them thoughtlessly, but to store them up and guard them in secrecy and silence". (*Sac*. 59-60).

Perhaps we can suggest the meaning of this vision by saying

that to contemplate the Omnipotence of God is to see that no weakness can limit His goodness and wisdom. And to contemplate the Omniscience of God is to see that no ignorance can limit His power and goodness. And to contemplate the All Goodness of God is to see that no evil can limit His power and wisdom. To raise any one of these three attributes to an absolute is to imply the other two. The Absolute Deity "is visible apart from and yet revealed in them". For He "measures out" or provides the standard by which these things gain meaning. A seer cannot explain why these three natures are one. He can only contemplate their unity in the "silence" and "secrecy" of his own immediate consciousness of the Majesty of God. For him to say that God is *Good* without at the same time saying that He is *Powerful* and *Wise* is to distort the vision and likewise with the other attributes. The "silence" of vision becomes a babble of plausible explanations, a confusion of inadequate description when the profound awe of God's Presence is profaned by glib explanations.

Philo likens the raising of any one of these three attributes of Deity above the others to three different dispositions in men and three different ways of serving God.⁷¹ To consider the Omnipotence of God before His other powers is to serve God in "fear" and this service averts punishment. It is a self-calculating service but nevertheless obedience. God rewards such service for what it is worth to itself, a formal righteousness. To consider the Goodness of God above the other powers is to serve God in gratitude for gifts bestowed. This may be not unlike the service of "fear" if it is a calculated service for value received. The best service is of a third sort. God may be served for Himself alone and here a "fear" and a "love" of God are both present but with no fear for nor love of self.⁷² This service is one which singles out the "image in the center" which would correspond to the attribute of Wisdom. In this wisdom the omniscience of God and the

71 Abr. 124 sq.; Mut. 11-58. For the man who needs discipline, God is *Κύριος*. For the man who needs encouragement, God is *Θεός*. But for the wise man who lives by a disinterested rational law, God is both *Κύριος* and *Θεός* for the wise man is ever being perfected in discipline and inspired of God.

72 Cf. R. Judah Halleivi in the Dialogue Kusari, "Know that our Torah is constituted of the three psychological states, Fear, Love and Joy. By each of these thou mayest be brought into communion with thy God." (Kuzari, ed. Sluzki, p. 45).

courageous faith of man meet in that equation of courage and knowledge which Philo describes as the "friendship" and companionship which man may have with God.⁷³ To describe this we must turn to the psychological interpretation of Philo's "mystery".

The Rise of Reason

In discussing the meaning of *δεσπότης*, Master, as applied to God, Philo indicates the authentic religious attitude as one in which the "love" of God, *Theos* and the "fear" of God, *Kurios* have no selfish connotations. It is when a man confesses himself to be but "dust and ashes" or even less before God that he may then "speak" out. The authentic awe of God is like a temerity in which fear and confidence combine. (*Heres.* 22 sq.). Here is the point at which instructive reason or "speech" takes its rise. Between the poles of "love" and "fear" there lie both the proper reverence for God and the proper condition for disinterested reasoning. This attitude is not a "facing both ways" (*Sac.* 70-71) like the attitude of the selfish man who calls on the goodness of God the Saviour only when in fear of disaster. Since God "knows that what is done under stress of necessity has no sure foundation, He does not in all cases follow His law (of mercy) but only when it may be followed for good and with profit". This would seem to mean that man's realization of the good through the law is conditioned upon a consecration in which "love" and "fear" is not a "dispenser of the excellent" but a unique attitude peculiarly appropriate to God's blessing.

By this attitude man becomes devoted to virtue for its own sake. He does not touch virtue with the superficial "kiss" of salutation but in "love" discovers two minds to be united in mutual good will and "friendship".

In "friendship" man is devoted to God and yet kept in humility at a proper distance from God. By love man is impelled to draw close to God and by fear man is compelled to refrain from obtruding himself into the divine presence. Presumption is as much to be avoided as ingratitude.⁷⁴ The wisdom of man is like a propriety in which man emulates but never claims to incarnate deity.

⁷³ *Heres.* 16-21.

⁷⁴ Cf. the declaration of Thomas, John, 20, 28, Ὁ Κύριός μου καὶ ὁ Θεός μου.

It is by reason that God is both Ruler and Good. It is by reason that man tempers his "fear" and his "love" for the awesome Deity. The dramatic expression of such reason is the Creation and the courage with which man accepts that Creation as an instructive Word.

Courage

It is to be observed that Philo gives voice to a characteristic Jewish faith. He interprets the two powers of God as instructive insights by which a man may gain a rational perspective on life. Such a faith is significantly called courage, a courage in which the "love" and the "fear" of God banish all love and fear of self. Like Plato, Philo equates courage with knowledge.⁷⁵ But for Philo such courage is not a calculating foresight. It is a hardy confidence in a Guide. It expects outcomes to be good and reasonable and proceeds to demonstrate that expectation by daring conduct. It is a courage that accepts responsibility in humble gratitude for the opportunity to prove its loyalty. Disinterestedness becomes a technique rather than an ideal. The attitude of the philosopher is lost in the fervor of the saint, the agent of God. Self-interest is not laid aside merely to further clear thinking. It is laid aside to release aggressive obedient conduct. The two chief attributes of God and the two fundamental religious traits or "virtues" of man outline a way of life which is both the Will of God for man and the conduct which man chooses as his responsible service of God.

Like the Stoics Philo thus gives to reason a moral dominance. But his treatment of reason is precisely the opposite of Stoicism. The Stoic would have personal attitudes conform to reason. Philo makes reason express personal attitudes. For the Stoic it is a lack of faith that leads him to discount good fortune and evil fortune. For Philo good fortune and misfortune are to be used as opportunities for testing a man's faith in God. It is under such a test that man proves his reasonableness by avoiding the infidelity

75 The spirit of Philo's treatise on courage is closer to Cynic-Cyrenaic counsel than to Platonic rationalism. Philo's *ἀνευδότης λογισμοῖς*, (Virt. 3) is not unlike the *ἀνάλωτοις λογισμοῖς*, of Antisthenes. (Diog. Laert. VI, 13). Philo quotes Antisthenes, (Prob. 28) in connection with this same idea. Antisthenes wrote a treatise on courage. (Diog. Laert. VI, 16).

of pride or discouragement. It is not the dignity of man that is at stake. It is the humility of man that is at stake.⁷⁶ Such humility is described by Philo as a courage which avoids the ignorance of audacity on the one hand and the ignorance of cowardice on the other.⁷⁷ The ignorance of audacity misses the instruction of good fortune because in pride it forgets God's care. The ignorance of cowardice misses the instruction of misfortune because in distrust it forgets God's care. The life of courage is a life of reason in which both optimism and pessimism are replaced by an invincible faith in God.

Knowing by Training

The bi-polar principle of motivation⁷⁸ associated with the two names of deity is used by Philo to indicate two ways of knowledge. The one is a way of labor, propitiation, natural experience and discursive reasoning and it is associated with the name *Kurios*. The other is a way of worship, gratitude, and intellectual illumination and it is associated with the name *Theos*. In general these two ways may be distinguished as cumulative and intuitional ways of knowing. The two ways are not separable. They are related as part to whole. They are correlative ways in which God tries man and man tries the law,

"That I may prove them whether they will walk in My law or no", "for this is the divine law to value excellence for its own sake. Right reason therefore tests all aspirants as one does a coin to see whether they have been debased in that they refer the soul's good to something external, or whether as tried and approved men, they distinguish and guard this treasure as belonging to thought and mind alone. Such men have the privilege of being fed not with earthly things but with heavenly forms of knowledge". (*L. A.* III 168).

This trial of man is by the way of discipline when the law is con-

76 *Virt.* 1-17.

77 *Virt.* 4; *Praem.* 52; *Ebriet.* 114-118.

78 Philo takes over from the Peripatetics the notion of virtue as a mean between two extremes, e. g. *Sp. L.* IV, 144-150. It is notable that he associates courage with the harmony that is the "health" of the soul. He is not stressing symmetry or moderation so much as dedication that involves an abandonment of self. The soul is most "healthy" when it is least self-centered. Cf. *L. A.* I 72-73 and Plato, *Phaedrus* 253 D.

sidered as made up of parts and it is by way of intellectual appreciation when the law is considered as a whole.

"Tillers of the soil say that if you cut a coriander seed and divide it into countless pieces, each portion into which you cut it, if sown grows exactly as the whole seed could have done. Such too is the Word of God, able to confer benefits both as a whole and by means of every part, yes any part you light upon". (*L. A. III 170*).

This figure would seem to refer to the counsel to keep any portion of the law as a way of grace not to be regarded as any less excellent than the whole law. But Philo is speaking of the Word as a way of knowledge and goodness in a more general sense than the written law.

The relation of whole and part in the Word as "heavenly food" is a correlation of two ways of reaching the same fruitage. This correlation concerns the principle by which both practical and intellectual concerns may be dedicated to virtue for its own sake or rather for the sake of God. Philo would seem to suggest that "hope" and "faith" are like part to whole in such a principle.

Man must live from day to day in two different senses. For "day" may symbolize a part of life or the whole of life according as goodness and knowledge is a matter of daily conduct or of intellectual vision. The daily "instruction" of God through the Word may be a matter of practical care or of illuminating insight. "The day is a symbol of light and the light of the soul is instruction". (*L. A. III 167*).

For both practical and intellectual "instruction" it is necessary that a man show "good sense". Such good sense is a readiness to acknowledge that man himself cannot be the guardian and security of goodness and knowledge. Like the manna that kept only for the day so goodness and knowledge can suffice only for the moment and must be continuously renewed by God. Thus living day by day is acknowledging that both for practical needs and for intellectual needs man must depend upon the daily care of God. To live thus from day to day would be a mere opportunism if practical conduct were not based on hope. And such hope could have no intellectual grounding without faith.

"He lacks hope if he expects that now only but not in the future also will God shower on him good things; he lacks faith if he has

no belief that both in the present and always the good gifts of God are lavishly bestowed on those worthy of them". (*Ibid.* 164).

To study the Word in hope would seem to mean that a superficial opportunism is replaced by practical obedience of God's law before the goal is intellectualized. To study the Word in faith would seem to mean that a view of life as a whole leads to an immediate appreciation of the bountiful care of God always exercised to illuminate the mind of man whenever man turns in gratitude toward God. Both these ways lead to the knowledge of the good. (Cf. *Det.* 65-66). The way of hope is like a practice of the good without being fully aware of the good that is done. The way of faith is both doing and knowing the good.

"Let God then proclaim to the soul, 'Not on bread only shall men live but on every utterance that goeth forth through the mouth of God', that is to say he shall be fed both by all the word and by a part of it; for the mouth is a symbol of utterance (or speech) and the statement (verb) is a part (of speech). The soul of the most perfect is fed by the word as a whole; we may well be content should we be fed by a portion of it." (*L. A.* III 176).

Thus the part and whole relation is likened to a doing and a knowing. These two ways of instruction are more explicitly associated with the two names of God in *Sac.* 64 sq.

The way of propitiation is a way of laborious study. It is associated with God under the name *Kurios* and with the natural experience of man.

"Long experience had taught him that what the world of creation gives to the soul it makes secure only after long time, as it is with those who impart the arts and their rules to their pupils. They cannot at once fill to the brim the mind of the beginners as one fills a vessel". (*Sac.* 64).

This disciplinary way of knowing is "what the Lord set before me". The whole text however is "What the Lord God set before me". The two names describe the Word as a way in which both the disciplinary and the inspirational modes of knowledge are combined.

Knowing by Revelation

As creative goodness God is called *Theos* and it is in this rôle that He brings into being particular ends and inspires men to seek

those ends for the love of Him alone. The name *Theos* becomes descriptive of creative experience from two points of view. As a fountain of wisdom God,

"imparts each form of knowledge to the mortal race. He needs not time for the work. Such persons become apt disciples of the only wise Being and discover quickly what they seek. Now the first virtue of beginners, (pupils) is to desire that their imperfection may imitate as far as possible the perfection of the teacher. But the divine Teacher is swifter even than time for not even when He created the Universe did time cooperate with Him, since time itself only came into being with the world. God spake and it was done, no interval between the two, or it might suggest a truer view to say that His word was deed Necessarily then do His loyal children imitate their Father's nature and with a forwardness that brooks no delay, do what is excellent, and the most excellent deed of all is before aught else to honour God". *Sac.* 64-68).

It seems evident throughout the passage from which these words are taken that Philo is generalizing upon the theme of imputed righteousness through practice of the law. His generalization describes the nature of creative experience from two points of view. Timeless values are made incarnate in the law by God and are embodied in the practice of the law by men who love God. The imputation of righteousness is the realization of the good. Philo is describing how this can be. It can be because creative experience is but one "deed" that expresses both the care of God for man and the love of man for God.

The creative care of God is likened to the desire and power of a good teacher to illuminate the mind of an apt pupil so that the pupil may "find quickly" in a flash of intuition that which he would otherwise seek out by long and laborious study. The goodness of man is the fundamental human trait by which man forever aspires toward the better as both right and might. Without the creative "deed" the care of God would indicate only some vague transcendence and the goodness of man a futile sentimentalism. But creative and appreciative goodness become one concrete "deed" when the care of God is exercised to instruct man and the care of man is exercised in grateful emulation of God.

The emphatic denial of a time interval is most significant. The goodness of God is not an object of wistful speculation. It is an

ever repeated act by which the aspiring conduct of man becomes an immediate realization of the good in thought and word and deed. It is to man's religious motive that God imputes goodness but it is only by conduct that expresses that motive that man can experience the satisfactions of that goodness. Schematically considered creative goodness lies in God's efficacy as *Theos* and appreciative goodness lies in man's disposition to abandon himself in love. The good is realized when these two modes of the good become one "deed". Upon God's part this deed is the provision of the Word as a law of conduct. Upon man's part this deed is a worship and an intellectual illumination by consecrated practice of the law. Thus the Logos as a doing and a knowing the Will of God is grounded by Philo in one principle which describes God as a unique reference for both goodness and might and describes human nature as a unique reference for both "fear" and "love". We must now turn to the philosophic interpretation of Philo's mystery, the Logos doctrine.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE NOUS SPECULATION

Creation Ex Nihilo

Brehier has considered the possibility of Philo conceiving a creation *ex nihilo*, but inclines against the possibility in favor of a creation by stages. The problem of a creation *ex nihilo* involves a conception of time which confuses eternity with non-existence, a before or an after existence. Philo clearly identifies eternity with an ever extended present.⁷⁹ He does not regard creation as something following a stage of non-being. Creation for Philo is an ever present activity. It is distinguished as an act of God in the sense of a continuous exercise of the will to order.⁸⁰ God maintains the world, holds it from passing out of existence merely by "being". That is to say, He forever provides the object by which orderly relations can obtain. Existence is order guaranteed by an act of Will. Non-existence is chaos. This view assumes the reality of "mind" as the eternally active principle of the universe.

Mind and Measurement

Now Philo describes the universe as a system of measurement and in his allegorical fashion indicates that "mind", νοῦς,⁸¹ is the unit of measure for the system. Furthermore he accurately designates the functions to be ascribed to "mind" in the rôle of such a unit.⁸² Let us briefly review the ideas involved in such a problem as this and then indicate Philo's application of those ideas to a description of the universe as a system of measurement.

Now a system of measurement requires that there be available a minimum unit identical in form with a maximum unit. Between these as limits all numerical magnitude must be comprehended.

⁷⁹ Fuga. 56-57.

⁸⁰ Sp. L. IV, 187.

⁸¹ The nous speculation is usually associated with the name of Anaxagoras. In the doubtful treatise De. Aet. Mund. 4, Anaxagoras is mentioned by name. Elsewhere Philo indicates an acquaintance with his teaching. Fuga. 10; Som. I, 22; V. M. I, 280; Det. 1.

⁸² Heres. 227, sq.; Som. II, 193-196.

But in order that the minimum unit be distinguished from the maximum unit there must be available the same form in the character of a continuum. Examples of such continuity are space, time, number and consciousness.

Thus a system of measurement requires that there be available a unit form capable of representing three different functions, namely that of including, that of being included and that of being continuous. These three functions should not be regarded as properties of three different things but rather as three different manifestations of one form by the technique of measurement. It should not be said that a maximum, a minimum and a continuity obtain as things apart from each other. It should be said that magnitude and continuity receive meaning when a unit exemplifies the relations involved in measurement.

Philo describes the universe as a system of measurement by indicating how the "mind" as an indivisible unit is capable of dividing all things. The mind as such a unit exemplifies three functions of "division" which Philo calls "images" or "minds". To justify the analogy of mind to a measuring unit let us call attention to the three meanings of "division" which it illustrates.

The mind may divide in the sense of distributing. It may project ideas as though against a background and allot meaning to those ideas as in an act of organization. The mind itself remains "indivisible" in the sense that it is not itself assigned or allotted by something else but originates the act of distribution. Division in this sense is constructive and might better be called multiplication,⁸³ by organization.

83 The creative implications of this act are suggested by Philo's use of the term *σπειρεῖν*, in contrast with *διασπειρεῖν*, a *sowing* not a *squandering*. Philo distinguishes his view from the Stoic views of Logos Spermatikos and the Platonic views of classification by using the terms *τέμνειν* and *ταμιεύειν*. The act of the Creative Mind is a drastic "severance" of the creature from the Creator and a benevolent administration of creation. Conf. 190-198; Heres. 161-164; Sac. 74; L. A. II, 86; Mut. 179-180. There are two ideas underlying the use of *τέμνειν*. The one is a soteriological creation on the analogy of surgery and the other a creative explanation on the analogy of instruction. Cf. L. A. III, 36-41. When God creates he reduces chaos to order. As applied to the cosmos this is a twofold act by which God forestalls a confusion that would exist but never actually does exist, by establishing and maintaining order. The creature is ever rescued from a chaos and developed by organization, a twofold act which stabilizes creation as "change". When used with *ὄρχος*, *τέμνειν*, may mean to make a covenant.

The mind may divide in a passive sense. It may represent the continuity of consciousness as a sensory manifold. It may be subjected to an infinite division without ever being completely broken up into more primary elements. It divides in the sense that a continuum opens out into endless vistas. But it remains indivisible in the sense that a continuum is never completely exhausted by such passive readiness to unfold.⁸⁴

In the third sense the mind may divide by dissection.⁸⁵ It may analyze ideas that have been projected by breaking them up into parts for the sake of understanding. The mind that does this remains indivisible in the sense that a cutting edge must be sharp in order to dissect other things. Division in this sense may apply to the mind as an act of criticism. It is like the unit of measure which is applied to formulate the meaning of standards.

The Three Images

Philo describes the universe in terms of these three functions of mind by indicating the relations obtaining among three "images". The "first image" will be mind as it forever projects ideas as objective significances. This mind represents God in His rôle of "boundary" or limit. Such a limit is neither a substance, a void, a thing of size nor of indefinite extension.⁸⁶ It may be symbolized by the sphere of the fixed stars to suggest its function as the maximum unit for a system of complete measurement. But Philo empties this symbol of all materialistic significance. The mind as the "first image" represents God as Ruler and Guide,⁸⁷ a mind that contains without being contained, that limits without being limited. It is the meaning that would be reached when all objective significances have been analyzed.

The "third image" is the mind of man. It may be regarded as the minimum unit. Its function of measuring may be likened to a dissection or analysis of the parts of the universe as one would

84 Heres. 230 sq. τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ διεῖλεν; cf. ἐργάζεσθαι, L. A. I, 25-27, 89; Plant. 6; ἐπιτείνειν, Decal. 33-34; V. M. I, 25; L. A. III, 185; Deus. 24.

85 Conf. 190-198. διάκρισιν, διανέμησιν.

86 Heres. 228, οὐδενὸς σώματος, οὔτε ἰσομεγέθους αὐτῷ, οὔτε ἀπείρου, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὑπὸ κενοῦ κτλ.

87 ἔστι δὲ ὁρὸς αὐτοῦ ὁ Θεὸς ἡγίολος καὶ κυβερνήτης αὐτοῦ. Heres. 228; cf. Som. I, 64.

break up experienced ideas into parts for the sake of understanding.

The "second image" is a copy of the first and a model for the third says Philo. It is Nature conceived as a cosmic mind. It has no length nor breadth. It is "indivisible" in the sense of being a continuum. It is a principle of extension which both relates and distinguishes the "first image" from the "third image". (L. A. III 95-96).

Philo describes this relation by using the analogy of the sphere of the fixed stars and the sphere of the moving planets. He says that the "second image" or cosmic mind is to the "first image" or mind of God as the soul of man is to the mind of man.⁸⁸ Which is to say that the moving cosmic mind provides a mode of extension for the fixed mind of God as the living soul of man provides a mode of extension for the experience of the mind of man. Philo then explains that the correspondence between the cosmic mind and the soul of man is a correspondence between natural objects as things to be known and the perceptive faculties of man as the various senses by which the mind of man gains knowledge.⁸⁹ Thus the second image or cosmic mind which we may call Nature is not a self-contained entity nor is the soul of man a self-contained entity. These two things merely represent a mode of extension by which the mind of God and the mind of man are related. What appears like a sensory manifold to the mind of man is in reality a projection of ideas from the mind of God.⁹⁰

Let us then draw up a diagram of the universe as Philo's discussion would seem to suggest. We may represent the mind of God as forever projecting ideas which have objective significance. We may represent the mind of man projecting perceptive powers which have subjective significance. The cross section of these two projections where they meet is the world of natural experience. Into this natural world God ever pours meanings and from that natural world man may draw meanings. The essence of God and the essence of man remain unknown in themselves just as mini-

88 Heres. 231-236.

89 L. A. III, 185 ἀπὸ γὰρ τούτου (ὁ νοῦς) καθάπερ τινὸς πηγῆς αἰσθητικαὶ τείνονται δυνάμεις κτλ.

90 L. A. I, 25. ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ ἐπομβρήσῃ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὰς ἀντιλήψεις τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὁ Θεός, οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς ἐργάζεται καὶ πραγματεύεται τι περὶ αἰσθησιν.

mum and maximum limits convey no meaning until they are related to each other. But the world of natural experience as the analogue of that relation is forever becoming more fully known as the difference between God and man is ever becoming more accurately measured. Like a Word, a Book, a Law, a Covenant and an experience the meaning projected into the world may be drawn from it. Like an ever lengthening conversation between a creative and an appreciative mind the world of experience both broadens the difference between God and man and narrows the distance between a knowledge of God's Will and an acceptance of God's purpose for man. It seems that Philo uses geometric analogies to suggest that the universe as a system of measurement is like a Book which may bring author and reader into communion no matter how far apart they may be in other respects than their intellectual sympathies.

Such a diagrammatic description of the universe offers an opportunity to stress the notion of perspective. Without pushing the geometric analogy to an absurdity we may nevertheless stress the idea that personal attitudes are like points of view which alter the whole perspective of experience. And we may say that there is but one point of view by which a man may be so related to God that his world of experience becomes an inspiring and harmonious vista of meanings which bear witness to the Will of God for him.

The description of the universe as we have outlined it has more to do with psychology and ethics than with cosmology as such. To be sure Philo's moral and religious views are incompatible with a materialistic cosmology. And in so far as materialism involves ethics and theology Philo is concerned with the cosmological problem. His apparent familiarity with mathematical conceptions seems to provide him with tools for abstract thought which have undergone development since the immaterialism of Plato was first proclaimed. Nevertheless Philo uses mathematical analogies to suggest or illustrate fundamental relationships which are more significant for him in the field of personal attitudes than in the field of speculative cosmology. Natural science becomes absorbed into a psycho-ethic. The use of mind as a fundamental unit centers the whole problem of philosophy in the intentions, realizations and habits of thought which constitute the very stuff of experience. The *nous* speculation is bound up with teleology.

The Pythagorean Harmony

We have suggested a place for the Logos in our outline of the *nous* speculation and in our preliminary remarks on the two types of teleology. What we are now to consider is that "second image" which when called the cosmic mind is no more than a hypostasis for the whole-part relation and when called a teleological series, constitutes a program of action operating in one direction and a rational discourse operating in the opposite direction.

Before we consider this hypostasis let us indicate how the Logos doctrine ties into the "mystery" that centers Philo's thought. In giving the traditional Covenant of Israel a universal meaning it would seem that Philo recognizes a certain congeniality between his own religious insights as a Jew and a not dissimilar insight into the creative-appreciative unity of "purified reason" as expressed among Gentile thinkers. In particular the Pythagoreans⁹¹ seem to have contributed to a conception of reason in which such a bifocal feature is prominent. Now without minimizing the difficulties of identifying the Pythagoreans as a separate sect in Philo's day we may nevertheless call attention to the fact that a peculiar congeniality existed between the Jews and the Pythagoreans as evidenced in the Essene sect and in the writings of Josephus. What we wish to suggest is that Philo's eulogies of the Pythagoreans and his exploitation of their technical terms rests upon kindred insights rather than upon a substitution of pagan mysticism for Jewish faith. And such insights are intimately related to the Logos doctrine.

Franz Cumont⁹² has called attention to the fact that a succession of commentators on the *Timaeus*, from the Stoics at the close of the Republic to the Neoplatonists at the close of the Empire, made use of a Pythagorean myth of Mnemosyne for the exegesis of certain passages. A hymn containing the myth is reported by Proclus and interpreted at some length by Posidonius in commenting upon the *Timaeus*. Philo relates the myth in *Plant.* 127-131, cites *Timaeus* 29 A and parallels Posidonius in many ways throughout the discussion. Further than this Philo often uses many of the Pythagorean symbols associated with the famous "harmony of the spheres". Cumont thinks that Philo makes use of such

91 In Prob. 2-4 Philo eulogizes the "most sacred sect of Pythagoreans".

92 Un Mythe Pythagorean, *Revue de Philologie*, Paris, 1919, pp. 78-85.

ideas to indicate his Logos as a principle of coherence among the diverse parts of the cosmos. This had been done by other Stoics beside Posidonius and would seem to have constituted a favored monistic argument for various schools of thought.

An attempt to extricate the significances of the various symbols which are brought together to indicate the famous "harmony" is probably a futile undertaking. We may however classify three different types of symbolism that are involved. There is a number symbolism that indicates an abstract grounding for the doctrine in certain mathematical ideas. Thus the number "one", "four", "seven" and "ten" each indicates "all" in different but compatible senses.

A second type of symbolism represents the muses as a celestial choir led by Mnemosyne,⁹³ mother and leader, or by Apollo Musagete. This symbolism would seem to suggest that as each muse represents one of the arts or sciences and also one of the celestial spheres so all branches of knowledge may come into harmonious accord with each other and with the natural objects they represent.

The third symbol is an allegory of "purified reason". When God created the world He found it to be perfect in all details with the single exception of the need for a rational creature to enjoy its excellence with Him. He therefore created man as one who might study and then eulogize His work not merely in flattery but with critical insight into the skill displayed in creation. Thus to man is assigned both the honor of raising hymns of praise to God and the duty to construct those hymns with critical candour. Only a "purified reason" can raise a hymn appropriate to the creative skill of God. Thus for the complete harmony of creative and appreciative endeavor there must be a rapport of divine and human reason.

It is not necessary to suppose that this theme of "purified reason" presented any very novel conceptions to the Jewish faith of Philo despite the philosophic presuppositions of the symbols used. The whole-part relation as treated by mathematical symbols is not inassimilable to the whole-part relation involved in Jewish counsel concerning righteousness through the law. The convergence of all arts and sciences is already a traditional feature of the study

93 Plant. 129.

of the Torah. And the creative-appreciative way of knowledge is already featured in Judaism as a learning by doing.

What remains to be considered is the extent to which Philo subdues or evades the philosophic presuppositions of the Pythagorean symbols in the exposition of his religious theme. Let us return to the matter of "division" in order to discover Philo's view of some of these presuppositions.

Division

Philo agrees with the Stoics against the Epicureans when he rejects the notion of a void. In this he is in line with the sentiment of the Rabbis when they declared that "even the empty space is full of God". For purposes of allegory Philo seems to identify God with the sphere of the fixed stars as Boethus had done. (*D. L.* VII 148). But he hastens to rid this symbolism of all materialistic significance. He does not materialize Deity into "air" as Antipater had done. (*Ibid.*). And he is emphatic in his repudiation of materialistic implications in his use of the term πνεῦμα. Philo's "spirit" is not Stoic.⁹⁴

In considering an operative "division" Philo seems to agree with Chrysippus and Epicurus against Apollodorus that "division" operates ceaselessly in principle but does not produce an infinite regression. (*D. L.* VII -50; X 56).

But the entire setting of Philo's discussion of division is in a realm apart from Stoic and Epicurean materialism. Philo is concerned with "division" as a feature of measurement rather than a principle of attrition. The setting is Pythagorean. Nevertheless Philo does not adopt the Pythagorean conception of number. Numbers are not final entities but modes of expression. Philo says that although the "one" and the "monad" are categories appropriate to the One God yet God is the sole standard for the "monad" rather than vice versa. For like time all number is subsequent to the universe while God is prior to the universe as its Maker.⁹⁵

Thus Philo has denied formal finalities as the grounding for "division" and made that operation purely functional as an "art" of God. The hypostasis of this "art" is the Logos which is

94 τὸ πνεῦμα οὐκ ἀέρα κινούμενον. Det. 83; cf. Gig. 22 sq.

95 L. A. II, 3.

neither created nor uncreated. Like the Epicurean "categories" without which "body" cannot be known, the "art" of God is to be conceived as neither mind or matter but as a mode of expression for both mental and sensuous experience. The apparent discrepancy between these two expressions of one "art" lies in the difference between "dividing" "equally" and "unequally".⁹⁶

God may be said to "divide" "equally"⁹⁷ in the sense that He provides the standard by which all existing things are "measured" without residue. God's "division" is constructive. He does not submit to *a priori* norms but creates the norms which define order, proportion, symmetry and such types of "equality". God's function as a standard "places" all possible meanings in their peculiar relation to truth.

Man "divides" "unequally" in the sense that he cannot provide a standard by which to analyze things into their authentic "parts". He must therefore seek such a standard if his "divisions" are to be made without residue. His "divisions" must be an infinite regress unless he comes to "see" God as the standard. Without faith in God man can have no norms for analysis. He can only arrange things as "opposites" and refer both to God for meaning. When Philo says that Moses anticipated the Heraclitian principle that "opposites" are parts within a defining whole his superficial plagiarism is a justifiable recognition of a fundamental trait of Hebrew thinking. For it was true that the Hebrew habit of thought explained things by reference to God without permitting

96 The principles of "equality" and "inequality" are associated by Philo with two Pythagorean number series. (Qu. in Gen. II, 5, ed. Aucher.). The "equal numbers" are the "tetrahedrons" or series of perfect squares formed by adding the odd numbers cumulatively. The "unequal" or "oblong" numbers are produced by adding the even numbers cumulatively and each is an $x(x+1)$. The "equal" series has its limit in one and symbolizes both an arithmetic and a geometric application of a given factor multiplied by itself. The "unequal" series has its limit in zero and represents an incommensurable extension, for it cannot be reduced to two identical factors. This series would seem to express by multiplication the same significance that by division is expressed in the continuing fraction. The "equal" series will symbolize an identity of limits "one" and "all". The "unequal" series will symbolize a disparity of the limits, zero and incommensurable infinity. Both series are required to symbolize a universe in which recurrent "needs" are periodically supplied, the "inspiration" and "expiration" of Pythagoreanism.

Philo frequently condemns the use of two "measures", a great and a small. (E. g. Heres. 161-164). There is only one real limit, the monad. The other is the abstract zero of human subjectivity, the need for a dependable standard. (Som. II, 193-194).

97 Heres. 141, sq.

logical contradictions to nullify central meanings. By an early repudiation of polytheism in religion and morals the Jews had undercut the metaphysical problem of discrete finalities. Philo's recognition of the abstract statement for a habit of thought inherent in Judaism constitutes an application of a monotheistic faith to a monistic theory of limits. By his "unequal" "divisions" man gropes for meaning without finding a criterion of judgment until such time as he refers all things to God. Analytical division is not to be confused with the partitioning of substances. It is the search for meaning by reference to a standard.

Thus the "art"⁹⁸ of God as constructive "division" or distribution and the interpretative endeavor of man by analysis may be formulated in a proposition something like this: To say that the universe is divisible into an infinite number of parts is to say that it is the product of an ever active constructive art. The two features of this proposition are described by Philo as operations of *Logos Tomeus*, the Dividing Word, and *Logos Infinite*, the Law of God.

Logos Tomeus

The function of *Logos Tomeus* is that of a unit of measure. In this rôle it may be hypostatized into a "fifth" element,⁹⁹ a "periodic nature" in contrast with the four traditional elements of ancient physics, earth, air, fire and water. Unlike those four it is not cognate with "sense" as some particular sort of matter but with the "mind" as a "light". It operates like the effluence of a light rather than like a primordial stuff. It is periodic like a measuring unit.

The substantial origin that makes the measurements of the *Logos* real is not some "universal essence" in the sense of ἀμορφος ὕλη. It is an immaterial point of reference. It is God as a

⁹⁸ Heres. 156.

⁹⁹ Soulier has recognized this Peripatetic feature in Philo's cosmology. Drummond denies Philo's use of the idea but fails to recognize Philo's familiarity with Pythagorean speculation on limits. He dismisses Philo's frequent use of the idea of God as a "boundary", putting it down as "one of Philo's grand phrases". Drummond also fails to catch the significance of an atomism in which configuration subordinates the idea of a fusion of substances. For Philo's references to a "fifth" element see Qu. in Gen. III, 6 ed. Aucher.; Heres. 283; Som. I, 21; Abr. 162; Mig. 198; Heres. 134-140; Plant. 132-138.

"boundary". Such a boundary or "place" may be said to be "no-where" and "everywhere". (*Conf.* 136). For it is an act that originates all orientation. It guarantees to the unit of measure that feature of reference by which the periodic application of the same unit may make extension a reality. The four traditional elements will be to *Logos Tomeus* as the digits of a number sequence are to the unit. They represent different modes of extension, different combinations of the same unit.

Logos Tomeus is thus the cosmological counterpart for the detailing of an immediate mental apprehension into the parts of a rational discourse. *Logos Tomeus* grounds the details of this discourse in the objectivity of the cosmos by referring both the unit it deploys and the act by which it measures to the substantial reality of the First Cause. Thus *Logos Tomeus* is the distribution of meanings guaranteed an objective validity by the exact relation each bears to the creative intent of a universal mind.¹⁰⁰ That which is without extension becomes a discourse of rational meaning by the operation of *Logos Tomeus*.

Logos Infinite also "divides". But this division is a function of holding parts in their respective places. The operation of this Logos is understood by regarding the universe as a manifold of various qualities. Such a manifold would be a mere chaos¹⁰¹ unless some structural law guaranteed that no part could cancel out another part and that the whole could not disintegrate by parts falling away from each other in endless dispersion. (*Plant.* 6).

Whether we start with a homogeneous substance or with a variety of qualities the universe will remain merely an imaginary chaos or absence of order unless by a creative act the functional Logos divides and maintains by structural law the "gifts" of the creative mind. The one function of *Logos Tomeus* and *Logos Infinite* is to provide coherence in a universe where there is both a unity in variety and a variety in unity. The guarantee of the reality of this extension is the substantial reality of God. God as the Cause of all expression is the point of origin for all modes

100 The association of *Logos Tomeus* with God's Oath and the covenant seems to be implied by Philo's use of the figure of a "hostage" in describing this Logos. Heres. 206 sq. Brehier, op. cit., 86, has remarked upon the importance of *Logos Tomeus* in Philo's thought and Inge has done likewise.

101 Compare Timaeus, 51 with Philo's modification of the Stoic *κράσις δι' ἑλων* in Mig. 180-183.

of measured meaning, the *Guarantor* that a unit common to all parts of the cosmos has objective validity. That unit is mind.

We may regard the Logos as a principle of emanation and a law of structural coherence. The two descriptions are two specifications or modes of extension. But the Logos as the mere principle of extension should not be specified as to mode for it ranks among "first things" only in the sense of being one removed from the Uncreated. As emanation the Logos is specified by the Creative Goodness of God. As structural coherence the Logos is specified by the Controlling Power of God. Philo does not specify other modes of extension in any very systematic fashion. The Word of many "names" indicates many functions or "powers".¹⁰² Philo says these are innumerable by which he probably means that God exercises His Will in innumerable ways. However in commenting upon various first principles of the schools Philo does employ the idea of continuity to indicate that all things must begin and end in God. It is only as the Logos provides the principle of such continuity that things can be regarded as real. Otherwise they would be discrete and empty ideas.

Thus although the "element" στοιχεῖον is the unit of numerical extension¹⁰³ Philo has removed from that "element" the final principle of Pythagorean metaphysics by declaring that number is consequent upon creation rather than an *a priori* principle.

Similarly *Logos Spermatikos* does not indicate for Philo that "seed" is a final principle. He describes its distribution throughout the body much as Sphaerus had done. (*D. L.* VII 159). But he cites a Pythagorean objection that "seed" is nothing in itself.¹⁰⁴ Philo describes *Logos Spermatikos* functionally as "that which openeth the womb".¹⁰⁵ A career is begun, a vital extension is created but the beginning and end of that career is in God. This vitalism may be generalized to include all forms of life, physical, natural, mental and the like. Such life is merely apparent and not real unless its source and limit is in God.¹⁰⁶ The term "soul", ψυχή is made a synonym for *Logos Spermatikos*. The πνεῦμα or rational spirit is not a function of the physical body as with the Stoics. It is a distensible reality that relates the soul to God.

102 Conf. 146.

103 Heres. 190; Plant. 75-78; L. A. II, 3.

104 Opif. 67; cf. Arist. Aet. Plac. V, 3, 417.

105 Heres. 118; cf. Conf. 83, sq. σφάλλω, versus ἀσφάλτος.

106 Heres. 45, sq.

Again, the status of the Platonic idea is subordinated to the principle of continuity, the Logos, when Philo says that each idea must be "stamped" with one "seal" which he calls "virtue" and the "idea of ideas".¹⁰⁷ Discrete ideas are but figments of the imagination. Until ideas are organized by the "art" of God they have no reality.¹⁰⁸ For it is by the "art" of God that particular ends receive value, the value of a distinctive place within a continuity of ends. Thus God cannot be said to be an idea nor is the Logos an idea. God functions as Creator and the Logos expresses the deeds of God. These deeds may be called ideas for they stand in relation to each other as a coherent expression of many and various values all of which are revealing moments of the one value, namely the creative goodness of God.

Summary

There is a sense in which Philo's denial of the finality of different "first principles" of the various schools constitutes a negative definition of God, a description of God in terms of what He is not. But after all Philo's conception is unintelligently criticised by urging this negative definition as a characteristic of the conception. To say that Philo defines by negation is tacitly to assume the finality of the things he denies. One makes *a priori* principles that are incompatible with Philo's view, the criteria of judgment, a dogmatic procedure unworthy of intelligent criticism. Thus to say that Philo makes God an abstraction because he denies that the "essence" of God can be known is merely to define "essence" as something that is not abstract and to argue that Philo's God must therefore be relatively abstract in terms of the critic's presuppositions in the matter of a meaning for "essence".

It is a much fairer criticism of Philo's conception to say that the Logos is an abstraction. For it hypostatizes a relationship which must be conceived as a principle of continuity in which function and form are merely the coordinates of activity.

We are to think of the perfection of God as complete without being inactive. God alone may be said to "rest". His rest is a continuously successful activity without strain.¹⁰⁹

107 Mig. 103; Fuga. 7-13.

108 Heres. 154-161.

109 Cherub. 87; L. A. I, 5-18; Sac. 40.

We are to think of the activity of God as real without involving a change of place such as is required of a part within a whole.¹¹⁰ The highest degree of activity and the highest degree of fixity are one and the same in God. God in moving, says Philo, does not change His "place" but employs "one intense motion".¹¹¹

The unity of God is therefore not a monotony but rather a richness accessible to appreciation by means of the many "powers" which set off the excellence of each other within the more excellent unity.¹¹² Absolute activity and fixed values are the two coordinates for the expression of a meaningful whole that would otherwise be inaccessible to appreciation.

All being save Deity is hypothetical and is involved in some relation to God. It is incorrect however to say that being itself is a form of necessity. Being is rather a principle of spontaneity, of free will and of benevolence. For it is by such a category that God creates and specifies hypothetical reality in positive ways. There thus arises created being of many and various sorts such as corporeal and incorporeal, mortal and immortal, movable and immovable and the like.

In this creative activity there is made manifest a third principle which is neither uncreated as God nor yet created as are the objects of God's working. This principle is the Logos as the continuity of God's works, the "powers" of God made manifest.

¹¹⁰ Post. 19-20, 28; Ebriet. 119-120.

¹¹¹ Sac. 68.

¹¹² Sac. 59; V. M. II, 132-133; Sp. L. I, 41-51.

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER XIX

CONSCIENCE

Sacred Reason

According to Philo, a man is made in the "image of God" in two respects. He is a "mind", a free rational agent.¹¹³ He is a value, a "God-loving disposition", a creature with a "hope" in God.¹¹⁴ It is only when man is of this sort, a reasoning being with an infinite hope, that he can be said to differ from an animal automaton.

But reason is twofold,¹¹⁵ says Philo. It may be the formal means for securing merely apparent goods. Such reason is doomed to confusion because it rests upon the variability of human desire which can lend it no abiding principle of order.¹¹⁶ On the other hand, reason may become the best of instruments, full of clarity and truth,¹¹⁷ if it becomes established upon that One Good which is eternally fixed in God who never varies.

It is because man is free to choose¹¹⁸ between the One Good in God and the multitude of things that can only appear good that there arises the possibility of that frustration which is the "death of the soul", the break with the world of reality guaranteed by God and the entry into a world of fantasy constructed by the vain imaginings of man. A man may make many errors in judgment and so secure only empty satisfactions. But he has always that capacity to "hope" in God and by "memory" recover his course and proceed with the support of an unfailing Benevolence. Evil is the neglect or "forgetting" of this criterion, a lingering with the

113 Det. 22-26; Sp. L. IV, 14.

114 Som. II, 219-267; Det. 138-140; Praem. 10-11; Abr. 7-40; Qu. in Gen. I, 80.

115 Som. II, 240 sq.; cf. Sac. 2.

116 Post. 52-65; Conf. 176-180; 142-149; 107-133.

117 L. A. III, 118-132.

118 Deus. 45-50; Opif. 73; Ebriet. 4-13; Plant. 43-45; Det. 122.

abortive structure reasoned out by mind to secure baseless unsupported goods.¹¹⁹

Thus Philo says that the evil man endeavors to construct a "city of reason" which will guarantee him his desires but he finds that instead he has imagined a chaotic anarchy of lust. The pious man on the contrary builds a "city of reason" upon unselfish allegiance to God and discovers that all is peace and order and blessing under such monarchy.

This theme of a "sacred reason" may be found in Fourth Maccabees.¹²⁰ It indicates how congenial to the Jews was the Stoic conception of reason as a fundamental ethical principle.¹²¹ But, whereas the Stoics thought of this principle as a rational will the Jews regarded it as the proper attitude before the sacred Law, thus giving it a religious basis rather than a grounding in ethical theory. It was a developed conscience for the Jews and a self-reliance for the Stoic, two ideas that may become exact opposites. We must therefore distinguish Philo's Stoic terminology from his Jewish conception of Law, for it is in the attitude to Law that a divergence is most clearly seen.

Stoic Reason

The Stoics distinguished between a reason which is the providential order of Nature, *Logos Prophorikos*, and a reason which is the inner movement of the provident Spirit immanent in all things, *Logos Endiathetos*. Their moral problem therefore reduced to the simple injunction to live in accord with Nature. And

119 Fuga. 77-86.

120 Fourth Maccabees, I, i; VII, 16; XIII, 1; XV, 20; XVI, 1; XVIII, 2.

121 Several types of reason are distinguishable in Philo's discussions. (1) speculative reason or "mind", νοῦς Opif. 8, (2) analytical reason leading to understanding, ἀρχινοῖαν, Agri. 135, (3) critical reason leading to evaluation, κανόνι ὁρθοῦ λόγου, Agri. 130; Prob. 46-47; Sac. 46, 48; Post. 91-96. This term ὁρθός λόγος goes back to Diogenes the Cynic but was used by the Stoics also. The Cynics emphasized unconventional moral criteria while the Stoics emphasized earnest reasoning. Diog. Laert. VI, 73; VII, 47. Philo uses the term to indicate a rational training of preferences by instruction and experience. This leads to a suggestion of a fourth type of reason which Philo derives from Judaism; (4) practical reason or learning by doing, παιδεία. The law is likened to an instructive "father" who trains the devotee by a regimen. Agri. 171; Abr. 1-6; 99-102; Som. II, 1-109.

since the rational spirit is immanent in man as a part of Nature, he has simply to order his thought so that he may never be out of harmony with the natural vicissitudes of life.

This simple counsel expressed a noble austerity that refused to acknowledge either pleasure or pain as good or evil in themselves. But its practical working out led to unfortunate consequences. It led to that futility which having failed to get what it wants strives to become content by wanting what it gets. The goal of the Stoic became a condition of "apathy" immune from the promise of good or the threat of evil. Reason became a concern for the individual soul and providence a wistful dream.

By his austere reason the Stoic might escape any disillusionment of cherished desires and any despotism of haunting fears. But for such freedom he must pay the price of never abandoning himself to an enterprise which involved factors beyond his control. As Epictetus puts it,¹²² a man must sharply separate those things which he can control from those things he cannot control and concern himself for the former alone. Stoicism required a stern sense of duty but it practically eliminated faith.¹²³ The caution against disillusionment read out of the doctrine that sort of surrender by which a man transcends himself in the quest of the ideal. The Stoic must find the ideal in his own soul or reject it as an irrational snare.

Despite the keen moral insights which brighten the pages of a Seneca or an Epictetus we must say that the Stoic view of Natural Law developed the attitude of a prudent man who has fallen into the hands of a master whom he but vaguely understands but whom he humors by an apparent servility the while he cherishes within himself the dignity of his own free soul. He takes Nature very literally but not too seriously. He submits with good grace to the natural course of events but does not permit those events to perturb the inner peace of mind to which he may retreat whenever circumstances threaten his control over his desires or fears. Nature is a god whom it pays to understand but a man's own soul is the only thing he can trust.

The fundamental difficulty with the Stoic doctrine of a law of reason lay in this assumption of two incompatible principles for

122 Bk. I, ch. 12.

123 Cf. Epictetus, Bk. I, ch. 25-26.

its administration. *Logos Prophorikos* operates by natural force and *Logos Endiathetos* by spiritual initiative. The Stoic tried to unify these two principles in a conception of the Pneuma, or spirit, as a pure material essence, even going to the extreme of declaring that thought itself is material. Whatever might be the merit of such a conception for a natural science of matter and force, its moral implications are disastrous. In theory it declares that a man's inner reason initiates the same activity which the natural course of events prescribes. In practice it recognizes that the natural course of events often thwarts man's most carefully laid plans. Man is therefore reduced to legislating for the realm of his own soul because he is not entrusted with the exercise of a force sufficient to alter events in nature. The moral law becomes an instrument administered by force over moral agents incapable of meeting that force with aught but a noble resignation. The spiritual domination so boldly proclaimed by the Stoic lost the brightness of its promise by committing the administration of the moral law to irresponsible material forces.¹²⁴

Theocracy

It is because Philo can bring to the theory of law a principle of administration that subordinates material force to a higher responsibility that he can extend the Stoic sense of duty to a free enlightened conscience. The principle is that of *Theocracy* and Philo has a practical example of the principle in the administration of the Jewish Law.

Now the Jewish Law was without parallel among the nations because its administration depended upon no political power nor official authority. Its administration rested upon a most successful enterprise of popular education. Scribism and the Synagogue did for Israel what had never been done for any people outside the pages of Plato's *Republic*. They had so integrated and instructed the Jews from youth up that as Josephus declares, the Law was written upon the very soul of each Jew.¹²⁵ Other peoples scarcely knew what their laws were, much less obeyed them. The Jew alone knew at all times what to do, why he did it

124 Cicero shrewdly remarks, "Ergo id est convenienter naturae vivere, a natura discedere." *De Finibus*, Bk. IV, ch. 15.

125 *Contra Apion*, II, 164-189; cf. Philo, *Gaius*, 210.

and whom he obeyed. According to Josephus, the Jewish Law was uniquely superior to the legislation of all other nations because it never allowed theory, practice and inculcation to become separated.

From the experience of the Jews Philo may draw a principle for the administration of law which other philosophers had known only as a theory and never as an object lesson.¹²⁶ By this principle a precise moral education for each person provided a motivation extending from the simplest practices of youth to the most profound contemplation of wise men.

The consequent success of Israel as a militant social order and an example of moral excellence could not fail to suggest a conformity with natural conditions and eternally valid principles of life, no matter how one might explain the claim for divine revelation in Israel's Law. Philo is glad to admit that the excellent principles of morality in that Law may be found scattered throughout the traditions of other nations. But Israel alone had collected these principles into one code and without using force or officialism had made them the daily practice of every Jew.

When therefore Philo claims a natural validity for his Law, that claim rests in significant degree upon the successful method of administration. Josephus in an attempt to describe this method coined the term *Theocracy*. Philo describes it by saying that God offers this Law but does not enforce it by any punishments.¹²⁷ It is a saving Law to allure men to virtue and not an enforced guidance by which even a selfish fool can stumble upon great treasure. Only the wise can appreciate it and freely accept it.

This description of the Law will not fit in with an analogy from a fatalistic natural process. And despite the fact that Philo frequently describes the Law in Stoic language his attitude toward the Law makes it necessary for us to seek a different descriptive analogy. An obvious analogy for such description is the "unwritten law" of the best social practice that dictates only through developed sentiments and habits. For the Jews this did not mean the deification of convention and social pressure. Scribism and

126 An exception may be made in the case of Cicero. The Roman had an object lesson to present in the success of Roman law as an instrument of civil order. Brehier has noted the parallel between Cicero and Philo in proclaiming a universal law grounded in "nature" and in resting that claim upon a tradition that had proven itself by survival.

127 Decal. 175 sq.

the Synagogue had provided that directive agency by which the rigidity of tradition had become balanced with changing conditions of life. In proportion as a man can see that the best social practice has the sanction of divine truth he will lose all sense of social pressure and make the principles of social order a matter between himself and God. And should he consider that the moral character of God is inadequately expressed in some detail of the social code he is free to modify that detail according to his vision and by an established technique of scribal amendment to the current legislation on that point.

Such innovation may incur the censure of society for an apparent violation of the code. It does not involve physical nature. The good man may stand with God against society for the improvement of that society.^{127*} He never retreats within his own soul as though social pressure were his "natural" master. There is no natural master over man, conceived as physical nature or human nature. "As mortals we must suffer," says Philo, "but let our sufferings be that other kind which is the reaction of our own activity."¹²⁸ Man should acknowledge no Lord save the God above the material and the social realm.¹²⁹ The highest boast of the good man is to be a "slave of God".¹³⁰ In this service he becomes a god to other men and enjoys an equal footing with Nature, another slave of the same God.¹³¹

When therefore Philo takes over the Stoic terms for an inner reason and a reason expressed in the moral order of the world he does not read the real freedom of man out of the picture. *Logos Endiathetos* in the cosmos becomes something like the Platonic ideas or eternal beauties rather than a pantheistic world spirit.¹³² And *Logos Prophorikos* becomes the dramatic expression of God's Grace through those excellences. In man *Logos Endiathetos* becomes a conscientious purpose and *Logos Prophorikos* its dramatization in word and deed.

The Law is equivalent to Nature because it represents the larger experience of the race in which are collected permanently valid principles for an ever increasing harmony among men even as the

127* Mig. 57-63.

128 Cherub. 74-83.

129 Mut. 22 sq.

130 Cherub. 107.

131 Prob. 41-72; Sobriet. 51-58.

132 V. M. II, 127-135; Mig. 70-85.

theocratic principle has manifested a perfect harmony in the natural world.¹³³ The Law is not like any mechanical device but like a garden planted by God in the soul where the virtues may grow as trees husbanded by man and stimulated by the sunlight of a divine Goodness.¹³⁴

Conscience

Philo describes in allegorical fashion the manner in which the Law became so individual and yet so universally valid. When God delivered the Decalogue, he transmitted it to man by the most marvelous of instruments.¹³⁵ This was an "invisible echo" acting like a *voice* composed of neither body nor soul but so omnipresent that it addressed each man near and far alike. It was both "seen" and "heard" within each mind as though it presented one truth as both a flash of "light" and a reasoned discourse.¹³⁶ It was a "power of God in action", newly created as a divine voice. It rang through the Law like a breath (*Pneuma*) through a trumpet. Yet it was not a material breath like the Stoic rational spirit (*Pneuma*), but a more fundamental harmony clear and articulate, a very creative principle of rational spirit. It was like a "fire"¹³⁷ that may guide by its light and punish by its heat.

Thus Philo describes the divine origin of conscience. It is the very spirit of the moral law and the indispensable instrument of instruction for any who would listen to God through the Torah. There are a number of functions ascribed by Philo to this innermost reason which acts as the voice of God.

In the first place conscience has a sovereign character. It acts as a king, a governor, a high priest, trustee, a father, a tutor.¹³⁸ It comes to the soul as a "hearth of hospitality". The actions of this soul are blameless for they are non-moral. Its first business

133 V. M. II, 45-52; Sp. L. IV, 179-192.

134 L. A. I, 43-55.

135 Decal. 32-50; Praem. 2; Sp. L. II, 188-192.

136 Cf. Mig. 36-63.

137 The allegory of the burning bush and the ἀπαθὴς οὐσία suggests the divine championship which is associated with the αὐτοκελεύστω προθυμία of Moses. God delivers His people by the power He exerts through their conscience to make them invincible. V. M. I, 63-73; cf. the messianic discussion in which "virtue" delivers the dispersed by striking terror in their masters. Praem. 164; cf. Fuga. 157-169.

138 Deus. 134 sq.; Som. II, 185-189.

is to "pollute" this house or make evident the faulty condition of unaided human reason. It reveals the evil in conduct that was innocent enough before but cannot remain innocent after the moral law is divinely revealed. The allegory suggests the quickening to moral life and judgment that suggests the thought of John 5:25.

Conscience has also a judicial rôle. It is now called a judge, an umpire, a witness and an accuser.¹³⁹ But the term used most often is "conviction" or "cross examination", *ἐλεγχος*, the same word which in the famous definition of faith in *Hebrews* 11:1 has been translated as "evidence" or "conviction" of things not seen. It is a legal term and it is of interest to note that while cross examination as an instrument of justice was apparently unknown to Hellenism¹⁴⁰ the Jewish book *Susannah* shows that it was familiar to the Jews.

Philo derives the judicial function of conscience from "nature". It is not the authority but the rational character of the Law and conscience that convicts. God does not convict. He provides a saving law clearly understood of reason. Man can accept or reject this rational advocate. If he rejects it he becomes a morally "dead" soul to whom the "incorruptible high priest" conscience will cease to come. If he accepts it he has a companion to advise him. In any case the reward is with God and it is positive only.¹⁴¹ That is to say God inflicts no punishment for the rejection of conscience but he will not vitalize into moral life and inspiration the soul that offers him no opportunity to confer that reward.

Flouting conscience is an impiety because it is like asking God to swear falsely in a court of justice.¹⁴² It is also irrational to flout conscience because this is an abortive attempt to thwart that fundamental justice that deals with the innermost secrets of a man's heart no matter what his outer fortunes may be.

But the most important rôle of conscience is neither its sovereign nor its judicial rôle. Its greatest blessing is as an avenue of friendship with God. The Supreme Deity is a God of friends and man may know him as a Friend.¹⁴³ If man were a slave it would be an audacity for him to argue with conscience. But

139 Fuga. 113-118, 5-6; Opif. 128; cf. Plato, Rep. 532 sq.

140 So Tarn, Hellenistic Civilization, pp. 186-187.

141 L. A. I, 96; Post. 80 sq.

142 Decal. 82-95.

143 Heres. 1-52 sq.; cf. Mig. 109-117.

among friends "freedom of speech" involves no loss of dignity nor respect. Convention and formality have their place but Philo indicates how subordinate is that place when he eulogizes Diogenes the Cynic for that "freedom of speech" which he first made famous by boldly speaking out his mind on all occasions.¹⁴⁴ The virtuous man, says Philo, may enjoy no less "freedom of speech" with God his Friend. Indeed, as the Pythagorean maxim declared, "a friend is another self".¹⁴⁵ The Lover of God in discourse with his conscience may appear to others to be alone, but, says Philo, there are two present, the one "self-taught wisdom" and the other the Invisible God.¹⁴⁶ It is in this free and confident investigation of conscience that a man may receive his richest insights. Such was the case with Moses the friend of God. Like any other man Moses frequently encountered insuperable difficulties. He then turned and asked God as one companion to another what should be done. There followed a "happy conjecture". Philo declares that all such "happy conjectures" are in their nature prophecies.¹⁴⁷

This would seem to suggest that as Moses in a dialogue with God became instructed and as the Scribes by the question and answer form of investigation into the Law secured practical solutions to moral problems so any man instructed in the Law may freely question his conscience and thereby receive enlightenment as from a Divine friend. Conscience therefore is never to be regarded with that superstition which shirks the obligations of hard thinking. It is to be regarded as a friendly adviser representing the offer of advice from above.

The theory of conscience may be summarized by reviewing the three essentials which Philo lays down in describing the inspirable mind. There must be a *good natural disposition*, an unselfish piety.¹⁴⁸ There must be added to this *instruction* in the best available learning, which for Philo meant the Torah but also the general knowledge of the day as an aid to its interpretation. There

144 Prob. 121-126, 19-20; cf. Diog. Laert. VI, 69.

145 Cf. Qu. in Gen. I, 17 ed. Aucher.

146 αὐτομαθῆς σοφίαν Det. 29-31; cf. 44.

147 V. M. III, 264-267.

148 τῆς διδακτῆς, ὁ δὲ τῆς φυσικῆς, ὁ δὲ τῆς ἀσκητικῆς σοφίας κανὼν. (V. M. I, 76); διδασκαλίας, τελειότητος, ἀσκήσεως, (Mut. 12); διδασκαλίας ἀρετῆς, φυσικῆς, ἀσκητικῆς (Abr. 52 sq.); cf. Ebriet. 82-83; cf. Clement, Strom. I, 334 sq.

must be added to these *practice* or trained habits of action in accord with the best learning.

. Each of these three things constitutes a "grace" and is typified by an appropriate biblical character. The learned Abraham typifies a speculative reason, the practical Jacob an active obedience or practical reason and the "self-taught" Isaac a critical reason. The three heroes represent a composite character of the mind prepared for "migration" or inventive imagination which is so-sanctioned by God that it becomes like an artist "able to invest the objects which it paints or forms with motion and life . . . the arts which were previously imitative of the works of nature appear now to have become the natures themselves".¹⁴⁹

There is a further significance to Philo's identification of the constituents of the conscientious mind with the patriarchs. When God said "I am the God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob", this, says Philo, was to indicate that God permitted his moral character to be so represented in the combined virtues of these men that forever after there might be available an example of the personality attested by God as divine. These men, before ever the Law became written down by Moses, were "unwritten laws" or living parables of the moral legislation. What Moses did was to recognize the divine quality of these lives and build his code therefrom.

Philonic Zakuth and the Pauline Kurios

What Philo has done with the patriarchs is very much like what Paul does with the example of Jesus. He considers that the character there revealed represents both the ethical fulfillment or spirit of the Law and the moral character of God. Neither Philo nor Paul identify this expression of the character of God with the absolute Deity. But they both feel the need of an intermediary in terms of a model personality. Paul finds this model in Jesus as a disciplined product of the Law. Philo finds the model in the composite virtues of the patriarchs as a creative model for the Law. Both Jewish thinkers meet the question of the dispensability of the ceremonial law by shifting their religious faith to an example of divine character in human form.

149 Mig. 166-167.

Thus Philo and Paul come to a conception of freedom through an "indwelling spirit" from exactly opposite angles. For Paul there is a faith in the Lordship of Jesus. For Philo there is a faith in the divine origin of the virtues of the patriarchs. The view of Philo is more philosophical than theological. He is careful lest his use of the patriarchs degenerate into Hellenistic hero worship. His task is to indicate types of character and functions of the human mind which have been and may be expected to continue to be attested by God as inspirable. The Spirit is not a possession of man but a divine agent that comes and goes between God and man. Philo does not wish it to become confused with Stoic pantheism. Yet he is concerned to promise a divine assistance when the limits of human reason have been reached. He therefore indicates conscience as the avenue of such assistance and elaborately develops the method of acquiring that conscience along the lines laid down by the Jews in their experience with a superior moral law. Thus Abraham and Jacob by referring all thought and practice to God became "added to" the "host and people of God", who like "angels" represent the service which "witnesses" to the moral character of God among the people. Isaac the "self-taught" by the same motivation became "added to" a more universal company, namely the "race" or the "genus" which represents those consecrated individuals who belong to no one time or people but to the "race". Moses goes farther and is bidden by God to "stand here with me" because Moses represents a character superior to the man who thinks, acts and aspires with moral validity.¹⁵⁰ He is able to teach others how to do this because he is able to express the eternally valid moral Law in simple injunctions and explanations for common folk.

Philo would have men believe that the motivation which carried these men to divine wisdom is available to anyone who will by faith in God, transcend the formal observation of the Law and prepare conditions for insights which may be trusted as the very words of God.

The man who is of a "good natural disposition" and both "instructed" and "practiced" in the Law will be able to enjoy frequently but not continuously a divine dimension in his reasoning. That is to say, in proportion as he reasons sincerely and disinter-

150 Sac. 5-10; Mut. 125-129.

estedly, God will provide flashes of insight that will illumine his mind as from a "light" above and beyond him. He will become "blessed" of God, "happy in the use of reason" and confident of a greater "probability" for the validity of his thinking than is normal to human reason.

Eulogos

Philo plays with the word *Eulogos* to indicate these three things. The word means "say well done", and hence "blessing", as well as "happily reasoned". It was used by Carneades and Arcesilaus to indicate "probability". Philo weaves these various meanings about the word. The "say well done" is the creative fiat of God, pronounced when he created the world and repeated in the mind of each man as that man visions the moral significance of the Creation.

The man who has such a vision is "happy in the use of reason". By his own "self-taught mind" he has placed himself in that attitude for thinking which can easily view the handiwork of God as God intended man to see it. This attitude reveals him as "blessed" or holy because he is willing to think as God would have him think.

But human reason even in a vision is not an intellectual certainty. It is only an act of faith in the intention of God, not a knowledge equal to God's. It is *Eulogos* or "probable". Now probability for Philo exhibits an ambiguity which can only be removed by investigating motives. The man who says that God is merely probable and therefore need not be taken seriously describes no fact about God but rather reveals his own motives in relation to God. The man who says that God is at least probable and therefore to be taken seriously into account does not describe a fact about God but he reveals a motive which can carry his thinking about God to higher levels. Now since man's reason is only probable the former motive will make it even less trustworthy if God should turn out to be a fact, while the latter motive will make man's reason more trustworthy since it has taken God into account from the first and need never revise that postulate. Therefore the motive behind human reason when once grounded in God may be considered a test of human reason before ever the certainty of its findings are reached. It assumes the only postulate that can validate human reason.

Now conscience is *Eulogos* because it fixes the probability of human reason upon the intention of God. With this faith it becomes "happy in the use of reason" and is from time to time corroborated by the experience of "blessing" or a creative vision of the larger purposes of the God so long followed with only an unattested faith.

With this much of corroboration for conscientious reasoning or "evidence for things not seen" Philo exhorts each man to

Go up, O Soul, to the view of the Living God,
Rationally, voluntarily, fearlessly, lovingly. (*Mig.* 169).

But we who are followers and disciples of the prophet Moses will never abandon our investigation into the nature of the Living God. For we hold that the knowledge of Him is the greatest happiness and life everlasting and as the Law says that all who are obedient to God shall live. In this precept it gives us the most indispensable and philosophic lesson. For in very truth those who are atheists are dead souls but those who are marshalled in the ranks of the Living God as His servants enjoy an everlasting life. (*Sp. L.* I 345).

ABBREVIATIONS FOR TREATISES OF PHILO

Abr.	De Abrahamo.
Aet.	De Aeternitate Mundi.
Agri.	De Agricultura.
Cherub.	De Cherubim.
Conf.	De Confusione Linguarum.
Cong.	De Congressu Eruditionis Gratia.
Decal.	De Decalogo.
Deus.	Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis.
Det.	Quod Deterius Potiori Insidiari Soleat.
Ebriet.	De Ebrietate.
Flac.	In Flaccum.
Fuga.	De Fuga Et Inventionem.
Gaius.	Legatio Ad Gaium.
Gig.	De Gigantibus.
Heres.	Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres Sit.
Jos.	De Josepho.
L. A.	Legum Allegoriarum, lib. I-II.
Mig.	De Migratione Abrahami.
Mut.	De Mutatione Nominum.
Opif.	De Opificio Mundi.
Plant.	De Plantatione.
Post.	De Posteritate Caini.
Praem.	De Praemiis et Poenis.
Prob.	Quod Omnis Probus Liber Sit.
Qu. in Ex.	Quaestionum in Exodum, lib. I-II.
Qu. in Gen.	Quaestionum in Genesin, lib. I-IV.
Sac.	De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini.
Sobriet.	De Sobrietate.
Som.	De Somniis, lib. I-II.
Sp. L.	De Specialibus Legibus, lib. I-IV.
V. Cont.	De Vita Contemplativa.
V. M.	De Vita Mosis, lib. I-III.
Virt.	De Virtutibus.

Other Abbreviations

C. A.	Josephus, Contra Apion.
D. L. or Diog. Laert.	Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers.
S. V. F.	Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Text

- Cohn and Wendland—Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, 6 vols. Berlin, 1896.
J. Leisegang—Indices ad Philonis Alexandrini Opera. Berlin, 1930.
J. R. Harris—Fragments of Philo. Cambridge, 1884.
Colson and Whitaker—Philo, Vols. I and II. Loeb Classical Library, 1929.
Yonge—The Works of Philo Judaeus. Bohn, London, 1854.
Cohn—Die Werke Philos von Alexandria. Marcus, Breslau, 1909

Literature

- E. Brehier—Les Idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie. Picard, Paris, 1903.
J. Drummond—Philo Judaeus, 2 Vols. Williams and Norgate, London, 1888.
E. Schürer—Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes in Zeitalter Jesu Christi. 3d. A., Leipzig, 1898.
C. Siegfried—Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger des Alten Testaments. Jena, 1875.
Caird—Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers. Glasgow, 1904.
Zeller—Die Philosophie Der Griechen in ihrer Geschichtlichen Entwicklung. 3d. A. 1881.
W. R. Inge—Alexandrian Theology, article in Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.
Von Arnim—Quellenstudien zu Philo von Alexandria—Philologische Untersuchungen von Kiessling und Moellendorf, vii. xi.
T. H. Billings—The Platonism of Philo Judaeus. University of Chicago Press, 1919.
Cumont—Un Mythe Pythagorean, Revue de Philologie. Paris, 1919, pp. 78-85.
M. Apelt—De Rationibus Quibusdam Quae Philoni Alexandrino Cum Posidonio Intercedunt—Commentationes Jenensis, viii, pp. 91-141.

- H. R. Willoughby—Pagan Regeneration. Chicago University Press, 1929, pp. 225-262.
Hugo Odeberg—The Fourth Gospel. Uppsala Och Stockholm, 1929.

General

- W. W. Tarn—Hellenistic Civilization. Arnold, London, 1927.
E. Bevan—Stoics and Epicureans. Oxford, 1913.
E. V. Arnold—Roman Stoicism. Cambridge, 1911.
G. Murray—Five Stages of Greek Religion. Oxford, 1925.
G. Brett—A History of Psychology. London, 1912, pp. 237-252.
S. Schechter—Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology. Macmillan, 1910.
G. F. Moore—Judaism, 2 vols. Harvard University Press, 1927.
S. Dill—Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius. Macmillan, 1905.

INDEX TO GREEK WORDS

ἀγαθός	140, 192	κάθαρσις	158
ἀγένητος	113, 127	καθήκοντα	158
ἀγεννής	113	καιρός	158
ἅγιος	140, 181	καλός	140, 186, 192
ἀγώνισμα	91, 202	κατάπληξις	39-41
αἴτιον	112, 161	κράσις	141, 153
ἀκήρατος	169	κρείττων	140, 168-175
ἄλογος	151	μετάνοια	116, 154-157
ἄμορφος ὕλη	131, 141, 258	μίξις	141
ἀνεπιστημοσύνη	197	νοῦς	197, 249
ἀντικρύ	145-162	οἰκείωσις	146, 157-161
ἀπαιδευσία	197	ὁμόνοια	117
ἄποιος	139-143, 168-175, 180-227	ὄνομα	129, 132, 135
ἄσώματος	143	ὄραω	129
αὐθιγενής	169	ὀρθός λόγος	117
αὐτοκρατής	136	οὐρανός	129
ἄφυής	119	οὐσία	126-138, 141
γνώμη	149	παθητός	161
γνωστός	136	πάθος	156
δεσπότης	242	παράνοια	39
δυνάμει	130, 136-137	πίστις	116-118
ἐκστασις	39-46	πνεῦμα	119, 131, 135, 260
ἐλεγχος	270	ποιέω	139, 180
ἐνθεος	42	ποιότης	139, 180
ἐνθουσιασμός	40-41	προφαίνω	158
ἐνθύμημα	149	στερέωμα	129
ἐντελέχεια	130, 136-137	στοιχείον	260
ἐπίκρισις	148-157	σύγχυσις	142
ἐπιστήμη	117	συμφωνία	117, 142
ἐιλόγιστος	181	συναγωγός	46
εὐλογος	143, 181-182	σῶμα	128-129, 132
εὐνοια	40, 158	σωφροσύνη	170, 178
εὐρίσκω	158	τὸ ὄν	125-138, 167
εὐσέβεια	42	τόνος	223
εὐφυής	119	ὑπαίτιος	143
ἐχθρός	146-148	φαντασία	27, 119, 165
ζώος	136	φιλόθεος	122
ἡρεμία διανοίας	41	φρόνησις	117
θεοσεβές	122	χαρακτήρ	139
θεός	126	χάρις	119, 123
		ψυχή	260

INDEX OF REFERENCES TO PHILO'S WORKS

The numbers at the left indicate sections in the Cohn and Wendland edition of Philo's works. A "q" indicates that the passage is quoted in whole or in part.

<i>De Opificio Mundi</i>		157	55
		170-172	45, 134
		171	174
1-6	76	<i>Legum Allegoriarum</i> Lib. I-III	
2	59	Lib. I	
2-4	227	1	132
4-6	26, 77	2	209
7-12	134	3	209
8	168	5	q. 218
8-9	127	5-6	74
8-12	56, 161	5-18	261
10-11	161, 188	6	203
17	128	16-18	74, 204
19-25	188	17	151
22	139	17-18	181
23	135	18	q. 218
24	230	19	56, 128, 131
25	134, 174	19-21	64
34-35	209	21-24	q. 130
36-37	129	22	132
37	129	24-30	135
41	130, 131	25	q. 252
42-44	164	25-27	251
43	131	28-30	108, 165
46	136, 187	33-42	213
47	129	37-42	131
49	137	43-55	269
49-50	q. 130	44	q. 223
59	210	48-52	110, 180
60	209	48 sq.	180
67	260	50	161
69-71	108	50-51	161
71	40	53-55	117, 165, 192
72-75	172, 185	56 sq.	185
73	263	56-58	158
77	112	56-59	136
77-78	30, 45	59	72
78	39	60-62	136
83-85	39	63-87	170
92	137	65	161
120	128	72-73	244
128	62, 270	72-76	151, 212
132	137	89	251
136	187, 192	90-96	108
139	120, 189	91	132
140-141	135	95-96	216
144	218		
153-156	122		
154	192		

96	270
100-104	136
107-108	161
108	36

Lib. II

2-3	220
3	256, 260
4-8	152
9-18	112
15-18	125
16 sq.	179
17-18	112
20 sq.	108
22-24	164
26-30	144
31 sq.	43
32	43
33 sq.	227
37	164
44-45	176
49-59	161
52	43
53-70	196
54-59	144
67	60, 229
69	230
71	46
71-74	137
71-93	201
74-93	189
76 sq.	114
78	155
79	q. 178, 180
79-81	139, 170
82	66
82-83	110
84 sq.	112
86	136, 179, 180, 250
94-108	212
95-96	161
95-108	151
100-108	178

Lib. III

7-8	q. 226
7-10	113
10	q. 228
11-14	161
13	47
15-17	111
15-48	161
18-22	97
25	209
28-35	147
36-41	250

41-48	144
49-68	179
51	126
53	136
53-54	109
67-68	108, 165
73	45, 211, q. 216
78	q. 122
79-84	144
81	46
88-89	192
90-94	99
91	165
91-105	111
95-96	252
95-103	103
95 sq.	213
97-103	230
99-108	113
100	q. 233
100-103	61, 229
102	q. 228
103	60
107 sq.	214
118-132	263
123-124	176, 182
123-127	152
125-126	177
127-144	178
129 sq.	176
133-137	161
138-178	45, 115
140-144	161
151 sq.	144
161 sq.	179
164	117, q. 245
167	q. 245
168	q. 244
169-173	65
170	q. 245
174-175	161
174-181	180
176	q. 246
177-188	42
184-185	201
184-187	190
185	251, q. 252
186-199	173
201	145
203-210	142, 181, 233
204	60, 229
205	q. 143
206-208	137
209-219	203
211-219	155
211 sq.	154
214-219	44
228	60, 229

228-233	234	2	263
228-245	177	3-4	161
228 sq.	109	3-5	145
239-242	178	5-11	193
242	41	5-10	77, 273
246-247	136, 192	8-10	169

De Cherubim

1-10	161	12 sq.	182
3-10	103, 205	12-13	181
4-10	77	15	203
11-20	145	19-42	189
12-13	114, 146	34-45	57
15	180	37-41	211
17	153	40	228, 261
19-20	156	43-44	84
27	46	45-51	151, 152
28-29	q. 239	46	264
40-51	42	47-48	161
42	54	48	264
43-53	169	52 sq.	63
48	54	52-72	191, 212
49	q. 38, 63, 65	53-71	43
49-50	99	54	112
51-52	131, 139	55-58	165
56	127, 143	56	112, 193
57-64	43	57	q. 236
65 sq.	127, 143	59-60	q. 240
66	152	59	262
67 sq.	110	64 sq.	q. 246
69	39	64-68	q. 247
74-79	114	64-72	209
74-83	268	65-68	108
77-78	113	65-75	202
77 sq.	108, 128	67-68	209
79-82	145	68	223-262
85	116	70-75	150
87	261	70-71	242
87-90	204	72 sq.	203
91 fin.	88	74	250
96-97	153	76-79	82
98-100	223	76-77	85
106	89	76	29
107	268	77	64
109-113	90, 142, 172	80-85	134
113-123	112	85-87	213
113 fin.	109	88-96	162
114	112	88-90	203
116	39, 182	90-97	143
118	89	91-97	163
121	89	91	233
124	63	92	162
125-130	210	93	116
128	177	98-102	164
		101	79
		107-111	203
		109	161
		118-139	42
		120	97, 119
		121 sq.	41, 107

De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini

1	56
---	----

121	97
128 sq.	150
134-139	196
134	203
136-139	161
139	161

*Quod Deterius Potiori Insidiari
Soleat*

1	249
1-14	47
3-12	213
6-21	165
10-12	36, 85
12	107
13	q. 55
17-21	26, 30
18	180
18-21	47, 50, 81
22-26	263
27-31	27
28-31	103
29-31	271
34-44	151, 152
38	182
38-40	103
41-44	71
44	96, 102, 271
46	110
49-51	145
52 sq.	169
55-56	92
58-61	47
60	166
62	125
65-66	117, 246
65-68	181
72 sq.	q. 86
72-74	43
72-78	82
75-78	131
76 sq.	q. 86, 137
79-83	131
80-90	213
82 sq.	56
83	q. 256
83-85	185
83-90	225
84-90	108
86-87	227
86-90	134, 222
90	132
91-95	155
96-108	154
100-103	108
109-118	214
112-118	112, 215

113	132
120	157
120-123	214
122	68, 211, 263
123-125	66, 110
135-137	103
138-140	77, 110, 263
141	75
141-149	118
142	q. 166
150-160	161
154	188
155	96
156 sq.	q. 147
158	113
159-162	144
160	126
160-162	159, 227
163 fin.	80
167-170	146
177-178	148

De Posteritate Caini

1-7	55
7	72
8-9	127
12	197, 211
12-32	192
14	q. 229
15	q. 221
19	220
19-20	q. 222, 262
21	q. 217
22-32	109
28	262
30-31	q. 223
33-48	150
35 sq.	122
41 sq.	109
44-48	161
44-55	194
48	149
52-65	263
57-62	144
62	161
63-65	204
69-72	204, 211
69-74	194
69	197
80 sq.	270
84-85	56
84-101	57
85	197
88	149
91-96	264
96-97	161
100 sq.	182

101-102	27	20 sq.	156
105-106	177	23-32	155
112-130	215	24	251
112	129	30	209, 215
122	209	33-50	135
125-129	108	35 sq.	108
126	165	35-36	164
133 sq.	186, 213	45-50	146, 185, 211, 263
136 sq.	169	47-76	83
141-142	186	48-50	44
142-145	135	50	197
143-145	160	53	50
145	116	55	139
148-152	189	62	224
148	165	63-69	57, 71, 85
151-152	29	69	79
153-164	189	69 sq.	44
157	q. 115, 99	74-103	159
158-164	189	77-81	160
160-161	192	82-85	160
163	137	86-103	151
166-169	132, 138, 221	86-126	214
167-169	125	94-103	30
167	q. 221	96-108	154
168	q. 221	97-98	109
169	q. 222	99-103	158
170-171	108, 165	101	116
171 sq.	203	108	211
173-175	64	109-110	135
178	155	119 sq.	186
182	41	128 sq.	149
183-185	204	134 sq.	269

De Gigantibus

1-29	119
12-15	168
19-31	39
20	119
21-23	154
22 sq.	256
26-27	96
42	q. 227
43 fin.	114
45-52	41, 223
47	39, 79
47-50	43
47-52	44
51-52	204
52	96, 120, 125
53	39
53-55	144
58	59
60	113
64	113

Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis

5-15	202
16 sq.	157

De Agricultura

1-125	212
30	165
49-53	213
50	65
78	151
95	180
129 sq.	211
130	264
134	132
135	264
159-164	211
169-173	109
171	264
172	112

De Plantatione

5-10	175
------	-----

6	251, 259
10	46
18-22	176
18-31	109
28-141	202
43-45	211-263
45 sq.	131
53	211
59-64	113
70-72	91, 115, 202
72 sq.	108
75-78	131, 260
79-84	117, 182, 212
82-83	116
85-89	44
89	209
93-112	158
95	180
98	178
127-131	50, 99, 254
129	255
131	26, 90
132-138	258
139 sq.	40
147-148	39
158-159	26
165-172	30
171	40
173	17

De Ebrietate

4-10	196
4-13	211, 263
15	39
27-31	99
35 sq.	99
35-45	128
36-45	116
41-45	238
68-70	57
74-76	204
80-81	75
80-84	62
81	72
82-83	116, 271
97-106	144
104 sq.	26
107	221
114-118	244
119 sq.	40, 107
119-120	262
123-127	40
124-129	154
124-139	194
130	50
131-143	87, 144
133	56, 131

137	165
139	50
140-150	40
142-143	75
151-153	40
162 sq.	150
166	44
166 sq.	109
203-205	116

De Sobrietate

1-50	202
7-30	203
27	40
28-29	165
34-35	164
34-43	108
35-43	164
51-58	268
51-69	192, 211
59 sq.	223
63-65	134

De Confusione Linguarum

29-32	159
37-38	150
39-43	113
57	41
58-59	62
59	42
64-69	161
77-78	112
83 sq.	122, 260
85	137, 139
91-97	173
98-100	231
107-133	178, 263
122-133	44, 230
124	203
127	108, 165
134-140	126, 227
136	258
142-149	263
144	47
146	260
149	65
159	40
171-175	172
176-180	263
179	211
183	142
183-198	90
186	137
190-198	250, 251

<i>De Migratione Abrahami</i>		205-207	111, 165
1-126	116	205-225	99, 194
7-20	203	219-222	22, 27
7-30	217	225	155
13-25	63	<i>Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres Sit</i>	
14-21	75	1-52	270
16	165	16-21	242
21-25	103	22 sq.	242
34	39	45	79, 185, 260
34-45	28	51-67	43
34 sq.	98	57-62	113
35	42	77-79	79
36-63	269	81-85	91, 115, 158
38	98	96-99	205, 224
39-40	28	105-111	117
40-44	100, 117	118	260
41-47	116	128-132	q. 132
43-44	102	131	132
43-52	101	132	q. 130, 108, 165, 176
47	28	134-140	257
53-56	101	140	137, 139
56	165	141 sq.	257
56-59	88	142	132
57-63	268	154-161	261
59 sq.	40	155	185
68 sq.	40	156	258
70-75	112	157-160	174
70-85	43, 268	161-164	250, 257
84	40, 42	165-167	208
86-117	181, 188	167	151, 152
89-94	50, 102	170	128
101-105	43, 45	179-181	161
103	261	190	131, 260
104	29	201-214	134, 239
109-117	270	206	172, 235
117-147	211	206 sq.	259
118-123	107	213-214	133, 134
126	202	214	q. 133
126-142	71	227	134
126 sq.	203, 204	227 sq.	249
127-131	75	228	q. 251
134-138	26	230 sq.	251
139	229	231-236	252
139-140	27	240-242	113
152-157	43, 44	246 sq.	133
164-175	205	249-275	39, 88
166-167	q. 272	250	42
166	229	258-265	60
169	275	264	42
180-183	187, 259	283	258
180-186	134	<i>De Congressu Eruditionis Gratia</i>	
180-195	162, 224	1 sq.	44
183-191	27	5-10	204
184-186	56	5 sq.	205
190	40		
198	258		
205	203		

39-42	111, 165	168	42
44	77	170-182	42, 134
45-48	192	172-173	165
48-49	224	173	108
54-57	79	194-196	169
74-78	27	194-201	193
88-120	50	198	185
89 fin.	161		
97	q. 107		
99	144		
113	40		
114-120	204		
121-163	30		
131-138	202		
134	197		
139-145	135		
144 sq.	108, 177		
145	132		
158-167	44		
180	54		

De Fuga et Inventione

5-6	270		
7-13	261		
8-9	139		
10	249		
13	185		
13-86	194		
23-27	191		
23-47	169		
28-32	40		
33-38	30		
53-82	146, 211		
56-57	249		
57	209		
58	197		
63	91, 115		
65-105	149		
71-76	154		
75-76	126		
77-86	150, 264		
79-80	211		
90	40		
101-105	134		
110-112	q. 167		
113-118	149, 270		
122	59		
124-131	161		
132-136	179		
132-142	150		
132-165	100, 117		
141	125		
148	132		
148-156	116		
157-169	269		
163-165	138		
		<i>De Mutatione Nominum</i>	
		7	137, 229
		7-14	138
		11	q. 125
		11-58	241
		12	116, 271
		15-26	113, 192
		22 sq.	268
		27	q. 126
		30-31	137
		37-38	30
		39 sq.	42, 107
		54-55	128, 138, 228
		57-60	91, 115
		65-70	125
		77-80	131
		83-87	165
		83-96	205
		91	161
		97-102	165
		97-124	102
		103-105	56
		108-109	41
		118	165
		121-123	164
		125-129	71, 113, 165, 273
		134	144
		134-170	43, 44
		161-171	110
		166	40
		166-171	178
		175-187	116
		179-180	250
		180	132
		186-270	41
		216-223	135
		220 sq.	30, 202
		224 sq.	211
		233-260	155
		236-237	68
		237	197
		242	149
		257	165
		264-266	203, 209
		265	209
		270	111, 117, 165

<i>De Somniis Lib. I-II</i>		237	167
Lib. I		240 sq.	263
1	73	245 sq.	42
12	116	245-249	119
21	258	250-267	204
22	132, 249	250-254	110
36	42	253	127
39-40	221	283-302	150
52-60	212	292	155
61-67	126		
64	229, 251	<i>De Abrahamo</i>	
68-71	40	1-5	73
72-119	43	1-6.	264
76	q. 128	4	74
92-119	117, 202	5	80
140-152	120	5-6	61, 73
141-145	160	5 sq.	65
151-152	79	7-40	110, 263
160-165	205	7-118	116
160-188	44	9-14	78
189 sq.	121	22-30	83
194	229	26	157
201-212	26	27-47	204
202 sq.	203	27-59	214
211-212	26	31-36	77
228-230	126	48-55	76
231-241	122	52 sq.	42, 116, 271
231-237	128	69	137
231-256	202	98-102	101
		98-106	113
		99	72
		99-102	158, 264
		107-132	120
		107-146	181
		123	122, 177
		124 sq.	241
		124-131	84
		147-166	128
		162	258
		167-207	113
		200-207	44
		208	79
		255-261	178
		268-271	179
		268-276	116, 117
		<i>De Josepho</i>	
		8	40
		122-148	109
		126 sq.	112
		148-150	118
		<i>De Vita Mosis Lib. I-II</i>	
		Lib. I	
		4	69
		25	251
Lib. II			
1-109	264		
1-6	73		
1	40		
21-31	q. 152		
34	151		
39	151		
45	q. 216, 227		
71-77	203		
100-109	155		
123 sq.	49		
172-180	44, 101, 211		
180	197		
181-184	148		
185-189	269		
193-196	249		
193-194	257		
219-267	110, 263		
219-227	123, 174, 189		
221-260	203		
221	221		
222 sq.	112		
223-236	193		
228-237	148, 168		
228-236	134		
232 sq.	39		

31-33	63	192-245	87
63-73	269	193	63
65	132	202	161
72-90	64	203	61
73	63	205-208	38
75	125	209-210	62-80
76	116, 271	209-210	51
81-84	100	211-212	30-31
83-84	154	212-216	26
134-162	147	217 sq.	61
148-153	64	236 sq.	61
155-162	212	246	41
158	61, 229	258-292	92
175-177	41	258	41
189	64, 121	264-267	271
191-213	179	275-287	41
207	63	288-292	61
212-213	81	288	92
216	63		
238	63		
242	63		
278-279	62		
280	249		
289	40		
295	63		
304	41, 204		

Lib. II (III)

2-7	67	1	71
4-5	75	4-13	56
8-11	68	13-17	61
10-11	28	15-17	71
11	61	19	74
12-36	69	26-31	50
21-23	70	30	137
25-44	36	32-35	51
41-44	36	32-50	61, 269
41	60	33	67
42-44	63	33-34	251
45-53	75, 269	35	42, 176
45-48	73, 74	36-43	50
47-48	82	44-81	231
49-52	56	46	40
59-60	78	59-81	26
70	96	62	127
71 sq.	61	64-81	91
71	127, 172	69-75	91, 115, 202
113-126	176	82	125
127-135	268	82-95	270
132-133	262	96-120	91, 115
134-145	27	106-107	134
146-151	157	106-110	79
167	63	106-120	30
171	137	107	137
187-191	73	132	46
188	60	132-134	47
189	75	159	67
		175	50, 93, 267
		176	42
		178	204

De Specialibus Legibus Lib. I-IV
Lib. I

17-20	127, 172
20	137

22	180	137-141	213
32-50	125, 232	143-148	64
32 sq.	230	144-150	57, 244
36-40	125	149-150	84
41-50	262	169	180
41	229	170-175	61
47	139	179-192	91, 101, 269
48	132	179-182	115
51-55	78	187	128, 139, 249
56	63	188-192	61, 67
59-65	40		
66	120		
95	39		
120-122	135		
162-345	50		
207-211	45		
209-211	26		
229-307	211		
238-256	149		
245-246	157		
247-250	203		
248	46		
263-295	192		
285-288	87		
299-307	191		
313-314	193		
315 sq.	40		
317	158		
319-323	29		
319 sq.	54		
321	39		
327-330	131		
327	137		
328	139		
345	29, 88, 103, q. 275		

De Virtutibus

1-65	71
1-17	244
3	243
4	244
11-14	128
14	179
35	48
66-79	61
102-104	94
119-120	93
156	180
164-174	41, 107, 161
165	112
175-186	155
183	197
183-186	211
187-227	30
187-188	76
194-198	77
201-206	78
226-227	78

De Praemiis et Poenis

1-2	73
1 fin.	37, 93
2	61, 67, 269
3-4	93
3-7	61
7-66	116
9	111, 165
10-11	110, 263
15-21	155, 157
28-30	116, 118
36-40	93
52	244
53	67
53-57	71
57	64
67	93
79-84	71, 211
80	197
112-117	93
118-126	30
130	139, 142

Lib. II

1-38	143
46	q. 81
188-192	269

Lib. III

91	40
99	39
120-136	150
124-127	42, 63
202	165

Lib. IV

14	114, 263
48	40, 42
66	180
132-135	50

152	77
158	38
160-169	93
161	43
162	59
162-184	47
164	39, 269
165	94
169	93
170-172	98

Quod Omnis Probus Liber Sit.

2-4	48, 254
19-20	271
28	243
41-50	91
41-72	268
43-44	114
46-47	75, 264
62	75
68-71	44
74 sq.	94
75-91	48
80	42
83	30
121-126	271

In Flaccum

169	40
53-54	48

Legatio ad Gaium

76-114	81
98	40
115	q. 102
120-121	48
184-206	49
210	266
213	62
226	40

Quaestionum in Genesin Lib. I-III

Cited by the numbering from Aucher.

Lib. I

17	271
20-22	125
56	27
58	90, 210
80	110, 263
100	209

Lib. II

5	164, 257
72	22, 217

Lib. III

3	108, 164
6	258
6-7	133

VITA

Jesse Scott Boughton was born June 19, 1895, at Brooklyn, New York. He received his elementary and secondary education in the New Jersey suburbs of New York City. He was graduated from Colgate University, (A.B. 1917) from Columbia University, (A.M. 1925) and studied at Union Theological Seminary, New York City, from September 1924 to May 1927. He was a Sanders Prize Scholar, 1924-1925 and an "A" class scholar 1925-1926 at Union Theological Seminary. From 1919 to 1923 he was a secondary school principal and teacher in New York State. In 1923-1924 he was an executive secretary to President McKenziel at Fisk University. In 1928-1932 he was an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Gettysburg College. He was student pastor at The First Congregational Church of North Hyde Park, Vermont, during the summers of 1925, 1926 and 1928 and at the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, New York City, during 1927. His publications include, *Conscience and the Logos in Philo*, *The Lutheran Church Quarterly*, Vol. IV, No. 2, (April 1931), *Can Religious Behaviour be Defined Without the Concept of Deity?*, same periodical, July, 1932.

